C-319/96
ECLI:EU:C:1998:20
- Súd
- Súdny dvor Európskej únie
- IČS
- 61996CC0319
- Zdroj
- eur-lex.europa.eu ↗
BRINKMANN TABAKFABRIKEN v SKATTEMINISTERIET
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL JACOBS delivered on 22 January 1998
1. The basic issue put to the Court in this (c) smoking tobacco case by the Østre Landsret (Danish Eastern Regional Court) is whether a roll of tobacco enclosed in porous cellulose which the cus- tomer makes up into a cigarette by inserting it into a separately marketed cigarette-paper tube constitutes a cigarette or smoking tobacco (d) snuff for the purposes of the Community rules on excise duty.
(e) chewing tobacco'. Relevant Community and national provi- sions
2. Council Directive 72/464/EEC 1 ('the First 3. Council Directive 79/32/EEC 2 ('the Directive') laid down the general principles Second Directive' or 'the Directive') defined for the harmonisation of the structure of the different categories of manufactured excise duty on manufactured tobacco. Article tobacco. Article 3(1) of the Directive, in the 3(1) of the Directive defined manufactured form applicable at the material time for the tobacco as: purposes of the main proceedings, provided:
'(a) cigarettes
'Rolls of tobacco capable of being smoked as they are and which are not cigars or cigarillos (b) cigars and cigarillos as defined in Article 2 shall be deemed to be cigarettes'.
* Original language: English. 1 — Council Directive 72/464/EEC of 19 December 1972 on taxes other than turnover taxes which affect the consumption of 2 — Second Council Directive 79/32/EEC of 18 December 1978 manufactured tobacco, OJ, English Special Edition 1972 (31 on taxes other than turnover taxes which affect the consump- December) p. 3. tion of manufactured tobacco, OJ 1979 L 10, p. 8.
I - 5257
O P I N I O N OF MR JACOBS — CASE C-319/96
4. Smoking tobacco was defined in Article (c) rolls of tobacco which, by simple non- 4(1) as provided: industrial handling, are wrapped in ciga- rette paper.'
'tobacco which has been cut or otherwise split, twisted or pressed into blocks and is capable of being smoked without further industrial processing'. 6. More recently the First and Second Direc- tives — which were subject to a number of other amendments not relevant to the present case — have been consolidated in a single text by Council Directive 95/59/EC. 4
5. The First and Second Directives were amended by Council Directive 92/78/EEC. 3 Article 2(3) of the latter directive replaced Article 3(1) of the Second Directive by the following provision:
7. The Danish rules applicable at the mate- rial time were laid down by Law N o 614 of 1988 on Tobacco Duties, as amended by Law N o 825 of 1989. Paragraph 1 of the Law set ' 1 . The following shall be deemed to be ciga- out the tax rates for cigarettes, cigarette papers, rettes: smoking tobacco, chewing tobacco and snuff. Cigarettes were taxed at 60.68 øre each, plus 21.22% of the retail price given on the ciga- rette pack. A distinction was made between fine-cut and coarse-cut tobacco, the former (a) rolls of tobacco capable of being smoked being taxed substantially more heavily at DKR as they are and which are not cigars or 531.00 per kg. Cigarette papers were taxed at cigarillos within the meaning of Article 2; 2 øre each. Although the Law did not itself contain definitions of the various tobacco products, Article 33 of the Law empowered the Minister for Fiscal Affairs to lay down the rules necessary to implement the Law, including provisions defining tobacco prod- (b) rolls of tobacco which, by simple non- ucts in accordance with the provisions laid industrial handling, are inserted into down by the European Communities. At the cigarette-paper tubes; material time no definitions had been laid
3 — Council Directive 92/78/EEC of 19 October 1992 unending Directives 72/464/EEC and 79/32/EEC on taxes other thin 4 — Council Directive 95/59/EC of 27 November 1995 on taxes turnover taxes which are levied on the consumption of manu- other than turnover taxes which affect the consumption of factured tobacco, OJ 1992 L 316, p. 5. manufactured tobacco, OJ 1995 L 291, p. 40.
