C-247/98
ECLI:EU:C:2000:365
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OPINION OF MR ALBER — CASE C-247/98
O P I N I O N OF ADVOCATE GENERAL ALBER delivered on 6 July 2000 1
I — Introduction larly in relation to the compulsory distilla- tion of wine, relying on an insufficient legal basis for imposing the correction.
1. With the present action, the Hellenic Republic is seeking the annulment of Com- mission Decision 98/358/EC of 6 May 1998 on the clearance of the accounts I I — Forms of order sought presented by the Member States in respect of the expenditure for 1994 of the Guar- antee Section of the European Agricultural G u i d a n c e and G u a r a n t e e Fund ('EAGGF'), 2 in so far as that decision 3. The Hellenic Republic has therefore excluded from Community funding, in brought an action against the Commission, respect of the applicant, an amount of claiming that the Court should: GRD 8 093 595 532 for expenditure relat- ing to the arable crops, beef and veal, fruit and vegetable, and wine sectors. The Com- mission claims that there have been serious deficiencies in the management and control (1) hold the action admissible; system in Greece which were discovered during investigations in 1994 and 1995.
(2) annul, or otherwise modify, Commis- sion Decision C(98) 1124 final of 6 May 1998 on the clearance of the 2. The Hellenic Republic considers that the accounts presented by the Member contested Commission decision must be States in respect of the expenditure annulled or, in the alternative, modified, for 1994 of the Guarantee Section of since it is based on a misapprehension of the European Agricultural Guidance the facts and on an incorrect, or otherwise and Guarantee Fund. insufficient, statement of reasons. In adopt- ing that decision, the Commission exceeded the limits of its discretion, while, particu-
1 — Original language: German. 4. The Commission contends that the 2 — OJ 1998 L 163, p. 28. Court should:
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(1) dismiss the action brought by the refunds on exports to third countries Hellenic Republic; and — as in the present case — interven- tion intended to stabilise the agricultural markets. The Guidance Section finances (under Article 1(3)) common measures adopted in order to achieve the objectives of the agricultural policy — as set out in (2) order the Hellenic Republic to pay the Article 39(1)(a) of the Treaty (now, after costs. amendment, Article 33(1)(a) EC) — including measures to effect structural adjustments.
I I I— General observations on the EAGGF 7. As far as payment of aid is concerned, rules and applicable legislation Article 4(2) provides:
A — General rules 'The Commission shall make available to Member States the necessary credits so that the designated authorities and bodies may, in accordance with Community rules and national legislation, make the payments... 5. The fundamental provisions on the financing of the common agricultural pol- icy are laid down in Regulation (EEC) No 729/70 of the Council of 21 April 1970 on the financing of the common agricul- tural policy, 3last amended by Regulation ...' (EC) No 1287/95. 4
8. Under Article 5(1)(a) and (b), those 6. Financing is effected through the 'Eur- authorities must transmit to the Commis- opean Agricultural Guidance and Guaran- sion estimates and annual accounts, accom- tee Fund', which (under Article 1(1)) com- panied by the necessary documents. prises two sections, the Guarantee Section and the Guidance Section. The Guarantee Section finances (under Article 1(2))
3 — OJ 1970 L 94, p. 13. 9. Under Article 5(2)(b), after consulting 4 — OJ 1995 L 125, p. 1. the European Agricultural Guidance and
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Guarantee Fund Committee, the Commis- 11. Furthermore, the Member States are sion must, '... before the end of the required under Article 9 to cooperate in following year, on the basis of the docu- inspections and to provide information. ments referred to in paragraph 1(b), make up the accounts of the authorities and bodies'.
10. In order to ensure that payments are made correctly, the Member States are 12. If a Member State infringes the Com- required to take further measures. To that munity rules or fails to comply with its end, Article 8 provides as follows: obligations, the Commission is required to refuse to bear the expenditure, since, under Article 8(2), the financial consequences of 'irregularities or negligence attributable to administrative authorities or other bodies of the Member States' are not to be borne 'The Member States in accordance with by the Community. national provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action shall take the measures necessary to:
— satisfy themselves that transactions financed by the Fund are actually 13. Similarly, under Article 1(4), 'expendi- carried out and are executed correctly; ture relating to administrative costs and personnel borne by Member States and by recipients of aid from the Fund' is not to be paid.
— prevent and deal with irregularities;
— recover sums lost as a result of irregu- larities or negligence. 14. The necessary reductions can be calcu- lated on the basis of the actual loss incurred or as flat-rate percentages. In this connec- tion, the Commission adopted the relevant guidelines in the Belle Group Report (Document VI/216/93 of 1 June 1993), ...' which were approved by the Member
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States. Specifically, the Belle Group Report 15. The guidelines further provide that, proposes the following three categories of where there is doubt as to the rate of flat-rate corrections: correction to be applied, the following considerations may be taken into account (as mitigating factors):
'(a) 2% of expenditure — where the defi- ciency is limited to parts of the control system of lesser importance, or to the '— whether the national authorities took operation of controls which are not essen- effective steps to remedy the deficien- tial to the assurance of the regularity of the cies as soon as they were brought to expenditure, such that it can reasonably be light; concluded that the risk of loss to the EAGGF was minor.
— whether the deficiencies arose from difficulties in the interpretation of (b) 5% of expenditure — where the defi- Community texts'. ciency relates to important elements of the control system or to the operation of controls which play an important part in the assurance of the regularity of the expenditure, such that it can reasonably be concluded that the risk of loss to the EAGGF was significant. 16. Therefore, under the guidelines set out in that report, in assessing the rate at which flat-rate corrections are to be applied, where it is not possible to determine specific amounts which have been paid out at the expense of the EAGGF, the risk of loss to the EAGGF is firstly to be (c) 10% of expenditure — where the defi- calculated on the basis of the deficiencies ciency relates to the whole of or funda- found. In that regard, the effectiveness of mental elements of the control system or to the control system as a whole, individual the operation of controls essential to assur- elements of that system or the implementa- ing the regularity of the expenditure, such tion of those controls must be taken into that it can reasonably be concluded that consideration. Account must also be taken there was a high risk of widespread loss to of the seriousness of the deficiencies and the EAGGF.' the measures to combat fraud.
