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Súdny dvor Európskej únie·16.9.1999

C-220/98

ECLI:EU:C:1999:425

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Súdny dvor Európskej únie
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61998CC0220

ESTÉE LAUDER

OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL FENNELLY delivered on 16 September 1999 *

I — Introduction common case that the cream does not produce any lasting effect, although the defendant claims that it produces a signifi- cant firming effect. The action has been brought, pursuant to German law on unfair 1. The parties in the main proceedings competition, primarily as a defensive mea- giving rise to the present reference from sure by the plaintiff to protect its market the Landgericht, Köln (Regional Court, position, since, as it emerged at the oral Cologne, hereinafter 'the national court') hearing, a consumer-protection organisa- are the German subsidiaries of competing tion had succeeded before another German multinational cosmetic companies. The court, the Kammergericht (Higher Regional subject-matter of the dispute is the facial Court), Berlin, in obtaining an injunction firming cream 'Monteil Firming Action prohibiting the use by the plaintiff of the Lifting Extreme Creme' (hereinafter 'the word 'lifting' in respect of its own facial cream'), which is manufactured in Monaco firming cream. 2 and distributed throughout Europe by companies in the Lancaster group. 1 The defendant is the German member of that group and is responsible for organising the distribution of the cream not only on the German market but throughout Lancaster's selective distribution system.

3. The defendant denies that the cream will arouse the alleged expectation of perma- 2. The plaintiff, the German subsidiary of nent effects. It submits that the order the Estéé Lauder group, claims that use of sought would, if granted, hinder the free- the word 'lifting' in the name of the cream dom of movement of goods guaranteed by is misleading because it conveys the impres- Community law by necessitating additional sion that it has lasting effects comparable marketing expenditure to rename and to those of a face-lift operation. It is repackage the product solely for the Ger- man market. It also contends that it would be disproportionate, in view of the minimal * Original language: English. danger of any possible consumer error. 1 — It appears from information provided to the Court by the defendant that the cream is imported directly from Monaco to a central distribution centre at Wiesbaden, Germany, whence it is supplied to the various authorised distributors, both within and outside the Community. 2 — See 25 U 2991/93.

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4. The national court has taken the view misled by the word "lifting" in the name, that, in the absence of expert evidence, it indicating the effect of the product, into cannot dismiss 'the possibility that more assuming that it is of lasting effect, if that than an inconsiderable number of consu- product is being distributed with the same mers might be misled'. It cites a Bundesger- indication of its effect on the packaging ichtshof (Federal Court of Justice) judg- lawfully and without challenge in other ment of 12 December 1996, upholding the countries within the European Union?' earlier view taken by the Kammergericht, Berlin in the successful action taken against Estéé Lauder that the use of the word 'lifting' could be misleading. 3 However, it is uncertain whether C o m m u n i t y law requires it to depart from the rule devel- oped in German case-law, whereby the use of a word may be prohibited if 1 0 % to 1 5 % , at least, of potential consumers could be misled. In particular, it wishes to know II — The relevant legal context whether, in the light of cases like Mars, such a threshold would constitute too strict a standard of protection. 4

6. The German Gesetz gegen den unlaute- ren Wettbewerb (Law Against Unfair Com- petition) of 7 June 1909 (hereinafter 'the 5. Accordingly, the following question has UWG'), because of its potential to affect been referred to the Court: trade in goods, has given rise to numerous references to the Court, most notably for present purposes that in Clinique. 5 Para- graph 3 of the UWG provides:

'Are Articles 30 and 36 of the EC Treaty and/or Article 6(3) of Council Directive 76/768/EEC relating to cosmetic products to be interpreted as precluding the applica- tion of national legislation on unfair com- 'Injunction proceedings may be brought petition which allows the importation and against anyone who, in the course of trade distribution of a cosmetic product lawfully and for the purposes of competition, pro- manufactured or distributed in a Member vides misleading information [on the fea- State of the European Union to be prohib- tures of products] with a view to securing ited on the ground that consumers will be an end to the dissemination of the informa- tion in question.'

3 — 1 ZR 7/97, NJW-RR 1997, p. 931. 4 — Case C-470/93 Verein gegen Unwesen in Handel und 5 — Case C-315/92 Verband Sozialer Wettbewerb v Clinique Gewerbe Köln v Mars (hereinafter 'Mars') [1995] Laboratories and Estée Lauder (hereinafter 'Clinique') ECR I-1923. [1994] ECR I-317.

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There is a similar provision in the specific 28 EC and 30 EC), it will be necessary to German legislation dealing with consumer refer not only to Directive 76/76 8/EEC 6 products. Thus, under Paragraph 27(1) of mentioned by the national court but also to the Lebensmittel-und Bedarfsgegenstände- Directive 84/450/EEC on misleading adver- gesetz (Law on Foodstuffs and Consumer tising. 7 Items) of 15 August 1974 ('the LmBG'):

8. The 1976 Directive prescribes conditions for the marketing of cosmetic products. The second recital in the preamble shows 'It is forbidden to sell cosmetic products that one of the main objectives of the under a misleading name or on the basis of Directive is to facilitate free trade in misleading information ... Information is cosmetic products. Thus, under Arti- misleading in particular: cle 7(1), Member States are required not to '... refuse, prohibit or restrict the mar- keting of any cosmetic products which comply with the requirements of this Directive and the Annexes thereto'. Arti- cle 6(3), which results from the amend- ments effected by Directive 88/667/EEC, is the central provision in the present case. 8 It provides: (1) if effects are attributed to the cosmetic products which ... are supported by insuf- ficient scientific evidence ...'

