C-145/96
ECLI:EU:C:1997:218
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V O N H O F F M A N N v FINANZAMT TRIER
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL FENNELLY delivered o n 24 April 1997 *
1. This preliminary reference concerns the based in Paris. He was a member of a num- payment of VAT on arbitrators' fees. Are ber of international arbitration tribunals they taxable in the arbitrator's home Mem- which settled disputes between commercial ber State, in that of the arbitral tribunal undertakings by means of arbitration deci- which pays him, or in that (or those) of the sions or which sought to bring the parties to parties to the arbitration? This issue turns on a settlement. Such tribunals are composed of the interpretation of Article 9(2)(e) of the three arbitrators appointed for each indi- Sixth VAT Directive. ' In particular, are the vidual case; the chairman is designated by the arbitrator's services those of 'consultants' or ICC; his two colleagues are nominated by 'lawyers', or are they 'other similar services'? the parties and confirmed by the ICC. The proceedings of the arbitral tribunals and the pronouncement of their awards all took place in Paris. The parties to the arbitrations all had their places of business outside Ger- many. 2 Fees, and their distribution among I — Legal and factual context the members of the tribunal, are determined by the I C C . The members of the tribunal receive payment not from the parties but through the ICC.
A — Proceedings before the national court
3. The Finanzamt Trier (Tax Office, herein- 2. The plaintiff in the main proceedings after 'the defendant') claimed VAT from the (hereinafter 'the plaintiff'), Professor von- plaintiff on the fees paid to him by the ICC. Hoffmann, is Professor of Civil Law at the His objections were rejected as unfounded. University of Trier, Germany. During the He appealed to the Finanzgericht Rheinland- years 1987, 1988 and 1989 he served as an Pfalz (Finance Court, Rhineland-Palatinate, arbitrator at the International Chamber of hereinafter 'the national court'), which deter- Commerce (hereinafter 'the I C C ) , which is mined, firstly, that the plaintiff, in acting as an arbitrator, was a supplier of services in the pursuit of an independent occupation and, * Original language: English. 1 — Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonization of the laws of the Member Sutes relating to turnover taxes — Common system of value added tax: uni- form basis of assessment (hereinafter 'the Sixth Directive'); 2 — The order for reference docs not say whether the parties OJ 1977 L 1 « , p. 1. were established inside or outside the Community, or both.
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moreover, that the services were provided to mere consultant'. Thus, as regards German the I C C . 3 law, the national court held that the place of supply of the plaintiff's services was Ger many.
4. The real issue in the view of the national court was 'whether the services [were] sup plied in Germany or abroad'. The debate 5. The national court recognized, however, before it turned, inter alia, on whether the that Article 9(2)(e) of the Sixth Directive services were scientific in nature or similar. is different and, in particular, that the expres In this connection, the national court ruled sion '"other similar services" appears to that the requirements of the relevant provi give it a wider meaning than that of sions of German law 4 were not satisfied. 5 Paragraph 3(a)(4)3 of the 1980 UStG'. In its Nor, in so far as German law was con view, the fact that arbitration services are, by cerned, 6 could the plaintiff be considered t o nature, part of the activities sometimes pur be 'acting as an expert, lawyer or consultant'. sued by lawyers, might be sufficient to ren The plaintiff, though a lawyer and an expert, der them similar to lawyers' services under could not be considered to be providing Article 9(2)(e). Accordingly, it referred the expert services, because judges also base their following question to the Court under decisions on expert examinations. Nor, in its Article 177 of the Treaty: view, did his services fall within the non occupational activities of a lawyer. Finally, they could not be described as 'consultancy' services, since — being designed to bring the arbitration procedure to a successful conclu sion — the activities of an arbitrator are 'therefore broader in scope than those of a
3 — This decision was apparently based on Paragraphs 1(1)(1) and 3(a)(1) of the Umsatzsteuergesetz 1980 (Law on Turn over Tax 1980, hereinafter 'the UStG'); see BGBl, p. 1953. 4 — See Paragraph 3(a)(3), read in conjunction with Paragraph 3(a)(2)3(a), of the UStG, which, according to the 'Is Article 9(2)(e) of Title VI of the Sixth national court, provides that the place where 'artistic, scien tific, educational, sporting, entertainment or similar services, EEC Directive (third group: "services of including the services of organizers', are deemed to be p r o consultants, engineers, consultancy bureaux, vided is that where the supplier carried out his acűViries. lawyers, accountants and other similar ser 5 — The national court took the view that the services provided by the plaintiff could not, in German law at least, be vices, as well as data processing and the sup regarded as applied science activities, which would be tax able, as scientific services, at the place of supply. plying of information") to be interpreted as 6 — See paragraph 3(a)(4)3 of the UStG. including the services of an arbitrator?'
