C-267/97
ECLI:EU:C:1998:269
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COURSIER ν FORTIS BANK
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL LA PERGOLA delivered on 28 May 1998 *
2 Facts of the case and legal background Convention, the Cour Supérieure de Justice (High Court of Justice) of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg has referred the following question to the Court of Justice:
1. The question submitted to the Court for 'Does a judgment delivered in the State of a preliminary ruling in these proceedings origin in the context of a court-supervised relates to the concept of 'enforceable judg liquidation — a matter which is excluded ment' for the purposes of the first paragraph from the scope of the [Convention] — and of Article 31 of the Convention on Jurisdic which is not open to recognition under the tion and the Enforcement of Judgments in national law of the State in which enforce- Civil and Commercial Matters, signed at Brus ment is sought, but which, in the State in sels on 27th September 1968 (hereinafter 'the which it was given, confers on one of the par- Convention'). 1The first paragraph of Arti ties immunity from execution of the judg- cle 31 of the Convention states that '[a] judg ment whose enforcement is sought, affect the ment given in a Contracting State and enforce quality of enforceability which, according to able in that State shall be enforced in another the first paragraph of Article 31 of the Con- Contracting State when, on the application of vention, a judgment must possess in order to any interested party, it has been declared be recognised and enforced?' enforceable there'.
2. The facts at the origin of the dispute in the main proceedings can be summarised as fol- lows. By judgment of 6 January 1993 of the Cour d'Appel (Court of Appeal), Nancy, the In accordance with Articles 1 and 2(2) of spouses Eric Coursier and Martine Bellami, the Protocol on the interpretation of the both of French nationality and resident in France, were ordered to pay to the Luxem-
* Original language: Italian. 1 — Journal Officiel 1972 L 299, p. 32. The consolidated version 2 — See the Protocol concerning the interpretation by the Court of the Brussels Convention, as amended by subsequent Acces- of Justice of the Convention of 27 September 1968 on Juris- sion Conventions (the most recent of which was the Conven- diction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Com- tion of 29 November 1996 on the Accession of the Republic mercial Matters, signed in Luxembourg on 3 June 1971 of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of (OJ 1975 L 204, p. 28). The consolidated version of the Pro- Sweden to the Brussels Convention), was published in OJ tocol, as amended by the Accession Conventions, was pub- 1998 C 27, p. 1. lished in OJ 1998 C 27, p. 28.
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bourg company Fortis Bank (hereinafter 'For- by judgment of the Tribunal de Commerce of tis') the equivalent in French Francs of 16 June 1994. The judgment stated 'that the LUF 563 282 together with statutory interest right of creditors to bring individual proceed- and the costs of the proceedings. The claim of ings shall be reinstated only under the condi- Fortis recognised by the French court tions specified in Article 169 of the Law of stemmed from the failure of the Coursier- 25 January 1985'. 4 Under the first paragraph Bellami couple to meet their obligation to of Article 169: 5 repay the sum of LUF 480 000, which they had been lent in August 1990. It does not appear from the case-file that the debtors appealed against the judgment, which was served on them on 24 February 1993.
'a judgment terminating, for lack of sufficient assets, a liquidation under supervision of the court shall not reinstate the right of creditors to bring individual actions against the debtor, By judgment of 1 July 1993, the Tribunal de except in so far as the debt arises: Commerce (Commercial Court), Briey, brought simplified proceedings for court- supervised receivership {redressement judici- aire) against Mr Coursier, who ran a bar in Rehon (France). O n the same date the receiv- ership was converted into a court-supervised liquidation (liquidation judiciaire), in view of the cessation of business activities by the 1. from a criminal conviction in respect of debtor, his inability to offer creditors a serious facts unrelated to the occupational activity of recovery plan and the impossibility of other the debtor or in respect of tax fraud, in which recovery options. 3 Under this procedure, case only the public treasury may benefit; Fortis registered its claim as an unsecured creditor.
2. from rights attaching to the person of the debtor. 6 3. The court-supervised liquidation was finally terminated for lack of sufficient assets
4 — See footnote 3 above. 5 — As amended with effect from 1 October 1994 by Article 75 of 3 — The court-supervised receivership procedure introduced by Law N o 94-475 of 10 June 1994 on the prevention of and Law N o 85-98 of 25 January 1985 on the court-supervised remedies against the difficulties of undertakings. receivership and liquidation of undertakings (hereinafter 'Law 6 — The concept of 'rights attaching to the person of the debtor' N o 85-98') is designed to safeguard an undertaking in dif- covers claims relating to maintenance payments or a benefit ficulties, preserve its assets and employment and discharge its as compensation for material or non-material damage (see liabilities. The procedure may lead to continuation of the E Derrida, P. Godé and J.-P. Sortais in Redressement et liqui- undertaking's activities, total or partial cessation of business dation judiciaires des entreprises, cinq années d'application, or the court-supervised liquidation of its assets (see Article 1). Paris, 1991, 3rd edition, pp. 430 and 431).
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The debtor may, however, be sued by a surety enforcement had therefore not been reinstated or joint debtor who has paid in his stead.' either in France or in another Contracting State. Article 31 of the Convention makes enforcement (hereinafter referred to by that term in order to distinguish it from compul sory execution in the proper sense of the 8 word) subject to the condition that the deci sion to be enforced is of an enforceable nature. The appellant maintains that that requirement is not satisfied in the present case because the 4. Subsequently, as Mr Coursier had found court-supervised liquidation procedure under paid employment in Luxembourg while con French law grants the insolvent debtor 'immu tinuing to reside in France, Fortis applied to nity from enforcement', which in his view the Tribunal de Paix (Magistrate's Court) in makes the judgment delivered by the court in 9 Luxembourg for a writ attaching the wages that country unenforceable in Luxembourg. which its debtor earned there. In order to Under the procedure in question, no interna obtain an enforceable instrument for the pur tional validity can be conferred on a decision poses of securing the attachment, Fortis which under the internal law of the State of requested and obtained an order for the origin has ceased to be valid vis-à-vis the enforcement of the judgment, which order debtor on account of the immunity from was made in accordance with Articles 31 and enforcement which the law grants to the latter. 32 of the Convention 7 by the presiding judge Those arguments are endorsed by the Com- of the Tribunal d'arrondissement (District mission, as is clear from the observations it Court) Luxembourg on 2 July 1996 (herein has submitted to the Court of Justice. after 'the enforcement order').