'Member States shall take all measures necessary to ensure that, in the labelling, putting up for sale and advertising of cosmetic products, text, names, trade marks, pictures and figurative or other Paragraph 27(3) of the LmBG provides signs are not used to imply that these that a name is misleading 'if words which are apt to confuse ... are used ... in relation to factors which have a bearing on an 6 — Council Directive 76/768/EEC of 27 July 1976 on the assessment of the products'. approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to cosmetic products (hereinafter 'the 1976 Directive'), OJ 1976 L 262, p. 169. 7 — Council Directive 84/450/EEC of 10 September 1984 relat- ing to the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning misleading advertising, OJ 1984 L 250, p. 17. 8 — Council Directive 88/667/EEC of 21 December 1988 amending for the fourth time Directive 76/768/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to cosmetic products, OJ 1988 L 382, p. 46. A further sentence was also added by Article 1(9) of Council Directive 93/35/EEC of 14 June 1993 amending for the sixth time 7. Apart from Articles 30 and 36 of the EC Directive 76/768/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to cosmetic products, OJ 1993 Treaty (now, after amendment, Articles L 151, p. 32, but it is not relevant in the present case.

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products have characteristics which they do IV — Analysis not have.'

11. At the present stage of the main proceedings, the national court has adopted no definitive position regarding the suppo- sedly potentially misleading use of the word 'lifting'. It seeks guidance regarding 9. Directive 84/450/EEC contains the gen- the scope of protection that may, in con- eral Community rules regulating mislead- formity with Community law, be provided ing advertising. Article 2(2) of that direc- in national law to consumers of cosmetic tive defines 'misleading advertising' as 'any products such as the cream in question. advertising which in any way, including its Since it emerges from the order for refer- presentation, deceives or is likely to deceive ence that the goods at issue have been the persons to whom it is addressed or imported from Monaco, a third country, it whom it reaches and which, by reason of its is appropriate to consider the status in deceptive nature, is likely to affect their Community law of goods directly imported economic behaviour or which, for those from Monaco. reasons, injures or is likely to injure a competitor'. Article 3 furnishes a list of the features which should be taken into account for the purposes of determining whether advertising is misleading, includ- ing the characteristics of the goods or A — The Monacan question services advertised. Article 7 permits Mem- ber States to retain or adopt national provisions designed to ensure 'more exten- sive protection for consumers ...'. 12. According to Article 227 of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 299 EC), the territory of the Principality of Monaco is not enumerated as one of the territories to which the Treaty applies. Thus, as the Commission and France rightly observed at the hearing, it is a third country for Community-law purposes. It has nevertheless been part of the customs HI — Observations territory of the Community at least since 1968, when Article 2 of Council Regula- tion (EEC) No 1496/68 of 27 September 1968 on the definition of the customs territory of the Community declared that certain territories, including Monaco, 'situ- 10. Written observations have been sub- ated outside the territory of Member States' mitted by the plaintiff, the defendant, the but listed in the annex to the regulation, Federal Republic of Germany, the French were to 'be considered part of the customs Republic, the Republic of Finland and the territory of the Community'. 9The precise Commission, all of whom, with the excep- tion of Germany and Finland, also sub- mitted oral observations. 9 — OJ, English Special Edition, First Series 1968 (II), p. 436.

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legal consequences of Monaco's legislative ty's common external tariff ('CCT'), are inclusion within the Community's customs deemed to be in 'free circulation' in that territory are not spelled out in the relevant Member State. In Donckerwolcke v Pro- legislation. 10 However, since no customs cureur de la République, the Court held duties or charges having equivalent effect that 'products entitled to "free circulation" may be applied to trade between Monaco are definitely and wholly assimilated to and the Community, it seems at first sight products originating in Member States'; the to follow that goods originating there and result of this assimilation is that 'the exported directly to a Member State should provisions of Article 30 concerning the be treated as if they were of Community elimination of quantitative restrictions and origin. all measures having equivalent effect [apply] without distinction to products originating in the Community and to those which were put into free circulation in any one of the Member States, irrespective of the actual origin of the products'. 1 1Later in that judgment, the Court added the rider that such assimilation could 'only take full effect if [the] goods are subject to the same conditions of importation both with regard to customs and commercial considerations, irrespective of the State in which they were put in free circulation'. 12 However, it has not been suggested that any differences in customs or commercial policy still remain 13. The most convincing legal basis for this in respect of imports of cosmetic products interpretation lies in the analogy with the into the Community. Indeed, the current notion of goods in 'free circulation in a general rules, which are contained in Member State' enunciated in Articles 9 and Council Regulation (EC) No 3285/94 of 10 of the EC Treaty (now, after amend- 22 December 1994 on common rules on ment, Articles 23 EC and 24 EC), whose imports and repealing Regulation (EC) effect is that goods of third-country origin No 518/94, 13 expressly provide (see Arti- that have satisfied, in a particular Member cle 1(2) of the Regulation) that third-coun- State, the customs formalities for entry try imports of the products to which it onto the Community's customs territory, applies 'shall be freely imported into the and that have been subject to the appro- Community and accordingly, without pre- priate tariff required under the Communi- judice to the safeguard measures which

