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Súdny dvor Európskej únie·2.4.1998

C-39/97

ECLI:EU:C:1998:159

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Súdny dvor Európskej únie
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61997CC0039

OPINION OF MR JACOBS — CASE C-39/97

OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL JACOBS delivered on 2 April 1998 *

1. Article 4(1)(b) of the Trade Marks Direc- The Trade Marks Directive tive 1 prohibits the registration of a trade mark if 'because of its identity with, or similarity to, [an] earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public, which includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark'.

4. The Trade Marks Directive harmonises the provisions of national trade-mark law which 'most directly affect the functioning of the internal market' (third recital of the preamble to the Directive). Thus it harmonises, inter 2. In order to oppose the registration of a alia, the grounds for refusing to register or mark on the basis of that provision it is invalidating a trade mark (Articles 3 and 4), accordingly necessary to show both that the and the rights conferred by a trade mark mark is identical or similar to an earlier mark (Article 5 et seq.). and that the goods or services covered by both marks are identical or similar.

3. The Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice) wishes to know whether, in assessing 5. Under Article 16(1) of the Directive, whether goods or services should be consid- Member States were required to implement ered to be similar within the meaning of that its provisions by 28 December 1991. H o w - provision, the degree of distinctiveness of an ever, by Decision 92/10/EEC, 2the Council earlier mark, in particular its reputation, may made use of the power conferred on it by be taken into account. Article 16(2) and postponed the deadline for implementing the Directive until 31 December 1992. * Original language: English. 1 — First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks, OJ 1989 L 40, p. 1. 2 — OJ 1992 L 6, p. 35.

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CANON KABUSHIKI KAISHA v METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER

6. Article 4(1) of the Directive, which con- proprietor shall be entitled to prevent all third cerns the ability to register a mark, provides parties not having his consent from using in that: the course of trade:

'A trade mark shall not be registered or, if registered, shall be liable to be declared invalid: (a) any sign which is identical with the trade mark in relation to goods or services which are identical with those for which the trade mark is registered; (a) if it is identical with an earlier trade mark, and the goods or services for which the trade mark is applied for or is registered are identical with the goods or services for which the earlier trade mark is pro- tected;

(b) any sign where, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade mark and (b) if because of its identity with, or simi- the sign, there exists a likelihood of con- larity to, the earlier trade mark and the fusion on the part of the public, which identity or similarity of the goods or ser- includes the likelihood of association vices covered by the trade marks, there between the sign and the trade mark.' exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public, which includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark.'

7. Similarly, Article 5(1), which specifies the rights conferred by a trade mark, provides that: 8. Marks with a reputation can benefit from yet further protection. Article 4(4)(a) gives Member States the option of refusing the reg- istration of a mark in certain circumstances if the mark is similar or identical to an earlier national mark which has a reputation, even 'The registered trade mark shall confer on the though the goods or services in respect of proprietor exclusive rights therein. The which the later mark's application is made are

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not similar to the goods or services in respect has a reputation in the Community. In con- of which the earlier mark is registered: trast to Article 4(4)(a), Article 4(3) requires, rather than merely empowers, Member States to afford such protection.

'Any Member State may furthermore provide that a trade mark shall not be registered or, if 10. Furthermore, Article 5(2) (which con- registered, shall be liable to be declared invalid cerns the use, as opposed to the registration, where, and to the extent that: of a later mark) gives Member States a similar option to that provided in Article 4(4)(a):

(a) the trade mark is identical with, or similar to, an earlier national trade mark within the meaning of paragraph 2 and is to be, 'Any Member State may also provide that the or has been, registered for goods or ser- proprietor shall be entitled to prevent all third vices which are not similar to those for parties not having his consent from using in which the earlier trade mark is registered, the course of trade any sign which is identical where the earlier trade mark has a reputa- with, or similar to, the trade mark in relation tion in the Member State concerned and to goods or services which are not similar to where the use of the later trade mark those for which the trade mark is registered, without due cause would take unfair where the latter has a reputation in the Member advantage of, or be detrimental to, the State and where use of that sign without due distinctive character or repute of the ear- cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detri- lier trade mark.' mental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark.'

