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Súdny dvor Európskej únie·17.12.1998

C-241/97

ECLI:EU:C:1998:618

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Súdny dvor Európskej únie
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61997CC0241

FÖRSÄKRINGSAKTIEBOLAGET SKANDIA

OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL RUIZ-JARABO COLOMER delivered on 17 December 1998 *

1. The Regeringsrätten (Supreme Adminis- company. Livförsäkringsaktiebolaget Skandia trative Court), Sweden, has asked the Court is a life insurance company wholly owned by for a preliminary ruling on two questions Skandia. Together they own Skandia Invest- concerning the interpretation of an article in ment AB, a company which invests in small Directives 73/239/EEC and 79/267/EEC 1 and medium-sized companies. under which Member States may not pre- scribe rules as to the choice by insurance companies of the assets in which they invest their free resources.

4. In a letter of 29 December 1995, Skandia informed the Finansinspektionen (Financial 2. The interpretation of the Community rules Supervisory Authority) that Skandia Invest- is required to enable the referring court to ment intended to increase its shareholding in determine whether a national law prohibiting Kungsdialysen AB, a company carrying on insurance companies from holding, without dialysis activity, an intention which it carried special administrative authorisation, more out. shares in other joint-stock companies than corresponds to 5% of the votes attached to all the shares (hereinafter 'the 5% rule') is applicable in the case at issue.

5. After the additional share acquisition Skandia Investment owned shares in Kungs- The facts and procedure in the main dialysen carrying 9.2% of the votes and rep- proceedings (according to the order for resenting 33.9% of the share capital (the pre- reference) vious figures were 5.0% and 30.8%). After the acquisition, the shareholding was within the company's free assets, that is to say within the assets not used as cover for the technical 3. Försäkringsaktiebolaget Skandia (herein- provisions. after 'Skandia') is a non-life insurance

* Original language: Spanish. 1 — First Council Directive 73/239/EEC of 24 July 1973 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provi- sions relating to the taking-up and pursuit of the business of 6. By decision of 21 March 1996, the Fin- direct insurance other than life assurance (OJ 1973 L 228, p. 3) and First Council Directive 79/267/EEC of 5 March ansinspektionen found that Skandia had to 1979 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administra- observe the 5% rule and ordered it to ensure tive provisions relating to the taking-up and pursuit of the business of direct life assurance (OJ 1979 L 63, p. 1). that by 1 September 1996 Skandia Investment

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reduced its holding in Kungsdialysen to no to 5% of the votes attached to all the more than 5% of the votes attached to all shares? shares in the company.

If Question 1 is answered in the negative:

7. Skandia appealed against the decision to the Government, which rejected the appeal by decision of 15 August 1996. Skandia appealed against that decision to the Reger- ingsrätten, seeking a judicial review to deter- 2. Are the aforementioned directive articles mine the legality of the Government's final of such a character, as regards clarity and decision. In the context of that procedure, the so forth, that they have the consequence national court considered it necessary to refer that a national court must disregard a the following questions to the Court for a national provision having the tenor preliminary ruling: described above when called upon to examine the permissibility of an insur- ance company's investments of its free assets?'

'1. Is it compatible with Article 18(1) of Directive 73/239/EEC, as amended by Article 26 of Directive 92/49/EEC, 2 and The relevant national provisions with Article 21(1) of Directive 79/267/EEC, as amended by Article 27 of Directive 92/96/EEC, 3 for national legislation to prescribe that, so far as an insurance company's free assets (i.e. those assets not used to cover the tech- 8. The Försäkringsrörelselagen (Swedish nical provisions) are concerned, the insur- Insurance Business Law) of 1982 contains ance company may not, without special provisions concerning the pursuit of business administrative authorisation, own more of life insurance companies and non-life insur- shares in a domestic or foreign joint- ance companies. stock company than corresponds

2 — Council Directive 92/49/EEC of 18 June 1992 on the coor- dination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to direct insurance other than life assurance and amending Directives 73/239/EEC and 88/357/EEC (Third 9. The first paragraph of Article 3 of Chapter Non-life Insurance Directive) (OJ 1992 L 228, p. 1). 1 provides that an insurance company may 3 — Council Directive 92/96/EEC of 10 November 1992 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provi- not pursue any business other than insurance sions relating to direct life assurance and amending Directives business if there are no special reasons for 79/267/EEC and 90/619/EEC (Third Life Assurance Direc- tive) (OJ 1992 L 360, p. 1). such activity.