5. Mr Coursier appealed to the national court 6. By contrast, Fortis maintains that the immu- in accordance with Articles 36 to 39 of the nity from enforcement deriving from Convention (see point 14 below), claiming that the order enforcing the judgment was void. In his opinion, the judgment is not enforceable as Fortis' claim does not come 8 — As the Court of Justice pointed out some time ago, 'the Con- vention merely regulates the procedure for obtaining an order within the exceptions specifically laid down for the enforcement of foreign enforceable instruments and does not deal with execution itself, which continues to be in Article 169 of Law N o 85-98 and the bank's governed by the domestic law of the court in which execu- tion is sought', but the application of the domestic procedural right to bring individual proceedings for rules may not impair the effectiveness of the Convention (see Case 148/84 Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank ν Brasserie du Pêcheur [1985] ECR 1981, paragraph 18, and Case 145/86 Hoffmann ν Krieg [1988] ECR 645, paragraphs 27 to 29). 9 — 'Immunité d'exécution', meaning the preferential treatment 7 — Article 32 of the Convention states, in as far as concerns these which in exceptional cases the law accords to the debtor and proceedings, that 'the application [provided for in the first which relates to the person of the debtor and is designed to paragraph of Article 31 (see point 1 above)] shall be sub- protect him from compulsory enforcement in particular cir- mitted: ... in Luxembourg, to the presiding judge of the tri- cumstances, is described in Donnier, Voies d'exécution et pro- bunal d'arrondissement'. cedures de distribution, Paris, 1993, 3rd edition, pp. 49-51.
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Article 169 of Law N o 85-98 applies only to regarding territorial jurisdiction. 12Fortis adds the person of Mr Coursier (and therefore does that in France bankruptcy proceedings are not extend to Mrs Bellami) and has territorial governed by the principle of territoriality; effects which are confined to France. The fact hence, even if the liquidation were to be that the right to bring individual enforcement reopened — which is theoretically possible — proceedings against a debtor previously sub- it could not lead to assets or income held by ject to court-supervised liquidation is not the debtor in other Contracting States being reinstated does not, however, detract in any added to the assets in bankruptcy. way from the enforceable nature of judgments predating the opening of the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. The applicant in the main proceed- ings is therefore wrong to rely on Article 31 of the Convention. In the view of Fortis, the article in question does not permit enforce- ment to be refused in the light of the effects of other decisions that may have been adopted Legal analysis against the respondent in the State of origin if they relate to issues falling outside the scope of the Convention. This, the bank maintains, is precisely the case of the French order ter- minating the court-supervised liquidation for lack of sufficient assets. 10 Furthermore, Arti- cle 34 of the Convention provides that the
application for enforcement may be refused 'only for one of the reasons specified in Articles 27 and 28', 1 1none of which applies in the present case, even according to 7. In my view, the question submitted by the Mr Coursier. If the Court were to hold that national court calls for a preliminary inquiry. the alleged defence of unenforceability of the Above all, it is necessary to examine the pro- judgment in France were well founded and if cedure for reviewing the enforcement in one the enforcement order were quashed, Fortis Contracting State of enforceable judgments delivered in another Contracting State.
It is would have no possibility of taking action for also necessary to ascertain what effects can be the compulsory execution of its rights as accorded in the legal system of one Con- creditor, either in Luxembourg, the State in which Mr Coursier earns income from employment that is (at least partly) attach- able, or in France, where Fortis had duly 12 — Under the first paragraph of Article 2 of the Convention, 'subject to the provisions of this Convention, persons domi- obtained judgment against the debtor as ciled in a Contracting State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that State'. It should be noted that, required by the provisions of the Convention if the conditions for application of the Convention regarding scope, jurisdiction and time are met, the courts of the Con- tracting States are required to apply it [see the Report by
Prof. Dr. P. Schlosser on the Convention of 9 October 1978 on the Association of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Schlosser Report'), in OJ 1979 C 59, p. 71, and especially p. 97]. Not without reason, the Court has stated that questions relating to the scope of the provisions of the Convention, which determine jurisdiction within the international legal order, must be regarded as being matters of public policy (sec Case 10 — See point 19 below. C-89/91 Shearson Lehmann Hutton [1993] ECR I-139, para- 11 — See point 16 below. graph 10).
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tracting State to foreign decisions of the same creates a natural obligation on the part of the type as the judgment delivered on 16 June debtor: consequently, spontaneous repayment 1994 by the Tribunal de Commerce, Briey. to a creditor cannot be regarded as an undue That judgment in turn refers to Article 169 of payment liable to recovery. 13 The provision Law N o 85-98 (see point 3 above); the ratio in question does not appear to have an equiva nale and scope of that provision therefore lent in any other Member State; particular also warrant a brief analysis for the purposes relevance for the purposes of this Opinion of these proceedings. attaches to the fact that Luxembourg bank ruptcy law (see Article 536 of the Commer cial Code) applies the opposite principle, which permits creditors to resume individual actions for enforcement if the proceedings are
terminated, and on which the French system was based before the adoption of Law N o 85-98. By distinguishing between the The extinction of individual actions for enforce debtor and the undertaking, the rationale ment by creditors, provided for by Article 169 behind Article 169 appears to be to bring the of Law No 85-98 treatment of sole traders, who otherwise would be liable up to the value of their entire assets for debts contracted in the conduct of business, into line with that of shareholders in joint stock companies, who are not per sonally liable for the company's debts, which are extinguished when the company is dis solved. 1 4 However, legal writers have raised the question whether or not the provision at issue serves its intended purpose: it is one thing to rehabilitate the undertaking of a debtor in difficulties and another to allow him to free himself immediately of all his residual
8. I shall commence with the latter point. debts and to start again from scratch, resulting Article 169 — which lays down that the ter in a kind of 'advance rehabilitation' of his mination of court-supervised liquidation for lack of sufficient assets does not reinstate the future enterprise which excludes the risk of right of either unsecured or preferential credi another insolvency. 1 5 It has been observed, tors to bring individual actions against the debtor in respect of claims predating the com mencement of the recovery procedure except 13 — See Y. Guyon, Droit des affaires et des entreprises, Paris, in the cases specifically laid down by law — 1997, 6th edition, Vol. 2, p. 375, Y. Chaput, Droit du redresse ment et de L· liquidation judiciaires des entreprises, Paris,
is understood in academic writing as pro 1987, pp. 254-255, and Derrida, Godé and Sonáis (op. cit. in footnote 6 above), p. 431. viding for the definitive extinction of the 14 — See Chaput (op. cit. in footnote 13 above), p. 253. By the creditors' rights, and not simply for their sus same token, the exemptions provided for in the second para- graph of Article 169 for situations in which the debtor, by
pension. However, such extinction applies not reason of his own negligence, has forfeited preferential legal to creditors' substantive rights but to their treatment mirror the treatment prescribed for the managers of legal entities, who arc liable to actions to make good defi- ability to take legal action against the debtor ciencies in the company's assets (and, in the event of aggra- vated abuse, to personal court-supervised receivership; see to obtain satisfaction of those rights. This dis Article 178 et seq. of Law N o 85-98). tinction is important, because the counterpart 15 — See Guyon (op. cit. in footnote 13 above), p. 13.