9. Where the earlier mark is a Community 11. It should, however, be noted that, although trade mark provided for by the Community the question refers to marks with a reputa- Trade Mark Regulation, 3 Article 4(3) of the tion and Articles 4(4)(a) and 5(2) mention Directive allows for the same type of objec- such marks specifically, the Bundesgericht- tion to registration to be made by the owner shof has made it clear that the provision in of an earlier Community trade mark which question in the present case is Article 4(1 )(b) for the reasons explained below. 4

3 — Council Regulation (EC) N o 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark, OJ 1994 L 11, p. 1. 4 — See paragraph 26 below.

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The facts by 31 December 1992, 5 was implemented late into German law by a law adopted on 25 October 1994. The principal provisions of that law came into force on 1 January 1995. However, the Bundesgerichtshof explains that the present case must be judged on the basis of the law as it now stands, which gives effect to the Directive. The new German trade-mark 12. O n 29 July 1986, Pathe Communications law is called the Markengesetz and the Bundes- Corporation ('Pathe'), which is based in the gerichtshof explains that Article 9(1 )(2) of United States of America, submitted an appli- that law corresponds to Paragraph 4(1 )(b) of cation to register the word trade mark ' C A N - the Directive. N O N ' in respect of the following goods and services: 'films recorded on video tape cas- settes (video film cassettes); production, dis- tribution and projection of films for cinemas and television institutions'.

15. According to the Bundesgerichtshof, it must be assumed for the purposes of legal assessment that the two marks ' C A N N O N ' and 'Canon' sound identical. They are not, however, applied in respect of identical goods 13. That application was opposed by Canon and services. The question with which the Kabushiki Kaisha ('CKK') on the grounds German courts have been confronted is that it infringed its own word trade mark whether the respective goods and services can 'Canon'. That mark had already been regis- nevertheless be regarded as similar. tered, inter alia, in respect of 'still and motion picture cameras and projectors; television filming and recording devices, television trans- mission devices, television receiving and repro- duction devices, including tape and disc devices for television recording and repro- duction'. 16. When Pathe's application was examined by the German authorities the first examiner considered that the goods and services of the opposing parties were indeed similar and accordingly refused to register the mark ' C A N N O N ' . The second examiner set aside that decision and dismissed the opposition on 14. At the time the opposition by CKK was the ground that there was no similarity. CKK lodged the Trade Marks Directive had appealed to the Bundespatentgericht (Federal not been adopted and the national German Patent Court) but its appeal was dismissed by law on trade marks accordingly applied. That law is known as the Warenzeichengesetz ('the WZG'). The Directive, adopted on 21 December 1988 and due to be implemented 5 — Sec paragraph 5 above.

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an order dated 6 April 1994. CKK then However, it considered that the two sets of appealed to the Bundesgerichtshof and it is in goods were not similar. Disagreeing with the the context of those proceedings that the view taken by the Thirtieth Senate of the present reference has been made. Bundespatentgericht in a similar case, it stated that it could not be assumed that video film cassettes were similar to the television devices covered by CKK's mark or to the video cam- eras distributed by CKK.

17. The Bundespatentgericht dismissed CKK's appeal because it agreed with the second examiner that there was no similarity, within the meaning of Paragraph 5(4)(1) of the W Z G , between the parties' goods and 19. It explained that the Bundespatentgericht services. In its view, there could be similarity had already found, in 1989, that there was not only if the goods or services, in accordance a single manufacturer of leisure electronic with their economic significance and use, and devices to be found among the video tape with respect in particular to their usual places producers in the 1988 Seibt industry cata- of manufacture and sale, had such close points logue; no significant changes had taken place of contact that the average purchaser might in the meantime in that respect, at least in form the opinion that they came from the relation to recorded video cassettes; and same business operation. CKK claims that inquiries in relevant specialist shops had shown 76.6% of the population knew its mark in that no name of a manufacturer of television November 1985 and the Bundesgerichtshof devices or video recorders could be found in states that that must be taken as meaning that the range of recorded video cassettes. The the mark 'Canon' was a recognised mark. The Bundespatentgericht accordingly considered Bundespatentgericht, however, considered that that it could not be assumed that the relevant the reputation of CKK's mark was of no sig- average purchaser thought that recorded video nificance in assessing the similarity of the tapes and the corresponding recording and goods and services in question. reproduction devices came from the same business operation. Even members of the public were sufficiently aware of the different conditions for the manufacture of recorded cassettes and understood that video cassettes and video recorders do not come from the same manufacturer.

