C-50/96
ECLI:EU:C:1998:467
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DEUTSCHE TELEKOM V SCHRODER
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL COSMAS delivered on 8 October 1998 *
I — Introduction benefits under the occupational pension scheme operated by those companies, since the scheme was reserved to full-time employees.
1. The Landesarbeitsgericht Hamburg (Case C-50/96 and Joined Cases C-234/96 and C-235/96) and the Landesarbeitsger- icht Niedersachsen (Joined Cases C-270/97 and C-271/97) are asking the Court of Justice for an interpretation of Article 119 of the EC Treaty, of the Court's judgment in 3. The questions referred seek, in essence, Case C-262/88 Barber 1 and of Protocol to ascertain whether in the cases in ques- No 2 concerning Article 119 of the Treaty tion there is unfavourable treatment of establishing the European Community female employees in comparison with that annexed to the Treaty on European Union applied to men, which would be contrary of 7 February 1992. to Article 119 of the EC Treaty; whether the temporal limitation on the reliance by claimants on Article 119 introduced by the Barber judgment and the Barber Protocol also applies to the cases in question; and whether, if so, Community law prevails 2. In the main proceedings the claimants over any more favourable national provi- are five women who were for years sions which also grant entitlements to the employed part-time by Deutsche Bundes- interested parties for the period prior to post Telekom in its former capacity as a that judgment and protocol. single company, and the defendants are the two companies resulting from that compa- ny's split-up, namely Deutsche Telekom AG (in the first three cases) and Deutsche Post AG (in the latter two cases). The dispute arises from the fact that, during the period at issue, part-time employees of the above- mentioned companies, such as the clai- mants, were excluded from insurance and 4. Since the questions raised are basically common to all the cases, in order to avoid repetition I propose to examine them * Original language: Creek. together in a single text, pointing out any 1 — 11990] LCR I-1889. differences wherever necessary.
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II— Community legal framework 8. Protocol No 2 concerning Article 119 of the Treaty establishing the European Com- munity, and annexed to that Treaty, pro- vides as follows: '[f]or the purposes of Article 119 of this Treaty, benefits under occupational social security schemes shall not be considered as remuneration if and in 5. Article 119 of the Treaty, which estab- so far as they are attributable to periods of lishes the principle of equal pay for men employment prior to 17 May 1990, except and women, states: '... For the purpose of in the case of workers or those claiming this Article, "pay" means the ordinary under them who have before that date basic or minimum wage or salary and any initiated legal proceedings or introduced an other consideration, whether in cash or in equivalent claim under the applicable kind, which the worker receives, directly or national law'. In accordance with Arti- indirectly, in respect of his employment cle 239 of the Treaty, this protocol now from his employer'. forms an integral part of it.
6. That Article was given detailed expres- sion by Council Directive 75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to III— National legal framework the application of the principle of equal pay for men and women. 2
A —· National provisions 7. In addition, the principle of equal treat- ment for men and women was applied to statutory and in occupational pension schemes by Directives 79/7/EEC and 86/378/EEC respectively. 3 9. Article 3 of the Grundgesetz (German Basic Law) states, inter alia, that all persons 2 —OJ 1975 L 45, p. 19. 3 — Council Directive 79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978 on the are equal before the law (paragraph 1), that progressive implementation of the principle of equal treat- men and women have equal rights (para- ment for men and women in matters of social security (OJ 1979 L 6, p. 24) and Council Directive 86/378/EEC of graph 2) and that no one may be prejudiced 24 July 1986 on the implementation of the principle of or favoured because of his sex (paragraph equal treatment for men and women in occupational social security schemes (OJ 1986 L 225, p. 40). 3). I-748
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10. Paragraph 612(3) of the German Bür- unless there is objective justification for gerliches Gesetzbuch (Civil Code) 4 pro- a difference of treatment. vides as follows:
' 3 . In an employment relationship, it may not be stipulated that for the same work or work of the same value, the remuneration of an employee is, by reason of the sex of that employee, to be lower, than that paid to an employee of the opposite sex. A lower level of pay may not be agreed on the basis that, because of the employee's sex, special 6. Precedence of collective agreements rules of protection are applicable.'
(i) The provisions of this chapter may be 11. In addition, Paragraphs 2 and 6 of the derogated from by collective agree- 1985 Gesetz über arbeitsrechtliche Vors- ment, even to the detriment of employ- chriften zur Beschäftigungsförderung (Law ees.' laying down provisions of employment law designed to promote employment, herein- after 'the Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz'), which regulate issues relating to part-time work, provide as follows:
12. The situation regarding pension insur- ance for employees of the former Deutsche Bundespost company is as follows. In accordance with Paragraph 24 of the '2. Prohibition of unequal treatment Tarifvertrag für Arbeiter der Deutschen Bundespost (Collective Agreement for Ger- man Post Office Workers), employees ol Deutsche Telekom and Deutsche Bundes- post are compulsorily insured with the (i) An e m p l o y e r m a y n o t t r e a t an Versorgungsanstalt der Deutschen Bundes- employee who works part-time differ- post (German Post Office Pensions Institu- ently, because of that part-time status, tion, hereinafter 'the VAP') under the terms from employees who work full-time, of the Tarifvertrag über die Versorgung dei Arbeitnehmer der Deutschen Bundespost (Collective Agreement concerning Pensions 4 — Tins third paragraph was inserted under Article 1 of the for Employees of the German Post Office, 1980 Gesetz uber die Glcichbehandlung von Mannern und hereinafter 'the Versorgungstarifvertrag') in Frauen am Arbeitsplatz (Law on Equal Treatment for Men and Women at Work). the version in force at the material time.