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10. The first paragraph of Artide 17 sets out holdings in companies which pursue some the 5% rule in the following terms: form of financial activity.'

11. Rules similar to those contained in the 'An insurance company may not, without the first and second sentences of the first para- approval of the Finansinspektionen, own a graph of Article 17 of Chapter 7 of the 1982 greater proportion of the shares in a Swedish Law were also contained in the 1948 Insur- or foreign joint-stock company than corre- ance Business Law. The reason stated for sponds to the number of votes not exceeding those rules upon the enactment of that Law 5% of the votes attached to all the shares. If was to prevent insurance companies from the insurance company belongs to a group, acquiring too much influence in companies this provision shall be applicable to the group. outside the insurance sector. In the calculation of the group's holding, no regard shall be had to shares owned by banks belonging to the group or by subsidiaries of such banks unless they represent more than 5% of the votes in the joint-stock company. The relevant Community provisions

12. Community insurance law has developed The first paragraph shall not be applicable to in three stages: shares or holdings in insurance companies or in legal persons whose business consists exclu- sively in owning shares in insurance compa- nies, to provide guarantee capital for mutual insurance companies, to administer insurance — A first 'generation' of directives (Directive companies' property or to assist insurance 79/267 on life insurance and Directive companies in the conduct of their business. 73/239 on non-life insurance, both cited The first paragraph shall, however, be appli- above) was designed to facilitate the effec- cable to shares or holdings in legal persons tive exercise of insurance companies' right whose object is to own, directly or indirectly, of establishment. assets referred to in the first paragraph of Article 10 if those assets do not consist of shares or holdings in public insurance com- panies or foreign companies of the same type. — A second 'generation' of directives (Direc- tive 90/619/EEC 4 on life assurance and

4 — Council Directive 90/619/EEC of 8 November 1990 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provi- sions relating to direct life assurance, laying down provisions Article 17(a) shall apply as regards the right to facilitate the effective exercise of freedom to provide ser- vices and amending Directive 79/267/EEC (OJ 1990 L 330, of insurance companies to own shares or have p.50).

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Directive 88/357/EEC 5 on non-life insur- had to be able to carry on business throughout ance) facilitated the effective pursuit of the Community under the right of establish- such insurance business under the rules ment or the freedom to provide services. To on freedom to provide services. that end, the third generation directives adopted the approach of '... bringing about such harmonisation as is essential, necessary and sufficient to achieve the mutual recogni- tion of authorisations and prudential control systems, thereby making it possible to grant — Lastly, a third 'generation' of directives a single authorisation valid throughout the (Directive 92/96 on life assurance and Community and apply the principle of super- Directive 92/49 on non-life insurance, both vision by the home Member State'. 6 cited above) was intended to complete the internal market in insurance on the prin- ciple of a single official authorisation and financial supervision by the competent authorities of the State in which the insur- ance company has its head office.

15. That principle meant that Member States would be responsible for monitoring the finan- cial health of insurance undertakings, including their state of solvency, the establishment of adequate technical provisions and the cov- ering of those provisions by matching assets. 13. Thus the Community legislation sought The coordination of national rules on the to ensure, on the one hand, that insurance subject was particularly necessary in a system undertakings were free to pursue their busi- where there was mutual recognition of auth- ness and, on the other, that Community citi- orisations and prudential control systems. zens were free to avail themselves of the widest possible insurance market, while guar- anteeing them adequate legal and economic protection.

