C-346/96
ECLI:EU:C:1997:544
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BIRB v PROLACTO
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL LÉGER delivered on 13 November 1997
1. The question on which the Court is asked 4. According to Article ll(6)(b), no tender is to give a ruling is the exact extent to which a to be valid unless it is also accompanied by tenderer who has been awarded a contract to proof that the tendering security referred to deliver skimmed-milk powder as food aid is in Article 12 has been lodged before the final liable for the financial consequences of his date for submission of tenders. failure to fulfil his obligations.
5. Under Article 12(1), second indent, in the I — The relevant Community provisions case of milk purchased on the Community market, the tendering security is to be 3 % of the intervention price for skimmed-milk powder applicable to the quantity to which the tender relates.
2. Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1354/83 of 17 May 1983 1 ('the Regulation') lays down general rules for the mobilisation 6. Article 11(7) provides that tenders may and supply of skimmed-milk powder as food not be withdrawn. aid.
7. Under Article 14(1), the contract is to be awarded to the tenderer whose tender is the 3. Article 9(1) of the Regulation provides for lowest. a tendering procedure to determine the costs of supply, including, where appropriate, the price for the purchase or the manufacture and packaging of the skimmed-milk powder.
8. Article 16(2) provides that the successful * Original language: French. tenderer may not unilaterally cancel the 1 — Regulation laying down general rules for the mobilisation operation for which he has been awarded the ana supply of skimmed-milk powder, butter and buttcroil as food aid (OJ 1983 L 142, p. 1). contract. Article 16(4) requires the successful
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tenderer to provide the competent bodies 10. Article 26(5) and (6) of the Regulation concerned with the necessary information as provides: promptly as possible for immediate trans mission to the Commission.
'5. Where, for reasons attributable to the successful tenderer, the shipment period as specified in the notice of invitation to tender 9. Article 25 of the Regulation provides that: ... has not been observed, the body con cerned shall withhold, for each day's delay, in proportion to the quantities not shipped:
'1 . The successful tenderer shall bear all the financial consequences of a failure to supply — 1 % of the amount of the tendering secu some or all of the goods on the terms stipu rity in the case of goods purchased on the lated, if the recipient has made supply pos Community market or goods manufac sible on such terms. tured therefrom,
If, for reasons attributable to the successful tenderer, shipment has not been made within three months of the expiry date of the ship ment period as specified in the notice of invi tation to tender ... the body responsible for payment shall release the successful tenderer from his obligations. In such cases the Com 6. All the secundes shall be forfeit in the mission shall take appropriate action. event of the successful tenderer's being released from his obligations in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 25(1).' 3
2. The costs arising from a failure to supply the goods as a result of a case of force majeure shall be borne by the body respon 11. Commission Decision 87/203/EEC of sible for payment.' 10 March 1987 fixed at a maximum of
2 — My emphasis. 3 — Ibidem.
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94 100 tonnes the quantity of milk powder 14. On 5 March 1987, the Agency notified to be supplied as food aid for 1987. Prolacto that its tenders had been accepted, with the reminder that the milk had to be supplied in accordance with the Regulation. The milk had to be shipped by 30 April 1987 on vessels supplied by the recipient of the food aid. II — The facts and proceedings before the national court
15. On 7 August 1987, Prolacto advised the Agency that it was unable to carry out the 12. Two Commission Regulations provided deliveries. for the supply by intervention bodies (in the case of Belgium, the Belgisch Interventie- en Restitutiebureau, hereinafter referred to as 'the Agency') of various lots of skimmed- 5 milk powder as food aid.
16. By registered letter of 20 August 1987, the Agency informed Prolacto that, as the result of the failure to supply, the tendering The first tendering procedure securities, amounting to BFR 573 330 and BFR 667 238, would be declared forfeit, unless Prolacto paid the corresponding amounts, which it did.
13. Prolacto NV, a company governed by Belgian law (hereinafter 'Prolacto' or 'the tendering company'), submitted tenders for The second tendering procedure two lots on the final date for submission of tenders, 23 February 1987, under Regulation No 345/87. The skimmed-milk powder was to be purchased by Prolacto on the Commu nity market.
17. Prolacto submitted tenders for four lots 4 — Decision fixing the overall quantities of food aid and estab- under Regulation No 1358/87 on the final lishing a list of products to be supplied as aid for 1987 (OJ date for submission of tenders, 20 May 1987. 1987 L 80, p. 32). 5 — Commission Regulations (EEC) No 345/87 of 3 February The skimmed-milk powder was to be 1987 and (EEC) No 1358/87 of 15 May 1987 on the supply purchased by Prolacto on the Community of various lots of skimmed-milk powder as food aid (OJ 1987 L 34, p. 8 and L 131, p. 1). market.