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B — Community legislation he has his permanent address or usually resides:
6. Article 9 of the Sixth Directive concerns the 'supply of services'. The relevant provi- sions for this case are as follows:
' 1 . The place where a service is supplied shall be deemed to be the place where the supplier has established his business or has a fixed establishment from which the service is supplied or, in the absence of such a place of business or fixed establishment, the place — services of consultants, engineers, consul- where he has his permanent address or usu- tancy bureaux, lawyers, accountants and ally resides. other similar services, as well as data pro- cessing and the supplying of information,
2. However:
7. Article 21, which is the sole article of Title (e) the place where the following services XII of the Sixth Directive and which con- are supplied when performed for cus- cerns 'persons liable to pay tax to the tomers established outside the Commu- authorities', provides, at paragraph 1(b), that nity or for taxable persons established in the 'persons to whom services covered by the Community but not in the same Article 9(2)(e) are supplied and carried out country as the supplier, shall be the place by a taxable person resident abroad' shall be where the customer has established his liable to pay VAT, although 'Member States business or has a fixed establishment to may require that the supplier of services shall which the service is supplied or, in the be held jointly and severally, liable for pay- absence of such a place, the place where ment of the tax'.
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II — Observations (relating, in that case, to Article 9(2)(c) of the Sixth Directive). In Dudda, the Court, how- ever, rejected Germany's submission in that case and, by implication, also in this case in the following terms: 8
8. Written and oral observations were sub- mitted by the plaintiff, the defendant, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Com- mission. Counsel for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland made submissions only at the oral hearing.
'As regards the relationship between Article 9(1) and Article 9(2), the Court has III — Analysis already held that Article 9(2) sets out a num- ber of specific instances of places where cer- tain services are deemed to be supplied, whereas Article 9(1) lays down the general rule on the matter. The object of those provi- sions is to avoid, first, conflicts of jurisdic- tion, which may result in double taxation, A — The reUtionship between Article 9(1) and, secondly, non-taxation, as Article 9(3) and (2) indicates, albeit only as regards specific situ- ations ... . 9
9. It is fortunate that the relationship between Article 9(1) and (2) of the Sixth Directive has been decisively laid down in the recent case-law of the Court. Germany, consistently with the stance it had adopted in D udda v Finanzamt Bergisch GUdbach, 7 in its written observations in the present case, It follows that, when Article 9 is interpreted, characterized Article 9(2)(e) as being a provi- Article 9(1) in no way takes precedence over sion derogating from the general rule laid Article 9(2). In every situation, the question down in Article 9(1) and, thus, to be inter- which arises is whether it is covered by one preted strictly. In particular, it took issue, as of the instances mentioned in Article 9(2); if it was at liberty to do, with the view to the not, it falls within the scope of Article 9(1). contrary effect that I had adopted in para- graphs 26 to 31 of my Opinion in Dudda 8 — See paragraphs 20 to 23 of the judgment. 9 — The Court refers to Case 168/84 Finanzamt Hamburg- Mme-Altstadt [1985] ECR 2251, paragraph 14 of the judg- 7 — Case C-327/94 [1996] ECR 1-4595, hereinafter 'DudtL·'. ment.