16. The necessary harmonisation of the Member States' rules on the technical provi- sions which insurers are required to establish 14. To achieve the first objective, insurance to cover their commitments had already been undertakings authorised in a Member State effected. The third generation of insurance directives took a further step in the same direction, stating that 'the rules governing the spread, localisation and matching of the assets 5 — Council Directive 88/357/EEC of 22 June 1988 on the coor- dination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to direct insurance other than life assurance, laying down provisions to facilitate the effective exercise of freedom to provide services and amending Directive 72/239/EEC (OJ 1988 L 172, p. 1). 6 — Fifth recital in the preamble to Directives 92/49 and 92/96.

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used to cover technical provisions must be 19. The assets not used to cover the technical coordinated in order to facilitate the mutual provisions constitute what might be described recognition of Member States' rules'. 7 as the insurance undertaking's 'free assets' or 'available or disposable assets'. The questions referred by the national court seek an inter- pretation of the rule, relating to those assets, contained in the two directives.

17. To that end, the articles on technical reserves in the first generation directives (Arti- cle 15 of Directive 73/239 and Article 17 of 20. As amended, that rule is set out in the Directive 79/267) were amended. As amended, following terms: they provide that the home Member State shall require every insurance undertaking to establish adequate technical provisions in respect of its entire business. The amount of such technical provisions must be determined in accordance with the rules laid down in (a) with respect to life assurance, Article 18(1) Directive 91/674/EEC 8 or Directive 92/96. of Directive 73/239 provides that 'Mem- The technical provisions in respect of the ber States shall not prescribe any rules as undertaking's entire business must be covered to the choice of the assets that need not by matching assets. be used as cover for the technical provi- sions referred to in Article 15';

(b) with respect to non-life insurance, Article 21(1) of Directive 79/267 provides that 18. The directives lay down the legal rules 'Member States shall not prescribe any governing the spread, localisation and rules as to the choice of the assets that matching of those assets. In fact, only certain need not be used as cover for the tech- categories of assets (investments, debts and nical provisions referred to in Article 17'. claims, and others) may be used to cover the technical provisions. In addition, Member States must require every insurance under- taking to invest no more than a certain per- centage of its total gross technical provisions in certain categories of assets. 21. Lastly, the Community rules prohibit insurance undertakings from extending their objects to other types of commercial busi- 7 — Thirteenth recital in the preamble to Directive 92/49 and fif- teenth recital in the preamble to Directive 92/96. ness. Thus, Article 8(1 )(b) of Directive 73/239 8 — Council Directive 91/674/EEC of 19 December 1991 on the and the similarly worded Article 8(1 )(b) of annual accounts and consolidated accounts of insurance under- takings (OJ 1991 L 374, p. 7). Directive 79/267, as amended, provide that

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the home Member State shall require every may impose 'quantitative' restrictions (such assurance (or insurance) undertaking to 'limit as the 5% rule) that do not require specific its objects to the business provided for in this investment in any category of assets. Directive and operations directly arising there- from, to the exclusion of all other commercial business'.

24. The Commission and the appellants in the main proceedings take the opposite view, The first question maintaining that the rules contained in the two directives do not allow Member States to impose restrictions of any kind, qualitative or quantitative, on the choice by insurance com- panies of the assets in which they invest their free resources.

22. The first question referred by the national court seeks to ascertain whether the Commu- nity rule can be interpreted as meaning that the freedom in the 'choice of assets', accorded to insurance companies under the two direc- tives, may be limited by a national rule 25. For my own part, I incline to the latter imposing restrictions on that choice, as in the view. In giving my reasons, I shall first explain case of the aforementioned Swedish 5% rule. 9 why I disagree with the proposition that the 5% rule is necessarily connected with the limitation on insurance companies' business outside the insurance sector; I shall then try to show why that rule is contrary to the pro- visions on freedom of choice in the matter of disposable assets contained in the two 23. The Swedish Government (supported by directives. the Norwegian Government and, in part, by the Finnish Government) contends that the directives only prohibit the imposition of 'qualitative' limits on insurance undertakings' choice of assets, that is to say, Member States may not require those undertakings to invest (i) The proposition that the 5 % rule is based in certain 'categories' of assets. Conversely, so on the prohibition of pursuit by insurance long as that condition is met, Member States companies of business other than insurance business