18. The Bundespatentgericht observed that the goods 'video film cassettes' specified in Pathe's application were closest to the goods 'television filming and recording devices, tele- vision transmission devices, television receiving and reproduction devices, including 20. The Bundespatentgericht also rejected the tape and disc devices for television recording possibility of similarity between the services and reproduction' covered by CKK's mark. specified in Pathe's application relating to

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'production, distribution and projection of The question films for cinemas and television institutions' and the television filming devices etc. pro- tected by CKK's mark. The Bundespatent- gericht considered that the fact that cameras and projectors were used to produce and project films did not mislead persons, to an extent relevant for trade-mark law purposes, to conclude that the producers of such devices regularly also produced, distributed or pro- 22. The Bundesgerichtshof has accordingly referred the following question to this Court jected films. for a preliminary ruling:

'May account be taken, when assessing the similarity of the goods or services covered by the two marks, of the distinctive character, in particular the reputation of the mark with earlier priority (on the date which determines 21. In its appeal against the order of the the seniority of the later mark), in particular Bundespatentgericht, CKK argues that, since in such a way that likelihood of confusion the implementation of the Trade Marks Direc- within the meaning of Article 4(1)(b) of the tive into German law, the approach of the Directive must be taken to exist even if the Bundespatentgericht to the assessment of the public attributes the goods and/or services t o similarity of goods or services is no longer different origins?' appropriate. It submits that its mark 'Canon' is a famous or well-known mark and that that fact, coupled with the fact that video film cas- settes and video recording and reproduction devices are offered through the same points of sale, should lead to the conclusion that the goods covered by the two marks are similar and that there is consequently a likelihood of the public being confused within the meaning 23. The Bundesgerichtshof explains that the of Paragraph 9(1)(2) of the Markengesetz. 6 essential question is whether the adoption of the Trade Marks Directive requires the German courts to change their approach in assessing the similarity of goods or services. It accordingly seeks to ascertain which cri- teria should be applied in assessing whether goods or services are similar within the 6 — As explained earlier, that provision corresponds to Article 4(1)(b) of the Directive. meaning of Article 4(1)(b) of the Directive.

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24. The order for reference contains the fol- relation to dissimilar goods and services by lowing information as to the implementation virtue of Article 4(4)(a) of the Directive. of the Directive. When implementing the Although that provision is optional, the Directive, the German legislature started from Bundesgerichtshof states that it has been the assumption that the concept of the simi- implemented into German law by Paragraph larity of goods or services could not be under- 9(1)(3) of the Markengesetz. However, the stood in the same way as that concept had Bundesgerichtshof stresses that it is impor- been understood under the previous German tant to distinguish between the application of law. In the explanatory memorandum to the Article 4(1 )(b) and Article 4(4)(a) because, draft Markenrechtsreformgesetz (Trade Mark under national law, the initial registration of Reform Law), it was stated that in future it a mark in relation to dissimilar goods cannot would not be possible to refer back to the be opposed per se under the national provi- 'static' concept of similarity developed in the sions implementing Article 4(4)(a): the person previous law. objecting can only commence an action for cancellation of the mark once it has been reg- istered or bring proceedings for infringement of his own mark, the idea being that the reg- istration procedure should be carried out in an abstract, systematic way. Article 4(1)(b), 25. Under the previous law, there had to be on the other hand, is a ground for opposing objective similarity between the goods or ser- the registration of a mark. The question vices: there was thus no protection under whether a particular use of a mark falls within trade-mark law where there was no objective Article 4(1)(b) or Article 4(4)(a) is accord- similarity of goods and services, however ingly of considerable practical importance. similar the marks and whatever the reputa- tion of the earlier mark. Commentators argue that, since implementation of the Directive, that is no longer the case: there is now an inverse correlation between, on the one hand, the similarity of the goods and services and, on the other, the similarity of the marks and the distinctive character of the earlier mark. The meaning of 'confusion' Thus the closer the marks and the more dis- tinctive the earlier mark, the less similarity of goods o r services needs to be shown. According to the Bundesgerichtshof, such an interpretation would mean that it would be considerably easier than under the previous German law to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion.