10 — The current provision, which is contained in Arti- cle 3(2)(b) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 11 — Case 41/76 Donckerwolcke v Procureur de la République 12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs [1976] ECR 1921, paragraphs 17 to 18. See also Case Code (OJ 1992 L 302, p. 1), as amended by Article 1(b) of 119/78 Peureux v Services Fiscaux de la Haute-Saône et du Council Regulation (EC) No 82/97 of the European Territoire de Belfort [1979] ECR 975, where the Court Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 held, regarding Article 30, that 'the prohibition of mea- amending Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing a sures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restric- Community Customs Code (OJ 1997 L 17, p. 1), is tions in infra-Community trade has the same scope as worded as follows: 'Although situated outside the territory regards products imported from another Member State of the French Republic, the territory of the Principality of after being in free circulation there as for those originating Monaco as defined in the Customs Convention signed in in the same Member State', paragraph 26. Paris on 18 May 1963 ... shall, by virtue of that Conven- tion, also be considered to be part of the customs territory 12 — Donckerwolcke, paragraph 25. of the Community'. 13 — OJ 1994 L 349, p. 53.

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may be taken under Title V, shall not be now prevailing in respect of the Republic of subject to any quantitative restrictions'. 14 San Marino. Like Monaco, it had been considered from 1968 to be part of the Community's customs territory, but its trade relations with the Community have, since 1992, been governed by a special international agreement. 17 Notwithstand- ing the lack of a complete system governing trade relations between Monaco and the Community, I believe that the very fact that Monaco is part of the customs territory of the Community justifies treatment of goods originating in Monaco as benefiting from the rules on free movement. To my mind, reliance on the fact that Monaco is within

14. Admittedly, the assimilation to the the Community for customs purposes pro- notion of goods in free circulation,which vides a more convincing basis for that applies to goods already imported from a extension than that suggested by the defen- third country, of goods being exported dant at the hearing, viz. that the fact that directly from Monaco, a third country, to the goods in the present case (presumably Germany implies an extension of that in common with most Monacan exports) notion. In particular, it involves applying pass physically through France en route the prohibition of measures having equiva- from M o n a c o to Germany suffices to lent effect to quantitative restrictions as render Community law applicable.

That against Germany where there is no reci- would lead to anomalously different treat- procal a r r a n g e m e n t capable of being ment of goods exported by sea from invoked in the contrary situation of direct Monaco to, for example, Spain and Italy. exports from Germany to Monaco. That It is clear from Article 10 of the Treaty and the lack of any international agreement Donckerwolcke that third-country goods with Monaco 15 can occasionally give rise to problems was acknowledged by the must physically be imported into and agent representing France at the hearing. 16 legally satisfy the relevant CCT formalities, This may be contrasted with the situation including payment of the appropriate tariff, in a Member State before they may be regarded as being in free circulation.

Mon- 14 — Pursuant to its Article 1(1), Regulation N o 3285/94 aco's legal status, as part of the Commu- applies to imports of products originating in third nity's customs territory, renders these countries, with the exception of textile products and products originating in certain, not including Monaco, requirements superfluous. Consequently, I third countries; see Annex I to Council Regulation (EC) am satisfied that the legal significance of N o 519/94 of 7 March 1994 on common rules for imports from certain third countries and repealing Regulations the Community legislature's decision to (EEC) Nos 1765/82, 1766/82 and 3420/83, OJ 1994 L 67, p. 89. 15 — See Snyder, International Trade and Customs Law of the European Union (1998), p. 504, at footnote 3 . 16 — She observed that Monaco is effectively obliged — appar- ently as a result of the bilateral customs union agreement 17 — See Council Decision 92/561/EEC of 2 7 November 1992 between Monaco and France of 18 May 1963, ratified in on the conclusion of an interim Agreement on trade and France by Decree N o 63-982 of 24 September 1963, customs union between the European Economic Commu- JORF, p . 8679 — to respect Community legislation such nity and the Republic of San Marino, OJ 1992 L 359, as the 1976 Directive. The Court was informed that p. 13. The agreement establishes a customs union between problems still arise and that, following approaches made the Community and San Marino (Article 1), under which by the French and Monacan authorities, the Commission is (Article 8) quantitative restrictions and measures having now considering the need for the negotiation of an equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions are expressly international agreement with Monaco. prohibited in trade between the contracting parties.