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Accordingly, it is necessary to determine the Sixth Directive to Article 9(2)(e) was applied scope of Article 9(2) in the light of its pur- by the Court in Linthorst, Pouwels and pose which is set out as follows in the sev- Scheres. 10 I am satisfied, therefore, that the enth recital in the preamble to the directive: issue of whether the services provided by the plaintiff are covered by Article 9(2)(e) can be decided without applying any restricted approach to its interpretation.
"... the determination of the place where tax- able transactions are effected has been the subject of conflicts concerning jurisdiction as between Member States, in particular as regards supplies of goods for assembly and the supply of services; ... although the place where a supply of services is effected should in principle be defined as the place where the B — The effect of Article 9(2)(e) in Germany person supplying the services has his princi- pal place of business, that place should be defined as being in the country of the person to whom the services are supplied, in par- ticular in the case of certain services supplied between taxable persons where the cost of the services is included in the price of the goods."
11. The issue of the direct effect of Article 9(2)(e) of the Sixth Directive has been raised in certain of the observations submit- The overall purpose of Article 9(2) of the ted to the Court. I do not think that it is Sixth Directive is accordingly to establish a necessary, however, to express any view o n special system for services provided between that issue, since it is clear from the order for taxable persons where the cost of the services reference that the national court, quite prop- is included in the price of the goods.' erly, intends to ensure that the UStG, which implements the Sixth Directive in Germany, is interpreted and applied in conformity with the Court's interpretation of Article 9(2)(e).
10 — Case C-167/95 Maatschap Linthorst, Pouwels and Scheres v Inspecteur der Belastingdienst/Ondernemingen Roermond [1997] ECR1-1195 (hereinafter 'Linthorst'). See in ren- 10. After the hearing in the present case, the erai paragraphs 10 and 11 of the judgment and, regarding the interpretation of Article 9(2)(c), paragraphs 19 to 23; see interpretation given in Dudda of the rela- also paragraphs S to 10 and 19 to 25, respectively, of my tionship between Article 9(1) and (2) of the Opinion.
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C — The recipients of arbitral services 15. As the Court stated in its recent judg- ment in Phytheron International, '[w]ere the Court to base its ruling on the facts men- tioned in course of proceedings before it, the very substance of the problem raised by the questions referred would be changed', and 12. Germany, the Commission and the this '... would be incompatible with the United Kingdom have expressed doubts Court's function under Article 177 of the about the ruling of the national court that Treaty and with its duty to ensure that the the plaintiff's services as arbitrator were pro- Governments of the Member States and the vided to the I C C , but there is no question parties concerned are given the opportunity before the Court on this issue. to submit observations'. n
13. N o doubt in a private arbitration these 16. In my view, therefore, this Court should services are provided to the parties. As to leave to the national court any questions whether the I C C system should lead to a about the identity of the true recipient of the different conclusion would depend on find- services or its taxable status, and should con- ings of fact by the national court, without fine itself to answering the question posed as which the Court would be indulging in to whether the third indent of Article 9(2)(e) speculation as to the true relationship includes the services of an arbitrator. between the arbitrator, on the one hand, and either the parties to the arbitration or the I C C , on the other.
D — Services under Article 9(2)(e), third indent, of the Sixth Directive 14. The application of Article 9(2)(e) of the Sixth Directive depends, of course, on the recipient of the services being established either outside the Community or as a taxable person within the Community; matters which are to be determined by the national court, with the assistance of this Court, if 17. The proper approach to the interpreta- requested. According to the information tion of the third indent of Article 9(2)(e) has provided by the Commission at the hearing, now been explained by the Court in its judg- the I C C is exempt from the payment of VAT ment in Linthorst. It had been contended under French law but circulates a notice stat- that veterinary services should be included as ing that, though fees of arbitrators do not include VAT, any arbitrator, liable to pay that tax, may seek to recover it directly from 11 — Case C-352/95 Phytheron International v Jean Bourdon the parties. [1997] ECR 1-1729, paragraphs 12 and 14 of the judgment.