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18. On 22 May 1987, the Agency notified been delivered and the price which Prolacto Prokcto that its tenders had been accepted, had originally tendered for those lots. with the reminder that the supply had to be made in accordance with the Regulation. The milk was to be shipped by 30 June 1987 in ships provided by the recipient of food aid.
23. According to a letter from the Commis sion of 17 July 1991, that sum has been charged to the Belgian State, which was asked to recover it from Prolacto.
19. Prolacto failed to effect the delivery which it had undertaken to make. On 13 October 1987, it notified the Agency that it was unable to make delivery. 24. By registered letter of 3 October 1991, the Agency served notice on Prolacto to pay it the sum of BFR 50 781 099 in pursuance of Article 25 of the Regulation, together with default interest from 1 November 1991, before initiating recovering proceedings, on 15 April 1992, before the Rechtbank van 20. By letter of 16 October 1987, the Eerste Aanleg (Court of First Instance), Agency notified Prolacto that it was obliged Brussels. to declare forfeit the securities lodged for the four lots in question.
III — The question submitted by the national court
21. In accordance with the last sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 25(1), the Commission decided to hold new tendering procedures for the lots which Prolacto had 25. Being in doubt as to the extent of the failed to deliver. obligations placed on the tendering company under the Regulation following its failure to supply, the national court stayed the pro ceedings and submitted the following ques tion to the Court for a preliminary ruling:
22. Although the award for the lots was made to the tenderer submitting the lowest tender, the total additional costs amounted to BFR 50 781 099, being the difference 'In the context of a tender for the supply of between the total cost of the new tendering skimmed-milk powder as food aid on the procedures for the six lots which had not basis of Commission Regulations (EEC)
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Nos 345/87 and 1358/87, of 3 February 1987 successful tenderer is liable for both obliga and 15 May 1987 respectively, and the asso tions, it should be clarified whether the two ciated tendering securities lodged pursuant amounts have to be aggregated or whether to Article 12 of Commission Regulation the tendering security must be deducted (EEC) No 1354/83 of 17 May 1983, may a from the 'financial consequences' incumbent legal person who subsequently failed to fulfil upon the successful tenderer. its obligations and did not effect delivery be also the subject of a claim for payment of compensation on the part of the Belgisch Interventie- en Restitutiebureau pursuant to Article 25(1) of Regulation (EEC) No 1354/83 when all the tendering securities The coexistence of both obligations have been declared forfeit to that agency?'
26. The question of the national court is 29. The right to recover from the defaulting essentially whether the Regulation should be successful tenderer the sum representing the interpreted as meaning that a successful ten 'financial consequences' referred to in Article derer who fails to carry out the contract to 25(1) of the Regulation in addition to the supply goods awarded as food aid is still tendering securities declared forfeit is clear liable for all the financial consequences, pur from the wording. suant to Article 25(1) of the Regulation, when the tendering securities have been declared forfeit under Article 26(6) of the Regulation.
30. By providing that: 'The successful ten derer shall bear all the financial consequences of a failure to supply ... the goods on the 27. In my opinion, the reply to the question terms stipulated', the Community legislature should address two separate issues. clearly postulates the successful tenderer's liability for additional costs arising from the failure to carry out the operation.
28. First, it should be clarified whether or not the lodging of securities excludes the liability of the successful tenderer for the whole of the 'financial consequences' of his 31. There is an exception to the rule in that failure to supply the goods. Secondly, if the the costs are borne by the body responsible
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for payment where the failure to carry out the successful tenderer's being 'released from the operation is the result of force majeure. his obligations in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 25(1)'. The primary obligation of the successful tenderer is to supply goods to the recipient, and accord ingly the obligation from which the success ful tenderer is released and which determines 32. In this case, however, such a possibility the outcome regarding the security is not, as was expressly ruled out by the national Prolacto would have it, the obligation to court, which declared that 'the defendant 8 assume the 'financial consequences' of the was not a victim of force majeure'. failure to supply referred to in Article 25(1). When the body responsible for payment finds that the delay of the successful tenderer has exceeded a reasonable period, set in this case at three months, it will abandon its 33. Prolacto argues that the effect of Article cooperation with that tenderer for the opera 25 and Article 26(6) of the Regulation read tion. New tendering procedures may thus be together is that when a successful tenderer initiated in order to remedy the omissions of who has defaulted is released from his obli the tenderer. That is when the security is for gations, only the tendering security is forfeit. feit; but the successful tenderer remains The tendering security is to be substituted liable to pay the financial consequences for the financial consequences of Article under Article 25(1), as both obligations arise 25(1). It operates as a type of penalty clause, from the failure to carry out the operation. the purpose of the substitution being to pro tect the position of the intervention bodies, which will be compensated without having 9 to show proof of the extent of the damage.