See also B. Dureuil and J. Mestre, La 'purge' des dettes par l'article 169 to the extinction of the action is that it de la loi du 25 janvier 1985, Rev. proc. coll, 1989, p. 389.
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more specifically, that the major sacrifice in 10. As we know, the object of facilitating the terms of creditor rights and the serious harm recognition and enforcement of judgments to freedom of contract caused by Article 169 between Member States (endorsed by Arti- cannot be justified on grounds of the survival cle 220 of the EC Treaty) is of such impor- of the undertaking, which by definition has tance that it prompted this Court to affirm ceased to exist at the liquidation stage. Con- that the Convention should be interpreted in versely, if the debtor submits a plan for the the spirit of promoting the free movement of continued operation of the undertaking, he is judgments within the single market. 1 8 It was actually prevented from relying upon Arti- precisely in order to pursue that objective cle 169. 1 6 This leads some authors to argue more effectively that the authors of the Con- that the article in question which, 'in disre- vention did not confine themselves to estab- gard of a judgment that has acquired the force lishing simplified procedures for the recogni- of res judicata, divests of his rights a creditor tion and enforcement of foreign judgments who had fulfilled all the obligations imposed but also laid down rules of direct jurisdiction upon him', is unconstitutional. 17 (see Articles 2 to 24), that is to say rules that are also applicable in the State of origin (and not only by the court of the State in which recognition or enforcement is sought when the jurisdiction of the foreign court is reviewed for those purposes). 1 9
The procedures Uid down by the Convention for the recognition and enforcement of enforce- able foreign judgments
11. The recognition and enforcement proce- dures are purely declaratory and rest on the fundamental principle of reciprocal confi- dence among the Contracting States. The powers of the court of the State in which rec- ognition is sought are confined to a much
9. Article 169 of Law N o 85-98 is relied upon by Mr Coursier in the main proceedings to 18 — See Case 145/86 (cited in footnote 8 above), paragraph 10. block the attempt by the creditor bank to As Advocate General Tesauro pointed out, the fact that obtain the compulsory execution (in Luxem- Article 220 'entrusts to the Member States, and not to the Community institutions, the task of attaining the objectives bourg) of its claim which is legally recognised which it sets is due to the fact that jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters remains, in any event, a matter within (in France), after having obtained recognition the sovereignty of the Member States; however, that does of the foreign judgment as equivalent to the not preclude the conclusion that the rules with which it is concerned fall within the scope of application of the Treaty, domestic enforcement instrument, in accor- for the purposes of Article 2. The free movement of judg- ments is of fundamental importance to the avoidance of the dance with the domestic rules for compliance difficulties which can arise for the functioning of the common with the Convention (see point 5 above). market when it proves impossible to secure the acceptance of, and easily enforce, even by judicial means, the individual rights that derive from the multiplicity of legal relationships which come into being in that market' (see the Opinion delivered on 16 December 1993 in Case C-398/92 Mund & Fester v Hatrex Internationaal Transport [1994] ECR I-467, 16 — See Dureuil and Mestre (op. cit. in footnote 15 above), p. 398. paragraph 8; footnote omitted). 17 — See Derrida, Godé and Sortais (op. cit in footnote 6 above), 19 — See H. Gaudemet-Tallon, Les Conventions de Bruxelles et de p. 426. Lugano, Paris, 1993, p. 211.
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simpler and speedier review of the 'interna 'leads to a considerable simplification for the tional legality' of the foreign judgment than creditor, enabling him to avoid those delaying that laid down by the rules of ordinary law. tactics that often lie at the root of appeals In the light of the guarantees accorded to the [made in the State of origin] in purely finan respondent in the original proceedings by the cial disputes and which are lodged for the uniform rules on direct jurisdiction referred sole purpose of delaying enforcement of the 20 to above and the safeguards provided for claim. The Convention has, as a rule, given the rights of the defence, again within the priority to the position of the creditor over framework of the objectives pursued by the that of the debtor', although naturally without Convention, 2 1 the foreign judgment is pre denying protection to the latter (see points 14 sumed to be in order, even if it has not and 17 below). 2 4 acquired the force of res judicata in the State of origin. Judgments enforceable by law against which there is a right of appeal or which the court has declared to be provision ally enforceable may be treated in this way; 2 2 so too may provisional and protective mea sures, as Article 24 of the Convention shows. 2 3 As has been observed, this system
20 — It will be recalled, for example, that the court of the State of origin must declare of its own motion that it has no jurisdic tion if the claim turns on a matter over which the courts of 12. The concepts of 'recognition' (see Articles another Contracting State have exclusive jurisdiction (sec Article 19 of the Convention) and, in cases where the for 26 to 30) and 'enforcement' (see Articles 31 eign defendant does not enter an appearance, if its jurisdic tion is not derived from the provisions of the Convention to 45) are not expressly defined in the Con (see the first paragraph of Article 20). Moreover, the court must stay the proceedings in the absence of proof that the vention. In this regard, I would point out that defendant who fails to appear has been able to arrange for his defence (second paragraph of Article 20). the former automatically confers substantive 21 — See Case 125/79 Denilauler ν Coachet Frères [1980] validity on the foreign judgment in the State ECR 1553, paragraph 13. According to K. D. Kerameus, 'By having almost alljurisdictional issues determined in the court in which recognition is sought as well. This of origin, the Convention has been able to relieve the rec- State therefore agrees to incorporate auto ognition and enforcement proceedings from that most serious obstacle confronting all other bilateral or multilateral trea- matically the legal situation enshrined in the ties. Thus upgrading the relevance of rules on jurisdiction ends up in significantly improving recognition and enforce- measure in question 2 5 (a declaratory judg ment itself' (see Basic rules relating to recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments under the Brussels Con- ment, for example) into its own legal system vention, in Studia Juridica, 1995, Vol. III, p. 495, especially p. 505). without the need for judicial review. The 22 — See G. A. L. Droz, Compétence judiciaire et effets des juge- intervention of the court is prescribed only if ments dans le Marché Commun, Paris, 1972, p. 353. recognition is sought: (i) as the principal issue, 23 — The expression 'provisional, including protective, measures' within the meaning of Article 24 must therefore be under- where there is dispute between the parties as stood as referring to 'measures which, in matters within the scope of the Convention, are intended to preserve a factual to the legality of the decision in question (in or legal situation so as to safeguard rights the recognition of which is sought elsewhere from the court having jurisdic- which case the party applying for recognition tion as to the substance of the matter' (see Case C-261/90 may request application of the enforcement Reichert et al v Dresdner Bank [1992] ECR I-2149, para- graph 34). However, provisional or protective measures which are ordered or authorised without the party against which they are directed having been summoned to appear and which are intended to be enforced without prior service do not come within the system of recognition and enforce- 24 — See F. Pocar, La convenzione di Bruxelles sulla giurisdizione ment provided for by Title ΙΠ of the Convention (see Case e l'esecuzione delle sentenze, Milan 1995, 3rd edition, p. 27. 125/79, cited in footnote 21 above). 25 — See Gaudemet-Tallon (op. cit in footnote 19 above), p. 227.
