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Súdny dvor Európskej únie·18.6.1998

C-134/97

ECLI:EU:C:1998:309

Súd
Súdny dvor Európskej únie
IČS
61997CC0134

VICTORIA FILM

OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL FENNELLY delivered on 18 June 1998 *

1. This preliminary reference raises a number consideration within the territory of the of issues regarding the application of the country by a taxable person acting as such' is 'transitional' VAT exemptions which Member subject to VAT. Article 6 of the Directive is States have been permitted to continue to concerned with the 'supply of services', which, apply in accordance with Article 28(3)(b) of as defined in Article 6(1), includes 'assign- the Sixth Directive. 1 The Court is, in par- ments of intangible property whether or not ticular, asked whether Sweden was entitled it is the subject of a document establishing from its accession until 1 January 1997 to title'. Tide XVI, comprising Article 28, con- exempt from VAT royalties received from the cerns 'transitional provisions'. Article 28(3)(b) grant or assignment of exclusive rights to permits Member States, during the transi- exhibit motion pictures. However, in its obser- tional period, to 'continue to exempt the vations the Commission has queried the juris- activities set out in Annex F under conditions diction of the Court to answer the questions existing in the Member States concerned'. The referred on the basis that the referring body relevant provision of Annex F in the instant should not be regarded as a 'court or tri- case is that contained in point 2, which refers bunal' for the purposes of Article 177 of the to: Treaty.

I — Legal and factual context

A — The legal context 'Services provided by authors, artists, per- formers, lawyers and other members of the liberal professions, other than the medical and paramedical professions, in so far as these are not services specified in Annex B to the Second 2. Under Article 2(1) of the Sixth Directive, Council Directive of 11 April 1967.' 2 'the supply of goods and services effected for

2 — Second Council Directive 67/228/EEC of 11 April 1967 on * Original language: English. the harmonisation of legislation of Member States concerning 1 — Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the turnover taxes — Structure and procedures for application of harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the common system of value added tax; OJ , English Special turnover taxes — Common system of value added tax: uni- Edition 1967 (IX p. 16 (hereinafter 'the Second Directive'). I form basis of assessment; OJ 1977 L 145, p. 1. shall also for brevity hereinafter refer simply to 'Annex B'.

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Point 1 of Annex B to the Second Directive on Value Added Tax, hereinafter 'the 1994 covers 'assignments of patents, trade marks Law'), 4 under which, as it applied at the and other similar rights, and the granting of material time, 5 turnover arising from the grant rights in respect of such rights'. Finally, or assignment of copyright in literary and according to the Act of Accession between artistic works is — subject to certain excep- the Member States of the European Union tions which are not relevant in the present and, inter alia, the Kingdom of Sweden in case — 6 exempt from tax. 7 This provision Annex XV, section IX 'Taxation', point 2 aa: 3 applies regardless of the legal form of the assignor. Under Article 1 of the 1960 Law, films are expressly covered.

'For the purposes of applying Article 28(3)(b) [of the Sixth Directive], so long as the same exemptions are applied in any of the present Member States, the Kingdom of Sweden may exempt from VAT: B — The facts and the main proceedings

— services supplied by authors, artists, and performers referred to in point 2 of Annex F;

4. O n 6 March 1996 Victoria Film A/S (here- inafter 'the applicant'), a Danish undertaking, applied to the Skatterättsnämnden (Revenue Board) for a preliminary decision on a ques- ... .' tion concerning the appropriate VAT treat- ment of dealings in film rights. The applicant through, inter alia, its Swedish subsidiary engages in the activity of commercial film production in Sweden and in other countries. Its application in the main proceedings con- cerned the filming, primarily for television, of 3. The relevant provisions of Swedish VAT detective novels written by certain Swedish legislation are contained in Article 11(1) of Tide 3 of the 1994 Mervärdesskattelagen (Law 4 — SFS 1994: 200. 5 — The period at issue runs until 31 December 1996. 6 — Reference is made to Articles 1, 4 or 5 of Law 1960: 729 on 3 — Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Kingdom Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works (lagen om upphovs- of Norway, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland rätt till litterära och konstnärliga verk, hereinafter 'the 1960 and the Kingdom of Sweden and the adjustments to the Trea- Law'). ties on which the European Union is founded; OJ 1994 C 241, 7 — From 1 January 1997, turnover from such grants or assign- p. 21 (hereinafter 'Act of Accession'). ments has been made liable to VAT; SFS 1996: 1327.

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authors. In order to finance the production of 7. The Skatterättsnämnden defined the main the films, due to begin in Sweden on 1 August issue as being whether dealings in rights such 1996, the rights to exhibit them on television as film rights come within the notion of ser- and in cinemas were assigned mainly to vices supplied by authors, artists or per- television-network undertakings in Sweden, formers for VAT purposes. It also pointed Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany. 8 out that, if the incompatibility of the national exemption were established, the direct effect issue arising 'would be somewhat unusual since the trader would be claiming that it was liable to pay VAT. Accordingly, it has decided to refer the following questions to the Court:

5. The applicant sought a preliminary deci- sion from the Skatterättsnämnden that the assignments in question were liable to VAT under the 1994 Law in order to be able to deduct VAT on its inputs. It contended that services supplied by authors or artists could only be exempt from VAT under point 2 of Annex F in so far as they were provided by natural persons, the applicant being a legal ' 1 . Does Article 28(3)(b) of the Sixth VAT person. The right of deduction is, it says, Directive in conjunction with point 2 of directly effective and may be relied upon by Annex F to the Directive, and having regard an individual against a national tax authori- to the terms of Annex XV, IX Taxation, point 2 ty's refusal to permit its registration for VAT aa, of the Treaty of Accession between the purposes. Member States of the European Union and Sweden concerning Sweden's accession to the European Union, mean that Sweden may have provisions in its national legislation having the tenor of Article 11(1) of Title 3 of the Value Added Tax Law as worded until 31 December 1996?