9 — The fact that the law allows the national authorities to auth- orise this type of investment in certain cases does not alter the fact that the rule is in the nature of a prohibition. The Court has consistently held that, when a national rule that is in the nature of a prohibition is contrary to Community law, the mere fact that the national authorities have discretion to grant authorisations that are contrary to the general rule is not suf- 26. The Swedish and Norwegian Govern- ficient to prevent that rule from being declared incompatible with Community law. ments state that the 'aim and purpose' of the

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5% rule is necessarily connected with the ment in transferable securities (UCITS). 11 prohibition on insurance companies pursuing That directive did not, in the end, set any business outside the insurance sector. That figure in this connection. prohibition is contained not only in their national legislation but also in the Commu- nity provisions. 10

29. I do not agree with that line of argument for various reasons. Before going into them, I must confess that the Swedish Govern- ment's explanation seems to me to have been thought up after the event to justify a restric- 27. In their view, a legitimate way of ensuring tion imposed on other grounds. In fact, as the compliance with that prohibition is to pre- appellant in the main proceedings has shown, vent insurance undertakings from owning sig- the original purpose of the 5% rule, in 1948, nificant shareholdings in companies outside was not to ensure that insurance companies the insurance sector. Holdings exceeding 5% complied with the prohibition on pursuing of the votes in such companies would enable business other than insurance business, but insurance undertakings to exercise a 'domi- simply to limit their influence on the eco- nant influence' on the companies in question. nomic life of the country as an alternative to According to the Swedish and Norwegian nationalisation of the insurance sector, which Governments, insurance undertakings could was advocated in certain political circles at then easily evade the prohibition on pursuing that time. business other than insurance business.

30. Moreover, as the appellant rightly points out, if the real purpose of the 5% rule was to 28. The Swedish Government emphasises that prevent insurance companies from pursuing the limit of 5% of the vote-carrying capital business other than insurance business, it is was considered appropriate for the purpose difficult to see why the rule relates only to of defining the point at which a holding with holdings in joint-stock companies and not to votes attached enabled the shareholder to exert shares in other types of commercial company a 'significant influence' on the management of or legal person. a company. It referred in this connection to the opinions expressed by certain Member States in the context of the preparatory work for Council Directive 85/611/EEC of 20 December 1985 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions 31. Even if it were to be admitted, for the relating to undertakings for collective invest- sake of argument, that the purpose of the 5%

10 — See point 21 above. 11 — OJ 1985 L 375, p. 3.

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rule is the one at present proposed by the 34. The difference between the two hypo- Swedish Government, I consider that the pro- thetical cases is quite clear. O n the one hand, hibition on insurance companies pursuing we have the movable assets of a particular business other than insurance business in no person (natural or legal, it does not matter way requires them to limit their holdings in here) and, on the other, the entirely separate other companies to that extent. There is no issue of the pursuit of commercial business direct and necessary connection between by that person. Owning shares in a company acquiring a 5% shareholding and pursuing amounting to 6% of all vote-carrying shares the particular business of the company in does not turn the shareholder into a busi- which those shares are owned. nessman, that is to say a person pursuing a certain business.

32. In short, I cannot see why a modest holding, albeit exceeding 5% of the vote- 35. It could be argued that this is a somewhat carrying shares, should be regarded as tanta- formalistic line to take and that, in the busi- mount to the shareholders 'pursuing' the par- ness life of undertakings, shareholders who ticular business of the company in which they have a relatively modest holding may some- own shares. It could be argued, by the same times have a decisive influence on a compa- token, that any individual shareholder who ny's management decisions. In my view, that owns 6% of the vote-carrying shares in a does not alter the fact that there is a differ- number of different joint-stock companies is ence between owning shares, on the one hand, pursuing the particular business of all those and pursuing a commercial business, on the companies at the same time. other.