I - 5258
BRINKMANN TABAKFABRIKEN v SKATTEMINISTERIET
down under that provision. It is however trict customs authority that Westpoint was common ground between the parties to the taxable as fine-cut smoking tobacco. Later in main proceedings that the definitions of the same year one of Brinkmann's competi- tobacco products in the Second Directive are tors obtained an identical ruling from another directly applicable in Danish law. district authority. That ruling was upheld on appeal by the Told-og Skattestyrelse (the Cus- toms and Excise Authority) but then over- turned on further appeal by the Momsnævn (VAT Board), the highest Danish administra- tive authority in matters of taxation. By a The facts and the national court's questions decision of 14 May 1990, confirmed by a fur- ther decision of 23 October 1990, the Board ruled that Westpoint should be taxed as ciga- rettes, which attract a higher rate of duty than smoking tobacco.
8. The applicant in the main proceedings, Brinkmann Tabakfabriken G m b H ('Brink- mann'), is a German company which manu- factures and sells tobacco products. In 1988 it acquired an exclusive licence to produce and sell in Denmark and other countries a tobacco product called 'Westpoint'. The product com- prises a packet containing 25 g of fine-cut smoking tobacco divided up into 30 industri- ally produced rolls of tobacco enveloped in porous cellulose. Each roll of tobacco is 68.6 mm long and consists of approximately 833 mg of fine-cut tobacco. The rolls of 10. O n 2 April 1990, shortly before the tobacco cannot be smoked simply by being decision of 14 May 1990, Brinkmann launched lit but must first be covered in cigarette paper. Westpoint on the Danish market. Brinkmann's Brinkmann sells separately specially designed Danish distributor was informed by the VAT cigarette-paper tubes into which the West- Board of the appeal proceedings before it four point tobacco rolls can be inserted. Alterna- days later, on 6 April 1990. At the hearing tively the product can be wrapped in ordi- before the Board on 1 May 1990 Brinkmann nary cigarette papers. asked the Board, in the event of the latter's decision being unfavourable to it, to suspend the operation of the decision in order to limit Brinkmann's losses in the event of the Board's decision being inconsistent with a ruling by this Court. Brinkmann's request was refused by the Board in its decision of 14 May 1990 and, although repeated at a re-hearing of the 9. In April 1989 Brinkmann's Danish dis- case, was again refused by the Board in its tributor obtained a ruling from a Danish dis- decision of 23 October 1990.
I - 5259
OPINION OF MR JACOBS — CASE C-319/96
11. Brinkmann brought proceedings before same size, consistency and unifor- the referring court by an application of 8 mity; January 1991, claiming that the Danish Min- istry for Fiscal Affairs was obliged to classify Westpoint as smoking tobacco. It also claimed that, since the combined effect of the higher rate of duty on the rolls of tobacco and the duty payable on the cigarette papers and tubes had forced Westpoint out of the Danish — each roll of tobacco is 68.6 mm long market, it was entitled to compensation for and consists of approximately 833 mg all the losses thereby incurred. of fine-cut smoking tobacco wrapped in cellulose, and pressed out into a thin block;
12. Against that background the national court seeks a preliminary ruling from this — the wrapping is porous, and the roll Court on the following questions: of tobacco cannot be smoked as it is but must be inserted into a cigarette- paper tube or wrapped in ordinary cigarette paper, which in both cases can be done without the use of imple- ments?
'1. Should the definitions in the Council's Second Directive (79/32/EEC) of 18 December 1978 on taxes other than turnover taxes which affect the consump- tion of manufactured tobacco, in the If the answer to Question 1 is that the version in force on 14 May 1990, be product should be classified as smoking interpreted to the effect that a product tobacco, the Court is asked to reply to with the following characteristics should the following questions: be classified as cigarettes or as smoking tobacco:
2. Under Community law is an under- taking entitled to compensation for every loss suffered by it as a consequence of a — there is a packet containing 25 g of Member State's infringement of Com- fine-cut smoking tobacco divided up munity law, consisting in the fact that an into 30 rolls of tobacco, industrially authority responsible for the final admin- manufactured, each roll being of the istrative decision as to which tax group
I - 5260
BRINKMANN TABAKFABRIKEN v SKATTEMINISTERIET
a tobacco product should fall under has 4. Does it matter, as regards the answer to reached a decision which conflicts with Question 2, that the authorities refused Article 3(1) of Directive 79/32/EEC and, to suspend the operation of the authori- if so, what are the conditions governing ty's decision as requested by the plaintiff such liability? with a view to limiting its losses?'