27. The question asks in part whether a like- lihood 7 of confusion must be taken to exist

26. The Bundesgerichtshof recognises that, in certain circumstances, where the earlier mark 7 — The German version of the Directive speaks of a 'risk' of con- fusion, while the English version speaks of a 'likelihood' of has a reputation, it can be protected even in confusion.

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even if the public attributes the goods or ser- likelihood of confusion on the part of the vices to different origins. The meaning of public'. 1 1Thus the Court held that 'the mere 'confusion' in Article 4(1)(b) of the Directive association which the public might make has already been considered by this Court in between two trade marks as a result of their its judgment in the case of SABEL, delivered analogous semantic content is not in itself a on 11 November 1997. 8 sufficient ground for concluding that there is a likelihood of confusion' , 2 within the meaning of Article 4(1)(b).

28. That case concerned the interpretation of Article 4(1)(b) of the Directive in so far as it refers to 'a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public, which includes the likeli- hood of association with the earlier trade mark'. The Court explained that it had been submitted that 'the likelihood of association may arise in three sets of circumstances: (1) where the public confuses the sign and the mark in question (likelihood of direct confu- sion): (2) where the public makes a connec- 30. It follows that if, in the present case, there tion between the proprietors of the sign and is no likelihood of the public assuming that those of the mark and confuses them (likeli- there is any sort of trade connection between hood of indirect confusion or association); (3) the marks 'Canon' and ' C A N N O N ' , there is where the public considers the sign to be no likelihood of confusion within the meaning similar to the mark and perception of the sign of Article 4(1)(b) of the Directive. The Com- calls to mind the memory of the mark, mission suggests however that the question although the two are not confused (likelihood refers to the attribution of goods or services of association in the strict sense)'. ' to different 'places of origin'; and that con- cept may reflect the importance attached by the previous German trade-mark law to the place of manufacture of the goods in ques- tion. In that respect it should be noted that it is not sufficient to show simply that there is no likelihood of the public being confused as 29. The Court stated that it was therefore to the place in which the goods are manufac- necessary to determine 'whether Article tured or the services performed: if, despite 4(1)(b) can apply where there is no likelihood recognising that the goods or services have of direct or indirect confusion, but only a different places of origin, the public is likely likelihood of association in the strict sense'. 10 to believe that there is a link between the two It concluded: 'The terms of the provision itself exclude its application where there is no concerns, there will be a likelihood of confu- sion within the meaning of the Directive.

8 — Case C-251/95 SABEL v Pumi, Rudolph Dossier Sport. 9 — Paragraph 16 of the judgment 11 — Paragraph 18 of the judgment 10 — Paragraph 17 of the judgment. 12 — Operative part

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Assessment of the similarity of goods and the earlier mark, the greater will be the likeli- services hood of confusion'. 13 It should be noted, however, that in that case, in contrast to the present case, it was not disputed that at least some of the goods to which the marks in question related were the same; the question was whether the marks (as opposed to the goods) in question were sufficiently similar to give rise to a likelihood of confusion.

