C-381/97
ECLI:EU:C:1998:421
- Súd
- Súdny dvor Európskej únie
- IČS
- 61997CC0381
- Zdroj
- eur-lex.europa.eu ↗
BELGOCODEX v BELGIAN STATE
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL ALBER delivered on 17 September 1998 *
A — Introduction putes whether a Member State can abolish such a right of option with retroactive effect once it has granted it. In 1990, Belgocodex acquired a 25 % share in a complex which was subsequently fully renovated as offices and shops. The plaintiff does not use the 1. In this reference for a preliminary ruling building itself but has let it to a taxable person the Tribunal de Première Instance (Court of which uses the leased premises for its eco First Instance), Nivelles, has referred a ques nomic activities. The plaintiff wishes to reclaim tion to the Court concerning the taxation of part of the costs of the renovation work which the letting of immovable property pursuant lasted from 1990 to 1993 by deducting the to the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC input tax charged for that work. of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turn over taxes — Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment 1 (hereinafter 'the Sixth Directive'). It seeks to ascertain, in particular, the extent to which a right to opt 3. The letting of immovable property is, in for taxation of an otherwise tax-exempt let principle, exempt from taxation pursuant to ting of immovable property once granted by Article 13B of the Sixth Directive, which, a Member State — in this case Belgium — under the heading 'Other exemptions', pro can be repealed subsequently with retroactive vides: effect. Such a right of option gives a taxable person the option of waiving the exemption from tax which would normally apply to let- tings of immovable property and instead have such lettings subject to value added tax, thereby acquiring a related right to deduct 2 input tax. 'Without prejudice to other Community pro visions, Member States shall exempt the fol lowing under conditions which they shall lay down for the purpose of ensuring the correct and straightforward application of the exemp tions and of preventing any possible evasion, 2. The plaintiff in the initial proceedings, Bel- avoidance or abuse: gocodex SA (hereinafter 'the plaintiff'), dis
* Original language: German. 1 — OJ 1977 L 145, p. 1. 2 — The proceeds of the leasing or letting will otherwise prob ably be subject to income tax or some comparable tax.
I-8155
OPINION OF MR ALBER — CASE C-381/97
(b) the leasing or letting of immovable prop of the option provided by Article 13C of the erty ... Sixth Directive. Article 44(3)(2)(c) provides that value added tax is payable on 'lettings to a taxable person for the purposes of his eco nomic activity of buildings ... where the lessor has given notice of his intention to let the ...'. building subject to tax; the King shall deter mine the form of the option, the manner of exercising it and the conditions which the leasing contract must meet.' The Law came into force on 1 January 1993. The King, how ever, never issued the measures provided for 4. Pursuant to Article 13C of the Sixth Direc by the Law. tive, Member States may, however, make avail able the option of subjecting the leasing of immovable property to tax. Article 13C thus provides:
6. The plaintiff considers that it may opt for 'Member States may allow taxpayers a right taxation and thereby claim the right to deduct of option for taxation in cases of: input tax. The Belgian Government, on the other hand, views the letting and leasing of immovable property as a tax-exempt activity, basing this view on the fact that the Law of July 1994 ('the 1994 Law') repealed Article (a) letting and leasing of immovable prop 44(3)(2)(c) of the Belgian VAT Code with ret erty; roactive effect. Furthermore, argues the Bel gian Government, the right of option pro vided for could not have had any legal effect as the King never issued the implementing measures.
Member States may restrict the scope of this right of option and shall fix the details of its 7. The plaintiff considers that, once granted, use.' a right of option cannot then be repealed with retroactive effect. The reintroduction of the tax exemption for the letting of immovable property to taxable persons (which is the basic rule provided for by the Sixth Directive) 5. In a Law of December 1992 ('the 1992 infringes the principle of neutrality and is Law'), which inserted Article 44(3)(2)(c) into contrary to the basic principle of the value the Belgian VAT Code, Belgium availed itself added tax system — which allows no excep-
I-8156
BELGOCODEX v BELGIAN STATE
tions. This is set out in Article 2 of the First tion of the laws of the Member States relating Council Directive 67/227/EEC of 11 April to turnover taxes — Common system of value 1967 on the harmonisation of legislation of added tax: uniform basis of assessment, and 3 Member States concerning turnover taxes has thus given its taxpayers the right to opt (hereinafter 'the First Directive'). The first for taxation of certain lettings of immovable paragraph of Article 2 provides: 'The prin property, from abolishing, in a subsequent ciple of the common system of value added law, that right of option and thus reintro tax involves the application to goods and ser ducing the exemption in full?' vices of a general tax on consumption exactly proportional to the price of the goods and services, whatever the number of transactions which take place in the production and dis tribution process before the stage at which tax is charged.' The second paragraph pro B — Opinion vides: On each transaction, value added tax, calculated on the price of the goods or ser vices at the rate applicable to such goods or services, shall be chargeable after deduction of the amount of value added tax borne directly by the various cost components.'