Question 1 3 (a) Are the definitions of manufactured tobacco products in Directive 79/32/EEC properly implemented in a Member State if the Minister for Fiscal Affairs is, by law, empowered to lay down provisions concerning the definitions of tobacco products in compliance with the provisions 13. Brinkmann contends that Westpoint was laid down by the European Com- to be classified as smoking tobacco under the munities, where no legal provisions Second Directive in its original form. The have been adopted pursuant to the Danish Ministry for Fiscal Affairs, the Finnish Law. Government and the Commission consider that it was to be classified as a cigarette.
If Question 3(a) is answered in the negative, the Court of Justice is asked to reply to the following question: 14. I share Brinkmann's view that Westpoint fell to be classified as smoking tobacco. That conclusion is supported by the wording of the Directive and is consistent with its aims.
3 (b) Does it matter, as regards the answer to Question 2, that the definitions in the Tobacco Directive were not implemented in the Member State if the national authority, in its decision, 15. As regards the wording of the Directive, referred to the definitions, and the it is true that there is no specific definition of parties to the case before the national a product such as Westpoint in the Second court are in agreement that the defi- Directive. Nevertheless, it seems to me that nitions in the Directive are directly the product corresponds more closely to the applicable? definition of smoking tobacco. The definition
I - 5261
OPINION OF MR JACOBS — CASE C-319/96
of cigarettes is a precise one comprising three by Directive 92/78. That provision sets out characteristics: (a) they must be rolls of three independent definitions of a cigarette: tobacco; (b) they must be capable of being 'rolls of tobacco capable of being smoked as smoked 'as they are'; and (c) they must not they are' (subparagraph (a)); 'rolls of tobacco be cigars or cigarillos. It is common ground which, by simple non-industrial handling, are that Westpoint lacks the second characteristic. inserted into cigarette-paper tubes' (subpara- graph (b)); and 'rolls of tobacco which, by simple non-industrial handling, are wrapped in cigarette paper' (subparagraph (c)). That formulation is inconsistent with the view that Directive 92/78 merely clarified rather than extended the definition of a cigarette. Sub- 16. Smoking tobacco, on the other hand, is paragraph (a), the original provision, remains defined as 'tobacco which has been cut or untouched. Westpoint is not classified as a otherwise split, twisted or pressed into blocks cigarette by virtue of that provision but by and is capable of being smoked without fur- virtue of the new free-standing definitions in ther industrial processing'. Westpoint has subparagraphs (b) and (c). those characteristics. It has been cut and is capable of being smoked without further industrial processing. That is so notwith- standing the fact that it has the additional characteristic of being enveloped in porous cellulose, a characteristic that does not bring it within the definition of a cigarette.
19. Moreover, the transitional provision in Article 3(1), which allows Germany to con- tinue to tax the rolls of tobacco referred to in (b) as fine-cut smoking tobacco, tends to sup- port the view that Westpoint fell outside the original definition. At the very least it shows 17. I am not persuaded by the argument put that the Council accepted that the original forward by the Danish Ministry and Finnish provision was sufficiently open to that inter- Government that cigars must sometimes be pretation to justify a transitional provision cut before they can be smoked and to that for a Member State where a manufacturer extent cannot be smoked 'as they are' either. established there had invested on the basis of What the term 'as they are' implies is that the that interpretation. product must be finished. A cigar, even where it must be cut, is a finished product. It does not entail assembly of two separately mar- keted products.
20. The conclusion that Westpoint did not meet the definition of a cigarette under the 18. Support for the above view is to be found Directive in its original form is moreover in Article 3(1) of the Directive, as amended supported by the account provided by the
I - 5262
BRINKMANN TABAKFABRIKEN v SKATTEMINISTERIET
national court in its order for reference of the Directive by distinguishing between 'fine-cut rulings given by national authorities. It appears tobacco for the rolling of cigarettes' and 'other that the product was classified as smoking smoking tobacco'. The former is defined in a tobacco in Germany, the United Kingdom new Article 4a of the Second Directive intro- and, following an appeal, the Netherlands. duced by Article 2(4) of Directive 92/78. Moreover, it was also so classified in Den- mark by two district customs offices and the Customs and Excise authority; the Danish VAT Board alone took a different view.