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13. Paragraph 3 of the Versorgungstarif- B — The case-law of the national courts vertrag provided, in the version in force until 31 December 1987, that employees must be insured with the VAP where, inter alia:
16. Up until the Court's Barber judgment, no questions appear to have arisen relating specifically to the validity of the above- mentioned provisions on pension insur- ance, either in connection with the Grund- gesetz or as regards Community law. '[the employee's] average weekly working hours under his contract of employment amount to at least half the regular weekly working hours in force at the time of a corresponding full-time employee' (point b). 17. It should however be noted that, as the Commission points out in its written obser- vations in Case C-50/96, the Bundesar- beitsgericht ( G e r m a n Federal L a b o u r Court) had already decided, in a judgment of 14 October 1986 (3 AZR 66/83), that unfavourable treatment of female part-time 14. P a r a g r a p h 3(b) w a s subsequently employees as regards access to a benefit amended by Collective Agreement N o 394 falling within the scope of Article 119 of of 6 December 1989, with retroactive the EC Treaty was (also) prohibited under effect from 1 January 1988. From then on Article 3(2) of the Grundgesetz, which lays an obligation to insure arose where the down that men and women are to be equal employee's average weekly working hours before the law and has been in force since amounted to at least 18 hours. 1949. Furthermore, according to that same judgment a temporal limitation of clai- mants' entitlements was neither justified nor necessary 5(see also the Bundesarbeits- gericht's judgment of 20 November 1990 (3 AZR 613/89) along the same lines).
5 — I would point out that that judgment represents a conse- 15. That provision was later amended quence of the Court of Justice's judgment in Case 170/84 Bilka [1986] ECR 1607, in which it answered the questions again, to the effect that since 1 April 1991 relating to Community law referred to it by the Bundesar- beitsgericht for a preliminary ruling in the case concerned. employees have been compulsorily insured I would also point out that the respondent then lodged an with the VAP if their employment is not appeal with the Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Federal Constitutional Court) against the Bundesarbeitsgericht's merely 'minimal' within the meaning of judgment, asserting that the retroactive obligations thereby imposed were contrary to the principle of protection of Article 8(1) of the Sozialgesetzbuch IV legitimate expectations. The Bundesverfassungsgericht deci- (Book IV of the German Social Security ded that there was no need to hear this appeal, since there was no likelihood of its being allowed (Order of 28 Sep- Code). tember 1992 1 BVR 496/87).
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18. In its subsequent and already settled quences flowing therefrom. The additional case-law, however, the Bundesarbeitsger- cost arising for the company, amounting to icht bases rejection of the differential DEM 40 to 50 million, could be covered treatment of part-time and full-time from other sources such as the capital employees, and in particular exclusion of market or company reserves. 6 the former from insurance with the VAP, on, rather, the principle of equality before the law as deriving from Article 3(1) of the Grundgesetz, independently of the sex of the individual concerned and the percen- tages of men and women affected (judg- ment of 16 January 1996 (3 AZR 767/94), IV — Facts for example). In accordance with that same case-law, furthermore, since the constitu- tional provision concerned regulates the contested matter in full and predates Arti- cle 119 of the EC Treaty, there is no A — Employment history of the claimants question either of relying on Article 119 and proceedings before the Arbeitsgericht or, consequently, of applying the temporal (first-instance Labour Court) limitation imposed by the Barber judgment and the Barber Protocol annexed to that article. (a) Case C-50/96
20. Lilli Schröder entered the employ of the Deutsche Bundespost Telekom company in 1974. From 20 May 1975 to 31 March 19. The result of that conflict is, in accor- 1994, when she retired, she worked on a dance with the Bundesarbeitsgericht's case- part-time basis for fewer than 18 hours per law, that those provisions of the Versor- week. From 1975 to 31 March 1991 the gungstarifvertrag which exclude part-time claimant was not insured with the VAP. employees from insurance with the VAP are Following the most recent amendment of contrary to the constitutional principle of the Versorgungstarifvertrag mentioned equality and therefore inapplicable, above, however, she was insured with the whereas its other provisions remain valid, VAP from 1 April 1991. Since 1 April 1994 and that employees excluded from pension she has been in receipt of the statutory insurance consequently acquire entitle- retirement pension. ments with retroactive effect. The princi- ples of legal certainty and protection of 6 — Judgments of 28 February 1992 (3 AZR 173/92) and legitimate expectations on which the defen- 7 March 1995 (3 AZR 321/94) concerning Deutsche dant company (in one case Deutsche Tele- Telekom; 16 January 1996 (3 AZR 767/94) concerning Deutsche Post; etc. Deutsche Telekom lodged an appeal kom) relied by way of objection cannot with the Bundesverfassungsgericht against the judgment of 7 March 1995, but this was still pending when proceedings defeat the employees' entitlement to inclu- were brought before the Court of Justice in the present sion, with retroactive effect, in the occupa- cases. Other appeals lodged with the Bundesverfassungsger- icht by other parties against similar judgments delivered by tional pension scheme and the conse- the Bundesarbeitsgericht are also pending.
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21. In her action before the Arbeitsgericht (b) Joined Cases C-234/96 and C-235/96 Hamburg, the claimant maintained that she was entitled to compulsory insurance with the VAP with retroactive effect from 20 May 1975, since the exclusion of part- time employees from insurance with the VAP constituted a form of indirect discri- mination against women which is contrary both to Article 119 of the EC Treaty and to 22. Agnes Vick (claimant in Case Article 3 of the Grundgesetz and Paragraph C-234/96) was taken on by Deutsche 2 of the Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz. Bundespost as a part-time employee on 1 July 1971. Until 30 September 1972 she worked full-time and was insured with the VAP. From 1 October 1972 she began to work part-time, for 16 hours per week. For that reason she was deregistered from the VAP and the insurance contributions she had paid were repaid to her. From the abovementioned date until 30 July 1991, when she left the defendant's employ, she She based that assertion on the fact that, was not insured with the VAP. Since according to the figures adduced for 1991, 1 August 1991 the claimant has been in of the defendant's 240 339 full-time receipt of the statutory retirement pension. employees 169 477 (70.5%) were men while only 70 861 (29.5%) were women, whereas of its 11 521 part-time employees 560 (5%) were men and 10 931 (95%) were women.