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accord Community customs territory status the possible confusion of some 10% to to Monaco is that, whenever Monacan 15% of consumers suffices to justify a goods are exported to a Member State, they restriction on the sale of a product, may be should thereafter be equated, for all trade applied despite its adverse effect on trade purposes, with goods in free circulation. between Member States and when product rules in the relevant field have been har- monised at Community level. Only Finland suggests, with some support from France at the hearing, that, notwithstanding the 1976 Directive, Member States may maintain their own stricter rules on consumer pro- tection.

15. It follows that the fact that the pro- ducts in question in the main proceedings are imported directly from Monaco to Germany does not affect the analysis of whether the injunction which the national court is minded to grant would be compa- tible with Community law.

17. To begin with, it is not contested that the grant of an injunction by the national court restricting the sale of the cream merely because the word 'lifting' is used in its name would constitute a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction on imports prohibited, in prin- B — The substantive issue ciple, by Article 30 of the Treaty, as well as a restriction on trade in cosmetic products contrary to Article 7(1) of the 1976 Direc- tive. 18 The cream is sold widely under similar conditions in other Member States so that compliance with special German rules would, as in the Clinique case, entail for the exporter additional labelling and 16. Not surprisingly, the written and oral advertising costs for that market alone. 19 submissions made to the Court in the Consequently, it is necessary only to con- present case do not disclose any substantial sider the extent to which such a restriction disagreement regarding the principles to be is none the less permissible. applied in formulating an answer to the question posed by the national court. The principal legal issues have been settled by 18 — Although the UWC and the LmBG apply equally to both relatively recent case-law. The real issue in German and imported products, the grant of the injunction would clearly constitute a 'products rule' for the purposes the case is the extent to which consumer of Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097 and the restraint on trade protection, provided under German rules, it would entail must thus be justified. in particular a rule tending to presume that 19 — See Chnique (footnote 5), paragraph 19.

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18. It is equally well established in the case- so as 'to imply that [they] have character- law of the Court, in particular in Clinique, istics which they do not have'. The 1976 that the 1976 Directive 'provided exhaus- Directive leaves to the Member States the tively for the harmonisation of national choice of measures to give effect to this rules on the packaging and labelling of obligation. This is not surprising since it cosmetic products'. 20 It 'defines the mea- would be impossible to lay down in sures to be taken in the interests of advance comprehensive criteria which consumer protection and fairness of com- may be applied in all cases to determine mercial transactions, which are included whether product claims are erroneous. among the imperative requirements speci- None the less, the 1976 Directive must be fied in the case-law of the Court in the interpreted as providing exhaustively for context of the application of Article 30 of the rules to be applied to protect consumers the Treaty'. 21 In other words, this particu- from selling or marketing practices which lar imperative requirement is adopted by make or even imply false claims about the 1976 Directive and the rules to pursue cosmetic products. In other words, the it are therein exhaustively defined. relevant standard is laid down at Commu- nity level and must simply be applied on a case-by-case basis by the Member States. Consequently, the latter are precluded from legislating in the matter and are confined to acting within the confines of the harmo-

19. Member States are prevented, by Arti- nised rules. 22 cle 7(1) of the 1976 Directive, from prohi- biting or restricting the marketing of cos- metic products which comply with the terms prescribed in that Directive. In the present case, it is common case that the cream is packaged and labelled in accor- dance with those terms. The question that 21. The 1976 Directive may, therefore, be arises is whether Germany may, in pursuit contrasted with Directive 84/450/EEC, of the objective of Article 6(3), none the which provides only for partial harmonisa- less restrict its marketing in that Member tion of national rules governing misleading

State. advertising through the establishment of minimum objective criteria for determining whether particular advertising is mislead- ing. 23 I cannot therefore agree with the contention, advanced by Finland and sup- ported by France at the hearing, that 20. The debate in the present case, thus, Article 6(3) of the 1976 Directive should centres around the obligation imposed on Member States by Article 6(3) to ensure that products are not labelled or marketed 22 — See Case C-1/96 R v MAFF, ex parte Compassion in World Farming [1998] ECR I-1251, paragraph 47, Case C-323/93 Centre d'Insémination de la Crespelle v Coop- érative de la Mayenne [1994] I-5077, paragraph 31 and Case 148/78 Pubblico Ministero v Ratti [1979] ECR 1629, 20 — Ibid., paragraph 11. See also Case C-77/97 Österreichische paragraphs 36 to 38. Unilever v Smithkline Beecham Markenartikel [1999] 23 — Case 238/89 Pall [1990] ECR I-4827, paragraph 22, Clin- I-431, paragraph 24 (hereinafter 'Unilever') and the cases ique, paragraph 10 and Joined Cases C-34/95 to C-36/95

there cited. Ko v De Agostini and TV-Shop [1997] ECR I-3843, 21 — Clinique, paragraph 15. paragraph 37.