10 34. Even read together, those texts do not 36. As the Commission points out, under admit such an interpretation. the Regulation, tenders may not be with 1 drawn 1and the successful tenderer may not unilaterally cancel the operation for which 12 he has been awarded the contract. In this context, it is evident that he cannot be released from his obligations unless the body 35. Article 26(6) of the Regulation provides responsible for payment makes a formal for the security to be forfeit in the event of decision to that effect, within the meaning of the second subparagraph of Article 25(1). It is, however, inconceivable that the same 6 — The body responsible for payment is, under Article 23 of the decision would at the same time release him Regulation, the intervention agency to which the tender was submitted. 7 — Article 25(2) of the Regulation. 8 — Page 7 of the English translation of the reference document. See also pp. 5 and 6. 10 — Point 39 of the Commission's written observations. 9 — Pages 9 and 10 of the French translation of the Commis- 11 — Article 11(7). sion's written observations. 12 — Article 16(2).
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from his obligation to compensate for the incurred, where the amounts in question financial consequences of his failure to bear no relation to one another. supply.
37. It should, moreover, be emphasised that 40. The costs in question may, in fact, prove the procedure in the second subparagraph of to be considerable, as in the present case Article 25(1) does not allow any margin of where variations in market rates and new discretion on the part of the body respon tendering procedures have given rise to an sible for payment, which must release the additional cost of BFR 50 781 099, whereas successful tenderer from his obligations as the tendering security was set at 3 % of the soon as a period of three months has elapsed, intervention price for skimmed-milk powder with the result that the security is forfeit applicable for the quantity to which the ten whenever there is a delay of that length. It is der related, namely BFR 5 400 000. therefore unclear whether the forfeiture of the security was to exclude compensation for the 'financial consequences' of the failure to supply, which would explain the existence of the first subparagraph of Article 25(1), which covers exclusively compensation for the financial consequences of delays of under 41. The two provisions are not mutually three months. exclusive and the forfeiture of the security appears to me to be compatible with liability for the additional costs arising from the fail ure to supply.
38. I note too that the compensation payable under the above legislation arises only where there is failure to supply goods on the terms The aggregation of the amounts stipulated, which signifies ultimate failure to supply, of the kind attributable to Prolacto, rather than short delays.
42. Aggregation may be either total, so that the successful tenderer who has defaulted is 39. It is, moreover, hard to conceive that an to be liable both for the security and for the intervention body, in order to avoid long or 'financial consequences' of the failure to sup complex calculations, would be content with ply the goods, or limited to the amount of a security, and forgo compensation for the damage suffered, which would entail deduct whole of the additional costs which it has ing from that amount the forfeited security.
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43. The extent of the aggregation would, in compensatory in nature. In such a case, the my view, depend upon the objective of each application of the security towards compen of the two provisions. As the Commission sation for the damage would justify a corre has rightly observed, those objectives dif sponding reduction in the compensation 13 fer. sought, the compensation due to the Agency being in part recovered by forfeiture of the securities.
44. Under the first subparagraph of Article 25(1) of the Regulation the successful ten derer is liable in the event of a failure to sup 47. That, however, is not the purpose of the ply goods. As the Court has found, such security. liability in relation to food aid is of a con 14 tractual nature.
15 48. The security is, first of all, a guarantee. In a similar case the Court held that the security '[was] solely to ensure that the 45. The successful tenderer becomes liable trader receiving the refund honours his for additional costs arising from his default 16 undertakings'. It ensures, initially, the where he fails to fulfil his obligation to sup good faith of tenderers in submitting their ply goods on the terms stipulated. tender to supply by making its validity sub ject to proof that the security 'has been lodged before the final date for submission 17 of tenders'. Secondly, it guarantees that the tendering company will adhere to the terms of the contract awarded.
46. The securities which have been declared forfeit by the Agency can only be deducted from the amount of the claim made under Article 25(1) of the Regulation if they are
49. Above all, the security becomes a pen 13 — Paragraphs 60 to 67 of the Commission's observations. alty when the obligation which it guarantees 14 — See, in particular, Case 109/83 Eurico [1984] ECR 3581, paragraph 19, and Case C-142/91 Cebag v Commission [1993] ECR I-553, paragraphs 11 and 12). The judgment in the second case was based on regulations adopted after Regulation No 1354/83, but the factors enabling the Court 15 — See W. Alexander, 'Perte de la caution (ou acquisition de la to reach its finding as to the contractual nature of the rela- garantie) en droit agricole communautaire', Cahiers de droit tions between the Commission and tenderers is to be found européen, 1988, No 4, p. 384, I B. in the present relevant legislation. As in the first case cited, the determination of the supply price in terms of the ten- 16 — Case 288/95 Piange Kraftfutterwerke [1987] ECR 611, derer's tender and its acceptance by the Commission within paragraph 10. See also, for example, Case 11/70 Internatio- the meaning of Article 11(4)(e), Article 13(1) and Article nale Handebgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125, paragraph 6, and 14(1) of the Regulation is consistent with contractual rela- Case 137/85 Maizena [1987] ECR 4587, paragraph 22. tions. 17 — Article 11(6)(b) of the Regulation.