9. The national court refers in its question to both the First and the Sixth VAT Directives. Accordingly, one must first consider the rela tionship between the two directives. Article 8. Because of the questions arising as to the 1(1) of the First Directive provides that the interpretation of the Sixth Directive, the court Member States are to replace their existing hearing the case has referred the following system of turnover taxes by the common question to the Court for a preliminary ruling: system of value added tax, which is described in Article 2 of the First Directive.
'Does Article 2 of the First Council Direc tive of 11 April 1967 on the harmonisation of legislation of Member States concerning turn over taxes, which establishes the principle of 10. Pursuant to Article 1(1) of the Sixth Direc a common system of value added tax, prevent tive, the system of value added tax introduced a Member State — in this case Belgium — by the First Directive is to be adapted to con which has availed itself of the possibility pro form to the provisions of the Sixth Direc 4 vided for by Article 13C of the Sixth Council tive. Directive of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisa
4 — Article 1(1) provides: 'Member States shall modify their
3 — OJ, English Special Edition 1967, p. 14. p resent value added tax systems in accordance with the fol- owing Articles.'
I-8157
OPINION OF MR ALBER — CASE C-381/97
11. This leads the Commission to conclude which, in the absence of implementing mea that the application of the common system of sures which were to have been adopted by taxes is governed in particular by the provi the King, could have no legal effect and that sions of the Sixth Directive. It further implies it therefore could simply be revoked with ret that the provisions of the Sixth Directive can roactive effect. As all parties have submitted, no longer be called into question by reference it is, however, for the court referring the to the provisions of the First Directive on the question for a preliminary ruling to rule on common system of value added tax. This this point. There is much to support the applies, for example, to tax exemptions pro argument that the Law acquired legal force vided for under the Sixth Directive. The despite the absence of the royal implementing 11 recital in the preamble states that a measures, as it would not otherwise have common list of tax exemptions should be needed to be expressly repealed by the 1994 drawn up in order to ensure a uniform col Law. As long as it existed, one could reason lection of own resources in all the Member ably expect that the royal measures would be States. These common tax exemptions are adopted. These were probably not an express defined in the Sixth Directive as part of the precondition for the validity of the Law. How entire system of value added tax and its appli ever, as I have explained, this point is one cation. They may very well — and this is also which ultimately must be determined by the the argument advanced by the Belgian Gov national court. ernment — derogate from the general system.
12. The disputed Belgian provision falls, 14. Should the national judge come to the therefore, to be examined by reference to the conclusion that in the present case Belgian provisions of the Sixth Directive. Of par law confers no rights on individual taxable ticular relevance here is Article 13, which, in persons, it must be pointed out that repeal of Part B, sets out the tax exemptions applying the 1992 Law, which would then have to be to the letting and leasing of immovable prop regarded as having no effect, might breach the erty, while Part C allows Member States to principles of legal certainty and of the protec grant taxable persons the right to opt for tion of legitimate expectations. As the Com taxation in the case of letting and leasing of mission rightly states, one must then consider immovable property. It is common ground whether the letting was not perhaps already between the parties that in introducing its subject to tax and whether the taxable person 1992 Law Belgium has availed itself of the had taken this into account or whether a option provided for in Article 13C. deduction of input tax was permissible.