6. The Riksskatteverket (National Tax Board) submitted that, in any event, the relevant pro- visions of the Sixth Directive do not satisfy the criteria for direct effect.

8 — It would appear from the order for reference that the assign- ments had already occurred at the time of the application to the Skatterättsnämnden. Although the Court has not been informed of the amount paid in consideration of the assign- If the answer to that question is in the nega- ments, it may be presumed to be quite considerable given that tive, an answer to the following question is the total production budget was calculated as being SKR 48.2 million. sought:

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2. Does the fact that Article 28(3)(b) does not II — Observations allow national legislation to provide for an exemption from tax liability for the transac- tions referred to in Question 1 mean that this provision, Article 6(1) or any other provision of the Sixth Directive has so-called direct effect in this regard and can therefore be relied 8. Written and oral observations have been upon as against a national authority by the submitted in this case by the Riksskatteverket, the Kingdom of Sweden and the Commis- person dealing in such rights as a ground jus- sion; the Republic of Finland submitted only tifying treatment of those transactions as tax- written observations. able transactions?

9. In the light of the admissibility objection raised by the Commission in its observations, it is appropriate initially to consider the nature of the body which has made the reference in the present case, before subsequendy dis- cussing the content of the questions referred.

If, again, that question is answered in the negative, an answer to the following question III — Admissibility is sought:

A — The Skatterättsnämnden and the preliminary-decision procedure

10. In its order for reference the Skat- 3. Can the person dealing in those rights still terättsnämnden describes itself as 'a special claim a right to deduct on the basis of Arti- board which, upon application by a taxable cle 17(2) or another provision of the Direc- person, can give a preliminary decision on tive, that is to say, does the provision have matters of taxation'. The Skatterättsnämnden direct effect even though the transaction does furnishes the following explanation of its func- not give rise to any output tax?' tions by reference to the Lagen om förhands-

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besked i taxeringsfragor (Law concerning pre- the applicant or by the Riksskatteverket liminary opinions in fiscal matters, herein- without any requirement of leave to appeal. after 'the 1951 Law'): Such an appeal must be made within a period of one month from the time when the appel- lant received notice of the preliminary deci- sion. A decision dismissing an application may not be appealed against.

'It is divided into two divisions, one for direct taxation and the other for indirect taxation. The Government appoints the members for a maximum period of four years and deter- mines the composition of the divisions. Cases A preliminary decision which has gained legal are determined after preparation and presen- force serves as a guide in matters of assess- tation of reports by civil servants at the ment to tax and — as far as value added tax Board's offices. is concerned — in relation to the account period concerned by the ruling and to the extent to which the party seeking the ruling demands. A preliminary decision is therefore binding on the State if the applicant makes a claim to this effect. However, this does not apply if, after the preliminary decision is An application for a preliminary decision must given, a statutory amendment is adopted such be made in writing. If the Board finds that, in as to affect the assessment to tax in the case view of its contents, the application is not to with which the preliminary decision is con- be dismissed immediately, the observations of cerned. the Riksskatteverket ... in the matter must be obtained.

In summary, it can be said that the Skat- terättsnämnden adopts decisions in forms If the application is taken up for examination, similar to courts of law in matters which con- the Board rules, to the extent considered nec- cern inter alios taxable persons, relations to essary, how the question referred to it is to be the public at large regarding their liability to determined in relation to the applicant's assess- tax.' ment to tax and, as far as value added tax is concerned, the position concerning the appli- cant's liability to tax.

11. In its written observations the Commis- sion first recalls that the notion of 'court or tribunal' for the purposes of Article 177 of A decision concerning a preliminary decision the Treaty must be given an autonomous may be appealed against to the Regering- Community-law construction. A fundamental srätten [Supreme Administrative Court] by distinction must, in its opinion, be made

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between bodies which exercise a judicial role body comprising 18 full and 18 deputy mem- and those which merely carry out administra- bers, all of whom are nominated by the tive functions. Relying, in particular, on the Swedish Government for four-year mandates. Court's judgments in Almelo 9 and Job Cen- Of the 18 full members, the Government tre, 10 the Commission concludes that the nominates two as presidents (one for each Skatterättsnämnden falls into the latter cat- division of the Skatterättsnämnden) and three egory; its preliminary opinions do not differ as vice-presidents, as well as deciding to which in substance from decisions made by the tax division the other members shall be allocated. administration in respect of the imposition of Only the two presidents are engaged full-time tax. with the Skatterättsnämnden; all of the other members (and deputy members) have other full-time positions as judges, civil servants or in the private sector. The two presidents and the members who act as rapporteurs for the Skatterättsnämnden must be (or have the qualifications required of) judges. The quorum for hearing a request for a preliminary deci- sion is fixed at six members, which must 12. Sweden, in its written observations, says include a president and a vice-president. that the Skatterättsnämnden plays a vital role in the Swedish fiscal system and that its deci- sions have an important influence on com- mercial activities. Furthermore, Sweden con- tends that it is very important for its fiscal system that the Skatterättsnämnden be per- mitted to refer questions to the Court.

14. It also refers to Article 9 of Chapter 1 of the Regeringformen (Swedish Constitution) under which the procedure followed by the Skatterättsnämnden must be both objective 13. In its written answers to a number of and impartial, a requirement secured by the questions put to it by the Court concerning, Brottbalken (Swedish Criminal Code), which in particular, the structure and organisation of contains provisions on active and passive cor- the Skatterättsnämnden, as well as the inde- ruption. Moreover, the Forvaltninglagen (Law pendence of its members and the extent to applicable to the administration) 1 1provides which requests for its preliminary decision rules concerning the right to object to a spe- must concern concrete disputes between the cific Skatterättsnämnden member sitting in a tax administration and taxpayers, Sweden first particular case. 12 emphasises that, under Article 2 of the 1951 Law, the Skatterättsnämnden is a permanent

11 — SFS 1986: 223. 12 — However, in response to a question posed at the hearing, counsel for Sweden confirmed that members of the Skat- 9 — Case C-393/92 [1994] ECR I-1477. terättsnämnden are not required, on appointment, to take a 10 — Case C-111/94 [1995] ECR I-3361. specific oath of office.