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17. With regard to the decision on the therefore made to points 25 to 28 (arable clearance of the accounts, Article 8(a) of crops and beef and veal sectors), 57 to 59 Regulation (EEC) No 1723/72 5 provides (fruit and vegetable sector) and 85 to 95 as follows: (wine sector) below.
'The decision to make up the accounts mentioned in Article 5(2)(b) of Regulation (EEC) No 729/70 shall cover: C — Case-law principles on the clearance of accounts procedure
(a) the determination of the amount of expenditure incurred in each Member State during the year in question, 19. It should firstly be stated that the recognised as chargeable to the clearance of accounts procedure is intended EAGGF, Guarantee Section; to ensure that the funds made available to the Member States have been used in accordance with the Community rules applicable within the framework of the common organisation of the market. ...'
20. The Court has held that Article 8(1) of Regulation No 729/70 — see point 11 B — Particular provisions above — which expressly lays down in that specific area the obligations imposed on the Member States by Article 5 of the EC Treaty, defines the principles according 18. In order ensure greater clarity and to which the Community and the Member easier comprehension, the particular provi- States are to ensure the implementation of sions will not be set out in succession at this Community decisions on agricultural inter- point, but will be included with each of the vention financed by the EAGGF and com- individual sectors in question. Reference is bat fraud and irregularities in relation to those operations. It imposes on the Mem- ber States the obligation to take the mea- 5 — Regulation (EEC) No 1723/72 of the Commission of sures necessary to satisfy themselves that 26 July 1972 on making up accounts for the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, Guarantee the transactions financed by the EAGGF Section (01 1972 L 186, p. 1), as amended by Commission are actually carried out and are executed Regulation (EEC) No 295/88 of 1 February 1998 (OJ 1988 correctly, even if the specific Community L 30, p. 7).
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act does not expressly provide for the that its own information and figures are adoption of particular supervisory mea- accurate. 9 As can be seen from the above- sures. 6 mentioned judgment, the Member State in question cannot rebut the Commission's findings by mere assertions, but must indicate specific circumstances by reference to which, for example, the existence of a reliable and operational supervisory system can be proven. 21. It is settled case-law that where the Commission refuses to charge expenditure to the EAGGF on the ground that it was incurred as a result of breaches of Com- munity rules for which a Member State can be held responsible, it is not required to demonstrate exhaustively that the informa- tion transmitted by the Member States is inaccurate, but merely to adduce evidence of serious and reasonable doubt regarding 23. If the Member State is not able to show the figures notified by the national autho- that they are inaccurate, the Commission's rities. 7 Where, in refusing to bear certain findings can give rise to serious doubts, expenditure, the Commission claims that which give sufficient grounds for a payment there has been a breach of the rules on the reduction, as to the existence of an ade- common organisation of the agricultural quate and effective series of supervisory markets, it is obliged to give reasons for its measures and inspection procedures. 10 decision and indicate how the absence of, or defects in, inspection procedures oper- ated by the Member State in question were found. 8
24. In refusing to bear expenditure within the framework of the grant of funds 22. Consequently, it is for the State to show through the EAGGF, the Commission is that the Commission's calculations and not required in principle to prove that findings are incorrect and to adduce the actual loss has occurred. If such specific most detailed and comprehensive evidence cases cannot be proven, proof of a (theore- tical) risk of loss to the EAGGF is suffi- cient. 6 — See Case C-2/93 Exportslachterijen van Oordegem [1994] ECR I-2283, paragraphs 17 and 18, and Case C-235/97 France v Commission [1998] ECR I-7555, paragraph 45. 7 — Case C-28/94 Netherlands v Commission [1999] 9 —Case C-54/95 Germany v Commission [1999] ECR I-35, ECR I-1973, paragraph 40, with further references. paragraph 35. 8 — Case C-242/96 Italy v Commission [1998] ECR I-5863, 10 — Case C-242/96 Italy v Commission, cited in footnote 8, paragraph 58, and Case C-8/88 Germany v Commission and Case C-8/88 Germany v Commission, cited in [1990] ECR I-2321, paragraph 23. footnote 8.
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IV — Opinion payment under the conditions set out in Title I of that regulation.
27. "With regard to the amount of the A — Corrections in the arable crops and compensatory payments, Article 15(3) beef and veal sectors states:
25. In these sectors the Commission has not recognised expenditure amounting to 'The payments referred to in this Regula- GRD 1 877 531 872 (which corresponds tion are to be paid over to the beneficiaries to 2% of the declared expenditure). 11The in their entirety'. 13 Commission essentially justified its correc- tions on the ground that the producers' organisations in the Hellenic Republic had made an average deduction of 2% from the compensatory payments and premiums to be paid to the producers (members of the 2 8 . U n d e r R e g u l a t i o n (EEC) N o organisations and non-members) in order 2066/92 14 the conditions for the grant of to cover their own costs. premiums for beef producers were rede- fined and Article 30a was inserted into Regulation (EEC) No 805/68 of the Coun- cil of 27 June 1968 on the common orga- nisation of the market in beef and veal. 15 That article is worded as follows:
1. Particular provisions
'The amounts to be paid pursuant to this Regulation shall be paid in full to the beneficiaries'. 16 26. Under Article 2(1) of Regulation (EEC) No 1765/92, 12 Community producers of 13 — Emphasis added. arable crops may apply for a compensatory 14 — Council Regulation (EEC) No 2066/92 of 30 June 1992 amending Regulation (EEC) No 805/68 on the common organisation of the market in beef and veal and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 468/87 laying down general rules 11 — Specifically, expenditure amounting to GRD 1 732 138 applying to the special premium for beef producers and 831 was declared in the arable crops sector and GRD 145 Regulation (EEC) No 1357/80 introducing a system of 393 041 in the beef and veal sector. premiums for maintaining suckler cows (OJ 1992 L 215, p. 49). 12 — Council Regulation (EEC) No 1765/92 of 30 June 1992 15 — OJ 1968 L 148, p. 24. establishing a support system for producers of certain arable crops (OJ 1992 L 181, p. 12). 16 — Emphasis added.