31. The main argument in this case has focused on the question whether the degree of dis- tinctiveness of a mark, in particular its repu- tation, can be taken into account when assessing whether goods or services should be regarded as similar within the meaning of Article 4(1 )(b). In other words, is it permis- 33. CKK, the French Government and the sible to consider goods or services to be Commission are all of the view that the degree similar in relation to particularly distinctive of distinctiveness of a mark is relevant to the marks when such goods or services would test of the similarity of products or services. not be considered to be similar in relation to At the hearing the Italian Government stated other, less distinctive marks? O r should the that the notion of similarity is a very vague test for assessing the similarity of goods or concept which cannot be based on objective services be objective (i. e. unrelated to the factors alone. nature of the marks in question)?

34. They refer to the tenth recital of the pre- amble of the Directive, which is in the fol- 32. All trade marks, if they are to perform lowing terms: their function, should be distinctive; a trade mark which is devoid of any distinctive char- acter is, pursuant to Article 3(l)(b) of the Directive, not to be registered and, if regis- tered, is liable to be declared invalid. But dis- tinctiveness is a matter of degree. A trade mark might be particularly distinctive either because it is well known or because it is of an '... whereas it is indispensable to give an inter- unusual character. The more well known or pretation of the concept of similarity in rela- unusual a trade mark, the more likely it is tion to the likelihood of confusion; whereas that consumers might be confused into the likelihood of confusion, the appreciation believing there to be a trade connection of which depends on numerous elements and, between goods or services bearing the same or a similar mark. As the Court observed in its judgment in SABEL, 'the more distinctive 13 — Cited in note 8, paragraph 24 of the judgment.

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in particular, on the recognition of the trade 37. Pathe and the United Kingdom, however, mark on the market, on 14 the association advocate an objective, independent assess- which can be made with the used or regis- ment of the similarity of the goods or services tered sign, [and] on 15 the degree of similarity (i. e. an assessment made without regard to between the trade mark and the sign and the nature or reputation of the earlier mark). between the goods or services identified, con- The United Kingdom maintains that to stitutes the specific condition for such protec- require, at the stage of registering a mark, tion; whereas the ways in which likelihood of that the reputation of an earlier mark be taken confusion may be established, and in par- into account when assessing the similarity of ticular the onus of proof, are a matter for the goods or services in question would place national procedural rules which are not preju- an undue burden on examiners and consider- diced by the Directive'. ably lengthen the registration process. Pathe also argues that large companies would delib- erately delay registration processes.

35. CKK and the French Government argue that that recital, in particular the statement that 'it is indispensable to give an interpreta- tion of the concept of similarity in relation to 38. Moreover, Pathe argues that flexible the likelihood of confusion', shows that the boundaries to the definition of similar goods test of the similarity of goods or services is or services would cause legal uncertainty. O n e not to be regarded as an objective test. final argument made by the United Kingdom is that, if the question of the likelihood of confusion had to be addressed in order to decide whether goods or services were similar, there would be no purpose in requiring such similarity: the only question would be whether or not there was a likelihood of confusion; if that had been the intention, the Directive would have had a different structure. 36. CKK also argues that it is important to be able to oppose the initial registration of a mark under Article 4(1 )(b), rather than having to accept the initial registration and attack its use under other provisions. It considers that parties to opposition proceedings are subject to lower costs and can present their rights more effectively and more efficiendy than in other proceedings. 39. In my view, the decisive consideration in resolving the issue is the statement in the tenth recital of the preamble to the Directive that 14 — The word 'of', rather than 'on', appears in the English text the appreciation of the likelihood of confur by mistake. 15 — See note 14 above. sion depends in particular on the recognition