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be interpreted in the light of Directive implementing those objectives, where they 84/450/EEC. Member States, although left are in conflict, national courts are naturally with the primary responsibility for control- called upon to strike a balance between ling the use of misleading labelling claims, them. The function of this Court, in are required to apply the standard pre- responding to a question such as that posed scribed in Article 6(3), i.e. to prohibit false by the national court in this case, is, as or misleading claims regarding the charac- Germany and France rightly submit, to teristics possessed by a cosmetic product. provide clear and useful interpretative Finland's view, based on an analogy with criteria to assist the latter in that task. Article 7 of Directive 84/450/EEC, that Member States may apply higher standards of consumer protection is thus miscon- ceived. Each Member State must apply the same Community-law standard.

23. In the light of these preliminary remarks, I shall endeavour to outline the considerations which should guide the Court in addressing the question referred by the national court. That question, it will be recalled, notes, firstly, that the cream is 'lawfully manufactured and distributed in a Member State [Germany] of the European Union ... [and is also marketed] with the same indication of its effect on the packa- ging lawfully and without challenge in 22. The 1976 Directive must also, as the other countries of the European Union' Court pointed out in Clinique, 'like all and, secondly, that German law on unfair secondary legislation, be interpreted in the competition may provide that its sale and light of the provisions of the Treaty on free distribution be prohibited 'on the ground movement of goods'. 24 It is settled law that that consumers will be misled by the word the prohibition of quantitative restrictions "lifting" in the name, indicating the effect and of all measures having equivalent effect of the product, into assuming that it is of applies not only to national measures but lasting effect ...'. This antithesis highlights also to measures adopted by the Commu- the essential problem raised by the case, nity institutions. 25 Article 6(3) is contained which, in my view, is to adopt the appro- in a directive designed, by means of har- priate standard for protection of consumers monisation, to further the free movement against being misled or confused by false of cosmetic products. It is, consequently, to claims. Whereas German law permits the be considered as pursuing the dual objec- prohibition of marketing where a product tives of free trade and consumer protection. may mislead 10% to 15% of consumers, In giving effect to any national rules the national court observes, referring to Mars, that Community law treats consu- mers as being both sufficiently alert and 24 — Clinique, paragraph 12. sensible and, thus, as not needing protec- 25 — See in particular Case 15/83 Denkavit Nederland v tion from claims that might only deceive so Hoofdproduktschap voor Akkerbonivprodukten [1984] ECR 2 1 7 1 , paragraph 15 and Case C-51/93 M e y h i a v few consumers. The plaintiff, in its written Schott Zwiesel Glaswerke (hereinafter 'Meyhia') [1994] ECR I-3879, paragraph I I . observations, describes vividly the sharply

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divergent views expressed in German legal measures taken ... must not create obstacles literature regarding the appropriate level of to imports which are disproportionate to protection. At one extreme is the view that those objects'. 29 As the Court has specifi- the right to equality of economic opportu- cally acknowledged, citing Clinique and nity suggests that Articles 30 and 36 of the Mars, measures of protection against 'the Treaty should not be interpreted with the risk of misleading consumers cannot over- mature and critical consumer in mind, as ride the requirements of the free movement that would discriminate against consumers of goods and so justify barriers to trade, with limited intellectual capacity! 26 At the unless that risk is sufficiently serious ...'. 30 other end of the spectrum is the view that The obligation to 'observe the principle of Community law imposes the standard of proportionality' applies equally to 'the the well-informed consumer and that Ger- measures which Member States are man unfair-competition law should aban- required to take for the implementation' don 'the attempt, which is as stupid as it is of Article 6(3) of the 1976 Directive. 31 pointless, to seek to protect practically the Thus, the Community interest in protecting last "simpleton" ("Trottel") from the dan- consumers, which the directive recognises, ger of being misled by advertising'. 27 may be allowed to impinge on the free movement of cosmetic products only to the extent that is clearly necessary to serve that interest.

24. The appropriate standard of consumer protection must, in my view, start from the proposition enunciated in the constant case-law of the Court that the free move- ment of goods between the Member States is a fundamental principle of Community 25. Community law, in its approach to the law. 28 Reliance either on one of the protection of consumers, has preferred to grounds of derogation set out in Article 36 emphasise the desirability of disseminating of the Treaty or on a mandatory require- information, whether by advertising, label- ment must be considered as an exception to ling or otherwise, as the best means of that principle. The scope of such exceptions promoting free trade in openly competitive must not be 'extended any further than is markets. The presumption is that consu- necessary for the protection of the interests mers will inform themselves about the which it is intended to secure and the quality and price of products and will make intelligent choices. As long ago as the 'Cassis de Dijon' case the Court offered 26 — Reference is made to Reuthental, 'Verstößt das Deutsche Irreführungsgebot gegen Artikel 30 EGV', WRP 12/97, p. 1154, at p. 1160. 27 — See Emmerich, The Law of Unfair Competition, sec- 29 — Case 72/83 Campus Oil v Minister for Industry and tion 12(8)(b), 4th ed., 1995. Energy [1984] ECR 2727, paragraph 37. 28 — See Case C-200/96 Metronome Musik v Music Point 30 — See Case C-313/94 Graffiane [1996] ECR I-6039, para- Hokamp [1998] ECR I-1953, paragraph 14, and Case graph 24. C-61/97 Egmont Film v Laserdisken [1998] ECR I-5171, 31 — See Unilever, cited in footnote 20 above, paragraph 27, paragraph 13. and also Clinique, paragraph 16.