13. There is disagreement, however, as to whether such a right of option was in fact granted in the present case. The Belgian Gov 15. The following observation may be added ernment considers that the 1992 Law was one here:
I-8158
BELGOCODEX v BELGIAN STATE
It is true that in considering whether a Member 18. The Commission refers in this context to State has availed itself of the option allowed the judgment in the Italittica case. In that by Article 13C, the question is not whether judgment, the Court held with reference to or not the Sixth Directive has been imple the provisions of the Sixth Directive — in mented. Thus, the taxable person could not that case Article 10(2) — that these were to have acquired a right to deduct tax by virtue be interpreted broadly, as the Community of the direct effect of the Directive. As the legislature had allowed the Member States a Belgian Government has, however, already broad discretion. enacted and then repealed the Law in ques tion, it might be thought.that the Govern ment had committed itself in some way to granting a right of option in accordance with the Sixth Directive, thereby allowing a par allel to be drawn with direct effect in relation 19. The Belgian Government submits in this to the right to deduct tax., regard that Article 13C clearly does not have direct effect due to the broad discretion given
6 to the Member States. According to Com munity law, the Belgian legislature was, there fore, entirely at liberty to grant or not to grant the right of option. Article 13C thus docs not prevent Member States from with 16. Should the national court come to the drawing this option and maintaining or rein conclusion that the Belgian Law granted an troducing the rules in Article 13B. option in accordance with Article 13C of the Sixth Directive, the question arises whether this option could have been withdrawn without contravening the Sixth Directive.
The Commission and the Belgian Government say that it could. 20. It should be noted, furthermore, that the Sixth Directive assumes, in principle, that the letting and leasing of immovable property are to be exempt from tax, even if this represents a derogation from the system of tax as defined in the First Directive. Under the Sixth Direc tive, a Member State can give taxable persons 17. In this regard, it must be observed first of the possibility of opting for taxation.
There is all that the Sixth Directive gives Member no evident reason why a Member State which States a wide discretion under Article 13C. Thus, it is for each Member State to decide whether to introduce the right of option in 5 — Judgment in Case C-144/94 Ufficio IVA di Trapani v Italittica the first place. If a Member State does so, it [1995] ECR I-3653. has the further possibility of determining its 6 — The direct effect of Article 13B was confirmed —as the scope and the details of its use, If, then, a Commission also submits —in the judgment in Case 8/81
Becker. In its reasons the Court stated inter alia 'that Article Member State is at liberty to decide whether 13(C) docs not in any way confer upon the Member States the right to place conditions on or to restrict in any manner and in what manner it will grant such a right whatsoever the exemptions provided for by Part (B). It merely of option, there is no obvious reason why it reserves the right to the Member States to allow, to a greater or lesser degree, persons entitled to those exemptions to opt should not also be able to withdraw such a for taxation themselves, if they consider that it is in their interest to do so' (Case 8/81 Becker v Finanzamt Münster-
right. Innenstadt [1982] ECR 53, at paragraph 39).
I-8159
OPINION OF MR ALBER — CASE C-381/97
has availed itself of this derogation should during a certain transitional period, to con not be allowed to revert to the basic rule, tinue to tax, for example, certain turnover which provides for tax exemption. The fact exempt from tax pursuant to Article 13 or that this tax exemption is — as the plaintiff grant the taxable persons the possibility to claims — actually a derogation from the gen opt for taxation of the transactions exempt eral system of value added tax is immaterial. from tax under Annex G. It is permitted under the Sixth Directive and, therefore, cannot — as already mentioned — be contrary to the First Directive.
23. In its established case-law on Article 28, the Court held, in relation to a disputed Spanish regulation which subjected certain services to the general VAT system, that: 'Since the Kingdom of Spain subjected the 21. Nor are the rules which the Commission provision of the services in question ... to the initially provided for in the draft Directive general scheme of VAT by Law ... it could no relevant here. The plaintiff drew attention to longer subsequently claim the right to con the fact that in its first draft of the Sixth tinue to exempt those activities pursuant to 7 Directive the Commission had wished to sub Article 28(3)(b) of the Sixth Directive.' So, ject all lettings of immovable property for reversion to the exception was not allowed. commercial purposes to value added tax. The In the present case, however, the reversion is only decisive point, however, is what tax back to the rule (in the Sixth Directive), even exemptions are provided for under the Sixth though the possibility provided for therein Directive as actually enacted. Under its provi itself represents an exception to the First sions, there is no general right of option; one Directive. exists only if it is granted by the Member States.
24. The case-law cited cannot be applied to the granting of a right of option pursuant to Article 13C. Article 28 is part of Title XVI of the Sixth Directive, headed 'Transitional Pro 22. The plaintiff, unlike the Commission and visions'. It contains provisions applying to the Belgian Government, takes the view that, the transition or adaptation of national laws once it has exercised the option provided for to the Sixth Directive. Accordingly, the pro under Article 13C to tax lettings and leasings visions of Article 28(3) are only intended to — at the option of taxable persons — a apply for a 'transitional period'. As Belgium Member State can no longer go back on its rightly argues, they entail a temporary autho- decision. In support of this view, the plaintiff cites the case-law of the Court on Article 28 of the Sixth Directive. Article 28(3) of the 7 — Judgment in Case C-35/90 Commission v Spain [1991] ECR Sixth Directive allows the Member States, I-5073, at paragraph 7.