In her action before the Arbeitsgericht Hamburg she similarly sought a declaration that she is entitled to be paid a monthly pension in the amount which would have been payable if she had been insured with the VAP from 1 July 1971, together with interest at 4% from each due date. In the light of the foregoing the claimant asked that the defendant be required to pay her, from 1 April 1994, a supplementary pension in the amount which would have been payable if she had been insured with the VAP from 20 May 1975 to 31 March 1991. In the alternative, she claimed that 23. Ute Conze (claimant in Case C-235/96) she should be insured retroactively from was employed from 13 September 1971. this last-named date at the defendant's Until 30 April 1972 she worked full-time expense and, in the further alternative, that and was insured with the VAP. From 1 May she be paid compensation for the period 1972 she began to work part-time for 16 during which she had not been insured. hours per week and, as a result, she was I - 752
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deregistered from the pension scheme. could not have retroactive effect for the Since 1 April 1991 the claimant, who is period before 17 May 1990, the dale on still in the defendant's employ, has again which the Court of Justice delivered its been insured with the VAP. judgment in Barber. 7
26. The Arbeitsgericht Hamburg upheld the claims, on the ground that the objective 24. In her action before the Arbeitsgericht preconditions for indirect discrimination Hamburg, the claimant asked that the against women were present. Prohibition defendant be obliged to place her in such of such discrimination already follows, a position, when an insured event occurred, however, from Article 3(2) of the Grund- as if she had been insured with the VAP gesetz. In addition the first-instance court from 1 January 1983 to 31 March 1991. found that there was no constitutional principle preventing retroactive recognition of the claims. For those reasons the Arbeitsgericht decided that there was no question of applying the temporal restric- tion provided for in the Barber judgment.
25. In both of these cases the defendant submitted that retroactive insurance of the claimants was contrary to the principle of good faith and to the constitutionally (c) Joined Cases C-270/97 and C-271/97 guaranteed principles of freedom of con- tract and autonomy in collective bargain- ing. It also submitted that retroactive insurance of all part-time employees would threaten its economic existence.
27. Elisabeth Sievers (claimant in Case C-270/97) entered the defendant's employ on 16 September 1964 and left it on 28 February 1988, when she retired. Throughout that period she worked as a part-time employee, with working hours fluctuating between 2.5 and 18 hours per The defendant further submitted that, in any event, any potential recognition of entitlements to the benefit of the claimants 7 — Cited in footnote 1.
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week. In view of her working hours, the part and granted her a pension from claimant was not insured with the VAP. 1 January 1991. The defendant lodged an appeal against this judgment with the court making the reference.
28. In March 1993 she brought an action before the Arbeitsgericht Hannover and 3 1 . Brunhilde Schrage (claimant in Case claimed that the defendant be obliged to C-271/97) entered the defendant's employ pay her, from 1 M a r c h 1 9 9 3 , such a in 1960 and worked, with interruptions, up monthly pension as if she had been insured to 1 October 1981 and thereafter continu- with the VAP from the outset. In the ously, as a part-time employee, until alternative, she claimed that she should be 31 March 1993. By her action she claimed insured with the VAP for the entire period from the latter date such a pension as if she of her employment with the defendant at its had been insured from 1 January 1964 to expense and, in the further alternative, she 31 March 1993, and also submitted alter- claimed compensation from the defendant native claims similar to those of Elisabeth for the damage she had suffered through Sievers. not being insured.
32. The court upheld the main claim in 29. Before the Arbeitsgericht the claimant part, but did not consider her claims in maintained that she had suffered indirect respect of the period prior to 1964 since discrimination on grounds of sex, while the these were caught by the 30-year limitation defendant contested that assertion and, in period in German law (Article 195 of the addition, maintained that her claims in Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [Civil Code]). respect of the period prior to 1 January 1991 were time-barred.
B — Proceedings before the Landesarbeits- 30. The Arbeitsgericht Hannover held that, gerichten (Higher Labour Court) independently of sex, the differential treat- ment of part-time and full-time employees was in itself contrary to Paragraph 2(1) of the Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz and to the constitutional principle of equality; on 3 3 . T h e defendant c o m p a n i e s lodged that ground it upheld the main claim in appeals against the respective judgments
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before the Landesarbeitsgericht having jur insurance with the VAP constitutes discri isdiction in each case. They maintained that mination in contravention of Article 119 of Article 119 of the EC Treaty and the the Treaty. In addition, on the assumption relevant protocol annexed to the Maas that the Barber judgment and the Barber tricht Treaty prevail over the provisions of Protocol prohibit the retroactive recogni national law in the matters which they tion of entitlements from before the date of regulate. Consequently, according to the delivery of that judgment by the Court of appellants, the temporal limitation provi Justice, they are disposed to the view that ded for in the Barber judgment and the that date represents the farthest limit gen Barber Protocol must be applied in the erally for all claims falling under Arti cases in point. cle 119. Having regard to the principle of the supremacy of Community law over national law and the requirement for uni form application of Community law in all Member States, the abovementioned tem p o r a l l i m i t a t i o n applies even w h e r e n a t i o n a l law recognises e n t i t l e m e n t s extending to a period predating the Barber judgment. Furthermore, according to those 34. The claimant-respondents contested courts it must be borne in mind that the that interpretation and argued that the earlier case-law of the Bundesarbeitsgericht rights they were claiming derived from itself made it difficult or impossible in Article 3 of the Grundgesetz and had Germany, before the Barber judgment, to always been applicable in Germany. In establish whether the contested provisions their view, Community law cannot give of the Versorgungstarifvertrag were con rise to a situation in which, where the trary to Article 119 of the ĽC Treaty or to existing legal position within a Member Article 3(2) of the Grundgesetz and that, State prior to delivery of the Barber judg consequently, the retroactive recognition of ment was the same as the legal position employees' entitlements raises the question which that judgment has created in Com of a contravention of the principles of legal munity law, individuals who suffered dis certainty and protection of the legitimate crimination prior to the Barber judgment expectations of employers. Lastly, the are now no longer able to assert any claim courts making a reference observe that, in respect of discrimination on grounds of from the point of view of competition, the sex. economic consequences of retroactivity in the cases at issue would place German undertakings at a disadvantage in relation to undertakings in other Member States.
35. The courts making a reference observe in general that the cited case-law of the Bundesarbeitsgericht is not undisputed. In particular, they take the view that the 36. In the light of those doubts, the exclusion of part-time employees from national courts concerned have referred
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the following questions to the Court of Protocol) and the prohibition of retro- Justice for a preliminary ruling in each case. activity contained therein also cover cases of indirect discrimination against women in circumstances such as those described in Question 1?
V — Questions referred for a preliminary ruling
3. If Question 2 is to be answered in the 37. The questions referred for a prelimin- affirmative: does the prohibition of ary ruling are as follows: retroactivity contained in the Protocol concerning Article 119 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (the Barber Protocol) prevail over Ger- man constitutional law (Article 3(1) of the Grundgesetz (Basic Law)), which specifically precludes a prohibition of retroactivity in cases such as that (a) In Case C-50/96 Schröder described in Question 1?