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15. Thirdly, the procedure before the Skat- brought to the Regeringsrätten against its terättsnämnden, which is adversarial, is initi- decisions underscores the judicial nature of ated by a written request. 13 If it is not imme- such opinions. Moreover, Sweden questions diately rejected under Article 6 of the 1951 whether, if the Skatterättsnämnden were Law, the Riksskatteverket, or, where appro- unable to refer questions to the Court, the priate, a commune or a region, is required to Regeringsrätten would be entitled to do so on submit observations. The opinion sought must appeal. concern the fiscal situation of the requesting taxpayer, namely a particular transaction or a number of transactions. Typically, Sweden points out, it will concern the fiscal treatment of a proposed transaction which the taxpayer intends to enter into but in respect of which he is in dispute with the tax administration. However, it appears that the taxpayer may 17. At the oral hearing, the Commission decide not to proceed with the transaction, maintained its view that the Skat- particularly if the ruling of the Skat- terättsnämnden could not be regarded as a terättsnämnden is unfavourable. Sweden 'court or tribunal' for the purposes of Arti- asserts that the preliminary-decision proce- cle 177 of the Treaty. It contended that the dure before the Skatterättsnämnden is effec- non-judicial nature of the Skatterättsnämnden tively the counterpart in administrative law of was confirmed by the fact that, under the a declaratory judgment in Swedish civil law. 1951 Law, there was no requirement for the existence of a real dispute between the tax- payer and the tax administration before a request for a decision could be made. Even if there would often be a difference of under- standing as to the scope or application of the relevant fiscal provisions, such differences of opinion would essentially be of an unofficial nature. The Commission also submitted that 16. Finally, under Article 11 of the 1951 Law the Court's recent judgments in Dorsch Con- a preliminary decision is binding on the tax sult 15 and Garofalo and Others 16 did not administration. The ordinary administrative affect its view that a body such as Skat- courts are bound by the decision in any sub- terättsnämnden could not be regarded as com- sequent litigation. This, Sweden contends, petent to refer questions to the Court. demonstrates that Skatterättsnämnden deci- sions are more binding in nature than certain other decisions on which the Court has ruled. 14 The fact that an appeal may be

13 — At the oral hearing in the present case, Sweden confirmed that the bill to amend the law on preliminary opinions (Reformerat förhandsbesked i skattefrågor, m. m.), to which 18. It also emerged clearly at the hearing that it refers in its written reply to the Court's questions, was the Skatterättsnämnden is not bound to adopted on 21 April 1998 by the Swedish Parliament and will enter into force on 1 July 1998. The new law will permit the Riksskatteverket to request preliminary decisions of the Skattcrätt5nämnden. 14 — Case 36/73 Nederlandse Spoorwegen v Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat [1973] ECR 1299 and Joined Cases C-69/96 15 — Case C-54/96 Dorsch Consult v Bundesbaugesellschaft Berlin to C-79/96 Garofalo and Others (hereinafter 'Garofalo'), (hereinafter 'Dorsch Consult'), [1997] ECR I-4961. [1997] ECR I-5603. 16 — Loc. cit., footnote 14 above.

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provide any ruling and that there is no appeal of the Directeur des Contributions Directes against a decision not to do so. et des Accises (Director of Taxation and Excise Duties) of Luxembourg, that the Director had an organisational link with the body that made the disputed tax assessment and was not, therefore, 'an authority acting as a third party in relation' to that body. 21 B — Analysis

19. It should initially be emphasised that the 20. The Court has generally adopted a broad question whether a referring body is a 'court approach when determining the ambit of the or tribunal' for the purposes of Article 177 of notion of a 'court or tribunal'. 22 It is hardly the Treaty is a matter of Community law surprising, given the wide variety of national rather than national law. 17Thus, in Vaassen bodies which may seek to refer questions to v Beambten f onds Mijnbedrijf, 1 8the Court the Court, that the development of a general held that the Scheidsgerecht (Arbitration Tri- definition of a 'court or tribunal' has been bunal), 19 which had jurisdiction to hear eschewed. The Court has, nevertheless, enu- appeals against decisions concerning the man- merated a number of criteria whose applica- agement of a pension fund for the mining tion largely determines whether a referring industry concerning the rights of members body will be regarded as competent to make and former members or their survivors, but a reference. In its recent judgment in Dorsch which was actually set up under Dutch pri- Consult the Court listed the following factors vate law by all the organisations representing by way of example: employers and wage-earners in the mining industry, was to be considered a 'court or tri- bunal' within the meaning of Article 177 of the Treaty. O n the other hand, in Corbiau v Administration des Contributions 20 the Court decided, notwithstanding two decisions of the Luxembourg Conseil d'État (Council of State) recognising the judicial character of decisions '... whether the body is established by law, whether it is permanent, whether its jurisdic-