I-8160
BELGOCODEX v BELGIAN STATE
risation to tax or exempt from tax certain conform with the provisions of the First transactions, which do not correspond to the Directive, it may no longer — just as in the general effect of the Sixth Directive. Against case of Article 28 — go back on its decision. this background, the Court held that this possibility could no longer be used if the Member State had already laid down rules or provided for taxation in a certain field in accordance with the Sixth Directive.
27. But the exemption of letting and leasing of immovable property from value added tax, which the plaintiff considers to be not in con formity with the system, is precisely the basic position under the Sixth Directive. It is not evident, therefore, why a Member State — having availed itself of the possibility pro vided in the Directive of granting a right of option — should be prevented from returning 25. The plaintiff considers that the parallel to the basic position. If the plaintiff is arguing with the present case lies in the fact that that a Member State which has availed itself exempting the letting of immovable property of the possibility offered by Article 13C may to a taxable person contravenes the principle no longer go back on its decision, this would of neutrality of value added tax enshrined in mean that a Member State which has availed the First Directive. The plaintiff explains, by itself of the possibility of derogation may no way of an example, that the exemption from longer return to the basic rule. This is quite tax of the letting of immovable property the opposite of what the case-law of the Court results in unequal treatment thereby breaching on Article 28 — as explained above — pro the principle of neutrality, depending on vides, namely that a Member State, once it whether a company uses its property itself has adjusted its tax laws to conform to the for the purposes of its economic activity or provisions of the Sixth Directive, may no lets it out. In the latter case, it cannot deduct longer revert to the exceptions under Article tax on any costs of renovation. Those costs 28. are therefore added to the rent and passed on by the tenant to his customer, which pro duces a snowball effect on value added tax to be paid.
28. The plaintiff also refers in its argument to the Opinion in Case C-35/90 cited above. In that case, the Advocate General also reached the conclusion that the derogation available under Article 28 could no longer be used if a regulation conforming with the Directive had been introduced or already existed. The plain 26. The plaintiff goes on to argue that if a tiff relies in particular on the argument that Member State adapts its tax laws by granting this '... would be contrary to the principles of a right of option pursuant to Article 13C to general application and neutrality of the tax,'
I-8161
OPINION OF MR ALBER — CASE C-381/97
which underlie the Directive and which 'are tive.' This also suggests for him that it was an essential key in interpreting derogating the provisions of the Sixth Directive and the provisions ...'. 8The plaintiff considers that exemptions or impositions of tax provided the reintroduction of the exemption in the for therein which mattered and not the First present case is contrary to the principles of Directive, which merely established the system neutrality and the general application of the but does not govern its implementation. tax and that on this ground alone it cannot be allowed.
31. Thus the Court also held in its judgment: '... the extension of the transitional scheme of 29. It is appropriate to mention here, how exemptions from VAT beyond the period ever, that the Advocate General too took as originally provided for cannot justify the right his reference the rule laid down in the Sixth of Member States to grant exemptions which Directive and only examined the principles of they were not authorised to grant. Such a general application and neutrality of the tax right would compromise the object of Article as laid down in the First Directive as a supple 28(3)(b), which is to enable a progressive mentary line of argument. Thus, he reasoned adjustment of the national laws in the areas in 1 that an exemption would not be compatible question.' 1 As Belgium has, however, rein with the abovementioned principles, but went troduced an exemption which is expressly on to say: '... apart from the fact that it is provided for in the Directive, and not one quite excluded by the clear terms of the provi- which (as in the judgment cited) it was not 9 sion ...'. This shows that, in his view too, the authorised to grant, it is not clear why the crucial provision is that which is expressly Member State should be prevented from doing laid down in the Sixth Directive. so. It must, therefore, be concluded that a Member State which avails itself of the pos sibility available under Article 13C may also go back on this decision.