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informative labelling as a better alternative ested in the qualities of a product than the than a ban on sale. 32 This reliance on the place of registration of the trade mark'. 35 availability and utility of information is The Court has thus emphasised that 'Com- particularly well illustrated by the 'Beer munity policy. . . establishes a close link Purity Law' case in which Germany sought between protecting the consumer and pro- to defend, inter alia on consumer-protec- viding the consumer with information'. 36 tion grounds, the German-law requirement that only products manufactured from malted barley, hops, yeast and water could be marketed as 'beer' in Germany. 33 The Court, although agreeing with the legiti- macy of seeking to enable consumers 'who attribute specific qualities to beer manu- factured from particular raw materials to make their choice in the light of that consideration', felt that this objective could 26. In my view, however, it is the emer- be achieved by a system of consumer- gence in the Court's more recent case-law information requirements which would of a model of a hypothetical average permit 'the consumer to make his choice consumer for cases of alleged confusion in full knowledge of the facts .

. .'; breweries that is likely to be of the greatest utility could, thus, be obliged to indicate on their both to national courts and to the Court, in labels the raw materials used, while, as the latter case to obviate the need to decide regards beers sold on draught, they could such cases on an individual basis. It appears be required to ensure that 'the requisite to have been Germany that first laid information . . . appear on the casks or the emphasis on the significance of the infer- beer taps'. 34 A few years later, the Court ence which 'the average well-informed held in Pall, rejecting the possibility of consumer' 37 might draw regarding whe- error by German consumers regarding the ther a product would have prophylactic or place of registration of a trade mark in therapeutic properties in successfully respect of imported products bearing the defending the view of German authorities, symbol '(R)' as a justification for allowing whose validity was challenged in that case such use to be prohibited pursuant to the by the Commission, that eye lotions could UWG, that 'even assuming that consumers, be regarded as medicinal products and, or some of them, might be misled on that point, such a risk cannot justify so con- siderable an obstacle to the free movement 35 — Cited in footnote 23 above, paragraph 19. of goods, since consumers are more inter- 36 — C-362/88 GB-INNO-BM [1990] ECR I-667 at para- g r a p h 1 4 . In C a s e 1 2 6 / 9 1 Yves Rocher [1993] ECR I-2361, the Court held to be a disproportionate restriction of trade a general prohibition under the German UWG on eye-catching price comparisons in advertising 'in that it affects advertising which is not at all misleading and contains comparisons of prices actually charged, which can be of considerable use in that it enables the consumer to make his choice in full knowledge of the facts' (paragraph 17, emphasis added). 37 — See Case C-290/90 Commission v Germany [1992] ECR I-3317, paragraph 1 1 .

A few months before the judgment in Commission v Germany, the Court had averted to the need to bear in mind the consumers to 32 — Case 120/78 Rewe v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für which a claim — in that case, one allegedly involved in advertising as 'new' previously registered imported cars Branntwein [1979] ECR 649. that had not been driven on a public highway — is 33 — Case 178/84 Commission v Germany [1987] ECR 1227. addressed; see Case C-373/90 Complaint against X [1992] 34 — Ibid., paragraphs 35 and 56. ECR I-131, paragraph 15.

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thus, subject to an authorisation procedure ten per cent. The Court adopted, for the prior to marketing. 38 In 1994 in Meyhui first time, the notion of the 'reasonably the Court upheld a Community-law circumspect consumer' who might 'be requirement imposed, pursuant to a 1969 deemed to know that there [was] not directive, 39 on manufacturers of glass fall- necessarily a link between the size of the ing within certain categories ('crystal glass' publicity markings relating to an increase and 'crystalline') to use only descriptions of in the product's quantity and the size of such glass that appear in the language or that increase'. 41 languages of the Member State in which the product is marketed, since '... the difference in the quality of the glass used is not easily discernible to the average consumer for whom the purchase of crystal glass pro- ducts is not a frequent occurrence', who must therefore 'be given the clearest infor- mation possible so that he does not confuse a product [in the above categories] with a product in the higher categories and con- sequently ... pay too much'. 40

28. That approach has since been firmly established, in particular by two recent cases. Gut Springenheide 42 concerned a complaint brought before a German court relating to allegedly misleading informa- tion contained in both a trade mark used on 27. This identification of the level of pro- and a notice supplied inside the packaging tection required by the average consumer of eggs contrary, in that case, to Commu- crystallised in the 1995 Mars judgment. nity legislation. 43 The national court Mars concerned a complaint that the appli- expressly asked whether the proper test cation of a '+10%' marking whose dimen- was 'the informed average consumer or the sions exceeded ten per cent of the surface of casual consumer'. The Court's judgment is the wrapper on ice-cream bars infringed of general application: it drew particular Paragraph 3 of the UWG by misleading attention to the existence of similar con- consumers into believing that either the sumer-protection provisions in other Com- volume or the weight of the product had munity legislation and referred to a number been increased by an amount greater than of its earlier decisions, including GB- INNO-BM, Pall, Clinique and Mars. It