'1. Where part-time employees working less than 18 hours per week are exclu- ded by gender-neutral wording from eligibility for a supplementary pension operated within the framework of an occupational pension scheme, and 4. Does the retroactivity permitted by approximately 95% of the employees German constitutional law pursuant affected by that exclusion are women, to Article 3(1) of the Grundgesetz does that constitute indirect discrimi- constitute, in a case such as that nation against women within the described in Question 1, an impermis- meaning of the case-law of the Court sible circumvention of the prohibition of Justice on Article 119 of the EC of retroactivity in the Protocol con- Treaty? cerning Article 119 of the EC Treaty, where, by contrast with Community law, the national law applicable in comparable circumstances, which is also aimed at establishing equality of treatment in occupational pension 2. If Question 1 is to be answered in the schemes, operates retroactively in affirmative: do the Protocol concerning favour of employees, in particular Article 119 of the Treaty establishing women who are the subject of indirect the European Community (the Barber discrimination?
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5. If Question 4 is to be answered in the Community law have priority over the affirmative: does the application of constitutional law (Article 3 of the Paragraph 2(1) of the Beschäftigungs- Grundgesetz (Basic Law)) and ordinary förderungsgesetz (Law for the Promo- law (Paragraph 2(1) of the Beschäfti- tion of Employment) of 26 April 1985, gungsförderungsgesetz (Employment which purports to allow retroactivity Promotion Law) and the general prin- back to 26 April 1985, constitute an ciple of equal treatment in labour law) impermissible circumvention of the in force in Germany, with the conse- prohibition of retroactivity contained quence that, where the factual require- in the Protocol concerning Article 119 ments are fulfilled for a claim under of the EC Treaty (the Barber Protocol)? Article 119 of the EC Treaty on the ground of indirect sex discrimination in connection with an occupational old- age pension scheme because of unfa- vourable treatment of part-time work- ers, benefits can be claimed even under constitutional or ordinary rules of 6. Does the retroactivity permitted pur- national law, only on the same restric- suant to Article 3(1) of the Grundge- tive conditions as apply to a coincident setz in cases such as that described in Community-law claim under Arti- Question 1 constitute a breach of cle 119 of the EC Treaty, so that, in Community law from the standpoint divergence from the legal assessment of disproportionate discrimination otherwise applicable under national against nationals such as the German law, even on the basis of grounds of undertakings affected, or in the light of claim under national law benefits are an interpretation of national law that owed only for periods of employment renders it consistent with the Commu- after 17 May 1990, subject to the nity rules or a principle of Community exception for employees who have law, and does Community law prevail initiated legal proceedings or intro- in that respect over national law?' duced an equivalent claim before that date?
(b) In Cases C-234/96 Vick and C-235/96 Conze
'1. Do Article 119 of the EC Treaty, the Barber Protocol No 2 and the relevant 2. Is the answer to the preceding question case-law of the Court of Justice of the the same if, on the basis of concurrent European Communities as primary national law, entitlement to equal
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treatment already exists for the simple schemes only if and in so far as reason that there is objectively unjusti- they are attributable to periods of fied unfavourable treatment owing to e m p l o y m e n t s u b s e q u e n t to part-time employment, without it being 17 May 1 9 9 0 , whereas the relevant whether there is also indirect national provisions regulate the sex discrimination because a numeri- same factual situation differently cally greater proportion of women in that they do not exclude retro- workers are treated unfavourably?' active effect, does the precedence of Community law apply gener- ally?
(c) In Joined Cases C-270/97 Sievers and C-271/97 Schrage
(c) Does such precedence exist only if '1. (a) Does Community law require pre- the economic objective of Arti- cedence of application or validity cle 119 of the EC Treaty, which (under the second paragraph of exists with the social objective, Article 5 and Article 189 of the namely the creation of equal com- EC Treaty) over national provi- petitive opportunities, is specifi- sions of the Member States which cally affected? could or would be applicable, by way of concurrence of claims, to the same factual situation and with the same aim of supporting claims to equal treatment in occupational pension schemes, like for example in Germany the employment law principle of equal treatment gener- ally or, specifically, Paragraph 2(1) of the Beschäftigungsförderungsge- setz (Employment Promotion Law) 1985? 2. Does at least the Community law principle that national law is to be interpreted in a manner consistent with EC law require national provisions on equal treatment in the matter of bene- fits paid under occupational pension schemes to be interpreted and applied (b) In the case of such a conflict, where in accordance with the requirements Community law confers benefits and limitations (prohibition of retro- under occupational pension active effect) of Community law?' I - 758
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VI — Substance 40. Furthermore, there is no essential dis- agreement between the parties as to the reply to be given to this question, since the issue has been resolved. It therefore suffices to refer to the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, in accordance with which the exclusion of part-time employees from eligibility for a supplementary pension provided within the framework of an occupational pension scheme constitutes discrimination against women prohibited A — Question 1 in Case C-50/96 Schröder under Article 119 of the Treaty, where that exclusion affects a far greater number of women than men, unless the undertaking shows that the exclusion is based on objectively justified factors unrelated to any discrimination on grounds of sex. 9
38. This question asks whether the exclu- sion of female part-time employees from eligibility for a supplementary pension within the framework of an occupational pension scheme is contrary to Article 119 of the Treaty, where 95% of the employees excluded are women.
41. The United Kingdom, in its observa- tions, suggests a method of calculating the 39. It is undisputed in the case in point that respective proportions of men and women the pension scheme concerned falls within to be taken into account in establishing the scope of Article 119 of the Treaty and discrimination which differs from that that the benefit in question constitutes adopted by the courts hearing the cases. consideration within the meaning of that However, since this issue docs not arise article. 8 directly in these cases there is no need, in my opinion, to examine it. 10
8 — See Bilka, cited in footnote 5, at paragraph 22; Barber, cited in footnote 1, at paragraph 28; Case C-173/91 Commission v Belgium [1993] VECR I-673, at paragraphs 17 and 20; Case 9 — See, for example, Bilka, uted in footnote 5, at paragraph 31. C-109/91 Ten Oever [1993] ECR I-4879, at paragraphs 10 10 — I have explained my view on this matter in points 116, 124 and I I ; Case C-7/93 Benne [1994] ECR I-4471, at and 125 of my Opinion delivered on 14 July1998 in Clase paragraphs 30, 37 and 4 3 ; and so forth. C-167/97 Seymour-Snutb and Perez [1999] ECR I-623.