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2. Summary Report for verifying the payments made by the Associations. The actual situation in the Hellenic Republic appeared to be that, after receiving the applications for aid, the regional directorates passed them on to 29. In its Summary Report concerning the the Associations which were then respon- corrections in the arable crops and beef and sible for processing the data, examining the veal sectors, the Commission stated the applications for aid, compiling a compu- following: terised list and, lastly, paying the aid to the beneficiaries. The regional directorate is to be regarded as a supervisory authority, but appears to have failed to perform that function and to have approved payment lists without having conducted any real verification. No effective control was exer- cised for the 1993 and 1994 financial years, since the regional directorates did not have (a) Arable crops sector the necessary technical equipment and thus did not have access to the Associations' databases.
30. According to the findings of the Com- mission, the Associations of Agricultural Cooperatives (hereinafter: the Associa- tions) deal with the computerised proces- sing of applications for aid and the pay- ment of the relevant amounts for all 32. The Associations are responsible for beneficiaries, i.e. members and non-mem- performing public functions, the costs of bers of the Associations. On the basis of an which should not be imposed on the Greek agreement at national level, the Associa- farmers. It is thus apparent that there is an tions retained approximately 2% of the aid infringement of Article 15 of Regulation in each case to cover their costs. However, No 1765/92. Such action also infringes that action is contrary to Article 15 of Article 1(4) of Regulation No 729/70 in Regulation No 1765/92, under which the so far as administrative costs or execution amounts to be paid must be paid over to costs in connection with the grant of the beneficiaries in their entirety. Community aid were passed on.
31. It is apparent from the decision of the Greek Minister for the Economy and 33. The Commission then informed the Agriculture of 10 November 1993 that, Hellenic Republic that an action for failure firstly, the Associations pay the relevant to fulfil obligations would be brought aid to the beneficiaries and, secondly, that against it if the current practice was not the agricultural directorates are responsible brought to an end. The Hellenic Republic
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was also notified that the Commission remained that the Associations were would propose a correction of 2%. responsible for managing the aid and there- fore performed public functions. The costs connected with that service should not be passed on to the Greek producers. Rather it was for the Member State to pay a consideration for the service provided.
34. As part of the conciliation procedure requested by the Hellenic Republic, it argued that the existing statutory basis be changed and that a judgment by the Court of Justice in Jensen, 17 which was of importance to the present case, should be 36. The competent Greek authorities had awaited. In the light of the first argument, claimed that the retention in each case the Commission then refrained from bring- could vary between the individual coopera- ing an action for failure to fulfil obliga- tives. However, no evidence was produced tions. The Commission could not concur in support of that claim. with the second argument, since it took the view that the judgment in Jensen could not be applied to the present case. The Jensen case concerns the lawfulness of a set-off in connection with the grant of aid, whereas the present case relates to the indirect financing of administrative expenditure at national level, where important functions in connection with the grant of aid have been transferred to the Associations. (b) Corrections in the beef and veal sector
37. As in the arable crops sector, the 35. In the conciliation procedure the Hel- Commission found that in the beef and lenic Republic submitted new arguments. veal sector each of the producers' organisa- According to those arguments, the con- tions had retained at least 2% of the aid in tested retention had been arranged not on order to reimburse the administrative costs the basis of Greek Law No 1409/83, but on incurred. However, that is contrary to the basis of a voluntary agreement. Even Article 30(a) of Regulation No 805/68 18 after examining that submission, which under which the amounts to be paid must had, in the view of the Commission, been be paid in full to the beneficiaries. The lodged out of time, the assessment Commission therefore applied a correction
17 — Case C-132/95 Jensen and Korn- og Foderstoßompagniet v Landbrugsministeriet [1998] ECR I-2975. 18 — See point 28 above.
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of 2% for the 1993 and 1994 financial vided by the producers' organisations, years as part of the clearance of accounts which did not perform any public func- for 1994. tions. The corrections applied by the Com- mission were therefore based on a misas- sessment of the deductions made.
38. In the conciliation procedure, the Greek authorities argued that the retention by the producers' organisations was based on a voluntary agreement between the 40. Secondly, the Greek Government takes producers' organisations and the benefici- the view that the Commission may not aries and that the level of retention varied impose any financial correction as part of between 0.5% and 2%. The conciliation the clearance of accounts. The clearance of body reached the conclusion, however, that accounts has a preventive character and the Greek authorities could not produce does not permit penalties to be imposed on any evidence in support of that claim. The Member States. For that purpose the Com- conciliation body therefore accepted that a mission would have had to pursue the route correction of 2% was justified. of proceedings for failure to fulfil obliga- tions; however, in the context of clearance of accounts it cannot establish any treaty infringement or impose financial penalties on the Member States.
3. Submissions of the applicant
41. Thirdly, the argument is submitted, in the alternative, that the applicable provi- sions of Community law do not preclude the Greek action. In accordance with the 39. The Greek Government argues, first of case-law of the Court of Justice, 19 a all, that the contested retention took place deduction from the aid payable is permitted on a voluntary basis and was not applied to where that is consistent with the costs all producers. Since 1993 it had no longer actually incurred and the normal costs been founded on Law No 1409/83, but which might be passed on in other cases stemmed from an agreement concluded in national law and where the amount of between producers' organisations and their that deduction is not such as to deter the members. The retention was not therefore effected on a statutory basis and was not connected to the covering of costs linked to 19— The Greek Government relies in this respect on the the operation of aid management, but was judgments in Case 31/78 Bussane [1978] ECR 2429 and in Case 233/81 Denkavit Futtermittel v Germany [1982] the consideration for general services pro- ECR 2933.
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beneficiaries from participation in the sup deductions made by the Associations vary port programme or to impair the function between 0.5% and 2% of the aid to be ing of the common organisation of the paid. The Commission should therefore market. only have applied a correction rate of 1.25%.