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'similar services' within that indent. I appears to rule out any attempt to deduce a expressed the opinion that the content of the guiding principle from the enumerated ser- services enumerated in the indent did not vices. permit the application of the ejusdem generis principle of construction, , 2 since 'the appli- cation of that principle presupposes that it is possible to identify, from the matters enu- merated in the legal text under scrutiny, a genus which precedes the general words [and that] the search is, thus, essentially for a suf- ficiently common element to permit the identification of a recognizable class'. I was of the opinion that no such common element 19. It seems more appropriate, therefore, to could be identified. consider whether the plaintiff's services come within one of the enumerated descriptions or are similar thereto. The plaintiff argues that his services are not merely similar to those of a lawyer but, in fact, identical to a part of such services. It is true that the present plain- tiff's arbitral activities call most obviously for consideration of whether they constitute the services of a lawyer, but this has broader implications.
18. The plaintiff argues that there is a com- mon element linking the services listed in the third indent of Article 9(2)(e), namely that they are all specialized services of high qual- ity whose provision is entrusted to the pro- fessionals concerned by reason of special confidence in their personal integrity and technical competence, which applies particu- larly to a professor of law selected as an arbi- 20. Before coming to a conclusion on that trator. In Linthorst, however, the Court issue, I shall make some general observations ruled that '... the only common feature of the on the services of arbitrators, prompted par- disparate activities mentioned ... is that they ticularly by a remark in the Commission's all come under the heading of Uberal profes- written observations that it is so rare for sions', but it went on to state that, 'if the lawyers to practise as arbitrators in private Community legislature had intended all tribunals that the legislature had not men- activities carried out in an independent man- tioned them specifically. Admittedly, those ner to be covered by that provision, it would observations were made prior to the judg- have defined them in general terms'. 1 3 This ment in either D udda or Linthorst, and are based on the assumption that the third indent constituted an enumeration by way of example of independent services. However, I 12 — Sec paragraph 21 of the Opinion. For an exposition of the ejusdem generis principle, see, for example, Bennion, Statu- am surprised that it should be considered tory Interpretation (Butterworths, 2nd ed. 1992), pp. 860 et rare for lawyers to act as arbitrators. In the seq. 13 — Loc. cit, paragraph 20 of the judgment. common-law countries, at least, it is by no
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means unusual for a lawyer to act as an arbi- 22. In my opinion, a lawyer, in independent trator in private arbitrations. It is, indeed, practice, who undertakes the role of an arbi- common practice. The parties to private arbi- trator, is chosen for his legal expertise, just as trations are, of course, free to specify the engineers or accountants are, as the United qualifications, if any, of their arbitrator(s). Kingdom argued, chosen for professional The arbitration agreement will often assign expertise in their respective professions.
I4 to the president of a named professional Such a lawyer is, in my view, providing the institute the role of choosing an arbitrator in services of a lawyer for the purposes of the default of agreement of the parties. In this third indent of Article 9(2)(e). Whether the way, if not by individual agreement, the arbi- plaintiff is such a lawyer is a matter for the trator chosen may be a lawyer, an engineer, national court. In my view, the uniformity of an architect or an accountant. Indeed, such Community law requires that a consistent an arbitrator may be any other professional interpretation be given to the notion of person, or simply a person of wide business 'lawyer'. In AM&S v Commission,15 the or other relevant experience. Court ruled that the protection of profes- sional legal privilege should only be extended to legal advice provided by a 'law- yer entitled to practise his profession in one of the Member States', 16 as defined respec- tively for each Member State in Council Directive 77/249/EEC of 22 March 1977' 7 to facilitate the effective exercise by lawyers of freedom to provide services. I think the Sixth Directive should be interpreted simi- larly so far as lawyers' services are con-
cerned. However, even if the plaintiff does not meet this test, by being a lawyer as 21. As counsel for the United Kingdom pointed out, in some Member States, such as the United Kingdom and Ireland, there are even two separate branches of the legal pro- fession which traditionally concentrate o n providing different types of legal services. It is difficult, therefore, to imagine that, by adopting the generic term 'lawyers', the Community legislator intended only that 14 — I agree, therefore, with the views expressed by the Bundes- those services provided by lawyers acting o n finanzhof in its judgment of 17 November 1960 (Case IV behalf of a particular client would be cov- 135/58 U, BundessteucrbUtt III 1961, p. 60) to the effect that lawyers are chosen as arbitrators precisely because they
ered. I think the Commission is right to sug- arc lawyers and may, thus, be relied upon to act with suf- ficient independence. Because of their professional experi- gest that regard must be had to the nature ence, comprising essentially the resolution of legal prob- and content of the services. Thus, notwith- lems through the objective application of legal principles, they are especially suited to many types of arbitration pro- standing that, when nominated to act as arbi- ceedings. Indeed, although the Bundesfinanzhof recognized that 'lawyers generally defend the interests of one single trators, lawyers no longer directly represent a party', it also apdy acknowledged that this 'is not, however, specific client, it is clear that they, none the an absolute rule .