22. In the light of the above it is apparent that the root of the problem in this case is that there is inherent potential for distortion of competition where fine-cut smoking tobacco is taxed at a lower rate than ciga- rettes. The two products are in competition to a significant degree. It is perhaps for that reason that Denmark imposes a tax on the cigarette papers themselves and on cigarette- paper tubes such as those sold by Brinkmann. If such a tax were pitched at an appropriate 21. Turning to the aims of the legislation, I rate it would presumably be possible to cancel do not think they provide conclusive guid- out the advantage of the lower rate of tax on ance. As the Danish Ministry maintains, the fine-cut tobacco used for making cigarettes. legislation seeks to prevent distortions of com- petition between the different categories of tobacco belonging to the same group: see the fifth recital in the preamble to the First Direc- tive. Some guidance about the thinking behind the Directive can be obtained from the explan- atory memorandum accompanying the Com- mission's proposal for a Second Directive, 23. Inevitably, therefore, Westpoint is poten- cited in the Danish Ministry's observations. tially in competition both with finished ciga- The Commission considered that the inclu- rettes and with fine-cut smoking tobacco sion of all smoking tobacco within a single (which can be used to roll cigarettes either group was justified by the fact that, according manually or using one of the devices designed to the Commission, all such tobacco, even for that purpose available on the market). It fine-cut tobacco, could be smoked in a pipe. is possible that the somewhat easier assembly The Commission was nevertheless concerned of Westpoint may attract some consumers that, because fine-cut tobacco could also be who would normally prefer the convenience used by consumers for rolling their own ciga- of the finished product and would not other- rettes, there might be a distortion of compe- wise be tempted to roll their own cigarettes tition between fine-cut smoking tobacco and despite the price advantage. To that extent cigarettes. It proposed to keep the matter taxing Westpoint as smoking tobacco would under review. Subsequently, Article 1(2) of exacerbate the potential distortion of compe- Directive 92/78 amended the categories of tition between cigarettes and fine-cut smoking manufactured tobacco in Article 3 of the First tobacco. It is however unclear what propor-
I - 5263
OPINION OF MR JACOBS — CASE C-319/96
tion, if any, of smokers who prefer finished — the taste never alters; cigarettes Westpoint would be able to attract. The need for assembly will be inconvenient in many social contexts. Moreover, the degree of manipulation and dexterity still required and the disadvantage of the product being in two separate boxes seems likely in practice t o — there is always a uniform smoking ratio prove a significant deterrent for many (smoking time and draw); smokers.
— there is always a uniform, previously- determined content of harmful substances in relation to a particular cigarette-paper tube;
24. Competition with fine-cut smoking tobacco seems equally, if not more, likely. For some smokers the rolling of their own ciga- rettes may be motivated by factors uncon- nected with the price, such as image, which — it is extremely simple to make up a ciga- might make Westpoint unattractive (although rette directly comparable to a factory- Westpoint, like loose tobacco, can also be produced cigarette; wrapped in cigarette papers). However, for smokers whose primary motive for rolling their own cigarettes is that it is cheaper, West- point seems likely to be an attractive proposi- tion (provided that the price of the product compares favourably with self-rolled ciga- — there is no tobacco cylinder wrapping rettes). Indeed the characteristics of West- which has to be thrown away; point mentioned in the Danish patent suggest that it was designed to compete primarily with smoking tobacco for rolling cigarettes:
— it is subject to more favourable tax treat- ment as compared with industrially- prepared cigarettes'.