44. Fifthly, it is claimed that under Greek 42. Neither Regulation No 805/68 nor Law No 2538/97, which entered into force Regulation No 1765/92 contain express on 1 December 1997, the contested deduc provisions which prohibit deductions from tions from aid at the expense of the EAGGF the aid payable. The rules of Article 15 of were prohibited. Regulation 1765/92 and Article 30a of Regulation No 805/68 cited by the Com mission were adopted after the judgment had been delivered in Denkavit 20 without the Community legislature expressly prohi biting the imposition of administrative costs. The differing wordings of the above- mentioned articles also suggest that there is 4. Submissions of the defendant no generally applicable rule which prohi bits deductions from the aid payable. The Community legislature merely wished tž> prevent the beneficiaries having to bear 45. The Commission rejects the accusation costs which were not connected to the that it has incorrectly assessed the deduc grant of aid. It is thus apparent from the tion made by the Associations and argues two abovementioned articles only that the that the Hellenic Republic has inflicted a aid is to be paid to the beneficiaries, and loss on the EAGGF by permitting the not a third party, that no parafiscal levies or Associations to retain 2% of the aid to be other charges which are not connected the paid as reimbursement for administrative grant of aid may be imposed on the costs incurred and thereby also failed, inter beneficiaries and that the functioning of alia, to fulfil its obligations under Arti the common organisation of the market cle 15(3) of Regulation No 1765/92 and may not be impaired. Article 30a of Regulation No 805/68. Greek Law No 1409/83 was applicable for the 1994 accounting year and had afforded the Associations the opportunity to make a deduction of 2% from the aid to be paid. The abovementioned agreement between the producers' organisations and the producers merely constitutes the accep 43. Fourthly, and likewise in the alterna tance of the conditions laid down by tive, the Greek Government argues that the statute. The costs connected with the payment of aid should not be chargeable to the EAGGF. Even if a statutory provision 20 — Cited in footnote 19. such as Article 2 of Law No 1409/83 was
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not applicable, the Hellenic Republic, rules corresponding to Article 15(3) of which conferred a public function on the Regulation No 1765/92 and Article 30a Associations, should have prevented them of Regulation No 805/68. However, it is from retaining a certain percentage of the apparent from those two provisions that aid. Lastly, the argument that the deduction the Member States are prohibited from was voluntary was not put forward until deducting administrative costs from the two years after the objections had been Community aid to be paid. made by the Commission and thus after the expiry of the period within which that submission would have had to be consid- ered.
48. Lastly, as regards the level of the correction, the Commission argues that it is clear from its investigations that, in the cases inspected by it, there was a deduction of at least 2% from the amount of aid in 46. As regards the argument that Regula- each case. The Greek authorities had not tion No 729/70 is not an appropriate legal been able to produce evidence in this case basis for a financial correction, the Com- that a lower percentage had been applied. mission takes the view that it is not required under Article 169 of the EC Treaty (now Article 226 EC) to bring proceedings for failure to fulfil obligations whenever Community law is infringed. It may also assess such infringements as part of the clearance of accounts. Since the Commission must ensure that only proper expenditure is charged to the EAGGF, it is 5. Assessment required, in so far as it establishes infringe- ments of Community law with regard to the recognition of expenditure, to correct the expenditure declared by the Member State. 49. In accordance with the wording of Article 15(3) of Regulation No 1765/92 and of Article 30a of Regulation No 805/68, as inserted by Regulation No 2066/92, the relevant payments are to be paid over to the beneficiaries 'in full' or 'in their entirety'. 47. The third argument put forward by the Greek Government, that Community law does not preclude a deduction from aid, is rejected by the Commission on the ground that the case-law cited by the Hellenic Republic is not relevant to the present case. 50. The second recital of Regulation The provisions of Community law which No 1765/92 expressly states that the com- were applicable at that time contained no pensatory payments are intended to com-
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pensate for the loss of income caused by the 53. The case-law of the Court of Justice reduction of the institutional prices within cited by the Greek Government 22 is not the framework of the new support system relevant to the present case. Regulation for producers of certain arable crops intro- (EEC) Nol725/79, 23 which had to be duced as a result of the reform of the interpreted in those cases, does not contain common agricultural policy. Under the any rules on the costs of the checks to be third recital of Regulation No 2066/92 conducted by the Member States. The the purpose of the premiums in question wording of that regulation did not prohibit is to grant substantial compensation for the the Member States from conducting checks consequences for producers of the reduc- without remuneration or from requiring tion of the intervention price in the beef the undertakings concerned to reimburse and veal sector. the costs of those checks.
51. The objective of compensation for the 54. The Member States cannot therefore be loss of income caused by the reduction of granted the power under Regulation the institutional prices can thus be achieved No 1765/92 and Regulation No 805/68 to only if the compensatory payments are paid reduce the compensatory payments by over to the farmers affected by the reform deducting administrative fees, since that of the common agricultural policy in full or would result in varying compensation of in their entirety. the income losses suffered by the farmers. It is immaterial whether the deductions were made on the basis of a national statutory provision or an agreement between the producers and the producers' organisa- tions. The Member States are in any case required to ensure that the beneficiaries receive the compensatory payments to 52. In the joined cases of Kellinghusen and which they are entitled in full or in their Ketelsen, 21 the Court of Justice stated with entirety. regard to this issue, that 'Article 15(3) of Regulation No 1765/92, and Article 30a of Regulation No 805/68, as inserted by Reg- ulation No 2066/92, prohibit the authori- ties in the Member States from making a deduction from the payments made or from demanding the payment of administrative 55. The submissions of the Greek Govern- fees charged for processing applications ment are therefore unfounded and conse- and having the effect of reducing the quently must be rejected. amount of the aid'.
22 — Cited in footnote 19. 21 — Joined Cases C-36/97 and C-37/97 Kellinghusen v Amt für 23 — Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1725/79 of 26 July Land- und Wasserwirtschaft Kiel and Ketelsen v Amt für 1979 on the rules for granting aid to skimmed milk Land- und Wasserwirtschaft Husum [1998] ECR I-6337, processed into compound feedingstuffs and skimmed-milk paragraph 21). powder intended for feed for calves (OJ 1979 L 199, p. 1).