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procedure; see point 16 below); or (ii) as an domestic order. 28 In this way, the beneficiary ancillary matter (for example, to support an of the judgment is enabled to satisfy in the objection of res judicata or the offsetting of a State addressed — by using legal instruments claim), in which case jurisdiction rests with appropriate to its system, if necessary by the court hearing the main application. having recourse to public authority 29 — the substantive right found to exist and to be compulsorily enforceable in the State of origin.
14. Among the conditions for the legality of the foreign judgment, particular importance attaches here to its enforceability. 'If a judg- ment from which an appeal still lies or against which an appeal has been lodged in the State 13. The enforcement procedure which relates in which it was given [see point 11 above] solely to measures requiring material execu- cannot be provisionally enforced in that State, tion — that is to say, typically judgments it cannot be enforced in the State in which establishing and documenting a claim as being enforcement is sought. It is an essential requirement of the instrument whose enforce- certain, liquidated and enforceable, 26 ment is sought that it should be enforceable including, for example, judgments ordering in the State in which it originates. ... there is the unsuccessful party to pay the costs of the no reason for granting to a foreign judgment proceedings 27 — is designed to render the rights which it does not have in the country foreign judgment enforceable by means of a in which it was given'. 30 For the same reason,
26 — See G. Tarzia, Les titres exécutoires et le recouvrement des créances dans l'Union Européenne, in Actualité du droit/ 28 — Whereas 'in the countries which derive their model for Annales de droit de Liège, 1995, p. 381, especially p. 383. importing judgments from French law — the original sig- Enforcement in the State addressed by the enforcement natories to the Convention — the action [open to the inter- bodies of that State necessarily presupposes that the claim, ested party] is designed to append the "enforcement for- after taking account of the actual form in which it is formu- mula", whereby the court traditionally... "mande et ordonne lated, is capable of execution under the powers granted to à tous huissiers de justice, sur ce requis, de mettre ledit arrêt such bodies. Hence, although it is necessary to verify, from (ou ledit jugement) à exécution" ..., in the common law the enforcement phase onwards and in the same way as for countries, which acceded to the Convention at a later date, a domestic decision of the same kind, whether the claim is enforcement proceeds via "registration" [in one or more of . of an enforceable nature, the Convention does not lay down the autonomous jurisdictions of the United Kingdom: that such verification is to be performed by the bodies England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland], which entrusted with enforcement. In order to ascertain the enforce- consists in inserting the foreign judgment into the records ability of the foreign judgment, the court of the State in or registers of the court from which recognition is sought, which enforcement is sought may interpret the operative almost as though it had been delivered by that court itself. part of the judgment in the light of the statement of reasons The effect of this is that the judgment registered in this way [see Oberlandesgericht, Saarbrücken, Order of 3 August ... "shall, for the purposes of execution, be of the same force 1987, N o 5 W 102/87 (Digest of case-law relating to the and effect ... as [if] the judgment had been originally given European Communities, D Series, I-31-B 12), which granted in the registering court" ...' (see A. Miele, La cosa giudicata enforcement of a French judgment for the repayment of straniera, Padua, 1989, pp. 20-21; footnote omitted). borrowed sums of money, but only with regard to the capital 29 — Sec Gaudemet-Tallon (op. cit. in footnote 19 above), p. 228, sum and not to the contractual interest, which on the basis A. Miele (op. cit. in footnote 28 above) and P. Moreau, De of the original judgment were due, after deduction of sums /'exequatur et des causes de préférence, in Actualité du droit/ which the debtor had already paid as interest and which had Annates de droit de Liège, 1995, p. 395, especially p. 398. been allocated to a particular period prior to the judgment 30 — See the Report by P. Jenard on the Convention of 27 Sep- but not collected]. tember 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judg- 27 — See Cour de Cassation (France), judgment N o 676 90-21.473 ments in Civil and Commercial Matters (hereinafter referred of 5 May 1993, Times Newspapers v Pordéa (Gazette du to as 'the Jenard Report'), OT 1979, C 59, p. 1, p. 48 (foot- Palais, 1994, I, p. 383). note omitted; emphasis added).
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if at the time of the application the foreign addressee's State of domicile). Such an appeal judgment has ceased to be enforceable in the may be based, inter alia, on the fact that the legal system of origin — for example, because decision is not yet enforceable or is the sub it has been quashed or as a result of prescrip ject of an appeal in the State of origin or does 35 tion 31 — the view must be taken that the not fall within the scope of the Convention. substantive condition laid down by Article 31 The debtor can also effectively raise objec for the granting of enforcement is not ful tions on the ground of lack of interest on the filled. 32 part of the creditor in bringing proceedings because of events arising after the judgment was given (for example, evidence that the debt to which the foreign judgment relates has been discharged). 3 6 However, the substance of the judgment to be enforced or the proce dure on the basis of which the judgment was reached may be reviewed only to the extent provided for in Articles 27 and 28 (see point 16 below).