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of the mark. That statement set in its context held that the 'likelihood of confusion must ... reads as follows: be appreciated globally, taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case'. 16It is true that that statement was made in a different context: the Court was there considering the question whether conceptual similarity of the marks alone could give rise to confusion within the meaning of Article 'Whereas the protection afforded by the reg- 4(1)(b), in a situation in which the goods in istered trade mark, the function of which is in question were clearly the same. However the particular to guarantee the trade mark as an statement is one of general application. indication of origin, is absolute in the case of identity between the mark and the sign and goods or services; whereas the protection applies also in case of similarity between the mark and the sign and the goods or services; whereas it is indispensable to give an inter- pretation of the concept of similarity in rela- tion to the likelihood of confusion; whereas 41. The United Kingdom Government seeks the likelihood of confusion, the appreciation to refute the argument that the tenth recital of which depends on numerous elements and, of the preamble to the Directive supports a in particular, on the recognition of the trade global approach. It maintains that that recital mark on the market, [on] the association means simply that in assessing similarity regard which can be made with the used or regis- should be had to the question whether the tered sign, [on] the degree of similarity goods or services are such that the public between the trade mark and the sign and might be confused into thinking that they between the goods or services identified, con- have the same trade origin, and that in making stitutes the specific condition for such protec- that assessment it is not permissible to have tion ...' regard to the reputation of the earlier mark.

That statement makes it clear that the recog- nition of the mark, although not specifically mentioned in Article 4(1)(b) of the Directive, 42. That explanation, however, requires the is relevant in deciding whether there is suf- recital to be read as indicating that the ques- ficient similarity to give rise to a likelihood of tion of confusion is to be taken into account confusion. in assessing the similarity of goods or ser- vices, but that one element of the confusion test, namely that of the 'recognition' of the earlier mark 'on the market' (which is men- tioned expressly in the recital), cannot be taken into account in such an assessment. I

40. That view is also confirmed by the judg- ment of the Court in SABEL, in which it 16 — Cited in note 8, paragraph 22.

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have difficulty in reading the recital in that the registration of an identical or similar mark way. (The phrase 'recognition of the trade in relation to dissimilar goods or services. mark on the market' to my mind refers to the That suggests that the practical problems of degree of distinctiveness of the mark: i. e. requiring registrars to consider the reputation whether it is readily recognised by the public, of a mark are not as great as has been argued. either because it has an inherently unusual nature or because of its reputation.)

44. I would emphasise that although in my view the degree of recognition of the mark must be taken into account in deciding whether there is sufficient similarity to give rise to confusion, the requirement of simi- larity must be given full weight, both in assessing the similarity of the marks and in assessing the similarity of the goods or ser- vices in question. It is therefore incorrect to 43. In addition, the dangers of lengthening suggest that, in consequence of the imple- the registration process by requiring consid- mentation into national law of Article 4(1 )(b) eration of an earlier trade mark's reputation of the Directive, it may no longer be neces- do not appear to me to be as serious as Pathe sary in the case of a particularly distinctive and the United Kingdom Government sug- mark to establish the similarity of the goods gest. The French Government stated at the or services in question. In assessing the simi- hearing that, in its experience, such consider- larity of the goods or services it will be helpful ation did not unduly lengthen or complicate to have regard to the factors suggested by the the procedure. Indeed, it may be in the interest United Kingdom and French Governments. of legal certainty to ensure that marks whose use may be challenged successfully are not registered in the first place. In any event, it seems to me that the tenth recital of the pre- amble to the Directive indicates that the repu- tation of a trade mark should be taken into account in assessing the likelihood of confu- sion between two marks even if it cannot be 45. According to the United Kingdom Gov- taken into account in assessing the similarity ernment, the following type of factors should of goods and services. Moreover, the Com- be taken into account in assessing the simi- munity Trade Mark Registry will be obliged larity of goods or services: to consider the question of the reputation of a mark in many cases since the Community Trade Mark Regulation contains a provision similar to Article 4(4)(a) of the Directive. Under Article 8(5) of the Regulation the pro- prietor of an earlier mark which has a reputa- (a) the uses of the respective goods or ser- tion can oppose, subject to certain conditions, vices;

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(b) the users of the respective goods or ser- 46. Whilst recognising that that list of factors vices; is not exhaustive, the United Kingdom Gov- ernment observed at the hearing that it nev- ertheless indicates a common denominator which should be present in all factors taken into account in assessing the similarity of goods or services: namely that the factors are related to the goods or services themselves. (c) the physical nature of the goods or acts of service;

(d) the trade channels through which the 47. The French Government likewise con- goods or services reach the market; siders that, in assessing the similarity of goods and services, the factors to be taken into account should include the nature of the goods or services, their intended destination and cli- entele, their normal use and the usual manner of their distribution.