'-— the tobacco is measured out precisely beforehand during the industrial manu- The sole advantage which Westpoint has by facturing process; comparison with cigarettes, namely a lower
I - 5264
BRINKMANN TABAKFABRIKEN v SKATTEMINISTERIET
rate of tax, is shared by fine-cut smoking 26. Consequently, although the view taken tobacco. by the Council, when it amended the Direc- tive, that Westpoint was in sufficiently close competition with cigarettes to be classified as such can certainly not be said to be wrong or unreasonable, I do not think any conclusive arguments can be drawn from the Directive's aims for the purpose of interpreting the orig- inal provision. For similar reasons the Danish Ministry's reference to the principles laid down by the Court in the context of Article 95 of the Treaty does not get us any further. As the Danish Government states, in Com- mission v Denmark 5 the Court, referring to Rewe, 6 held that in order to determine whether products are similar for the purposes of the prohibition laid down in the first para- graph of Article 95 it was necessary to con- sider 'whether they have similar characteris- tics and meet the same needs from the point 25. It is true, as the Commission points out, of view of consumers'. As already noted, it is that the characteristics of Westpoint are such at least arguable that on that test Westpoint is as to make it resemble more closely an indus- closer to fine-cut smoking tobacco than t o cigarettes because, like such tobacco, it lacks trially produced cigarette. To that extent it the key characteristic of a cigarette, as defined more closely fulfils the same needs as such a in the legislation, of being ready to smoke cigarette. However, it might be replied that and to that extent also fails to serve the same Westpoint still lacks the main distinguishing need as an industrially produced cigarette. feature of an industrially produced cigarette, namely being ready to smoke. Indeed, if by virtue of being subject to a higher duty West- point were priced at the same level as ciga- rettes then, unless a consumer had a very strong preference for the particular taste of Westpoint, the aforesaid disadvantages seem such as to dissuade him from buying it. Taxing Westpoint as a cigarette when it failed to meet such an essential need would be likely to render it uncompetitive. O n the other hand, taxing the product as smoking tobacco would 27. I therefore conclude that under the Second allow it to compete on equal fiscal terms with Directive, in its original form, a product such fine-cut tobacco for rolling cigarettes, its par- as Westpoint was to be classified as smoking ticular advantages over such tobacco attracting tobacco within the meaning of Article 4(1) of some but certainly not all smokers who have the Directive. traditionally rolled their own cigarettes. In other words, classification as smoking tobacco might on balance produce the lesser distor- 5 — Case 106/84 [1986] ECR 833. tion of competition. 6 — Case 45/75 REWE v Hauptzollamt Landau [1976] ECR 181.
I - 5265
OPINION OF MR JACOBS — CASE C-319/96
Questions 2, 3 and 4 and damage caused to individuals as a result of breaches of Community law for which the State can be held responsible is inherent in the system of the Treaty (see, in particular, Joined Cases C-46/93 and 48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame [1996] ECR I-1029, paragraph 31, and Joined Cases C-178/94, 28. By its remaining questions, which may C-179/94, C-188/94, C-189/94 and C-190/94 conveniently be answered together, the Dillenkofer and Others [1996] ECR I-4845, national court inquires about the conditions paragraph 20). under which a Member State incurs liability for loss occasioned as a consequence of incor- rect classification of a product under the Directive (Question 2); in that connection the national court asks whether it is relevant that the authorities refused to suspend the opera- tion of the decision at the applicant's request (Question 4). The national court also asks whether the definitions of manufactured In those judgments, the Court, having regard tobacco products in the Directive are prop- to the circumstances of the cases, held that erly implemented if the Minister for Fiscal Community law recognises the existence of a Affairs is empowered to lay down definitions right to reparation when three conditions are of tobacco products but has not done so met: the rule of law infringed must be intended (Question 3(a)); if not, the national court also to confer rights on individuals; the breach asks whether it matters, as regards the answer must be sufficiently serious; and there must to Question 2, that the parties to the case are be a direct causal link between the breach of in agreement that the definitions in the Direc- the obligation resting on the State and the tive are directly applicable (Question 3(b)). damage suffered by the injured parties (Bras- serie du Pêcheur and Factortame, cited above, paragraph 51, and Dillenkofer and Others, cited above, paragraphs 21 and 23). The Court has in particular held that those conditions apply where a Member State incorrectly trans- poses a Community directive into national 29. In that regard the Court's ruling in Den- law (Case C-392/93 British Telecommunica- kavit 7 contains a useful statement of the rel- tions [1996] ECR I-1631, paragraph 40). evant principles:
'According to the consistent case-law of the While it is, in principle, for national courts to Court, the principle of State liability for loss determine whether the conditions for State liability for breach of Community law are met, it must be held that in this instance the 7 — Joined Cases C-283/94, C-291/94 and C-292/94 Denkavit Court has all the information necessary in Internationaal and Others v Bundesamt für Finanzen [1996] ECR I-5063. order to judge whether the facts presented are
I - 5266
BRINKMANN TABAKFABRIKEN v SKATTEMINISTERIET
to be characterised as a sufficiently serious in ministerial provisions but from the authori- breach of Community law. ties' misapplication of the Directive. Thus, in the light of the principles set out above, the question arises whether, having regard to the clarity and precision of the relevant provision of the Directive, Denmark manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits of its powers.