38 — See Council Directive 65/65/EEC of 26 January 1965 on the approximation of provisions laid down by Law, 41 — Paragraph 24. Regulation or Administrative Action relating to proprie- 42 — Case C-210/96 Gut Springenbeide and Tusky v Oberk- tary medicinal products, OJ, English Special Edition, First reisdirektor Steinfurt (hereinafter 'Gut Springenbeide') Series 1965-1966, p. 20. [1998] ECR I-4657. 39 — See Council Directive 69/493/EEC of 15 December 1969 4 3 — See Council Regulation (EEC) N o 2771/75 of 29 October on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 1975 on the common organisation of the market in eggs relating to crystal glass, OJ, English Special Edition, First (OJ 1975 L 282, p. 49) and Article 10 of Council Regula- Series 1969 (II), p. 599. tion (EEC) N o 1907/90 of 26 June 1990 on certain 40 — Meyhui, cited in footnote 25 above, paragraph 18 (empha- marketing standards for eggs (OJ 1990 L 173, p. 5), as sis added). amended.

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continued by enunciating (paragraphs 31 graph 36) reiterated flic Gut Springenbeide to 32) the following test: test:

'In those cases, in order to determine whether the description, trade mark or '... it is for the national court to assess in promotional description or statement in the light of the circumstances whether, question was liable to mislead the pur- bearing in mind the consumers to whom chaser, the Court took into account the it is addressed, a brand name or its presumed expectations of an average con- component parts are liable to be confused sumer who is reasonably well informed and with all or part of the description of certain reasonably observant and circumspect, wines. In that respect, it is also apparent without ordering an expert's report or from the Court's case-law that the national commissioning a consumer research poll. court must take into account the presumed expectations of an average consumer who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect' (paragraph 36).

So national courts ought, in general, to be able to assess, on the same conditions, any m i s l e a d i n g d e s c r i p t i o n or s t a t e m e n t designed to promote sales.' 29. Thus it is clear that the test to be applied to any case of restriction on the sale or marketing of a product on the ground of protecting the consumer from misleading labelling or other accompanying informa- Although couched as a test which the Court tion is whether its presence on the market had itself already applied, it is clear that it would, in some material respect, be likely was principally intended to be the test to mislead the hypothetical consumer so applied by national courts. This emerges defined. To my mind, the obligation of clearly, to my mind, from Sektkellerei national courts scrupulously to apply this Kessler. 44 That case concerned an allega- test is particularly important in cases where tion of confusion arising from the brand the source for the consumer-protection name of a German sparkling wine. The objective lies in a directive, such as the Court stressed (paragraph 33) the need to 1976 Directive, which occupies the field in establish, 'having regard to the opinions or so far as the marketing of cosmetic pro- habits of the consumers concerned, that ducts is concerned. The test should enable there is a real risk of their economic the national court to assess the facts of each behaviour being affected' and later (para- case against this standard on the basis of its own judgment of how such a consumer would be affected. The standard involved, 44 — Case C-303/97 Werbrmicherschutzvercin v Sektkellerei G. being based on a cumulation of four C. Kessler (hereinafter 'Sektkellerei Kessler') [1999] ECR I-513. factors, is clearly a high one. Having regard

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to all the relevant surrounding circum- I refer briefly to some of the factors which stances of the case, and especially the it should take into account in reaching a selling arrangements employed by the ven- judgment as to whether the average con- dor, the national court must be satisfied sumer of the cream in question would be that the average consumer, who is reason- confused by the evocation of a face-lift, or ably well informed and observant about the more generally cosmetic surgery, inherent product in question and w h o exercises in the use of the word 'lifting' in its name. reasonable circumspection when using his In the first place, it is clear from the critical faculties to assess the claims made considerable similarities between the facts by or in respect of it, would be confused. and issues raised by the Clinique case and The approach is thus not statistical. Market those involved in this case that the national surveys may, in certain cases, be of assis- court should take into account the fact that tance, although it must be remembered that the cream is clearly marketed and sold as a they are subject to the frailties inherent in cosmetic product, is sold exclusively in the formulation of survey questionnaires perfumeries and cosmetic departments of and often subject to diverging interpreta- large stores and has been marketed in other tion as to their significance. 45Accordingly, Member States without apparently mis- they do not absolve the national court from leading consumers. 46 In addition, Commu- the need to exercise its own faculty of nity law recognises, as the Court confirmed judgment based on the standard of the particularly in Graffione, that peculiar average consumer as defined in Community social, cultural or linguistic features in a

law. In conclusion, the important point is Member State may justify a different view that a single Community-law test is now being taken as to the effect of a particular available and it would, therefore, be inap- claim on consumers in t h a t M e m b e r propriate for a national court to base its State. 4 7 The national court may need final decision as to confusion on statistical therefore to consider whether, from a evidence regarding the probable effect on linguistic perspective, the use of the English 1 0 % to 1 5 % of potential consumers. word 'lifting' rather than a German word with the same or a similar connotation is apt to mislead German consumers.