17 — Sec in this respect, most recently, the judgments in Dorsch Consult, l o c at., paragraph 23 and Garofalo, l o c cit., para- graph 19. The dual reference to 'court or tribunal' in the 21 — Paragraphs 15 and 16. See paragraph 4 of the Opinion of English and Irish versions ('cúirte nó binse') of Article 177 Advocate General Darmon who noted that the soundness of of the Treaty, is not reflected in other language versions. the decisions of the Conseil d'État was disputed by eminent Accordingly, the correct inquiry is not to determine whether academic commentators, including the late Judge Schock- a body is first a 'court' and, if not, a 'tribunal', but, instead, 'weiler; see paragraphs 37 to 39. whether it is encompassed by the single Community con- 22 — The Court's approach prompted Advocate General Mancini, cept of 'court or tribunal'; see Anderson, References to the in his Opinion in one of the leading cases, to observe that: European Court (Sweet and Maxwell London, 1995), at p. 29. T h e criteria by which the Community concept of a "court 18 — Case 61/65 [1966] ECR 261. or tribunal" is defined could not be wider. That explains why the Court has permitted national judicial bodies of all 19 — As Advocate General Gand pointed out in his Opinion, '... kinds to consult it, irrespective of the nature and purpose of in spite of being called an Arbitration Tribunal, the Scheids- the proceedings in the course of which they raise a question gerecht has very little in common with such a body'; l o c or of whether the robe they are wearing when they do so is cit., p. 281. more or less markedly judicial'; see Case 14/86 Pretore di 20 — Case C-24/92 [1993] ECR I-1277. Salò v Persom Unknown [1987] ECR 2545, p. 2556.

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tion is compulsory, whether its procedure is relevant rules of both national and Commu- inter partes, whether it applies rules of law nity law. Furthermore, it has compulsory and whether it is independent.' jurisdiction in the sense that there is no other body in Sweden from which a taxpayer can obtain a binding preliminary decision of the sort at issue in this case. The doubts expressed by the Commission regarding the admissi- bility of references from the Skat- That this list is not exhaustive and that each terättsnämnden stem, however, from its factor is not always relevant emerges clearly opinion that preliminary decisions of the type from the case-law. Thus, in Job Centre the at issue may not, at least for the purposes of Court declared inadmissible certain questions the application of Article 177 of the Treaty, referred to it by the Tribunale Civile e Penale be viewed as being of a judicial nature. di Milano (Civil and Criminal District Court, Milan, hereinafter 'the Tribunale') in what were described as non-contentious proceed- ings ('giurisdizione voluntaria') concerning an application for the confirmation of the articles of association of a company. 23 The Court held that, although the preliminary-reference procedure under Article 177 of the Treaty does not require that the proceedings before 22. In my opinion, there are two factors the national court '... during which the national regarding the functions of the Skat- court frames a question ... [be] inter partes, it terättsnämnden, at least in so far as its juris- is none the less apparent... that a national diction in respect of preliminary decisions is court may refer a question to the Court only concerned, which, at first sight, might be if there is a case pending before it and if it is deemed to support the admissibility objection called upon to give judgment in proceedings raised by the Commission. intended to lead to a decision of a judicial nature'. 24

21. In the present case, I am satisfied, on the 23. In the first place, the Skatterättsnämnden basis of the information provided in the order is not obliged to respond to applications for for reference, as supplemented by Sweden's a preliminary opinion. The first paragraph of written reply to the questions put to it by the Article 7 of the 1951 Law provides that, in Court, that the Skatterättsnämnden is an inde- effect, where the Skatterättsnämnden, having pendent body established by law, which exer- regard to the content of the request, considers cises its functions on a permanent basis, whose that it is not appropriate to give a preliminary procedures are adversarial, and which gives decision, it shall refuse the request. N o rea- its decisions based on the application of the sons need be given and such decisions are not appealable. From the information provided by Sweden, it seems clear that the power con- 23 — Loc. CIL, footnote 10 above. ferred on the Skatterättsnämnden by the 1951 24 — Job Centre, paragraph 9. Law is used to weed out spurious requests,

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though it appears from an answer given at the to me to be very little that could genuinely be hearing that there is no established practice. described as contingent, let alone hypothetical, Moreover, Sweden has pointed out that the about the effects of the Skatterättsnämnden's request must concern the actual fiscal situa- ultimate decision for the applicant. There is tion of the requesting taxpayer; in other words, nothing in the present case that suggests that the application must concern one or several the Court's case-law concerning 'hypotheti- specific transactions and the response given cal' references is applicable. In Foglio v Nov- must have a concrete rather than a hypo- ello the Court confirmed that its duty under thetical impact on him. Finally, there is nothing Article 177 'is not that of delivering advisory to suggest that, in exercising its discretion to opinions on general or hypothetical questions reject requests under Article 7, the Skat- but that of assisting in the administration of terättsnämnden acts other than on the basis justice in the Member States'. 25 This doctrine of judicial criteria. Consequently, I am satis- has been applied in subsequent cases where fied that its broad powers to refuse requests the questions referred raised a problem which for preliminary decisions do not affect its status as a 'court or tribunal' within the was 'a hypothetical one' in the sense that the meaning of Article 177 of the Treaty. problem did not or could not arise for con- sideration, even before the national court, at least in so far as it appeared from the nature of the dispute as set out in the order for refer- ence, 26 or, alternatively, if it 'was obvious that the interpretation of Community law sought by the national court bore no relation to the facts of the main action or its purpose. 27 The 24. It is somewhat unusual that it is not pos- Court has, however, never applied this prin- sible, under the 1951 Law, to appeal to the ciple generally in respect of an entire form of Regeringsrätten decisions refusing to accept proceeding before a referring body, even if an application for a preliminary decision. Nev- that procedure allows potentially hypothetical ertheless, I do not think that factor alone matters to be raised. Furthermore, there is serves to deprive the Skatterättsnämnden of nothing to suggest that the questions referred its status as 'court or tribunal' for the pur- in the present case are, in so far as the dispute poses of Article 177 of the Treaty. between the Riksskatteverket and the appli- cant is concerned, hypothetical. I would sug- gest an analogy with the many cases on cus- toms classification where the Court gives preliminary rulings without imposing any pre- condition of a particular import or export transaction being in issue.