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B — Fruit and vegetable sectors organisation of fruit and vegetable pro- ducers:
56. The Commission applied a correction amounting to GRD 5 138 253 067 24 in this sector, justifying that correction on the ground that there were deficiencies in the Greek management and control system and (a) which is formed on the producers' own in the operation of the producers' organi- initiative for the purposes, in particu- sations. lar:
— of promoting the concentration of supply and the stabilisation of 1. Particular provisions prices at the producer stage in respect of one or more of the products referred to in Article 1, and 57. The fundamental provisions governing the common organisation of the market in fruit and vegetables are contained in Reg- ulation (EEC) No 1035/72 of the Council of 18 May 1972. 25 — of making suitable technical facil- ities available to producer mem- bers for presenting and marketing the relevant products; 58. As regards the producers' organisa- tions, Article 13, as amended by Regula- tion (EEC) No 3284/83, 26 provides as follows:
(b) which requires the producer members:
'1. For the purposes of this Regulation, "producers' organisation" means any
24 — Specifically, a correction of 10% (or GRD 448 497 124) — to sell through the producers' was applied in respect of citrus fruits and a correction of organisation their total output of 10% in total (or GRD 4 689 755 943) in respect of peaches and nectarines, where expenditure amounting to 20% was the product or products by reason not recognised for the nomos (district) of Pella. 25 —OJ 1972 L 118, p. 1. of which they have become mem- 26 — Council Regulation (EEC) No 3284/83 of 14 November bers; the organisation may, how- 1983 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1035/72 on the ever, waive this requirement in common organisation of the market in fruit and vegetables as regards producers' organisations (OJ 1983 L 325, p. 1). respect of certain quantities,
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— to apply, with regard to production — from the date of recognition they keep and marketing, rules which have specific accounts in respect of the been adopted by the producers' activities for which recognition is organisation with a view to sought. improving product quality and adapting the volume of supply to market requirements, and
Member States:
— to provide the information — shall take a decision on the granting of requested by the organisation on recognition within three months from harvests and supplies; the filing of the request,
— shall notify the Commission, within a time-limit of two months, of any deci- sion to grant, refuse or withdraw (c) which has been recognised by the recognition, Member State concerned pursuant to paragraph 2.
— shall draw up each year a report on the application of this Article ...'
2. Member States shall at the request of the organisations concerned grant them the recognition referred to in paragraph 1(c) if: 59. With regard to the withdrawal of products listed in Annex II of that regula- tion, 27 Article 15(1), as amended by Reg- ulation (EEC) No 1154/78, 28 provides that producers' organisations or associations of
27 — These are products covered by the price and intervention system. — there is sufficient evidence as regards 28 — Council Regulation (EEC) No 1154/78 of 30 May 1978 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1035/72 on the common the duration and effectiveness of their organisation of the market in fruit and vegetables and activities, in particular the tasks re- Regulation (EEC) No 2601/69 laying down special mea- sures to encourage the processing of certain varieties of ferred to in paragraph 1, oranges (OJ 1978 L 144, p. 5).
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such organisations may fix a withdrawal ducers' organisations had been recognised price for certain products below which the which had neither the technical equipment producers' organisations will not offer for necessary for marketing the products in sale products supplied by their members. If question nor an intervention fund, and that a withdrawal price is so fixed, in respect of the coefficient used to fix the withdrawal products which conform to the quality price was incorrect. A further inspection standards, producers' organisations or was carried out in the following year in the associations of such organisations must nomoi (districts) of Pella and Imathia. In grant an indemnity to the producers for that inspection, the Community inspectors the quantities that remain unsold. If mar- had concentrated on producers' organisa- keting rules aimed at limiting the volume of tions which the Greek authorities had the supply of products are applied, the initially refused to recognise. producers' organisations may decide not to put on sale products which, while con- forming to the quality standards, do not comply with the marketing rules referred to above. In that case the producers are to be granted compensation, calculated on the basis of the withdrawal price, for the quantities that remain unsold. To finance those measures, associated producers must establish an intervention fund, maintained by contributions assessed on quantities 62. For Imathia, the findings were by and offered for sale. large satisfactory. In Pella, however, a large number of producers' organisations should not have been recognised on account of inadequate technical equipment.
2. Summary Report
60. In its Summary Report, the Commis- sion states that in the course of several inspections it found significant deficiencies in the management and control system in 63. The Commission also discovered a the Hellenic Republic in the fruit and number of deficiencies in the area of citrus vegetable sectors. fruits. Alarming weaknesses were evident in the management and control system concerning the recognition and control procedures of the producers' organisations. In addition, the inspection of a large producers' organisation in Arta uncovered 61. The inspections carried out for peaches a number of deficiencies. The Commission and nectarines in Macedonia in August asked the Greek authorities to conduct an 1994 and August 1995 revealed that pro- investigation of the withdrawal of oranges
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in the nomos of Arta; however, no such 10% correction, with the exception of the investigation was satisfactorily conducted. nomos of Pella. There had been more The Commission therefore proposed a serious deficiencies in that nomos than in correction of 10% both for citrus fruits the other districts. and for peaches and nectarines, whilst notification was given of a correction of 20% for the nomos of Pella.
3. Submissions of the applicant
65. In this connection the Hellenic Repub- lic accuses the Commission of having adopted its decision on the basis of a misassessment of the facts and having exceeded the limits of its discretion under Article 5(2)(b) of Regulation No 729/70.
64. During the bilateral negotiations, the Greek authorities reported that improve- ments to the system had been introduced as from the 1996 marketing year. The Com- mission pointed out, however, that the 66. The Commission firstly announced that principal problem lay in the recognition it was imposing a correction of 50% for the procedure and in the checks carried out on financial years 1992 to 1994. However, the producers' organisations and that the after the Commission had been notified by abovementioned changes in 1994 had not the Greek authorities of a series of mea- yet had any effect. The conciliation body to sures taken in 1994, the Commission with- which the Greek authorities referred the drew its reservations concerning the finan- matter merely called into question the cing of expenditure for the 1992 and 1993 proposed 20% correction for the nomos marketing years. Since the measures taken of Pella. The Commission inspected the to improve the management and control producers' organisations with which fault system had been taken as early as 1994, the had already been found in national checks. correction applied by the Commission as However, the Commission did not consider part of the clearance of accounts for 1994 that it was able to revise the proposed was incorrect. correction. It initially proceeded on the basis of a 50% reduction for the total declared expenditure and wished also to extend this to the 1992 to 1994 marketing years. However, in order to accommodate the Greek authorities and to honour their 67. The Commission has exceeded the efforts, the Commission proposed only a limits of its discretion since the deficiencies
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GREECE V COMMISSION
found had not justified the correction made nectarines, similar instructions were issued and that correction was arbitrary. A 10% relating to the recognition of certain pro- reduction should be applied only where it ducers' organisations and the checks to be can be concluded that there is an increased conducted. Furthermore, a computerised risk of loss to the EAGGF. In its correc- form was devised for members of the tions, the Commission must take into producers' organisations in order to be consideration the nature and severity of able to verify their productivity and eco- the infringements and the financial loss nomic efficiency. As far as the supposed incurred by the Community. With regard to lack of technical equipment and interven- oranges, the Commission inspected only tion funds is concerned, the Hellenic one nomos out of a total of 52 in Greece. Republic argues that Regulation As far as peaches and nectarines were No 1035/72 does not prescribe that the concerned, the Commission inspected only producers' organisations must have their 2 (of the 52) nomoi and restricted itself to own technical equipment, with the result those producers' organisations whose con- that it is also possible to hire such equip- duct had already been criticised by the ment. That regulation does not lay down a Greek authorities. The 20% correction ceiling for the intervention funds either, and applied for the nomos of Pella should also the possibility that the financial means of be regarded as unjustified, since in that the producers' organisations might be nomos the Commission inspected only inadequate is not in itself a reason to refuse eight producers' organisations to whose recognition. recognition the Greek authorities had already objected.