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B — Questions 2 to 5 in Case C-50/96, the (a) The first issue two questions in Cases C-234/96 and C-285/96 and Questions 1(a), 1(b) and 2 in Cases C-270/97 and C-271/97
44. It follows from the Court's case-law subsequent to the Barber judgment that the temporal limitation contained in that judg- ment, which was incorporated in the rele- 42. In essence these questions, which it is vant protocol, concerns only those kinds of appropriate to examine together, ask whe- discrimination which employers and pen- ther Article 119 of the Treaty and the sion schemes could reasonably have con- Barber Protocol, as interpreted by the sidered to be permissible owing to the Court of Justice, run counter to national transitional nature of the derogations pro- provisions under which part-time employ- vided for by Community law and which ees have a claim to access to insurance and were capable of being applied to occupa- to the receipt of a supplementary pension tional pensions. 11 such as that in question in the main proceedings from a time prior to 17 May 1990, the date of the Barber judgment.
45. That being so, as far as the right to join an occupational scheme is concerned the Court has declared that, subsequent to its judgment in Bilka, it was clear that dis- crimination on grounds of sex constitutes an infringement of Article 119 and that 43. They raise two issues: first, whether in there was no reason to suppose that the the light of Community law cases such as professional groups concerned could have those being contested are subject, as a been mistaken about the applicability of general rule, to the temporal limitation that article of the Treaty. 12 resulting from the Barber judgment and the Barber Protocol or to some other temporal limitation (see (a) below); and secondly, 11 — Such as the possibility of fixing a different pensionable age for men and women provided for by Article 9(a) of whether, in accordance with the principle Directive 86/378, which incorporates the exception pro- of the supremacy of Community law, that vided for by Article 7(1)(a) of Directive 79/7 (see Barber, cited in footnote 1, at paragraph 42, and Case C-57/93 limitation is also applicable where national Vroege [1994] ECR I-4541, at paragraph 22). law confers rights which extend farther 12 — Vroege, cited in the above footnote, at paragraphs 20 to 29; Case C-128/93 Fisscher [1994] ECR I-4583, at back than the date concerned (see (b) paragraphs 17 to 26; Case C-435/93 Dietz [1996] ECR I-5223, at paragraphs 19 and 20; and Case C-246/96 below). Magorrian [1997] ECR I-7153, at paragraphs 27 to 29.
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46. The Court has also ruled that, since no 49. One point needs to be clarified here provision was made in the Bilka judgment with regard to the factual framework of the for any limitation of its effects in time, the disputes in the main proceedings. It should direct effect of Article 119 may be relied be noted that receipt of the benefits corre- upon to claim membership of an occupa- sponding to a period of retroactive insur- tional pension scheme with retroactive ance is subject to the general restrictions effect from 8 April 1976, the date on which and conditions in force on the matter in the its judgment was delivered in Case 43/75 Member State concerned, in particular the Defrenne II [1976] ECR I-455 (see para- previous payment by the employee of any graph 40), in which that article was first required insurance contributions. held to have direct effect. 13
50. As the Court has pointed out, where an 47. Lastly, the Court has stated that mem- employee has suffered discrimination based bership of a pension scheme would be of no on sex in contravention of Article 119 of interest to employees if it did not confer the Treaty: entitlement to the benefits provided by the scheme in question and, accordingly, ruled that employees who have been excluded from membership of an occupational pen- sion scheme because of their sex are not only entitled to retroactive membership but '... equal treatment is to be achieved by also have a retroactive claim to the corre- placing the worker discriminated against in sponding benefits, such as a retirement the same situation as that of workers of the pension or supplementary pension. 14 other sex.
48. From the Community law point of It follows that the worker cannot claim view, therefore, in circumstances such as more favourable treatment, particularly in those in the present cases, employees such financial terms, than he would have had if as the claimants not only, in any event, he had been duly accepted as a member. have the right to retroactive membership of the pension scheme from 6 April 1976, but are also entitled to the benefits correspond- ing to that period of insurance.
13 — Dietz (at paragraph 21) and Magorrian (at paragraph 30), ... [t]herefore ... the fact that a worker can both cited i n footnote 12 above. 14 — Dietz (at paragraph 23 et seq.) and Magorrian (at claim retroactively to join an occupational paragraphs 32 to 35), both cited in footnote 12 above. pension scheme does not allow the worker
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to avoid paying the contributions relating for years, which is the reason why such an to the period of membership concerned'. 15 interpretation was also rejected in the judgment in the Fisscher case.
53. Consequently, as concerns membership of an occupational pension scheme such as 5 1 . In the present instance, as already that at issue in the main proceedings and indicated in my account of the background receipt of the corresponding benefits, the to these cases, the first claimant and the last relevant time-limit, from the point of view two claimants merely sought payment of of Community law, is 8 April 1976, the the supplementary pension based on the date of the decision in Defrenne II, and not notional calculation of the period for which 17 M a y 1990, the date on which the they were employed part-time (that is, Barber judgment was delivered and to without retroactive membership of the which the protocol concerning that judg- scheme); in the alternative, they sought ment also refers. retroactive membership of the scheme at the expense of the defendants, and in the further alternative, compensation for the period of non-membership. That is, they claimed in all cases the benefit of the relevant entitlements at no cost to them- (b) The second issue selves. Similar claims were also put forward by the two other claimants.