15. The enforcement procedure is a summary one: the competent court (indicated for each Contracting State in Article 32 of the Con vention) decides upon application by the inter ested party, without delay and without hearing the other party. 3 3 The rights of the defence of the party against whom enforcement is sought are safeguarded, however, as there is provi sion for a hearing to be held at a later date if 16. Although the method of lodging the appli the respondent lodges an appeal within one cation for enforcement or recognition (such or two months of service of the measure as the information it must contain or the granting enforcement (depending on the number of copies to be submitted) is deter mined by the procedural law of the State addressed, the Convention requires the pro duction of certain documents, in particular an 31 — For example, under English law, authorisation is needed to obtain a writ of execution if six years have elapsed since the delivery of a judgment [see Rules of the Supreme Court (Rev.), Ord. 46, r. 2; see S. O'Malley and A. Layton, Euro pean Civil Practice, London, 1989, p. 744, footnote 20]. 32 — See Droz (op. cit. in footnote 22 above), p. 351. According 34 — If an appeal is lodged, or in any case during the time speci to O'Malley and Layton (op. cit. in footnote 31 above, at fied for doing so, any decision authorising enforcement docs p. 744), the date on which the foreign judgment must be not permit the applicant to commence measures of enforce enforceable is that on which the court from which enforce ment against the property of the debtor other than the pro ment is sought issues its writ. tective measures for which the legislation of the State in which enforcement is sought provides (see Articles 33 to 39 33 — Such an arrangement is obviously designed to permit 'the of the Convention). If the application for enforcement is element of surprise which is necessary in an enforcement refused, the applicant may appeal to the court designated in procedure if the respondent is not to nave the opportunity Article 40 of the Convention, before which both parties will of withdrawing his assets from any measure of enforcement' be called to state their case. (sec the Jcnard Report, cited in footnote 30 above, p. 50).
However, a party who has obtained judgment in his favour 35 — See the Jenard Report (cited in footnote 30 above), p. 51, and in a Contracting State, being a judgment for which an order the Schlosser Report (cited in footnote 12 above), p. 134. for enforcement under Article 31 of the Convention may be 36 — See the Jcnard Report (cited in footnote 30 above), p. 51, issued in another Contracting State, is prevented from making according to which 'such grounds are admissible in enforce an application to a court in that other State for a judgment ment proceedings', and Oberlandesgericht, Munich, Order against the other party in the same terms as the judgment N o 25 W 1937/79 of 30 November 1979 [(Digest of case-law delivered in the first State, even if such ordinary proceed relating to the European Communities, D Series, I-34-B 4), ings may be simpler and less costly, from the procedural quashing the enforcement order on the grounds of the par point of view, than the recognition procedure (see Case tial extinction of a pecuniary obligation arising from an 42/76 De Wolf v Cox [1976] ECR 1759).
Italian judgment].
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authenticated copy of the foreign judgment else from separate documents, and in par- 'which satisfies the conditions necessary to ticular from a comparison of the date of the establish its authenticity' and, in the case of a judgment, the date of service and the time judgment given in default, the document which allowed for lodging an appeal — is clearly establishes that the party in default was served linked to the first paragraph of Article 31 of with the document instituting the proceed- the Convention (see point 14 above). ings (see Article 46).
17. If the foreign judgment of which the applicant seeks recognition is only provision- ally enforceable and an appeal is lodged, the court of the State in which recognition is sought may stay the proceedings (see Article Under Article 47(1) of the Convention, a pro- 30 of the Convention), where appropriate vision which applies only to applications for after having first ascertained that the grounds enforcement, the applicant must also produce for refusal set out in Articles 27 and 28 (see documents which establish that (i) the judg- point 16 above) do not apply. Similarly, under ment is enforceable according to the law of Article 38 of the Convention, if the enforce- the State of origin and (ii) has been served on able foreign judgment is the subject of an the other party in order to give him the appeal in the State of origin (or if the time for opportunity to comply voluntarily. 37 It need lodging such an appeal has not yet expired), hardly be pointed out that the provision in the court of the State in which an objection question, by requiring proof of the enforce- has been lodged may (a) stay the proceedings, ability of the foreign judgment — which may upon application by the appellant, or (b) con- be deduced from the enforcement order or firm the enforcement order, even of its own other references in the same measure, 38 or motion, but make it conditional on the provi- sion of such security as it shall determine.
37 — It will be observed that the failure to produce the documents required by Articles 46 and 47 does not necessarily lead to the refusal of recognition or enforcement but makes it nec- essary to stay the proceedings and allow the applicant time to produce them. Only if the documents presented are insuf- ficient to allow the court to form an opinion can the court declare the application inadmissible (see the Jenard Report, cited in footnote 30 above, p. 50). 38 — See the Jenard Report (cited in footnote 30 above), p. 55. If the enforceability of the judgment is not unambiguously evi- dent from its content, the court in the State addressed may interpret it in the light of its knowledge of the legislation of the State of origin [and possibly refuse to grant enforcement; see Oberlandesgericht, Stuttgart, Order No. 5 W 9/76 of 19 May 1976 (Digest of case-law relating to the European Communities, D Series, I-47-B 1), which rejected the pro- 18. Recognition and enforcement of the for- visional enforceability of a French divorce decree only in so eign judgment may be refused (or, if granted, far as it ordered the husband to pay alimony to his former wife]. revoked by the ruling on the appeal) only for
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one of the reasons specified in Articles 27 and the 'anomalous' rules of jurisdiction listed in 28 of the Convention, 3 9 that is to say if the second paragraph of Article 3 of the Con (i) recognition (or enforcement) is contrary to vention (Article 28). public policy in the State in which recogni tion is sought; (ii) the rights of the defence of a respondent who has not entered an appear ance are infringed (failure to serve the docu ment which instituted the proceedings in suf ficient time); (iii) the judgment is irreconcilable with a ruling given in a dispute between the same parties in the State in which recognition 19. In particular, under no circumstances may is sought; (iv) the court of the State of origin a foreign judgment be reviewed as to its has decided a preliminary question concerning substance (see Articles 29 and 34 of the Con vention): even if the court of the State certain matters lying outside the scope of the addressed considers that a point of fact or of Convention in a way that conflicts with a law has been wrongly decided by the court of rule of private international law of the State origin, or if the defendant in the foreign pro in which recognition is sought; 4 0 (v) the judg ceedings does not enter an appearance, that ment is irreconcilable with an earlier judg court cannot refuse recognition or enforce ment given in a non-contracting State ment, substituting its own discretion for that involving the same cause of action and between of the foreign court. 4 1 This prohibition, which the same parties, provided that this latter is an expression of the respect and confidence judgment fulfils the conditions necessary for which the legal system of the State addressed its recognition in the State addressed (Arti vests in the juridical sovereignty of the State cle 27); (vi) the judgment conflicts with spe of origin 4 2 and which is accompanied by an cial or binding provisions regarding jurisdic almost total prohibition 4 3 on reviewing the tion (for example, in matters relating to jurisdiction of the original court, constitutes, insurance and consumer contracts) or rules of in my view, the central principle of the entire exclusive jurisdiction contained in the Con Convention. vention; and (vii) recognition or enforcement is prohibited under a previous convention concluded by the State addressed with a third State in which the respondent was domiciled or normally resident when the judgment was delivered, if the jurisdiction of the court of the State of origin was based solely on one of 20. Finally, as to the precise scope of the effects of the 'naturalised' 44 foreign judg-
39 — But see point 14 above for the further ground for refusing 41 — See the Jenard Report (cited in footnote 30 above), p. 46. enforcement — implicitly foreseen in the first paragraph of Article 31 and the first indent of Article 47 of the Conven 42 — See J. Beauchard and C. Houssa, La procédure (¡'exequatur, tion — consisting in the lack of enforceability of the foreign in Les Conventions de Bruxelles et de la Haye en matière judgment at the time when application is made. civile et commerciale (edited by G. de Levai), Brussels, 1994, p. 55, especially p. 57. 40 — The status or legal capacity of natural persons, rights in property arising out of a matrimonial relationship, wills and 43 — Apart from the exceptions laid down in the first paragraph succession. Recognition or enforcement cannot be refused, of Article 28 of the Convention (see point 16 above). however, if the application of the rules of private interna 44 — This felicitous expression is from P. Bellet, Reconnaissance et tional law of the State addressed would have led to the same exécution des décisions en vertu de la Convention du 27 sep- result as that reached in the foreign judgment [see indent 4 tembre 1968, in Revue trimestrielle de droit européen, 1975, of Article 27 of the Convention]. p. 32, in particular p. 41.