33. Such a conclusion is not defensible in law. 36. The power, by means of vote-carrying A portfolio of vote-carrying shares may be shares, to influence the decisions of the bodies part of the assets of a natural or legal person (shareholders' meetings, boards of directors, but owning such a portfolio does not neces- etc.) that determine the business policy of a sarily presuppose or imply that the person joint-stock company is not tantamount to concerned is in every case pursuing the com- pursuing the business of that company. It fol- mercial business of the company. In other lows that a shareholder cannot, merely because words, for legal purposes, the fact that a he exercises his right to vote, be held to be shareholder owns shares in a company is not pursuing the particular commercial business to be confused with the business of that of the joint-stock company in which he owns company. shares.

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37. I must emphasise that the two situations tively 'pursues' business outside the insurance are quite distinct, from a legal point of view. sector. 12 Also, shareholders who own 6% of the vote- carrying shares in a company usually play only a very small part in the decisions taken by the company's governing bodies and they cannot therefore determine its conduct. Even less can they be said to 'carry on' or 'pursue' the business of the company, since its day- 40. An insurance company could, in fact, seek to-day management is in the hands of bodies to extend its business activities by acquiring in which they may not even be represented. shares in a company or other similar instru- ments with a view to gaining control of the company in question. 1 3Such acquisitions would no longer be merely a financial invest- ment but controlling shares enabling the com- pany effectively to take over the management of the companies concerned.

38. The requirement that insurance under- takings limit their business to business in the insurance sector is stated in very clear terms in the directives, which refer to the 'objects' of the undertaking. Those objects must be 41. However, such conduct goes far beyond limited to insurance business (and operations mere financial investment. The investment of directly arising therefrom). So long as that free resources in shares, even vote-carrying rule is observed, there is nothing to prevent shares, ought not to be regarded as 'business an insurance undertaking's investment in other than insurance business', which shares in companies outside the insurance sector from exceeding 5%, or even a little more, of the share capital of those companies. 12 — The prohibition on modifying the objects of the undertaking by participating in other undertakings is absolute in some national legal systems. For example, Article 2361 of the Italian Civil Code prohibits joint-stock companies from acquiring shares in other undertakings, even in cases where the company's articles of association allow it, if the objects of the company as defined in its articles of association would be significantly modified as a result of the size and purpose of the holding. On the application of this principle to the problems arising from one company controlling others, see Schiuma, L., Controllo, governo e partecipazione al capitale, Padua, 1997. Italian writers have studied in detail the prob- lems caused by insurance undertakings participating in com- panies outside the insurance sector. See, in particular, Fanelli, 39. The problem that may arise in this con- G., 'Sulla legittimità dell'acquisto da parte di imprese di assi- curazione della partecipazione in imprese con diverso oggetto nection is far wider and is not confined merely sociale', Giur. Comm., 1987, I. pp. 817-826. to shareholdings. It is the problem of avoiding 13 — Under the Danish law on insurance business, an insurance company is considered to be pursuing business other than a surreptitious but significant modification in insurance if it has a decisive influence on a commercial com- the objects of the undertaking as a result of pany whose business is outside the insurance sector or con- nected with business outside the insurance sector. The Finnish the establishment, acquisition or control of law on insurance undertakings contains similar provisions, prohibiting them from holding more than 50% of the shares dummy companies, whether or not they are m companies outside the insurance sector. The Italian law subsidiaries in the strict sense of the term, prohibits insurance undertakings from acquiring holdings in undertakings outside the insurance sector that would give through which the insurance company effec- them control of those undertakings.

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insurance companies may not pursue, if it distinction to all types of shareholding, far does not modify the objects of the insurance exceeds what is admissible for the purpose of company investing its free resources in this limiting the objects of insurance companies, way. In fact, a financial investment of this as prescribed in the abovementioned kind is not even a 'business activity' in the directives. strict sense of the term 14 but merely a case of a company investing part of its assets in securities.