It follows from the Court's case-law that a breach is sufficiently serious if a Community institution or a Member State, in the exercise of its rule-making powers, manifestly and gravely disregards the limits on those powers (Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, cited above, paragraph 55, and Dillenkofer and Others, cited above, paragraph 25). One of the factors that may be taken into consider- 31. In my view it is clear that it did not. As ation in this regard is the clarity and preci- Denmark and the Commission point out, sion of the rule breached (Brasserie du Pêcheur Westpoint does not correspond exactly to and Factortame, cited above, paragraph 56, either of the relevant definitions in the Direc- and British Telecommunications, cited above, tive — it falls between two stools. N o r is paragraph 42).' 8 clear guidance to be obtained from the aims of the Directive. It was therefore necessary for the authorities of the Member States t o make a choice between the two definitions.
30. Before applying those principles to the present case it is appropriate to answer Ques- tion 3. It is clear that the mere conferring of a power on the Minister to lay down imple- menting provisions does not constitute ade- quate implementation of the Directive. H o w - 32. Although I have on balance opted for ever, the fact that the Danish authorities apply Brinkmann's interpretation of the Directive, the definitions in the Directive is relevant to Denmark's view is shared in these proceed- the question of the Member State's liability. ings by Finland and by the Commission and Where the authorities of a Member State seek also appears to have been taken by a Neth- to apply the definitions in the Directive, but erlands Customs Inspector. It cannot be said do so incorrectly, any resultant loss arises not to be untenable or to have been adopted in from non-implementation of the definitions bad faith. Indeed Denmark's view that clas- sification as a cigarette flows from the aims of the Directive was evidently shared by the 8 — Paragraphs 47 to 50 of the judgment. Council in amending the Directive.
I - 5267
OPINION OF MR JACOBS — CASE C-319/96
33. Since it was unclear how the provisions damages claims. If in a case such as the present in issue were to be applied to a product such a national court considers the interpretation as Westpoint, Denmark's breach of those pro- of a provision to be in doubt, it may make a visions cannot be considered sufficiently reference to the Court and, provided that the serious to give rise to liability under the requisite conditions are fulfilled, consider abovementioned rulings. There is therefore granting interim relief, such as suspension of no need to consider the other conditions for collection of the higher rate subject to the liability set out in those rulings. provision by the taxpayer of appropriate guar- antees.
34. As regards Question 4, the fact that the authority refused to suspend its decision has 35. Finally, since it has not been suggested no bearing on Denmark's liability in damages that under Danish law Denmark would incur in the present case. The contrary view would liability in damages for an equivalent breach be liable to paralyse administrative decision- of national law, it appears that Denmark will making since administrative authorities would not incur liability under the principle that be unable to implement their decisions in claims based on Community law must not be other than the clearest of cases without treated less favourably than those based on exposing themselves to potentially substantial national law.
Conclusion
36. A c c o r d i n g l y I am of the o p i n i o n t h a t the questions referred b y the Ø s t r e L a n d - sret s h o u l d b e a n s w e r e d as follows:
(1) A p r o d u c t consisting of a roll of t o b a c c o w r a p p e d in p o r o u s cellulose w h i c h c a n n o t b e s m o k e d as it is b u t must first b e inserted i n t o a cigarette-paper t u b e o r w r a p p e d in o r d i n a r y cigarette p a p e r fell t o b e classified as s m o k i n g t o b a c c o u n d e r Article 4(1) of C o u n c i l Directive 7 9 / 3 2 / E E C in t h e version in force o n 14 M a y 1990.
I - 5268
BRINKMANN TABAKFABRIKEN v SKATTEMINISTERIET
(2) A Member State whose authorities, in applying the definitions in Directive 79/32, mistakenly classified such a product as a cigarette under Article 3(1) of the Directive does not incur liability by virtue of Community law to repair any loss or damage resulting from the mistaken classification, unless in similar cir- cumstances such liability would arise in respect of a breach of national law.
I - 5269