25. Secondly, the binding effect of prelimi- nary decisions is contingent upon the appli- cant taxpayer actually carrying out the trans- 25 — Case 244/80 [1981] ECR 3045, paragraph 18. actions covered by the request. However, I 26 — Case C-83/91 Meilicke v ADC/ORGA [1992] ECR I-4871, am not persuaded that the possibly contin- paragraphs 30 and 31. 27 — See, inter alia, Case C-415/93 Bosman and Others [1995] gent nature of Skatterättsnämnden prelimi- ECR I-4921, paragraph 61; Case C-291/96 Grado and Basbir nary rulings deprives them of the status of [1997] ECR I-5531, paragraph 12; and the recent orders of the Court of 25 May 1998 in Case C-361/97 Nour [1998] judicial decisions for the purposes of Com- ECR I-3101, Case C-362/97 Karner, not published in the ECR, and Case C-363/97 Lindau, not published in the ECR, munity law. In the present case, there seems in particular paragraph 12 of each of the orders.

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26. It would appear that, at the moment of proceedings intended to lead to decisions of its application on 6 March 1996, the applicant a judicial nature'. 29 had already assigned the rights in question. Even if this were not the case, it would almost certainly have taken various other prepara- tory steps, such as purchasing the right to adapt the books upon which the films were to be based and perhaps even engaging actors, artists and other personnel that would later be required, such that its request could not be described as of purely hypothetical interest to it. In such circumstances there is little doubt 28. In Job Centre the Court held that a refer- that, in March 1996, the subject-matter of the ence made by the Tribunale — which was application was of considerable actual and manifestly, in form, 'a court or tribunal' under practical importance for the applicant. To my Article 177 of the Treaty — in an inter partes mind, this is what underlies Sweden's obser- procedure 30 brought for the confirmation of vation that the Skatterättsnämnden only deals the articles of association of a company was with concrete cases. 28 It follows, in my inadmissible, since the proceedings would not opinion, that the mere fact that applicants for 'lead to a decision of a judicial nature'. 31 Such preliminary decisions from the Skat- applications involve the performance of 'a terättsnämnden need not necessarily have non-judicial function which, in other Member undertaken, or undertake, the transactions States, is entrusted to administrative authori- that were the subject-matter of the request at ties'. 32 Thus, the Court found that the Tri- the time it was lodged does not render non- bunale was 'exercising administrative judicial the ultimate decision made by the authority without being at the same time Skatterättsnämnden for the purposes of Arti- called upon to settle any dispute'. 33 That is cle 177 of the Treaty. not the case here. The Skatterättsnämnden is not an administrative decision-maker; it is entirely separate from the Riksskatteverket. Thus, if its decisions are to be classified as non-judicial for the purposes of Article 177 of the Treaty, I agree with Sweden that it would be difficult to envisage how the role of the Regeringsrätten, in so far as it reviews on 27. I am fortified in this conclusion by the appeal preliminary decisions of the Skat- case-law of the Court where it has addressed terättsnämnden, could be classified differ- the possibility that the body which had made ently; in reality both assess the correctness of the preliminary reference before it might not the Riksskatteverket'sproposed tax treatment have been one which gives 'judgment in of certain transactions in cases where that treatment is disputed by the taxpayer.

28 — The three examples, taken from actual decisions of the Skat- terãttsnãmnden furnished by Sweden in its written reply to the Court's questions support this view. In two of the 29 — Job Centre, loc. cit. above, paragraph 9. examples, the applicants were actually engaged in economic 30 — In paragraph 16 of his Opinion in Job Centre, Advocate activities out of which the subject-matter of their requests General Elmer pointed out 'that the Pubblico Ministero was arose. Only in one was the transaction still anticipated at the heard in the case before the Tribunale ...'. time of the application. However, the request concerned the fiscal evaluauon of a certain aspect of a more general cor· 31 — Job Centre, paragraph 9. porate restructuring plan, which would appear to have 32 — Ibid., paragraph 11. already been in train. 33 — Ibid.

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29. Finally, I should say that, unlike the Com- decision not to follow the opinion of the mission, I find the Court's recent decisions in Consiglio di Stato may 'be adopted only after Dorsch Consult and Garofalo to be of assis- deliberation within the Council of Ministers tance in recommending that the reference in and must be fully reasoned'. 36 In those cir- the present case be admitted. 34In the former, cumstances, and having regard to the nature one of the objections raised by the Commis- and status of the Consiglio di Stato, the Court sion to the admissibility of the reference from held that, 'when it issues opinion in the con- the Vergabeüberwachgausschuß des Bundes text of an extraordinary petition, the Con- (Federal Public Procurement Awards Super- siglio di Stato constitutes a court or tribunal visory Board) was that its decisions were not for the purposes of Article 177 of the Trea- enforceable. This was dismissed by the Court, ty'. 37 which found that 'when the supervisory board finds that determinations made by a review body are unlawful, it directs that body to make a fresh determination, in conformity with the supervisory board's findings on points of law', and, thus, that the 'determina- tions of the supervisory board are binding'. 35 31. Although the difficulties in Dorsch Con- sult and Garofah concerning the admissibility of the references are only partially compa- rable to those at issue in the present case, the Court's decisions to answer the questions referred demonstrate that, apart from cases where the subject-matter of the proceedings before the referring body is clearly adminis- 30. In Garofalo the Court had to consider trative in nature, the Court will not readily the role of the Italian Consiglio di Stato classify a national proceeding, where the cri- (Council of State) in respect of the Opinions' teria discussed in paragraph 20 above are sat- it is required to give in the context of extraor- isfied, as one which will not 'lead to a deci- dinary petitions to the President of the Italian sion of a judicial nature'. Republic. Since the procedure, in effect, pro- vides persons seeking the annulment of an Italian administrative act with an alternative to instituting an appeal in the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale (Regional Admin- istrative Court), and since the applicants were actually seeking the annulment of a decision of the Minister for Health, there was little 32. In the light of the above considerations, doubt as to the existence of a dispute. The I recommend that the Court answer the ques- perceived difficulty lay in the fact that the tions referred in the present case. opinion of the Consiglio di Stato was not, as a matter of law, binding on the President. The Court, however, relied upon the fact that a 36 — Garofalo, paragraph 24. Although the Court did not refer to any statistics, it may be assumed that it bore in mind the statement of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer that '[T]n practice, the compulsory involvement of the advisory body plays a key role in the decision on the petition'; see 34 — Loc. cit. above. paragraph 35 of his Opinion. 35 — Dorsch Consult, paragraph 29. 37 — Ibid., paragraph 27.