It should, however, also take into account the fact that the use of the word does not appear to have given rise to cause for concern in other Member States, even those where German is the national or a widely spoken language. As for social or cultural factors, the national court has not averted in its order for reference to any peculiarities 30. In order further to assist the national court in the instant case, it may be helpful if 46 — Clinique, paragraphs 2 1 . 4 7 — Cited in footnote 30 above, paragraph 22.

The fact that 45 — In Sektkellerei Kessler (cited in foornote 44) the Court, the Court was concerned with trade marks does not, in my citing paragraphs 35 to 3 7 of its judgment in Gut Spring- view, detract from the general significance of its comment. enheide, (cited in foornote 42) also expressed reservations At paragraph 10 of his Opinion in that case, Advocate as to their utility: 'It is only where it has particular General Jacobs had observed that the name 'Cotonnelle' difficulty in appraising the misleading nature of the brand provided 'an excellent illustration of the linguistic factor' name that, in the absence of any Community provision on since it 'might, arguably, cause a speaker of English, the matter, the national court must assess whether it is French or Italian to believe that a product is made of necessary, under the conditions laid down by its national cotton [but] it could hardly have that effect on someone law, to decide upon measures of enquiry such as an expert's w h o understands only German or Spanish, since the words report or a consumer research poll as guidance for its for cotton in those languages are "Baumwolle" and judgment'. "algodón" respectively'.

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liable to render German consumers more previous paragraph, regarding the factors susceptible to being misled by the word which the latter may wish to consider in 'lifting' than consumers in other Member applying that test so that the national court States, but it is for it to assess whether any has all the relevant material to enable it to such factors actually exist and, if so, determine whether granting the injunction whether they influence the inferences in this case would be compatible with drawn by German consumers on seeing Community law. However, in doing so, it the word. The national court may also wish should, as Advocate General Gulmann to consider whether the very fact that the advised in Clinique, not 'link its interpreta- cream is specifically intended to be used on tion of Article 30 too closely to the parti- a regular, if not daily, basis, thus necessitat- cular facts of the case'. 49 I also agree with ing ongoing expenditure by consumers his view that 'under the system of the desirous of obtaining the desired firming Treaty, [the] task' of ensuring uniform effects, in itself sufficiently emphasises the application of general provisions such as ephemeral and transient nature of those those found in the 1976 Directive 'devolves effects as to dispel any contrary inference on the national courts'. 50 Thus, notwith- that might be drawn from the word 'lift- standing the earlier willingness of the Court ing'. In other words, as the Court has occasionally, 'where the evidence and infor- acknowledged particularly in respect of mation before it seemed sufficient and the alleged confusion between trade marks, solution clear', to 'settle [...] the issue itself the national court should, in determining rather than leaving the final decision for the whether the Community standard for con- fusion is met, adopt a 'global appreciation' national court', I am convinced that such of the risk. 48 departures from the normal division of competence between national courts and the Court of Justice in preliminary-refer- ence cases are inappropriate and, in the light of the development at Community- law level of a test that enables the proper degree of protection of consumers to be determined by national courts, unneces- sary. 51 In cases such as that in the main proceedings, the Court should henceforth confine itself to interpreting Community law and providing guidelines for its appli-

31. I would recommend that the Court, in addition to specifying the test that is to be applied by the national court, provide guidance, along the lines suggested in the 49 — Paragraph 9 of the Opinion. 50 — Hud. 48 — Sec, in particular, the recent judgment of 22 June 1999 in 51 — See Cut Sprmgenheide, paragraph 30. Of the cases cited Case C-342/97 Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer v Klijsen Handel there, the most notable example of this approach was [1999] LCR I-3819, paragraphs 25, to 26 and 28. clearly the judgment in Clinique.

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cation by the national court. The ultimate injunction sought by the plaintiff in the application of Community law and, thus, main proceedings, unless it is satisfied that final decision in respect of alleged mislead- an average German consumer of the cream ing or confusing product claims should be in question, who is reasonably well made by the national court. informed, observant and circumspect, would, having regard to all of the circum- stances in which it is sold, be confused, by use in its name or description of the word 'lifting', into attributing to that cream a 32. In conclusion, therefore, I am satisfied characteristic which it does not have. the national court should not grant the

V — Conclusion

33. In the light of the foregoing, I recommend that the question referred by the Landgericht, Köln be answered as follows:

Articles 30 and 36 of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Articles 28 EC and 30 EC), read in conjunction with Council Directive 76/768/EEC of 27 July 1976 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to cosmetic products and in particular its Articles 6(3) and 7(1), preclude the prohibition, pursuant to a Member State's national legislation on unfair competition law, of the importation and distribution of a cosmetic product that is marketed without restriction in other Member States and that satisfies the labelling requirements of Council Directive 76/768/EEC, unless, in that Member State, an average consumer of the product in question, who is reasonably well informed, observant and circumspect, would, having regard to all of the circumstances in which the product is sold, be confused by a claim made in its name or description into attributing a characteristic to it that it does not in fact have.

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