54. N o w that I have clarified the first issue involved, the question that arises is whether the abovementioned temporal limitations are also applicable where, as in the present instance, national law regulates the same 52. That construction cannot be accepted, matters more favourably. however, since entitlement to benefits is not an independent right but one consequent upon membership of the scheme which confers those benefits (in this instance, membership of the VAP). Furthermore, if the claimants were to receive the contested 55. In essence the claimants, the United benefits free of charge that would consti- Kingdom and the Commission maintain tute another form of discrimination, in basically that, if German law confers more t h e i r favour, a g a i n s t those full-time extensive rights than Article 119 of the employees who have paid contributions Treaty, neither that article nor the temporal limitations required for its implementation are applicable. The defendants, on the 15 — Fisscher, cited in footnote 12, at paragraphs 35 to 37. other hand, contend that, where a case
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falls within the scope of Article 119 of the 59. Furthermore, 'in accordance with the Treaty, in accordance with the principle of principle of the precedence of Community the supremacy of Community law that law, the relationship between provisions of article and the temporal limitations con- the Treaty and directly applicable measures nected with it must be applied, even to the of the institutions on the one hand and the exclusion of more favourable national national law of the Member States on the provisions. other is such that those provisions and measures not only by their entry into force render automatically inapplicable any con- flicting provision of current national law but — in so far as they are an integral part of, and take precedence in, the legal order applicable in the territory of each of the Member States — also preclude the valid 56. The defendants' argument cannot be adoption of new national legislative mea- accepted. sures to the extent to which they would be incompatible with Community provi- sions'. 17
57. First, the significance of the temporal limitations established by the Court's judg- ments in Defrenne II and Barber needs to be clarified. 60. Moreover, according to settled case- law, the interpretation which, in the con- text of Article 177 of the Treaty, the Court of Justice gives to Community law clarifies the meaning and scope of the rule con- cerned as it must be or ought to have been 58. According to settled case-law, the direct understood and applied from the time of its applicability of Community law means that coming into force. It follows that the rule as its rules must be fully and uniformly thus interpreted may, and must, be applied applied in all Member States from the date by national courts even to legal relation- of their entry into force and for so long as ships arising and established before the they continue in force. Those provisions are judgment ruling on the request for inter- a direct source of rights and duties both for pretation. 18 In other words, the effects of a the Member States and for individuals who judgment of the Court providing an inter- are parties to legal relationships under Community law, and it is the task of the national courts to protect those rights. 16 17 — See Simenthal. cited in the above 17. footnote, at paragraph
1« — See, (or example, Case 61/79 Denkavit italiana [1980] ECR 1 2 0 5 ,at paragraph 16; Joined Cases C-197/94 and C-252/94 Bantiaa and Others [ 1 9 9 6 ]ECR I-505, at 16 — S e c , for example. Case 106/77 Smmienthal [1978] ECR paragraph 47; and, more recently, Case C-31/96 Hills 629, at paragraphs 14 to 16. [1998] ECR I-4951, at paragraph 15.
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pretation normally date back to the time at limitation of the effects of the judgment which the rule interpreted came into providing the interpretation, on the other force. 19 hand, merely consists in depriving indivi- duals of the possibility of relying on and exercising the rights conferred on them by the rule thereby interpreted and in force. 22
61. That being so, a restriction by the Court of the effects of a judgment provid- ing an interpretation is a quite exceptional step justified only by overriding considera- tions of legal certainty. That is the case where national authorities, by reason of excusable legal mistake, have introduced 63. The following conclusions may be and applied, over a long period, rules drawn from the foregoing: contrary to Community law which have produced wide-ranging effects and to over- turn those effects would cost far more than their maintenance. 20 No restriction, how- ever, is permitted for the future. 21
First, the question of applying the principle of the supremacy of Community law arises only if national provisions are contrary to 62. It is therefore self-evident that the issue Community law, that is, when there is a of the meaning and applicability of a rule as conflict between Community law and interpreted by a judgment of the Court national law. 23 Consequently, it does not must not be confused with the issue of a arise when the national provisions are in limitation on the effects of the judgment compliance with Community law. providing that interpretation. An interpre- tation always (that is, even where the Court limits the effects of its judgment) has retroactive effect dating back to the time at which the rule concerned came into force. It merely clarifies the meaning and binding force which the rule has in itself and always had; it does not create them. A Secondly, limitation of the effects of a judgment of the Court is a concessionary 19 — See Edilizia Industriale Siderurgica, cited in the above measure to which the latter resorts after footnote, at paragraph 17. assessing the consequences which the 20 — See, inter alia, Defrenne 11, cited in point 46 above, at paragraph 69 et seq.; Case 69/80 Worringham [1981] ECR national provision contrary to Community 767, at paragraph 29 et seq.; Case 24/86 Blaizot [1988] ECR 379, at paragraph 28 et seq.; Barber, cited in footnote 1, at paragraph 40 et seq., Case C-137/94 Richardson [1995] 1-3407, at paragraph 32 et seq.; Bautiaa and 22 — Edis, cited in footnote 18, at paragraph 18. Others, cited in footnote 18, at paragraph 48. 23 — See, inter alia, Case 14/68 Wilhelm [1969] ECR 1, at 21 — This is stated expressly, albeit unnecessarily, in paragraph paragraph 6; Simmenthal, cited in footnote 16, at para- 44 of Barber. graph 17.
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law has produced. Consequently, a limita- domestic-law issue of how and why the tion of the effects of a judgment of the national courts arrived at that conclusion. Court again necessarily presupposes a con- flict between Community law and national law. However, such a limitation is incon- ceivable where a national provision is in accord with Community law, since that would lead to a reversal of Community law.
66. Under those provisions, as described above, since 1949 part-time employees (both men and women) must enjoy the same treatment as full-time employees (both men and women). The exclusion of part-time employees from membership of 64. In circumstances such as those in the the VAP and receipt of the supplementary main proceedings, therefore, the fundamen- pension has accordingly always been tal question is whether national provisions unconstitutional. This means that all part- such as those at issue in the main proceed- time employees (including women) arc ings are in accord with or contrary to entitled to retroactive insurance with the Community law. VAP and receipt of the corresponding benefits.
65. I would point out that in these cases the national provisions at issue are not the provisions of the Versorgungstarifvertrag in 67. It should therefore be noted that the their various successive versions. The pro- national provisions, in the context of visions at issue are the provisions of the regulating the more general issue (that is, Versorgungstarifvertrag as they now apply establishing equality of treatment of part- after having been retroactively expurgated time employees with full-time employees), of the rules which, in accordance with the also regulate the more specific issue of case-law of the Bundesarbeitsgericht as establishing equality of treatment of female described earlier (see point 16 et seq. part-time employees with full-time employ- above), were contrary to Article 3(1) of ees, which is the contested issue in the cases the German Grundgesetz. It is those provi- in point. Consequently, the same facts fall sions which constitute the 'national legal within the scope of two superimposed framework' of the questions referred for a legislative systems: Article 119 of the preliminary ruling, regardless of the purely Treaty, which prohibits discrimination
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against the comparatively larger number of 69. Consequently the national provisions, female part-time employees, and the inasmuch as they are more extensive than national provisions, which impose a gen- Article 119 of the Treaty and consistent eral prohibition of discrimination against with it, can legitimately constitute an part-time employees as compared with full- independent basis for the claims presented time employees. by the claimants before the national courts. There is therefore no question either of any contradiction or of any conflict between national law and Community law and, accordingly, no occasion for application of the principle of the supremacy of Com- munity law.