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IV — Substance its accession, of 'the same exemptions' in any of the then 12 Member States. It seems clear that this requirement was satisfied. In the first place, neither the order for reference nor any of the observations submitted to the Court query Sweden's entitlement, on the basis of 33. The substantive issues raised by the ques- the Act of Accession, to invoke the transi- tions referred in this case are relatively straight- tional exemption set out in point 2 of Annex F. forward in comparison with the thorny ques- Secondly, the Commission's report of 2 July tion of admissibility. The Skatterättsnämnden 1992 to the Council on the transitional provi- essentially wishes to know whether sions resulting from Article 28(3) of the Sixth Article 28(3)(b) and point 2 of Annex F of the Directive and Article 1(1) of the Eighteenth Sixth Directive permit a Member State to Council Directive of 18 July 1989 states, in continue to exempt royalties received from respect of point 2 of Annex F, that 'six Member the grant or assignment of exclusive film- States are currently applying the F2 deroga- exhibition rights from liability to VAT and, if tion (Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Greece, Ire- not, whether the taxable person may rely on land and the Netherlands)'. 38 the right to deduction provided by the direc- tive notwithstanding the fact that no output tax has been paid.

A — Question 1 (ii) The application of Annex B to the Second Directive

(i) The Act of Accession

34. Assuming that the assignments of rights 35. The services listed in point 2 of Annex F at issue can be considered to have been 'ser- may only fall within the scope of the transi- vices supplied by authors, artists and perform- tional exemption granted by Article 28(3)(b) ers', it seems beyond doubt that they are cov- 'in so far as these are not services specified in ered by both point 2 of Annex F and the Annex B to the second Council Directive of provisions of the Act of Accession quoted at 11 April 1967'. It is, thus, necessary to con- paragraph 2 above. The Act of Accession pre- sider the effect of this reference. scribes, as a precondition for Sweden's right to rely upon Article 28(3)(b) and point 2 of Annex F, the continued application, prior to 38 — See SEC(92)1006 final.

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36. In the first place, is its ostensible purpose tional continuance of certain existing exemp­ affected by the fact that Article 37 of the Sixth tions. However, the services covered by Directive repealed the Second Directive? I am Annex B to the Second Directive had been satisfied from the wording of Article 37, which compulsorily subject to VAT under Arti­ speaks of the cessation of 'effect' of the Second cle 6(2) of that directive. Failure to give effect Directive, that it is only the continued appli­ to the Annex B exclusion from the scope of cation of the provisions of the Second Direc­ point 2 of Annex F would, thus, lead to a tive that was repealed. The reference made to result where the Sixth Directive would exempt the Second Directive in point 2 of Annex F to services previously subject to VAT. Moreover, the Sixth Directive serves to define the mate­ there is no reason why the principle of strict rial scope of the exemption therein described. construction of exemptions should not apply It excludes 'services specified in Annex B ...', 41 in respect of Annex F. Thus, in so far as although the cessation of effect of the Second Annex B limits the scope of an exemption, it Directive was contemporaneously provided should, at the very least, not be given a nar­ for. 42 rower interpretation than its words require.

37. Furthermore, the intention underlying the reference to the Second Directive emerges from the legislative history of point 2 of Annex F. In its proposed amendments of 11 October 1974 39 to its initial 1973 pro­ posal, 4 0 the Commission had proposed the 38. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the 'ser­ following addition to Article 14 B of the main text of the 1973 draft: '(n) supplies of services vices specified' in Annex B must be excluded by authors, writers, composers, lecturers, jour­ from the scope of the transitional exemption nalists, actors, musicians, where they are not permitted by point 2 of Annex F to the Sixth themselves involved in the publishing or repro­ Directive. It remains to consider what ser­ duction of their works'. This amendment was vices are covered by the Annex B exclusion. not adopted by the Council, which, instead, chose merely to permit, in Article 28(3)(b) and point 2 of Annex F (the text of these latter 41 — This principle has been stated on many occasions by the provisions not having been contained in either Court: see Case 348/87 Sachtinį Uitvoering Financiële Atties of the Commission's proposals), the transi­ v Staatssecretaris van Financien [1989] ECR 1737, para- graph 13; Case C-453/93 Bulthuis-Griffioen v Inspecteur der Omzetbelasting [1995] ECR I-2341, paragraph 19; and, most recently, Case C-346/95 Blasi v Finanzamt München / [1998] ECR I-481, paragraph 18. 42 — See Case 173/88 Skatteministeriet v Henriksen [1989] 39 — Amendments to the proposal for a sixth Council Directive ECR 2763, paragraph 12. To my mind, the natural corollary on the harmonisation of legislation of Member States con­ of the principle of the strict interpretation of exemptions is cerning turnover taxes — Common system of value added that exceptions to exemptions must be construed broadly; tax: uniform basis of assessment; OJ 1974 C 121, p. 34. see paragraph 37 of my Opinion in Case C-468/93 Gemeente 40 — Proposal for a sixth Council Directive on the harmonisation Emmen v Belastingsdienst Grote Ondernemingen [1996] of legislation of Member Sutes concerning turnover taxes ECR I-1721, and paragraph 21 of the Opinion of Advocate — Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of General Gulmann in Case C-74/91 Commission v Germany assessment; OJ 1973 C 80, p. 1. [1992] ECR I-5437..