68. The Hellenic Republic further argues that the senior officials entrusted with carrying out the checks had been issued binding guidelines for the correct and proper implementation of the checks. Those instructions concerned quality con- 69. As regards the producers' organisation trol, the proper operation of the producers' in Arta, the Greek Government points out organisations and the correct procedure for that a computerised membership list was withdrawal. There is therefore no cause for created, accounting was reorganised and objection to the operation of the producers' the regulations were adjusted. Through organisations, which is also shown by the those changes there were repercussions on fact that the Commission withdrew its the operation of the producers' organisa- reservations concerning the 1992 and tion, but it was not possible to establish any 1993 financial years. For peaches and illegitimate payment of Community aid.
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OPINION OF MR ALBER — CASE C-247/98
The deficiencies to which the Commission tigations conducted by it. Those investiga- objects regarding registration on the mem- tions had uncovered a series of irregula- bership list had no consequences. rities. Thus, in the course of an investiga- tion in August 1994 in the area of peaches and nectarines, Commission officials found that some producers' organisations had not provided their members with the necessary technical facilities for marketing the prod- ucts, that others did not have an interven- 70. With regard to the supposed deficien- tion fund, that the withdrawal coefficient cies in the withdrawal of oranges in the had been incorrectly applied and that the nomos of Arta, further payments were obligation to define the size of fruit had not suspended immediately, further informa- been complied with. On the basis of those tion was requested from the competent findings, a correction of 50% was proposed local authorities and a special investigation for the 1992 to 1994 marketing years. group was appointed which nevertheless While the Greek authorities had taken concluded that no irregularities had oc- measures to improve the management and curred in that case. control system, new investigations had revealed that there were still significant deficiencies, in particular regarding packa- ging and mandatory definition of fruit size. In the area of citrus fruit, the same irregularities occurred as for peaches. Those irregularities concerned the recogni- tion of producers' organisations, the con- 4. Submissions of the defendant trols on the operation of those organisa- tions and the existence of intervention funds. Even though the Commission did not apply a correction for the 1992 and 1993 marketing years, the existence of the 71. The Commission firstly points out that abovementioned deficiencies justified the the clearance of accounts for 1994 covers proposed reduction of 10% for the 1994 the period from 16 October 1993 to marketing year. 15 October 1994. Since the marketing year for peaches and nectarines extends from 1 May to 31 October and for oranges from 1 October to 15 July, compensatory pay- ments for the withdrawal of peaches and nectarines applied for in August 1994 could not be taken into consideration until the clearance of accounts for 1995.
73. As regards the accusation that it excee- 72. The correction proposals were made by ded the limits of its discretion, the Com- the Commission on the basis of the inves- mission argues that a 10% correction for
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GREECE V COMMISSION
the declared expenditure relating to citrus 76. With regard to the argument put for- fruit and peaches and nectarines was justi- ward by the Greek authorities regarding the fied on account of the deficiencies found operation of the producers' organisations, and the resulting risk of loss to the EAGGF. the Commission claims that it has not been The losses to the EAGGF were in any case substantiated what instructions were higher than the correction made by the drawn up for the producers' associations Commission. with a view to improving quality control. In addition, the measures taken did not relate to the deficiencies established during an inspection in April 1994, according to which producers' organisations did not have any membership lists and admission was possible even after the expiry of the admission obligation under Article 5 of Regulation (EEC) No 2602/90. 29 As a result of those deficiencies, the competent authorities should have withdrawn recog- 74. In reply to the accusation that the nition from the producers' organisations. inspections were supposedly not represen- The improvements referred to by the Hel- tative, the Commission contends that the lenic Republic were not decided until June inspections conducted by it concerning 1995 and thus could not have had any peaches and nectarines in the nomoi of effect during the 1994 marketing year. The Pella and Imathia had covered 95% of investigations conducted in the nomos of Greek production of those products and Pella had revealed that 48% of the produ- 93.5% of the total amount of funding paid cers' associations had neither their own nor to the Hellenic Republic. The inspections hired equipment for presenting and market- for citrus fruit — where the nomoi of ing their products. Agulide, Arta and Leucade were inspected — were also representative, since 74% of all funds for the 1994 financial year were paid over to that area. The inspections in the nomos of Pella had revealed that 48% of the producers' orga- nisations did not have the necessary tech- nical facilities for marketing fruit.
77. The Greek authorities had disputed a withdrawal of oranges in the nomos of 75. A 20% correction for the nomos of Pella was justified, since more serious deficiencies had been found there than in 29 — Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2602/90 of 7 Septem- the other nomoi. ber 1990 laying down detailed rules concerning citrus fruit producers' organisations (OJ 1990 L 245, p. 13).
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OPINION OF MR ALBER — CASE C-247/98
Arta, but had been unable to prove that no its own figures and information are accu- such withdrawal had taken place. rate, it is not sufficient to make mere assertions. Rather, the Member State must indicate specific circumstances with which, for example, the existence of a reliable and operational supervisory system can be proven.