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has not been fulfilled. Many agricultural was intended to ensure the performance of a regulations, in particular those relating to certain undertaking but which has been Community food aid for third countries, use released ceases to be a guarantee and 19 a system of securities. The Court is there becomes a penalty when the undertaking has fore frequently asked for a ruling on the not been complied with and no longer can be 22 compatibility with the principle of propor complied with'. This reasoning, in my tionality of the forfeiture of a security fol opinion, is perfectly capable of being applied lowing a breach of obligations laid down by here, as in this case the security is only for the regulations in question. On such occa feit if the successful tenderer has previously, sions it has consistently found, at least and finally, been released from his obliga implicitly, that the forfeiture of the security tions following a delay in loading attribut 23 constituted a penalty for a failure to fulfil able to him. 20 those obligations.
50. This characterisation is still more appar ent in the Maizena case, referred to earlier. 52. Consequently, Prolacto's qualification of The Court was asked for a ruling on the the security as a penalty clause, in particular validity of a Community regulation requir because it is a fixed sum of money by way of ing the provision of a fresh security in order indemnity, cannot be upheld. The fact that, to guarantee compliance with the obligation nevertheless, as in a penalty clause, the secu imposed on the holder of an export licence rity is fixed at a standard rate 24 indicates that to export products within the period of it is a penalty, a penalty being by definition a validity of the licence. Under the relevant sum bearing no relation to the extent of the system '... the security is released, at the damage. request of the person concerned, even though the obligation to export has not been fulfilled and thus continues to exist, [and] ... the fresh security must be provided, and is forfeited if it subsequently emerges that the obligation to export was not complied with during the period of validity of the export licence'. 21 53. On the contrary, the first subparagraph of Article 25(1) of the Regulation indicates the intention of the Community legislature to guarantee compensation for the whole of the damage suffered as the result of failure to deliver food aid. 51. The Court held that '... the provision of fresh security in the place of security which
22 — Paragraph 12. 23 — The application of this characterisation here is not affected 18 — See W. Alexander, cited above, III H. by the fact that the security was forfeited after fresh secu- rity had been provided, the situation where a fresh security 19 — See Case C-2/93 Exportslacbterijen van Oordegem [1994] is provided being no different from the situation where a ECR I-2283, paragraph 22. security has never been released. 20 — See in particular Case C-326/94 Maas [1996] ECR I-2643, 24 — It should be noted that the security is fixed and calculated paragraph 36. beforehand as a proportion of the intervention price of the 21 — Paragraph 11. goods in question.
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54. I would add that the deterrent function obligations and for the operation conse of the security would be undermined if its quently not to be carried out. forfeiture was subject to proof of damage. What is more, such a view would lead the intervention body simply to reimburse the amount of the security to the successful ten derer, even where the operation had not been 55. Accordingly, the difference in the nature carried out, were a new tendering process to and function of the security mechanism and be carried out with price levels such as to that of compensation for the 'financial con compensate for the additional costs arising sequences' of failure to supply would indi from the failure of the original successful cate that account should not be taken of the tenderer to deliver. In such a case, in fact, no amount of the security in calculating the sum damage could be shown. According to due from Prolacto by way of compensation Article 26(6) of the Regulation, for securities to the Agency. I find that it should, on the to be forfeit, it is sufficient for the successful contrary, be added to the total assessment of tenderer, having failed to deliver the goods damages arising from the failure by the suc within three months, to be released from his cessful tenderer to carry out his undertaking.
IV — Conclusion
56. In the light of the foregoing , I propose that the Court give the following reply to the question put by the Rechtbank van Eerste Aanleg , Brussels:
Commission Regulation ( EEC ) No 1354 / 83 of 17 May 1983 laying down general rules for the mobilisation and supply of skimmed-milk powder , butter and but- teroil as food aid, should be understood as meaning that the undertaking awarded a contract through a tendering procedure to make a supply of goods and which does not fulfil its obligation must bear all the financial consequences of that failure to supply , in accordance with the first subparagraph of Article 25(1) of the Regu lation , even where the tendering security has been declared forfeit under Article 26(6) of the Regulation , and the amount of the security may not be deducted from the sums due under the head of financial consequences within the meaning of Article 25 .
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