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ment, the Court has stated, on the basis of Judgments in bankruptcy cases are outside the the Jenard Report, 4 5 that in principle a for scope of the Convention eign judgment should not be accorded greater authority and effectiveness than it would have in the State of origin (the so-called extension of effects theory). 4 6 Some academic writers, however, add a caveat, which received authori tative approval from Advocate General Darmon in the case of Hoffmann ν Krieg to 21.
In the light of the characteristics of the which I have referred: a foreign judgment system of reciprocal recognition of judgments cannot have greater effects in the State in established by the Convention, which I have which enforcement is sought than those of described above (see points 10 to 20), it is similar national judgments (the so-called easier, in my view, to understand the reasons equivalence of effects theory). 4 7 that led Mr Coursier to adopt the position described earlier (see point 5) in challenging the enforcement order in the main proceed
ings. As stated in the order for reference, the judgment falls within the scope of the Con vention and as such is capable of enforcement-at least in theory, without refer ence to the solution to be adopted in the indi vidual case. By contrast, the judgment termi 45 — Op. cit. in footnote 30 above. 46 — 'A foreign judgment which has been recognised by virtue of nating the appellant's court-supervised Article 26 of the Convention must in principle have the liquidation for lack of sufficient assets, which same effects in the State in which enforcement is sought as it does in the State in which the judgment was given' [see was delivered on 16 June 1994 by the Tri Case 145/86 (cited in footnote 8 above), in which the Court ruled that a (German) judgment ordering the husband to bunal de Commerce, Briey, cannot enjoy auto make maintenance payments to the wife — which judgment matic recognition under Luxembourg law by remained enforceable in the State of origin (where a subse quent Netherlands divorce decree had not been recognised) virtue of Article 26, as it turns on a matter and into which the enforcement formula had been inserted in the State addressed (the Netherlands), under Article 31 of that lies outside the scope of the Convention the Convention, upon application by the beneficiary — must ('bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the not continue to be enforced, despite the granting of an enforcement order, when it ceases to be enforceable for rea winding-up of insolvent companies or other sons which lie outside the scope of the Convention (i. e. the lapsing of the husband's obligation to make maintenance legal persons, judicial arrangements, composi payments as a result of the dissolution of the marital rela tionship, decreed in the State addressed; it will be recalled tions and analogous proceedings': see
that under indent (1) of the second paragraph of Article 1, indent (2) of the second paragraph of the status of natural persons is one of the matters to which the Convention does not apply). The Court also found that Article 1). the judgment ordering a person to make maintenance pay ments and the judgment pronouncing the divorce of the spouses were irreconcilable within the meaning of Arti cle 27(3) of the Convention]. See G. de Levai, Une harmoni sation des procédures d'exécution dans l'Union européenne
est-elle concevable?, in Seizure and Overindebtedness in the European Union (ed. G. de Levai), The Hague, 1997, p. 595, especially p. 606. 47 — See Droz (op. cit. in footnote 22 above), p. 280, and Gaudemet-Tallon (op. cit. in footnote 19 above), pp. 228-229. According to Advocate General Darmon, the latter 'limita- tion is founded on the need to harmonise interpretations and the desirability of preventing excessive recourse to the public As we know, the exclusion of insolvency pro policy exception' (see the Opinion delivered on 9 July 1987 in Case 145/86, cited in footnote 8 above, [1987] ECR 654, ceedings from the scope of the Convention especially p. 657). In more general terms, the Advocate Gen- was due historically to what at the time eral warned against the risk of a distorted application of the scheme of the Convention, causing the legal system of the appeared to be the insurmountable difficulty State of origin to take precedence over that of the State of execution, and hence to 'subordinate if not negate' the latter of arriving at a solution acceptable to all
(ibid., p. 658). Member States on a matter as complex as
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bankruptcy. In the light of this difficulty, and It therefore seems indisputable to me that the in order not to delay unduly the conclusion judgment terminating Mr Coursier's court-. of the Convention, the committee of national supervised liquidation — which derives experts appointed by the Council considered direcdy from the judgment opening the insol it advisable to 'excise' the matter in question vency proceedings and constitutes the culmi from the draft convention. Separate negotia nation of those proceedings — cannot be tions were begun in parallel with a view to relied upon by the debtor to block Fortis' concluding a separate convention relating claim for satisfaction of its rights as creditor. solely to bankruptcy, the scope of which In other words, the Convention works solely would have had to 'dovetail almost com to the disadvantage of the applicant in these pletely' with that of the Convention. 4 8 More proceedings, exposing him to the risk of over, as the Court of Justice has long since attachment of his income despite his immu made clear, this exclusion relates to all pro nity from enforcement under the French legal ceedings based, under the various laws of the system, in which both of the judgments rel Contracting States, on cessation of payments, evant to the main proceedings originated. As insolvency or lack of creditworthiness of the the Jenard Report 5 0 states, 'pending the con debtor, which involve the intervention of the clusion of the separate Convention covering courts culminating in compulsory collective bankruptcy, proceedings arising directly from liquidation of assets or simply in judicial bankruptcy will be governed by the legal rules supervision. Moreover, 'it is necessary, if deci currently in force, or by the conventions sions relating to bankruptcy and winding-up which already exist between certain Con are to be excluded from the scope of the tracting States'. Convention, that they must derive directly from the bankruptcy or winding-up and be closely connected with the proceedings for the liquidation of assets or supervision by the court.' 4 9
48 — Sec the Schlosser Report (cited in footnote 12 above), p. 90, the Commission Opinion of 10 December 1981 on the draft Convention on bankruptcy, winding-up, arrangements, com positions and similar proceedings (OJ 1981 L 391, p. 23), L. Daniele, Fallimento e Convenzione di Bruxelles del 1968, in La Convenzione giudiziaria di Bruxelles del 1968 e la riforma del processo civile italiano, Milan 1985, p. 85, and J.-L. Vallens, Le droit européen de la faillite: la Convention relative aux procédures d'insolvabilité, in Actualité législa- tive Dalloz, 1995, p. 217. 49 — Sec Case 133/78 G ourdam v Nadler [1979] ECR 733, para- 22. France and Luxembourg are not bound graph 4; (emphasis added), in which the Court ruled that the judgment of the civil court in France upholding the liqui- by any bilateral or multilateral convention dator's action to make good a deficiency and ordering the on jurisdiction and the recognition and de facto managers of a commercial company to pay a given sum into the assets in bankruptcy lay outside the scope of enforcement of judgments in bankruptcy the Convention. I note, incidentally, that judgments on the termination of insolvency proceedings, such as the judgment of 16 June 1994 of the Tribunal de Commerce, Briey, fall within the scope of the Convention on insolvency proceed- ings signed on 23 November 1995 in Brussels (hereinafter 'the Bankruptcy Convention'; see footnote 51 below). 50 — Cited in footnote 30 above, p. 12.