. . [and that] the lawyer may equally pro- vide advice to several parties who consult him collectively' less, act broadly in the interests of the parties and 'he may also attempt to reconcile the opposing interests of several parties to a transaction, when they have a com- to the arbitration, who, moreover, have cho- mon interest in seeing their points of disagreement sen arbitration as a means of obtaining a final resolved'.
and binding decision both quickly and at 15 — Case 155/79 [1982] ECR 1575. 16 — Ibid., paragraph 25 of the judgment. reasonable cost. 17 — O J I 9 7 7 L 78, p. 17.
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defined in Article 2 of Directive 77/249/EEC Directive, particularly Article 9, as inter- (namely a 'Rechtsanwalt' in Germany) he preted by the Court in Dudda. 2° can equally be considered to act as a consult- ant, which is a word of broad import or, as I suggested in my Opinion in Linthorst, of 'indeterminate ... scope'. , s Persons providing independent services as arbitrators can there- fore, in my view, be regarded as 'consult- ants', or their practices as 'consultancy bureaux': I agree with the United Kingdom 24. If they are not actually lawyers' or con- that the inclusion of these descriptions indi- sultants' services, I think the plaintiff's cates that the legislative intention was to give activities fall within the scope of 'other simi- wide scope to the indent of Article 9. lar services', in the sense of being similar to those of a lawyer. It follows from Linthorst that the general approach to be adopted to the interpretation of the third indent of Article 9(2)(e) of the Sixth Directive is that, in order for services which are allegedly similar to one of the listed services actually to fall within the expression 'and other simi- lar services', they must be capable of being regarded as sufficiently similar to one or other of the 'principal and habitual activi- ties' 21 of the professions expressly listed in the indent. The present case concerns a pro- 23. I also agree with the view expressed by fessor of civil law. It is, thus, necessary to the United Kingdom that it would be illogi- compare the services of such an arbitrator cal, particularly from the perspective of the with those normally provided by lawyers. If parties to the arbitration (and thus poten- such services are similar to 'services of law- tially damaging to the choice of the Commu- yers', it will not be necessary to examine nity as a venue for international arbitra- whether they may, alternatively, be regarded tions), ' 9 if the services provided by as similar to the 'services of consultants'. arbitrators were to be deemed to be supplied at a different place from those of the lawyers often engaged to act on behalf of the parties during the arbitration. The exclusion of arbi- trators from the third indent would, as the United Kingdom also observed, have the effect (leaving aside any special role for the ICC) of imposing VAT on arbitrators' fees to be paid by parties established wholly out- 25. In Dudda, in respect of the expression side the Community. This would not accord 'similar activities' used in Article 9(2)(c) of with the scheme and purpose of the Sixth the Sixth Directive in conjunction, inter alia,
18 — Loc. cit., paragraph 24 of the Opinion. 20 — See especially paragraphs 21 to 23, quoted in paragraph 9 of 19 — See, in this respect, paragraph 5 of the Opinion of Advocate the present Opinion. General Darmon in Case C-190/89 Rich [1991] 21 — This is the expression used by the Court in Linthorst, para- ECR 1-3855. graph 22 of the judgment.