(e) in the case of self-serve consumer items, where in practice they are respectively found or likely to be found in supermar- kets and in particular whether they are, or are likely to be, found on the same or different shelves;

48. The use of those 'objective' factors to assess similarity does not however in my view preclude account being taken of the degree of recognition of the mark in deciding whether there is sufficient similarity to give rise to a (f) the extent to which the respective goods likelihood of confusion. or services are in competition with each other: that inquiry may take into account how those in trade classify goods, for instance whether market research compa- nies, who of course act for industry, put the goods or services in the same or dif- ferent sectors. 17

49. Against that view it might be argued that the simpler and more objective the test of the 17 — Taken from the judgment of the English High Court in similarity of goods and services under Article British Sugar Plc v James Robertson & Sons Ltd on 23 May 1996, [1996] RPC 281. 4(1)(b), the less likely national trade mark

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registries or courts in different Member States tion of a mark or prohibition of its use) would would be to adopt different assessments as to often be the same. whether a particular mark is confusing. That would be consistent with the Directive's aim of harmonising Member States' trade-mark laws.

51. By way of a final observation I would add that I do not consider it unjust for a trade-mark owner to benefit from protection in relation to a wider range of goods than those in relation to which the mark is regis- tered. It is not reasonable to require a trade- mark owner to register his mark in relation to all types of goods in relation to which use of his mark may give rise to a risk of confusion, 50. I accept that a flexible test of the simi- because he may not be using his mark in rela- larity of goods or services might lead to dif- tion to such goods; indeed marks which are ferent interpretations of such similarity in registered in respect of goods or services in different Member States. It is indeed possible relation to which they are not used are hable that, contrary to the view in certain Member to be struck off the register after five years on States, a new mark might not be caught by the grounds of non-use. 19 Moreover, the cri- Article 4(1)(b) of the Directive in one Member terion of confusion ensures that when regis- State simply because it is considered in that tering a mark in relation to a certain class of State that, despite the reputation of the earlier goods or services, the trade-mark owner is mark and a likelihood of confusion, the goods not thereby protected in relation to too broad or services are not sufficiently similar. In such a range of goods and services. The concept of a case, however, the fact that the earlier mark confusion should not be extended too far has a reputation may well mean that in that since, as I observed in my Opinion in Member State Article 4(4)(a) or Article 5(2) SABEL, 20 a broad interpretation would be of the Directive (concerning the protection of contrary to the Directive's aim of assisting a mark in relation to dissimilar goods or ser- the free movement of goods. However, where vices) would apply instead. According to the there is a genuine and properly substantiated likelihood of confusion, it is in my view not understanding of the Commission, all Member only justifiable but necessary to protect both States have availed themselves of the option the consumer and the trade-mark owner by provided by Article 4(4)(a). 18 Thus the ulti- disallowing the registration of a later mark mate result in all Member States (namely the even in relation to similar goods and services prohibition, or cancellation, of the registra- in respect of which the earlier mark is not registered.

18 — Statement made by the Commission at the hearing in Case 19 — See Articles 10 to 12 of the Directive C-63/97 BMW on 13 January 1998. 20 — Cited in note 8, at paragraphs 50 and 51.

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Conclusion

52. Accordingly the question referred by the Bundesgerichtshof should in my opinion be answered as follows:

In the assessment of the similarity of goods or services covered by two marks within the meaning of Article 4(1 )(b) of First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks, account may be taken of the distinctive character, in particular the reputa- tion, of the earlier mark in deciding whether there is sufficient similarity to give rise to a likelihood of confusion. However, there will only be a likelihood of confu- sion within the meaning of that provision if it is likely that the public will be con- fused into thinking that there is some sort of trade connection between the sup- pliers of the goods or services in question.

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