(ii) The interpretation of the Community pro- visions on choice in the matter of disposable assets

42. Only if an insurance company's acquisi- tion of shares is intended to circumvent the limitation on its objects by establishing dummy companies, which it controls and which enable it to pursue business other than insurance business, only then, in my view, may the national authorities act, in a par- 44. The freedom of choice in the matter of ticular case, to forestall the possibility of a disposable assets guaranteed by the two rules in the directives, to which I have already significant modification in the insurance com- referred, takes the form of forbidding Member pany's objects. States to prescribe 'any rules' on the subject. In my view, the negative form of words used is a sufficiently clear indication that Member States may not act in this area, as there are clear and exhaustive Community rules on the subject. To be more specific, they may not impose limits, either qualitative or quantita- tive, on the choice of these assets. 43. In my opinion, it is clear that the 5% rule contained in the Swedish legislation, in view of its abstract and rigid character, taking no account of the facts and applying without

14 — For tax purposes, in particular for the purposes of value added tax, such investment is not even regarded as an 'eco- nomic activity'. Indeed, the Court has held that the mere 45. The first argument in favour of that inter- acquisition and holding of shares in a company is not to be regarded as an economic activity, within the-meaning of the pretation, even if it does not carry great weight Sixth Directive, conferring on the holder the status of a tax- able person (Case C-60/90 Polystar Investments Netherlands as a criterion for interpretation in Commu- [1991] ECR I-3111, paragraph 13). The mere acquisition of nity law, is purely literal: the wording of the financial holdings in other undertakings does not amount to the exploitation of property for the purpose of obtaining rule is mandatory, leaving no room for State income therefrom on a continuing basis, Decause any divi- dend yielded by that holding is merely the result of owner- action to limit the freedom of choice. The ship of the property (see also, to this effect, Case C-333/91 prohibition is expressed literally in terms that Sofitam [1993] ECR 1-3513, paragraph 12, and Case C-80/95 Harnas & Helm [1997] ECR 1-745, paragraphs 14 to 18). allow no exceptions, either quantitative or

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qualitative. Moreover, the provision is not other, would be meaningless if that second designed simply to guarantee freedom of part were also to be subject to limitations, choice with respect to 'certain categories of such as the 5% rule, which are more appro- assets' but to prevent Member States from priate to a system of supervision and control prescribing any rule restraining insurance such as that governing the technical provi- companies from investing their disposable sions. resources in whatever assets they consider appropriate.

48. Thirdly, the application of the 5% rule by a Member State to the insurance companies under its control significantly distorts the system of competition between undertakings 46. A second and more important point is of this type. Insurance companies established that an examination of the meaning of the in Sweden but subject to the control of another rule within the system of both directives leads Member State whose legislation does not con- to the same conclusion. The establishment of tain that rule could acquire holdings in Swedish a harmonised framework for competition or foreign companies corresponding to more between insurance undertakings that will be than 5% of the vote-carrying shares. They to the advantage of the policy-holder without could thus plan their investment decisions as jeopardising the financial health of the under- they think fit, in terms of market trends, and takings demands sufficiently clear rules on so improve their financial situation by pur- their assets. While the directives laid down suing a skilful investment policy. That oppor- rules on the obligation to establish technical tunity is restricted in the case of insurance provisions, which Member States were companies that are under the control of the required to enforce, they also intended to Swedish authorities and they are consequently leave to individual undertakings decisions as at a disadvantage compared with their com- to the investment of part of their assets, deci- petitors in the same sector. sions that are not and cannot be regulated by national provisions or national authorities.