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(iii) The scope of Annex B to the Second prior specific words. I do not consider that Directive these words should be interpreted as applying only to rights similar either to patents or to trade marks. In my opinion, they should be construed as alluding to other intellectual property rights, one of the most important of which is, of course, copyright. It follows, in my opinion, that the assignment of the rights to exhibit motion pictures by a film- production company, such as the applicant, must be regarded as excluded from the ambit of point 2 of Annex F to the Sixth Directive.

39. The notion of 'assignments of patents, trade marks and other similar rights, as well as the granting of licences in respect of such rights', is, to my mind, sufficiently broad to encompass the assignment of copyright. Such a provision is particularly suited for the appli- cation of the ejusdem generis principle of construction. 43 The application of that prin- ciple presupposes that a genus can be identi- fied from the matters enumerated in the text under scrutiny which precedes the general words; in other words, whether a common element emerges from perusal of a number of specific words which may be used in con- struing the general words. In this case I am satisfied that such an element exists. The spe- 40. Such assignments are clearly taxable sup- cific references to 'patents' and 'trade marks' plies for the purposes of Article 2(1) of the call to mind two of the principal types of Sixth Directive, which subjects to VAT 'the intellectual property provided in the laws of supply of goods or services effected for con- the Member States and recognised in the sideration ... by a taxable person acting as case-law of the Court. Without further words, such'. Since the assignment of such cinemato- the provision would, of course, refer only to graphic rights consists of the assignment of those two. However, the general words 'and intangible property, it is covered by the first other similar rights' must be given a meaning by reference to the elements suggested by the indent of Article 6(1), and should be treated as a supply of services which is taxable under Article 9(1), in principle, in the Member State where the supplier has established his busi- 43 — For a brief discussion of the nature of this principle, see ness or has a fixed establishment from which paragraph 21 of my Opinion in Case C-167/97 Linthorst, Pouwefs and Scheres v Inspecteur der Belastingdienst [1997] the service is supplied. Consequently, I rec- ECR I-1195 (hereinafter 'Linthorst'), as well as paragraph 67 of the Opinion of Advocate General Darmon in Case ommend that the Court answer the first ques- C-63/92 Lubbock Fine v Commissioners of Customs & Excise tion referred to the effect that national-law [1993] ECR I-6665. It has also been invoked as an aid to interpretation by Advocate General Sir Gordon Slynn in his provisions which seek to exempt such sup- Opinion in Case 218/86 SAR Schotte v Parfums Rothschild [1987] ECR 4905, p. 4911. The Court in Linthorst, although plies from VAT are incompatible with the not referring by name to the principle, considered it in that case before finding it to be inapplicable; see paragraph 20. Sixth Directive.

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(iv) Alternative view the Court on numerous occasions in relation to the Community VAT system. 4S Since VAT applies to the supply for consideration of goods or services, it is reasonable to assume that the Community legislature had in mind the exemption of the commercial exploitation of creative or artistic works when it included the 'services of authors, artists, performers' in point 2 of Annex F. I see no reason in prin- ciple or logic for limiting that exemption to supplies made by natural persons. If authors, artists or performers wish to form legal per- 41. In the event of the Court not regarding sons for the purposes of the commercial assignments of copyright as covered by point 1 exploitation of their works, the principle of of Annex B to the Second Directive, I would fiscal neutrality, as well as the need to avoid offer, ex abundante cautela, the following distortions of competition, requires that they comment on the alternative view that could be treated no differendy for VAT purposes be taken of the scope of point 2 of Annex F from those who choose not to adopt such a to the Sixth Directive. I should say straight- form. Moreover, given the generally high costs away that I do not think that such assign- of film production, it is likely that most films ments may be regarded as falling within the will be produced by corporate bodies. To notion of 'services supplied by ... members of limit the scope of the exemption to natural the liberal professions', as Sweden has sub- persons would, thus, effectively exclude film mitted. In the absence of a specific indication production, a very important modern outlet by the Community legislature that it intended for the collective provision of services by to adopt a very broad notion of what would authors, artists, and performers, from the traditionally be viewed as 'the liberal profes- scope of the exemption. sions', I do not think that the services of authors, artists, performers are included. I draw support for this view from the state- ment of the Court in Linthorst, where, refer- ring to that part of the third indent of Article 9(2)(e) which covers 'services of con- sultants, engineers, consultancy bureaux, law- yers, accountants and other similar services', B — Questions 2 and 3 the Court declared that 'the only common feature of the disparate activities mentioned in that provision is that they all come under the heading of liberal professions'. 44 H o w - ever, I agree with the observations of Finland and Sweden that it would be inappropriate to construe the exemption provided in point 2 of Annex F as limited to services provided by 42. As regards the second and third ques- natural persons. Finland has referred to the tions, it is sufficient to observe that the Court principle of fiscal neutrality, enunciated by has consistently held that the provisions of

45 — See Case C-317/94 Gibbs v Commissioners of Customs & 44 — Linthorst, loc. cit., footnote 43 above, paragraph 20. Excise [19%] ECR I-5339, and, in particular, paragraph 23.

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the Sixth Directive are capable of having direct invoiced to him by his suppliers or to pass on effect. 46 To my mind, this applies a fortiori any charge whatsoever to the person fol- with regard to both Article 6, which defines lowing him in the chain of supply'. 48 Con- the notion of 'supplies of services' for the sequently, since '[a]n exemption from VAT purposes of giving effect to the distinction may therefore lead to an increase in his tax made by Article 2(1) between the taxable burden', he may 'have an interest in being supply of goods and services, and Article 17 subject to VAT'. 49 There is therefore nothing concerning the right of deduction. The cor- untoward in seeking to register for VAT. nerstone of the VAT system is that a taxable person pays VAT only on the difference between the tax included in the supplies of goods and services which he has purchased from his suppliers and that due on his own supplies.