5. Assessment
80. Nor has the Greek Government proven that the recognised producers' organisa- tions have the intervention funds necessary 78. It should firstly be stated that under under Article 15(1) of Regulation Article 13(2) of Regulation No 1035/72, as No 1035/72, as amended by Regulation amended by Regulation No 3284/83 — No 1154/78, 31 for financing the measures see point 58 above — Member States must in connection with the withdrawal of grant the producers' organisations recogni- certain products. tion only if there is sufficient evidence as regards the duration and effectiveness of their activities. The duties of a producers' organisation under Article 13(1) of that regulation include making suitable techni- cal facilities available to producer members for presenting and marketing the relevant 81. Even though the Commission did not products. make any financial corrections for the 1992 and 1993 marketing years, that does not mean that it would not have been entitled to make corrections for the 1994 financial year on the basis of the same deficiencies in the management and control system. The Court has already ruled in this regard. In Italy v Commission 32 it held as follows: 79. In the present case the Greek Govern- ment could not prove that the findings made by the Commission regarding the lack of technical equipment held by produ- cers' organisations and producers were inadequate. However, since the Court of Justice has held 30 that it is for the Member '... Where the Commission did not carry State to show that the Commission's find- out the correction due in respect of a ings are incorrect and to adduce the most detailed and comprehensive evidence that 31 — See point 59 above. 32 — Case 55/91 Italy v Commission [1993] ECR I-4813, 30 — See point 22 above. paragraph 67.
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GREECE V COMMISSION
previous year, but tolerated the irregulari- were not decided until June 1995 and thus ties on grounds of fairness, the Member could not have had any effect during the State does not acquire any right to demand 1994 marketing year. to the same position to be taken with regard to the irregularities with respect to the following financial year by virtue of the principle of legal certainty or the principle of protection of legitimate expectations.'
C — Wine sector
84. In this sector the Commission declined 82. With regard to the representativeness to recognise expenditure amounting to of the inspections conducted by the Com- GRD 629 212 616. 33 That correction is mission, those inspections for the nomoi of based, firstly, on deficiencies in the manage- Pella and Imathia covered 95% of Greek ment and control system in connection with production of peaches and nectarines and the permanent abandonment of wine-grow- 93.5% of the total compensatory payments ing areas and, secondly, on failure to made. The inspections for citrus fruit achieve the quantities of wines fixed for covered a total of 74% of the compensa- compulsory distillation. tory payments made in that sector for the 1994 financial year. Finally, for the nomos of Pella, the Commission found that 48% of the producers' organisations inspected did not have the necessary technical equip- ment. 1. Particular provisions
83. It must therefore be assumed, as does (a) Permanent abandonment of wine-grow- the Commission, that the deficiencies found ing areas affected all or, in any case, substantial parts of the control system or at least related to the implementation of controls which are of vital importance for ensuring the legiti- 85. Regulation (EEC) No 1442/88 3 4 con- macy of expenditure. It can thus be con- tains the fundamental provisions on the cluded that there is a high risk of wide- spread loss to the EAGGF. Consequently, the corrections made by the Commission in 33 — Specifically, expenditure amounting to 8.64% (or the present case are justified. The reliance CRD 456 768 848) for set-aside and GRD 172 443 768 for compulsory distillation was not recognised. by the Greek Government on improve- 34 — Council Regulation (EEC) No 1442/88 of 24 May 1988 ments made to the system cannot affect this on the granting, for the 1988/89 to 1995/96 wine years, of permanent abandonment premiums in respect of wine- view in any way, since those improvements growing areas (OJ 1988 L 132, p. 3).
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OPINION OF MR ALBER — CASE C-247/98
granting, for the 1988/89 to 1995/96 wine Regulation No 1442/88. With regard to the years, of permanent abandonment pre- objectives of that regulation, the fourth and miums in respect of wine-growing areas. sixth recitals state: Under the third recital in the preamble to that regulation, an incentive is to be given for the abandonment of wine-growing areas through the grant of premiums in amounts to be varied on the basis of the 'Whereas in the interests of ensuring that productivity of the areas concerned, cover- the system runs efficiently and can be ing the cost of grubbing-up operations, the supervised, the nature of the information loss of replanting rights and the loss of to be entered on the application for a future income. premium must be laid down, and provision must be made for the checking of that information.'
86. Under Article 2(3) the yield per hectare of the grubbed-up areas is to be calculated 'Whereas before the premium is paid... the on the basis of the average yield declared production capacity of the areas to be for the recipient's holding and the produc- grubbed up should be assessed, and tive capacity of the wine-growing area to be whereas it should be verified that grubbing grubbed up assessed by the competent up of the said areas has actually taken authority. place; whereas these findings must be certified in order to enable the applicant to prove that grubbing up has been carried out...'.
87. Under Article 4(2) the grant of the premium is subject to a written declaration in which the applicant undertakes to grub up the vines on the areas in respect of 89. Under Article 4(2), on receiving the which the premium has been applied for or application for the grant of the premium, to have them grubbed up before 15 May of the competent authority must verify the the year following that in which the information contained in the application, application is submitted. determine in particular the production capacity of the wine-growing area to be grubbed up on the basis of its age, its state of upkeep and the proportion of missing vines, calculate the yield per hectare of the areas concerned, and notify the applicant of 88. Regulation (EEC) No 2729/88 35 laid the level of premium granted, after allow- down detailed rules for the application of ing him to submit his own observations.
35 — Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2729/88 of 31 August 1988 laying down detailed rules for the application of Regulation (EEC) No 1442/88 on the granting, for the 1988/89 to 1995/96 wine years, of permanent abandon- ment premiums of wine-growing areas (OJ 1998 L 241, 90. Under Article 6(1) the competent p. 108). authority must, at the applicant's request I-26
GREECE V COMMISSION
and within two months of the complete 93. Council Regulation (EEC) No 2048/89 grubbing up of the vines located on the laying down general rules on controls in the plots, verify that the operation has taken wine sector 4 0 contains, in Title II, measures place and certify when it took place. to improve controls to be carried out by Member States. The relevant principles are set out in Article 3:
91. Regulation (EEC) No 2392/86 36 con- tains the rules on the Community vineyard register. 37 The eleventh recital states that, by virtue of the information which it contains, the register constitutes a vital '1. Member States shall take the necessary instrument for the management and mon- measures to improve control of compliance itoring of the market. with the rules in the wine sector notably in the particular fields listed in the Annex.