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cases. Moreover, the Bankruptcy Conven- scope of the question referred by the national tion 5 1 has not yet entered into force. Arti- court but also outside the jurisdiction of the cle 25 of that Convention (entitled 'Recogni- Court of Justice. tion and enforceability of other judgments') states in the first paragraph of indent 1 : 'Judg- ments handed down by a court whose judg- ment concerning the opening of proceedings is recognised [in accordance with the Con- vention's rules on jurisdiction] and which concern the course and closure of insolvency
proceedings . . . shall also be recognised with no further formalities. Such judgments shall I shall therefore confine myself to recalling be enforced in accordance with Articles 31 to that, in the order for reference, the Cour 51 of the Convention . . ., with the exception Supérieure de Justice observed that in prac- of Article 34(2)' (emphasis added). tice — in the light of the 'universalist' approach of Luxembourg private international law regarding bankruptcy proceedings — the pos- sibility cannot be excluded that, under certain conditions, decisions of foreign courts regarding an insolvent debtor's capacity or assets may be recognised as having the same effects in Luxembourg as they produce in the State of origin, irrespective of whether a formal order enforcing the foreign decision
has been granted. According to the national 23. As to the possibility of the judgment of court, however, that principle is not appli- 16 June 1994 of the Tribunal de Commerce, cable to judgments delivered in a country Briey, being recognised in Luxembourg at whose legal system is based on the opposite least under the ordinary law, this is obviously principle of the 'territoriality and multiple a matter which the Court may analyse purely nature' of bankruptcy proceedings, as is the as an ancillary issue. In order to examine this
case of French law. A French judgment deliv- possibility, it would be necessary to interpret ered in insolvency proceedings and relied not the rules of the Convention but national upon in Luxembourg can therefore have only law: it therefore falls not only outside the strictly territorial effects; in the case in point, that principle means that the judgment cannot prevent the insolvent person's property situ- 51 — The Bankruptcy Convention (see Actualité législative Dalloz, ated in the Grand Duchy from being subject 1995, p. 239, for the text in French, International Legal Mat- ters, 1996, p. 1223, for that in English and Riv. dir. internaz. to individual enforcement proceedings. 52 priv. process., 1996, p. 661, for that in Italian), which remained open for signature until 23 May 1996, was signed by all the Member States except the United Kingdom. Under the third paragraph of Article 49, it should have entered into force on the first day of the sixth month following that of the deposit of the instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval by 52 — The order for reference does not, however, address the ques- the last State to take that step, provided that it had been rati- tion whether or not the Luxembourg court can accord the fied, accepted or approved by all the Member States of the judgment of 16 June 1994 of the Tribunal de Commerce,
European Union. Like the various unsuccessful drafts that Briey, at least de plano evidential value by treating it as a preceded it, the Bankruptcy Convention is based on the 'bare fact' in order to give it indirect or secondary substan- principle of the unity and universality of the bankruptcy tial effects, to be determined on the basis of domestic legisla- proceedings, which arc opened in the State in which the tion, including rules of private international law (sec 'centre of a debtor's main interests' is situated. This principle G. Cardia, Sentenza civile straniera, in Enciclopedia del is limited, however, by the provision for the opening of sec- diritto, Vol. XLI, Milan 1989, p. 1272, especially p. 1275, and ondary liquidation proceedings with territorial effects in A. Huet, Nota a Tribunal de première instance de Saint- other Contracting States in which the main proceedings have Pierre et Miquelon, ordinanza 26 ottobre 1990, PEBSA/ been recognised (the principle of so-called limited universal- Marinoil Service, in Revue de jurisprudence commerciale, ity). 1991, p. 177, especially p. 179).
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Answer to the question referred in the present incurred the objective risk of losing the pro- case tection afforded to him in France by the 'shield' of personal immunity. It was doubtful, to say the least, whether his legal immunity from enforcement proceedings, stemming in the jurisdiction of origin from the judgment of the Tribunal de Commerce, Briey, could automatically be extended from France to the host State. 24. I believe I have now brought into focus the precise contours of the problem, for the solution of which the national court has sought a ruling on interpretation. In my view,
the question raised by the Cour Supérieure de Justice must be answered in the negative, for the following reasons. 26. More precisely, the claim adduced by the debtor in the main proceedings does not appear to me to derive support from either the text or the spirit of the Convention. Under the simplified system of enforcement estab- lished by the Convention, the requirement that the judgment must be enforceable according to the law of the State of origin — 25. The case under review does not exhibit as provided for in the first paragraph of any special feature that distinguishes it sub-
Article 31 and the first indent of Article 47, stantially from others in which the problem upon which Mr Coursier relies in today's arises of ensuring the cross-border movement proceedings — is justified exclusively by the of judgments involving property: given the fact that the Convention does not make inadequacy of the debtor's property in the enforcement dependent on the foreign judg- State of origin — ascertained by the court in ment having acquired the force of res judi- the decision to terminate the court-supervised cata. 53 I have already explained how the liquidation for lack of sufficient assets — the system established by the Convention oper- interested party has evaded the order to meet ates (see point 11 above).
