C-270/95

the other parties to the proceedings being:

Council of the European Union, represented by Giorgio Maganza and Guus Houttuin, of its Legal Service, acting as Agents, with an address for service in Luxembourg at the office of Bruno Eynard, Director of the Legal Affairs Direc­ torate of the European Investment Bank, 100 Boulevard Konrad Adenauer,

and

* Language of the case: Dulch.

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ORDER OF 28. 3.1996 — CASE C-270/95 Ρ

Advocate General: P. Léger, Registrar: R. Grass,

after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General,

makes the following

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KIK ν COUNCIL AND COMMISSION

Order

3 The use of languages with regard to the filing of trade mark applications and in opposition, revocation and invalidity proceedings is governed by Article 115 of Regulation N o 40/94. Under Article 115(1), applications for a Community trade mark may be filed in the Office in any of the official languages of the European Community. Article 115(2) restricts the languages of the Office to English, French, German, Italian and Spanish. Paragraphs 3 to 7 of that article provide, in particular, that the applicant must indicate, in the application itself, a second language, which must be a language of the Office, and that, if the application was made in a lan­ guage other than the languages of the Office, the latter may send written commu­ nications to the applicant in that second language, and, lastly, that the applicant is to be deemed to accept the second language as a language of proceedings for oppo­ sition, revocation or invalidity proceedings.

4 Paragraph 3 of the contested order states that the applicant, who is a native Dutch speaker, is a lawyer and trade mark agent. She has a financial interest in a Nether­ lands firm of patent agents.

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ORDER OF 28. 3.1996 — CASE C-270/95 Ρ

By application lodged at the Registry of the Court of First Instance on 15 March 1994, the applicant brought proceedings against the Council and the Commission for annulment of Article 115(2) of Regulation N o 40/94. She also sought from the Court of First Instance an order restraining the Office from adopting or causing to be adopted any measures enabling it to commence operating until the Council reversed its decision to exclude Dutch from the languages of the Office. The Council, the Commission and the Kingdom of Spain, which had been granted leave to intervene in support of the form of order sought by those institutions, pleaded that the action was inadmissible.

10 The Court of First Instance observed as follows in paragraphs 35 and 36 of its order:

'35 In so far as the action for annulment is directed against the Council, it must be borne in mind that, by virtue of the fourth paragraph of Article 173 of the EC Treaty, the admissibility of annulment proceedings brought by a natural or legal person against a regulation is subject to the condition that the regulation challenged must be, in reality, a decision of direct and individual concern to the applicant, and that the criterion distinguishing a regulation from a decision must be sought in the general application, or otherwise, of the measure in question (see, for example, Case C-168/93 Government of Gibraltar and Gibraltar Development Corporation ν Council [1993] ECR I-4009; Case T-116/94 Cassa Nazionale di Previdenza ed Assistenza a favore degli Avvocati e Procuratori ν Council [1995] ECR II-1; and Case T-472/93 Campo Ebro Industrial and Others v Council [1995] ECR II-421). A measure is of general application if it applies to objectively determined situations and produces its legal effects with respect to categories of persons envisaged in the abstract (see, for example, Case C-244/88 Usines Coopératives de Déshydratation du Vexin and Others v Commission [1989] ECR 3811 and Case C-299/88 Cargill and Others v Commission [1990] ECR I-1303).

36 In the present case, Regulation N o 40/94 is clearly intended to establish a sin- gle procedural system whereby undertakings can obtain a Community trade mark. As part of that single system, the language regime set up by Article 115 produces legal effects with respect to a category of persons envisaged in the abstract, namely persons seeking to obtain a Community trade mark on their own behalf or on behalf of their principals. The applicant is therefore affected by the contested measure solely in her objective capacity as a trade mark agent, in the same way as any other trade mark agent who is, or might be in the future, in the same situation with regard to the language used until now in his or her professional activity (see, for example, in comparable situa- tions, Case 231/82 Spijker v Commission [1983] ECR 2559, paragraph 9;

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KIK ν COUNCIL AND COMMISSION

14 In the present case, Article 115 of Regulation N o 40/94 applies to all persons applying for a Community trade mark, by requiring them to adhere to a language system. Its scope is therefore objectively determined in relation to its purpose.

15 In the light of those rules of general application, the appellant has not shown that her circumstances differentiate her from all other persons seeking to obtain a Community trade mark on their own behalf or on behalf of their principals.

16 The Court of First Instance was therefore correct in finding the appellant's action for annulment inadmissible.

17 Consequently, the appeal must be dismissed as manifestly unfounded.

hereby orders:

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellant is ordered to pay her own costs and the costs of the Council and the Commission. The intervener is ordered to bear its own costs.

Luxembourg, 28 March 1996.

R. Grass D. A. O. Edward

Registrar President of the First Chamber