68. In view of their content, the national provisions are entirely consistent with Arti- cle 119 and indeed are even of broader scope than that article both in time (since they cover a period prior to the Treaty's entry into force) and as regards the persons covered (since they apply to all part-time employees independently of sex and of the percentages of men and women) and also, 70. It also follows from the foregoing that, in all probability, the matters covered in circumstances such as those of the (since, in the light of the broad wording present cases, no temporal limitation of of Article 3(1) of the Grundgesetz, on the effects of the judgment of the Court is which the Bundesarbeitsgericht based its possible. That is so firstly because, as the reasoning, the establishment of equal treat- claimants and the Commission rightly ment relates to the employment conditions point out, that limitation concerns rights in general of the two categories of which the persons concerned derive from employee and not merely to the matter of Community law (whereas in the present pay). 24 circumstances, as explained above, the claims put forward are legitimately based on national law), and secondly because a 24 — It should be noted that, given their content, the national limitation of the effects of the judgment of provisions constitute a measure falling within the scope of the Court is in any event inconceivable Articles 117 and 118 of the Treaty and therefore in principle within the competence of the Member States. Nevertheless, as I have had occasion to point out elsewhere where the national provisions are consis- (see my Opinion in Seymour-Smith and Perez, cited in tent with the provisions of Community law footnote 10, at point 70, and in particular its footnote 21), measures of that type are still subject to the test of as interpreted, since that would lead to a compatibility with Article 119. reversal of Community law. I-766
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71. If the defendants' view were accepted, economic objective of Article 1 19 and the Article 119 would appear, on the one hand, fact that other Member Slates have not- to require during the first stage equalisation adopted provisions similar to those con- of pay for men and women within the tested, the compatibility with Article 119 Member States, but, on the other hand, to of the Treaty of national provisions such as frustrate such equalisation by then impos- those at issue in the main proceedings can ing restrictions on national measures which be called into question on account of the already implement the requirement con- resulting economic burden on the under- cerned from an even earlier date. In terms takings affected. of both logic and law, however, that signifies a contradiction which is unaccep- table within the framework of Community law. Whereas reasons of legal certainty, that is, reasons likewise stemming from Community law, have by way of exception served to justify the retroactive mainte- nance of national measures which are contrary to Article 119, there is no express provision or general principle which per- mits the setting aside of national provisions that are consistent with Community law.
73. According to the argument submitted by the defendant companies, which the referring courts also seem to accept, retro- active insurance with the VAP of part-time employees and the founding of claims on their part entail for the companies con- cerned a serious economic burden which renders them less competitive in relation to C — Question 6 in Case C-50/96 and similar undertakings in other Member Question 1(c) in Cases C-270/97 and States. That does not appear to be compa- C-271/97 tible either with the requirement that conditions of competition within the Com- munity be equal or with the objective of Article 119, which is not only social but also economic in that it seeks to impose the same economic operating conditions for undertakings. The other parties, by con- trast, either reject that line of argument (the claimants) or consider a response unneces- sary in the light of the answers to the other 72. In essence, these questions seek to questions (the United Kingdom and the ascertain whether, having regard to the Commission).
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74. The defendants' view cannot be made within that system as a result. That accepted. being so, in so far as it contests the interpretation given by the Bundesarbeits- gericht to Article 3 of the Grundgesetz, which constitutes the framework of the questions referred for a preliminary ruling, the above line of argument cannot be taken into consideration here, since it entails the interpretation of national law, which falls within the competence of the national courts (in this case the Bundesverfassungs- gericht, before which appeals to that end 75. I would point out, first, that their are in fact still pending). arguments essentially relate to the practical repercussions for the defendant companies of the declaration by the Bundesarbeitsger- icht that the provisions of the Versorgung- starifvertrag which excluded part-time employees from membership of the pension scheme were unconstitutional. Similar arguments had also been presented before that court but, as I recounted earlier, were rejected on the grounds that the economic 77. There remains to be examined, there- burden for the undertakings did not seem fore, whether any question of the interpre- significant, that it could be covered with tation of Community law is involved, other resources and that that damage was, which only the Court of Justice has jur- in any event, of less significance than the isdiction to give. damage caused to the employees by their exclusion from the pension scheme (see points 17 and 19 above). Further, as I have also already stated, the highest German labour law court decided that neither the principles of legal certainty and protection of legitimate expectations nor any general principle precluded that conclusion. 78. The defendant companies attempt to derive an argument from the objective of Article 119. They maintain that, alongside its social objective, that article also has an economic objective which consists in pro- viding equal competitive opportunities for undertakings in the Member States. The achievement of that objective would, how- ever, be jeopardised if only undertakings in certain Member States had to suffer the 76. Those issues have therefore arisen consequences of the retroactive adjustment because of the conflict between lower- of national provisions to Community law ranking and higher-ranking rules within while others benefited from the mainte- the national legal system and of the changes nance of inequalities.
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79. It is true that, in its judgment in dignity and equality between men and Defrenne II, the Court, of Justice ruled, women and on the precept of improving first, that '... the aim of Article 119 is to working conditions, not on objectives avoid a situation in which undertakings which are economic in the narrow sense established in States which have actually set out above. 25 Furthermore, in its more implemented the principle of equal pay recent case-law the Court has stated that suffer a competitive disadvantage in intra- the principle laid down by Article 119 Community competition as compared with simply expresses in a specific form the undertakings established in States which general principles of equality and non- have not yet eliminated discrimination discrimination, which are fundamental against women as regards pay' (paragraph principles of Community law. 26 9), while stating, secondly, that '... this provision forms part of the social objectives of the Community, which is not merely an economic union, but is at the same time intended, by common action, to ensure social progress and seek the constant improvement of the living and working conditions of their peoples, as is empha- In my opinion, therefore, the presumed sised by the Preamble to the Treaty' (para- 'economic' objective of Article 119 cannot graph 10). in any event be relied on in order to avoid giving effect to national provisions which are, for the rest, in accord with that article.