30. He also referred to the judgment in the Kerrutt case from which he quotes, '... its wording [that of Article 28(3)(b)] precludes 32. Finally, it remains to be examined whether the introduction of new exemptions or the the granting of such an option pursuant to extension of the scope of existing exemptions Article 13C of the Sixth Directive may also after the date of entry into force of the direc
10 — Opinion in Case C-35/90 (cited in footnote 8), point 5, and 8 — Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro in Case C-35/90 (judg judgment in Case 73/85 Kerrutt v Finanzamt ment cited in footnote 7), point 5. Mönchengladbach-Mitte [1986] ECR 2219, at paragraph 17. 9 — Opinion in Case C-35/90 (cited in footnote 8), point 5 (my 11 — Judgment in Case C-35/90 (cited in footnote 7), at paragraph emphasis). 9.
I-8162
BELGOCODEX v BELGIAN STATE
be revoked with retroactive effect. Even the The Commission and the Belgian Govern Commission considers that this might pose ment agree that these existing deduction rights problems in relation to rights to deduct tax should be respected. which have already arisen. The common system of value added tax of the First Direc tive as well as of the Sixth Directive provides that the taxable person may deduct value added tax due or paid in respect of goods and services supplied to him by another taxable 35. As regards the case before the national person and which he has used for the pur court, however, the Belgian Government poses of his own taxable transactions (Article points out that the plaintiff did not expressly 17(2) of the Sixth Directive). Article 17(1) exercise its right of option. According to the provides that this right to deduct arises when Court, the exercise of a right of option which the deductible tax becomes chargeable. There has been granted is a matter for the taxable is thus a link between taxation and the right person alone. 14 On the other hand, the last to deduct. sentence of Article 13C provides that the Member States are to fix the details of its use. Accordingly, and this is common ground, it is for the national judge to decide whether or not the plaintiff's exercise of its right of option was effective.
33. The Court has thus held 'that the scheme of the directive is such that ... by availing themselves of an exemption persons entitled thereto necessarily waive the right to claim a 36. The parties do not agree on this question. 12 deduction in respect of input ...'. The 'right The plaintiff considers that it has done every of deduction ... is an integral part of the VAT thing necessary to expressly assert its right of scheme and in principle may not be lim option. It claimed a deduction and drew atten 13 ited.' tion to the fact that the rent should actually have been taxed. It was unable to bring the value added tax into account as the relevant implementing measures had not yet been adopted.
34. This means, and the Commission agrees, that taxable persons who opted for taxation when the Belgian Law (purportedly) applied 37. The Belgian Government, however, con are entitled to a right of deduction which siders that the option could only then have cannot, therefore, be retroactively disallowed. been effectively exercised if Belgocodex SA had formally stated this intention to the
12 — Judgment in Case 8/81 (cited in footnote 6), at paragraph 44. 13 — Judgment in Case C-62/93 BP Supergras v Greek Slate [1995] ECR I-1883, at paragraph 18. 14 — Judgment in Case 8/81 (cited in footnote 6), at paragraph 38.
I-8163
OPINION OF MR ALBER — CASE C-381/97
authorities and charged the relevant taxes on — and such measures have still not been the rent and passed these on to the State. As adopted under Belgian law — it must none previously mentioned, it is, however, a matter the less be remembered in the present case for the national judge to decide this point that the reason why taxable persons who having regard to the link between taxation decide to use the option cannot properly and the right to deduct. exercise it is precisely because the relevant measures have not yet been adopted by the Government. So, the requirements placed on the exercise of the right of option must not 38. It is appropriate at this stage to draw be too strict, as otherwise the right of deduc attention once again to the considerations tion under Article 17 of the Sixth Directive, mentioned at points 14 and 15 above, given which is an integral part of the system of that the same must apply to the exercise of value added tax, would be affected. Where the right of option as to the introduction or the right to opt for taxation is withdrawn validity of the right of option itself. Even if with retroactive effect, only persons who have Article 13C of the Sixth Directive leaves it to not in any way indicated their decision to the Member States to restrict the scope of the exercise the right of option should be denied right of option and to fix the details of its use the right to assert a claim.
C — Conclusion
39. On the basis of the foregoing considerations, I propose that the question referred to the Court should be answered as follows:
Article 2 of the First VAT Directive does not preclude interpreting the provisions of the Sixth VAT Directive, in particular, Articles 13C and 13B(b), as not preventing a Member State which has availed itself of the possibility provided for by Article 13C of the Sixth Directive and given taxable persons the right to opt for the taxa tion of certain lettings of immovable property from revoking that right of option by a subsequent — even retroactive — law and thus reintroducing the exemption in full. This only applies, however , to the extent that rights of deduction (as defined in Article 17 of the Sixth Directive) that have arisen by virtue of the taxable person's making clear that he wishes to exercise the option are not impaired .
I-8164