49. Moreover, that distortion of competition cannot be regarded as being inspired by the motive of protecting the financial health of 47. The distinction between one part of an insurance undertakings by spreading the risks undertaking's assets (the assets used as cover attaching to investment. As the appellant has for the technical provisions), which are sub- explained, the 5% rule would not prevent it ject to various restrictions, on the one hand, from investing all its disposable resources in and another part, the free assets which are not one of the large companies quoted on the subject to restrictions of any kind, on the Swedish stock exchange, given the ratio of

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Skandia's free assets to the stock market value tation of Article 67 of the Treaty, 16 as amended of one of those companies. by Council Directive 88/361/EEC of 24 June 1988 for the implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty 17 and Annex I thereto.

50. This is altogether incompatible with a Community rule that is intended specifically to harmonise national legislation on insur- 53. There is consequently no doubt that par- ance, in particular the rules on the assets of ticipation in the capital of an undertaking is insurance undertakings, both the assets used among the capital movements that have been as cover for the technical provisions and the liberalised and that the Swedish 5% rule disposable assets. restricts the freedom thus accorded. Could it, however, be held to be justified by Article 73d of the EC Treaty, under which Member States may take '... all requisite measures to prevent infringements of national law and regulations, in particular in the field of taxa- tion and the prudential supervision of finan- cial institutions'? 51. Lastly, the 5% rule is contrary to the Community rules on free movement of capital enshrined in Article 73 b of the EC Treaty, 15 since a limitation on insurance companies' holdings in Swedish or foreign joint-stock companies constitutes a restriction on the movement of capital in one of its most char- acteristic forms, namely investment in shares. 54. In my view, the answer must be in the negative. I have already observed that the purpose of the 5% rule is not to protect the solvency of insurance companies but to limit their influence on other sectors of the econ- omy. 18 Such a broad and undifferentiated objective (undifferentiated in that it does not 52. 'Participation in new or existing under- even distinguish between the economic takings with a view to establishing or main- taining lasting economic links' is one of the capital movements to be liberalised pursuant 16 — OJ, English Special Edition 1960, p. 49. to List A of Annex I to the First Council 17 — OJ 1988 L 178, p. 5. Directive of 11 May 1960 for the implemen- 18 — At the hearing, the Swedish Government representative con- tended that the 5% rule did not affect the free movement of capital, inasmuch as it applied only to Swedish insurance companies, a view which I clearly cannot share, since those companies too are active beneficiaries of that freedom. In the course of the same statement, he admitted that the aim of the 15 — As inserted by point 15 of Article G of the Treaty on Euro- rule at issue was to 'prevent an excessive number of votes pean Union. falling into the hands of a single shareholder'.

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sectors that may be protected) 1 9 cannot in and in the light of the circumstances sur- my opinion justify a clear restriction on the rounding a particular investment of free assets, free movement of capital that has nothing to prohibiting investments which jeopardise a do with the prudential supervision of finan- company's solvency margin, suggest that the cial institutions. company is taking excessive risks, or even show a significant change in its objects as a result of the establishment, acquisition or control of dummy companies outside the insurance sector. But, I must emphasise, this does not justify a general and comprehensive prohibition in principle, such as the 5% rule that is the subject of the order for reference in this case. 55. This conclusion is unavoidable, particu- larly in an area of business activity open to the free play of competition and in which national rules have to be adjusted to meet the criteria for coordination established in the Community directives on the sector in ques- tion. N o t only do those harmonised rules The second question make no provision for the possibility of imposing a rule such as the 5% rule on insur- ance companies' investment of their dispos- able resources in other domestic or foreign undertakings, they actually preclude any national action to regulate those companies' choice of assets.