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with 'artistic' and 'entertainment services', 28. Furthermore, unlike the services of vet- the Court stated that 'it is not only services erinary surgeons, whose omission from the relating inter alia to artistic and entertain- list could only reasonably be regarded to be ment activities but also services relating to deliberate, no such consideration applies in merely simüar activities that fall within its the case of arbitrators. 24 Indeed, given the scope'. 22 I think that the same approach myriad forms and types of arbitration pro- should be applied to the notion of 'other ceedings, it is not surprising that no explicit similar services' under Article 9(2)(e). reference to arbitral services was included in Article 9(2)(e). In my opinion, they are, by definition, ideally suited to being regarded, depending on the circumstances of each par- ticular arbitration, as similar to the services of 'consultants', 'engineers' or 'lawyers'.
26. I do not think that the fact that arbitral services differ from services normally pro- vided by lawyers — that is to say, the resolu- tion of a dispute as opposed to the provision of advice — precludes arbitral services from being regarded as similar to those of lawyers. The 'principal and habitual activities' 23 of 'lawyers' comprise the provision of manifold forms of advice to their clients and negotia- tions on their clients' behalf, as well as rep- resentation in legal proceedings. 29. Finally, certain doubts were raised, espe- cially at the hearing, as to whether, if Article 9(2)(e) of the Sixth Directive were found to apply, the plaintiff would, conse- quently, be able to avoid paying VAT. I do not accept that the plaintiff may be seeking to avoid tax. If, as I think it should, the Court finds that Article 9(2)(e) is applicable, I think it is clear that Article 21(l)(b) obliges Member States to require the person to 27. However, having already taken the view whom Article 9(2)(e) services have been that, subject to the national court's findings regarding the professional status of the plain- tiff, the arbitral services in this case are law- 24 — The Court stated at paragraph 21 of its judgment in yers' services, I have no doubt that, in the Linthorst that: 'Moreover, if tne legislature had intended alternative, they are similar to lawyers' ser- that provision to cover the medical profession generally, as an activity carried out in an independent manner, it would vices. have included it in the list, since, as the national court and the Advocate General in paragraph 22 of his Opinion per- tinently observe, other provisions of the Sixth Directive, such as in particular the transitional exception provided pursuant to Article 28(3)(b) in conjunction with Annex F, specifically mention the services of veterinary surgeons'. 22 — Loc. cit., paragraph 25 of the judgment (emphasis added). The services of arbitrators, on the other hand, are not 23 — Linthorst, paragraph 22 of the judgment. expressly mentioned in the Sixth Directive.
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supplied 'by a taxable person resident the supplier of [such] services shall be held abroad' to pay the VAT due. Thus, on the jointly and severally hable for payment of assumption that the plaintiff's services were the tax'. France does not appear to have exer- supplied to the I C C as a taxable person in cised this option, which is a decision for Paris, the appropriate French authorities which the plaintiff bears no responsibility. If, should have sought payment of the VAT on the other hand, the services are provided from the ICC. Moreover, Article 21(1 )(b) to parties established outside the Commu- also permits Member States to 'require that nity, no VAT is payable.
IV — Conclusion
30. I n the light of the foregoing, I r e c o m m e n d that the question referred b y t h e Finanzgericht, Rheinland-Pfalz be answered as follows:
Article 9(2)(e) of the Sixth C o u n c i l Directive 7 7 / 3 8 8 / E E C of 17 M a y 1977 o n t h e h a r m o n i z a t i o n of t h e laws of t h e M e m b e r States relating t o t u r n o v e r taxes — C o m m o n system of value added tax: u n i f o r m basis of assessment, s h o u l d b e inter- p r e t e d as including arbitral services p r o v i d e d b y practising lawyers. I n so far as a n a r b i t r a t o r is n o t a practising lawyer, h e m a y b e considered t o act as a consultant; i n a n y event, the a r b i t r a t o r ' s services, if h e is c h o s e n for his legal expertise, are similar t o l a w y e r s ' services.
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