81. As regards the issue of the retroactivity of the economic burden, I would in any event point out that, as is clear from the foregoing, on account of the findings of the Bundesarbeitsgericht (see my points 17 to 19 above) and of the option of levying contributions from the employees con- cerned retroactively (see my point 49 et seq. above), that argument no longer has any real basis. 80. Nonetheless, regardless of whether that 'economic' objective truly reflected the intentions of the historical Community 25 — Nowadays, to rely on such an objective would be legislature, it no longer corresponds to tantamount to asserting, for example, that child labour must be prohibited not because it shames the civilized present-day thinking. In a community gov- world but mainly because undertakings which exploit erned by the rule of law, which respects and children are more competitive than those which use adult workers. safeguards human rights, the requirement 26 — See, for example, Case C-132/92 Birds Eye Walls v of equal pay for men and women is Roberts [1993] ECR I-5579, at paragraph 17. See also Case C-18/94 P. v S. [1996] ECR I-2143, at paragraphs 15 founded mainly on the principles of human to 22.
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82. Irrespective of that, it should be noted State can validly fulfil its obligations under that the retroactive effect of the national Community law retroactively. 29 From the law to 1976 does not give rise to any point of view of Community law, therefore, problem of incompatibility with Commu- the national provisions legitimately have nity law. That is because even if the retroactive effect as from the period at national measures had not been adopted issue. the parties concerned would anyway have achieved the intended purpose by relying on the direct effect of Article 119. In respect of that period, the lack of adequate resources or simply the financial difficulty for the employers is a problem which must be resolved on the basis of national law and cannot affect the present cases. 27 Conse- quently, the only issue to be examined is whether provisions such as those being contested are contrary to Community law 84. The argument concerning the economic to the extent that they have retroactive burden on the undertakings, even assuming effect covering the period before 1976 and it to be true as regards its factual basis, does up to the entry into force of Article 119. not undermine that conclusion.
The provisions of Article 119 take account 83. It should be recalled in this connection of the interests of all the economic part- that, before they were pronounced uncon- ners — employees, employers and the stitutional, those provisions of the Versor- institutions providing the benefits. The gungstarifvertrag which gave rise to discri- consideration given to these last two groups mination against the claimants were con- by Community law is, in my view, apparent trary to Article 119 of the Treaty and that, both from the transitional stage provided from the end of the first period, Germany for in the first paragraph of Article 119 (a was under a continuous obligation to period allowing Member States and also abolish them. 28 In addition, it is apparent employers to adjust to the new conditions) from the Court's case-law that a Member and from the temporal limitations intro- duced by the judgments in Defrenne II and Barber and by the relevant protocol. 2 7 — S e e Case C-200/91 Coloroll [1994] ECR I-4389, at paragraph 4 2 . 28 — In my view, that obligation exists independently of the temporal limitations introduced by the Barber and Defr- 29 — See, as regards the retroactive implementation of direc- enne II judgments, with the difference that it is incomplete, tives, Case 80/87 Dik [1988] ECR 1601, at paragraph 13; that is, its infringement cannot give rise to an actionable Case C-373/95 Maso [1997] ECR I-4051, at paragraphs claim in respect of the period prior to those judgments on 39 to 4 1 ; and my Opinion in Joined Cases C-94/95 and the part of individuals deriving rights from Community C-95/95 Bonifaci and Others and Berto and Others [1997] law. ECR I-3969, at point 56 et seq.
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85. It must not, however, be forgotten that temporal limitation of the effects of the the main purpose of Article 119 is to confer judgment of the Court or, even less so, an rights on those groups of employees who objection to those measures from the point suffer systematic discrimination on grounds of view of Community law. of sex, who as a rule, given the traditional structures and stereotypes still existing in our societies, are groups of female employ- ees. 3 0 87. Lastly, the fact that other Member States may not have complied with Arti- cle 119 to the same extent as Germany does not affect the present cases. As the Court has ruled:
86. That being so, it must be accepted that the concern of the Community legislature to safeguard, in the matter of equal pay, the 'The effectiveness of this provision cannot legitimate economic interests of groups be affected by the fact that the duty other than employees has already been imposed by the Treaty has not been dis- given sufficient expression by the above- charged by certain Member States and that mentioned express provisions and the lim- the joint institutions have not reacted itations introduced by the case-law of the sufficiently energetically against this failure Court in interpreting in this case as well the to act. presumed intention of the Community legislature. N o further obstacle to or lim- itation on the implementation of the requirement contained in Article 119 of the Treaty is justified. As I have stated, To accept the contrary view would be to therefore, the possible economic repercus- risk raising the violation of the right to the sions for those groups resulting from status of a principle of interpretation, a national measures adopted with a view to position the adoption of which would not- implementing the requirement contained in be consistent with the task assigned to the Article 119 do not justify either a further Court by Article 164 of the Treaty'. 31
30 — C a s e C-409/95 Marschall [1997] LCR I-6363, at para- graph 29. 31 — Defrcimc II, cited IN point 46, at paragraphs 33 and 34.
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V I I— Conclusion
In view of the foregoing, I would propose that the Court reply to the questions referred to it for a preliminary ruling as follows:
(1) The exclusion of part-time employees from an occupational pension scheme such as that at issue in the main proceedings constitutes discrimination prohibited under Article 119 of the Treaty, where that measure affects a comparatively far greater number of women than men and is not justified by objective reasons unrelated to any discrimination on grounds of sex.
(2) Employees who have suffered discrimination such as that described above as concerns the right to membership of an occupational pension scheme and to the payment of benefits on the basis of that scheme may rely on the direct effect of Article 119 in contesting national provisions contrary to that article retroactively from 8 April 1976, the date on which the Court delivered its judgment in Defrenne II.
(3) Neither Article 119 nor any other provision or general principle of Community law precludes the application of national measures under which discrimination contrary to Article 119 such as that described above is remedied with retroactive effect from a period prior to the judgment in Defrenne II. I - 772
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(4) Any financial problems resulting for the undertakings concerned from the application of such retroactive national provisions must be resolved, taking account of the principle of equal pay, on the basis of national law and have no bearing on the replies to the above questions.
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