The wording of both provisions is mandatory and, as the Court has already held in respect of the provisions of Article 17(1) and (2), '[t]hey do not leave the Member States any discretion as regards their imple- 44. By its third question, the Skat- mentation'. 47 terättsnämnden wishes to know whether the right to deduct may be affected by the fact that a taxable person did not include output tax on the supplies which he made.

As I have already noted, the fundamental basis of the right of deduction recognised in Article 17 of the Sixth Directive is that VAT inputs 'may be deducted only in so far as the goods and 43. The Skatterättsnämnden has sought spe- services in respect of which those inputs have cific guidance as to whether any special con- arisen constitute "price components'* of a siderations apply where a taxable person taxable transaction'. 50 Accordingly, the Court invokes the directly effective provisions of has held that, in general, 'where a taxable the Sixth Directive in order to assert its person supplies services to another taxable liability to pay VAT. Although a taxpayer person who uses them for an exempt transac- would not normally voluntarily seek to pay tion, the latter person is not entitled to deduct tax, the nature of the VAT system is such the input VAT paid'. 51 Sweden refers to the that, occasionally, liability to VAT will be fact that, since the assignment of the rights at beneficial to a taxable person. As Advocate issue was exempt in Swedish law, no VAT General Darmon pointed out in his Opinion was charged by the applicant, and contends in Lubbock Fine v Commissioners of Customs that, if the applicant were now to be per- & Excise, 'where a taxable person carries out mitted to register for VAT and seek to deduct an exempt transaction, he is not obliged to its VAT inputs, the ex post facto recovery of pay tax on the transaction, but he is also unable to deduct the tax which has been

48 — Loc. cit., paragraph 29 of the Opinion. 49 — Ibid. 50 — See paragraph 9 of the Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro 46 — See, inter alia. Case 8/81 Becker v Finanzamt Münster- in Case C-302/93 Débouche v Inspecteur der Invoerrechten Innenaadt [1982] EC» 53, Case C-10/92 Balocchi v Minis- en Accijnzen [1996] ECR I-4495. tero delle Finanze [1993] ECR 1-5105 and Case C-62/93 BP 51 — Sec Case C-4/94 BLP Croup [1995] ECR I-983, para- Supergas v Greek State [1995] ECR I-1883. graph 28, and Débouche v Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en 47 — BP Supergas, ibid., paragraph 35. Accijnzen, loc. cit., paragraph 16.

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the VAT which should have been charged on 'rules governing the exercise of the right to the assignments would probably be very dif- deduct', will, thus, only be that by which its ficult. In consequence, Sweden asserts that it inputs exceed its outputs. Thus, the applicant would be contrary to Article 17(2) of the will be required to account for VAT on its Sixth Directive to allow the right of deduc- supplies, whether or not it added it to the tion in such circumstances. I do not agree. price charged to its customers for the assign- ments at issue. Moreover, it is not the respon- sibility of the applicant to ensure that the VAT which should have been included in the price of the assignment transactions is actu- ally reflected as an input in the VAT return of the assignees. In so far as those assignees are registered for VAT in Sweden, it is up to them to claim deduction of inputs. 52

45. For the reasons I have already discussed in paragraphs 35 to 40 above, the assignment of rights in cinematographic works has never been exempt from VAT. Thus, transactions such as those at issue in the main proceedings have always been compulsorily subject to VAT. It follows from the plain and unam- biguous wording of Article 17(2) that, once the taxable person uses the goods and services giving rise to the inputs for the purposes of his taxable transaction, he is entitled to exer- 47. Accordingly, I would recommend to the cise the right of deduction. Court that it answer the third question to the effect that the failure of a taxable person to add the value of the output tax at the time of calculating the price of the assignment of exclusive rights to exhibit motion pictures cannot affect the right of that taxable person, who has made the assignments in question, to deduct from the VAT which he ought to have paid in respect of those assignments the VAT component of the goods and services sup- plied to him for the purposes of making the 46. Sweden would appear to assume that such motion pictures that were the subject-matter a result would permit a taxable person, like of the assignments. the applicant, to have the best of both worlds; namely the benefit of deducting its inputs whilst not simultaneously being liable to pay VAT on its outputs. This concern is miscon- 52 — In respect of those assignees which were not registered for VAT m Sweden, since the assignments should have been ceived. The applicant will only be entitled to subject to VAT in Sweden they would, if they had paid VAT, deduct its inputs from its outputs like all other have been entitled to claim a refund in accordance with Article 7(4) of the Eighth Council Directive 79/1072/EEC of taxable persons under the VAT system: the 6 December 1979 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes — Arrangements amount in respect of which it will be entitled for the refund of value added tax to taxable persons not to claim a reimbursement pursuant to Arti- established in the territory of the country; OJ 1979 L 331, p. 11. The fact that no VAT has been paid does not therefore cle 18 of the Directive, which deals with the adversely affect overall Swedish VAT revenues.

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V — Conclusion

48. In the light of the foregoing, I recommend that the questions referred by the Skatterättsnämnden be answered as followed:

(1) The assignment of rights to exhibit motion pictures by a film-production undertaking does not come within the scope of the transitional exemption pro- vided for in Article 28(3)(b) of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes — Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment, read in conjunction with point 2 of Annex F to that Directive;

(2) It follows, in particular, from Articles 2(1), 6(1) and 17 of the Sixth Council Directive that a person who makes taxable supplies of exclusive rights to exhibit motion pictures may rely upon those provisions against a national tax authority which refuses to permit it to make a VAT declaration in which that person seeks to deduct the VAT component of the goods and services used for the purposes of producing the films in question from the VAT which should have been included in the price charged on the assignment of those rights;

(3) The failure of a taxable person to add the value of the output tax at the time of calculating the price of the assignment of exclusive rights to exhibit motion pictures cannot affect the right of that taxable person, who has made the assign- ments in question, to deduct from the VAT which he ought to have paid in respect of those assignments the VAT component of the goods and services supplied to him for the purposes of making the motion pictures that were the subject-matter of the assignments.

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