57. By its second question, the national court seeks, in brief, to ascertain whether, if the national rule is not compatible with the pro- visions of the aforementioned directives, those provisions are such as to render the con- flicting national rule inapplicable. 56. The prudential supervision of insurance institutions may certainly justify decisions by the national authorities, in particular cases

19 — In Case C-148/91 Vereniging Veronica Omroep Organisatie [1993] ECR I-487, the Court held that the provisions of the Treaty on the free movement of capital and the freedom to provide services must be interpreted as not precluding leg- islation of a Member State which prohibits a broadcasting organisation established in that State from investing in a 58. Clearly, the question assumes that, at the broadcasting company established or to be established in relevant time in the dispute in the main pro- another Member State, where those activities are directed towards the establishment of a commercial television station ceedings, the period allowed for incorp- whose broadcasts are intended to be received, in particular, in the territory of the first Member State and those prohibi- orating the insurance directives into Swedish tions are necessary in order to ensure the pluralistic and law had expired, a point that is not at issue non-commercial character of the audio-visual system intro- duced by that legislation. and requires no further comment.

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OPINION OF MR RUIZ-JARABO — CASE C-241/97

59. The answer to this question referred by binding. In this context, the relative clarity of the national court must be in the affirmative, the provision is immaterial: once the Court as the Court has confirmed on numerous has explained its meaning and shown it to be occasions. A national rule that is incompat­ incompatible with a conflicting national pro­ ible with Community law may not be applied, vision, the national provision may no longer and national courts must consequently refrain be applied. The relative clarity of the Com­ from applying it, in disputes they are called munity provision, raised by the referring upon to hear and determine. The uniform court, may be relevant in other circumstances application of Community law would not be (for example, in the context of a State's respon­ guaranteed if Member States were to give their sibility for failure to transpose a directive cor­ own national rules precedence over Commu­ rectly) but not when the issue is the primacy nity provisions, that is to say if they could of Community law over conflicting national apply national law in preference to Commu­ provisions. nity law in the event of a conflict between them.

60. From the ground-breaking judgment in 62. The Court has consistently held, most Simmenthal 20 to the recent decision in recently in IN. CO. GE. and Others, cited IN. CO. GE. and Others, 21that principle has above, that 'the interpretation which, in the been stated in sufficiently categorical terms: exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon it every national court must, in a case within its by Article 177 of the Treaty, the Court of jurisdiction, apply Community law in its Justice gives to a rule of Community law entirety and protect the rights which the latter clarifies and defines where necessary the confers on individuals and must accordingly meaning and scope of that rule as it must be set aside any provision of national law which or ought to have been understood and applied may conflict with it, whether prior or subse­ from the time of its entry into force. It fol­ quent to the Community rule. lows that the rule as thus interpreted may, and must, be applied by the courts even to legal relationships arising and established before the judgment ruling on the request for interpretation, provided that in other respects . the conditions enabling an action relating to the application of that rule to be brought before the courts having jurisdiction are satis­ 61. When, as in this case, the provision at fied (Case 61/79 Denkavit Italiana [1980] issue is contained in a directive, the Court's ECR 1205, paragraph 16, and Case C-188/95 interpretation of that provision is universally Fantask and Others [1997] ECR I-6783, para­ graph 37)'. 2 2

20 — Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato ν Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629. 21 — Joined Cases C-10/97 to C-22/97 Ministero delle Finanze ν 22 — Joined Cases C-10/97 to C-22/97 IN CO. GE. and Others, IN CO. GE. and Others [1998] ECR I-6307. cited in footnote 21 above, paragraph 23.

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FÖRSÄKRINGSAKTIEBOLAGET SKANDIA

Conclusion

63. I therefore propose that the Court should give the following answer to the ques- tions referred by the Regeringsrätten:

1. Article 18(1) of Council Directive 73/239/EEC of 24 July 1973 on the coor- dination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking-up and pursuit of the business of direct insurance other than life assur- ance and Article 21(1) of Council Directive 79/267/EEC of 5 March 1979 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking-up and pursuit of the business of direct life assurance preclude the application of a national provision to the effect that insurance companies may not, without special administrative authorisation, own more shares in a domestic or foreign joint-stock company than corresponds to 5% of the votes attached to all the shares.

2. A national court which is called upon to hear and determine an appeal against an administrative decision based on such a provision is under a duty to give full effect to the aforementioned directives, if necessary disapplying the provi- sion in question.

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