It is true that even his obligations issued in that jurisdiction and a judgment that is fully enforceable (whether has therefore been summoned to comply in automatically or by virtue of a clause affixed the territory of the State in which enforce- by the court), which has been equated to a ment is sought, where by contrast he has national judgment for the purposes of com- assets that can be seized. This duty to comply pulsory execution in another Contracting exists and, in my opinion, can be relied upon. State, may cease to be valid in the jurisdic- Indeed, the judicial position (including immu- tion of origin as a result of a subsequent nity from enforcement) relating to the subse- judgment partially reversing or quashing it. quent collective enforcement to which the debtor was subject by virtue of his individual undertaking in the legal system of origin, the effects of which were confined to the national 53 — As I observed earlier (see point 15), this provision is linked territory, does not suggest otherwise. O n the to the power of the court of the State addressed to stay any appeal procedure or to make enforcement subject to the other hand, by taking up paid employment in lodging of a guarantee if in the jurisdiction of origin an appeal has been made against the 'naturalised' judgment or another Contracting State, Mr Coursier if the time-limit for lodging an appeal has not expired.
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Under the system established by the Conven- ments of that type. Therefore, under the legal tion, a case of this kind is catered for by system of the Grand Duchy, the judgment stipulating that the host State must automati- was not accorded any 'rights' (for my part, I cally recognise the new foreign judgment, would prefer to speak of 'effects') 'which it which can then produce its extinctive effects does not have in the State of origin'. there. 54 However, if the new foreign decision with extinctive effects cannot be recognised (for example, because the application initi- ating the proceedings was not properly and promptly served on the respondent who failed to enter an appearance), Article 31 of the Convention will again come into play, in the sense that it will invalidate the enforcement Although it is true that in France Fortis would order or the registration of the judgment sub- be prevented from obtaining compulsory exe- sequently quashed or amended. 55 cution of the claim in question, this stems from a distinct measure (the judgment of the Tribunal de Commerce, Briey) which relates (like the substantive provision on which it rests) to a matter outside the scope of the Convention — to be precise, bankruptcy and
27. That said, it must be pointed out at once similar proceedings — and cannot therefore that this case undoubtedly differs from the benefit from freedom of movement for the one I have just described, and from more than purposes of recognition, in this case in Lux- one angle: the judgment, which established embourg (see points 21 and 22 above). This that Fortis had a liquidated claim that had exclusion stems from the clear and unam- fallen due (in that it was not subject to time- biguous decision of the Contracting States, limits or conditions), became final well before and in my view there is no doubt that the the action and order for enforcement; nor rules defining the substantive scope of the does the obligation arising out of the legally Convention take precedence over those which, recognised debt appear to have been extin- equally within the scope so defined, concern guished as a result of payment or any another the enforceable nature of foreign judgments,
reason. The bank's interest in bringing an the execution of which has been sought. Fur- action must therefore be assumed to be thermore, Luxembourg legislation does not unchanged (see point 15 above). The Luxem- grant extraterritorial validity to the aforemen- bourg court hearing the application for tioned judgment of the French court (see enforcement was accordingly justified, when point 23 above). That ruling is therefore of examining the legality of the judgment, in no relevance to the national court.
If it were holding that it exhibited the same 'quality as otherwise, and if the arguments of the appli- the instrument' for the purposes of enforce- cant in the present case were accepted, the ment that French law prescribes for all judg- result would be illogical, as Fortis has cor- rectly pointed out: the French judgment ter- minating the court-supervised liquidation, while falling outside the substantive scope of 54 — See V. Starace, Sull'estinzione di efficacia, nell'ordinamento di origine, della sentenza straniera riconosciuta o resa esecutiva, the Convention, would automatically be in Riv. dir. intern. priv. proc, 1969, p. 152, especially p. 153. accorded recognition under Luxembourg law, 55 — Ibid., pp. 154 and 155. According to O'Malley and Layton (op. cit. in footnote 31 above, pp. 744-745), the same result while at the same time enforcement of the is achieved — once again through the application of the first paragraph of Article 31 of the Convention — if the foreign judgment to which, by contrast, the Conven- judgment has ceased to be enforceable as a result of pre- scription (see footnote 31 above). tion is clearly applicable, would be prevented.
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28. Permit me to clarify one further point. In individual actions for enforcement in the State contrast to the fear expressed by the Com of origin as a result of a decision of the type mission, the solution proposed in this reached by the Tribunal de Commerce, Briey Opinion, which permits the creditor's claim — will be able, subject to their instrument to be enforced in the State addressed, does being declared enforceable, to intervene in the not impair the right to equal treatment of enforcement proceedings initiated by the creditors who have previously participated in speediest creditor in the State in which enforce bankruptcy proceedings that have run their ment is sought, and thus to participate col course in the State of origin. Other creditors lectively and on an equal footing in the sub who have obtained an enforcement instru sequent distribution of the assets (without ment from a court (including a court settle prejudice to the effects of substantive rules ment) or an authentic instrument (see Arti regarding preferential claims or granting pref cles 50 and 51 of the Convention) — even if erential treatment to the first creditor to seek 56 they have been divested of the right to bring attachment).
Conclusions
F o r t h e reasons set o u t above, I p r o p o s e that t h e C o u r t reply as follows t o t h e ques t i o n s u b m i t t e d for a p r e l i m i n a r y ruling b y t h e C o u r Supérieure de Justice:
A j u d g m e n t o r d e r i n g t h e p a y m e n t of a s u m of m o n e y does n o t lose t h e quality of enforceability, w h i c h Article 31 of the C o n v e n t i o n o n J u r i s d i c t i o n and t h e E n f o r c e - m e n t of J u d g m e n t s in Civil and C o m m e r c i a l M a t t e r s requires a j u d g m e n t t o p o s - sess in o r d e r t o b e enforced in a n o t h e r C o n t r a c t i n g State, if t h e p a r t y against w h o m e n f o r c e m e n t is s o u g h t is p e r m a n e n t l y p r o t e c t e d in t h e State of o r i g i n f r o m individual p r o c e e d i n g s for e n f o r c e m e n t as a result of a n o t h e r j u d g m e n t delivered in t h a t State in t h e c o n t e x t of insolvency p r o c e e d i n g s w h i c h is n o t o p e n t o r e c o g n i t i o n in t h e State in w h i c h e n f o r c e m e n t is s o u g h t either u n d e r t h e C o n v e n t i o n o r u n d e r t h a t State's national law.
56 — Sec E. Krings, Synthèse. Le droit des saisies dans les États membres de l'union européenne, in Seizure and Overindebt- edness in the European Union (cited in footnote 46 above), p. 3, especially pp. 41-44. The author notes that in the legal systems of some Contracting States (such as Italy, Greece and Belgium) creditors without an enforcement instrument are also permitted to intervene in the enforcement proceed- ings, subject to certain conditions, as a means of safeguarding the equality of claims.
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