92. Under Article 4(1) of that regulation, the vineyard register was initially to be established by 27 July 1992 at the latest. That time-limit was subsequently extended 2. The controls in the areas referred to in to 31 December 1996 on account of tech- the Annex shall be carried out either nical difficulties encountered by some systematically or by sampling. In the case Member States. 3 8 Article 4(4 ) 39 provides of sampling, Member States shall ensure by that Member States which, on 1 July 1995, their number, nature and frequency that have not yet established a vineyard register controls are representative of the whole of or which have only established a partial their territory and correspond to the scale register must, before 31 December 1998, of the wine-sector products marketed or establish reference charts covering the held with a view to their marketing. entire area under vines.
36 —Council Regulation (EEC) No 2392/86 of 24 July 1986 establishing a Community vineyard register (OJ 1986 L 208, p. 1). 37 — With regard to the spirit and purpose of such a vineyard register, the second recital states that 'such a register is needed if vital information is to be obtained on production potential and trends, in order to ensure the proper functioning of the common organisation of the market in wine, and in particular of the Community arrangements on Member States shall ensure that the com- intervention and planting, and monitoring measures'. petent authorities have a sufficient number 38 —Council Regulation (EC) No 1549/95 of 29 June 1995 of suitably qualified and experienced staff amending Regulation No 2392/86 establishing a Commu- nity vineyard register (OJ 1995 L 148, p. 37). 39 — Inserted by Regulation No 1549/95 and amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 1596/96 of 30 July 1996 amending Regulation No 2392/86 establishing a Commu- 40 —Council Regulation No 2048/89 of 19 June 1989 nity vineyard register (OJ 1995 L 206, p. 38). (OJ 1989 L 202, p. 32).
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OPINION OF MR ALBER — CASE C-247/98
to carry out efficiently the wine controls 2. Summary Report referred to in the Annex in particular.'
(b) Compulsory distillation (a) Permanent abandonment of wine-grow- ing areas
94. Compulsory distillation was intro- duced because it was regarded as the most suitable way to absorb surpluses of table wine on the market. 41 Thus, Article 39(1) 95. In the Summary Report, the Commis- of Regulation No 822/87 provides that sion states that, in the course of inspections where, in respect of a given wine year, the conducted in September 1995, it found a market in table wine and wine suitable for number of deficiencies in the management yielding table wine is in a state of serious and control system in connection with the imbalance, compulsory distillation of table permanent set-aside of wine-growing areas. wine is to be decided on. The Commission Since there was neither a vineyard register is to fix the quantities that are to be nor a land register in Greece, the necessary delivered for compulsory distillation to measures had not been taken to ensure a eliminate production surpluses and thus proper control system for designating and restore a normal market situation, in parti- surveying the plots. The inspection mea- cular as regards the levels of foreseeable surements of several plots had revealed that availabilities at the end of a wine year and the estimates of the Greek inspectors had prices. The total quantity to be distilled is exceeded the actual area by 10% on shared between the various wine-growing average. It had not been possible to explain regions of the Community, grouped toge- measurement methods for determining the ther by Member State. The quantity for surface areas. As had been confirmed by distillation is then shared between table one local Greek inspector, measurements wine producers in each wine-growing had not been performed after the set-aside. region. Member States must notify the Furthermore, discrepancies had arisen Commission of the quantities of table wine between production declarations and produced in each delimited wine-growing recognised yields. The relevant provisions region. Those notifications then serve as a do not provide that the average for a region basis for setting the total quantity for should be used to determine yield, but the distillation in the Community. plots set aside must be taken into consid- eration in each case. The on-the-spot inspections also revealed that the areas had not been set aside in accordance with 41 — See forty-fourth recital in the preamble to Council Regulation (EEC) No 822/87 of 16 March 1987 on the the Community legislation. It is also clear common organisation of the market in wine (OJ 1987 that the post set-aside checks were con- L 84, p. 1).
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GREECE V COMMISSION
ducted only after the prescribed period had 3. Submissions of the applicant expired. The Commission therefore con- siders a correction of 8.64% of expenditure to be justified.
(a) Permanent abandonment of wine-grow- ing areas
(b) Compulsory distillation 98. In the view of the Hellenic Republic, the correction made amounting to 8.64% is not justified, since the control and inspec- tion system is operational and reliable. The on-the-spot checks, which covered 100% 96. The reason for a correction in this of the submitted documents, were entrusted sector can be seen from the clearance of to specialised agricultural experts and were accounts for 1991, in which it emerged that conducted both before and after set-aside. several Member States (including the Hel- lenic Republic) had failed to comply with their obligations regarding compulsory dis- tillation and had systematically underesti- mated the stocks at the end of the market- ing year. As a result, compulsory distilla- tion had been carried out on too small a 99. The checks conducted before set-aside scale, the operation of the common orga- concerned the surface area, productivity nisation of the market in wine had been and yields of the individual plots. The impaired and the costs of private storage results of the checks and the data contained had increased. in the applications were published. The Greek system provides for verification of the data and the results of the checks by two different bodies. After the land is set aside, there is another on-the-spot check, including a new survey of the surface area, from which the data obtained are com- pared with the earlier data. 97. As regards compulsory distillation, the Commission initially assumed a shortfall of 153 000 hectolitres. In the conciliation procedure initiated by the Greek authori- ties, the Commission corrected that amount on the basis of documents produced by the Greek authorities and now assumes a 100. As far as the identification and sur- deficit of 135 569 hectolitres. veying of surface areas is concerned, the
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OPINION OF MR ALBER — CASE C-247/98
Greek Government argues that the existing estimate the maximum yield of a plot in system requires the applicant to indicate order to calculate the compensatory pay- whether he manages a plot alone or toge- ments on that basis. ther with another producer, or whether the plot is rented. As a result, the competent authorities are in a position to determine at any time the owner of each plot. The problems discovered by the Commission concerning the surveying of areas were 102. Furthermore, the Greek Government attributable to the fact that there are no claims that the checks made were sufficient, detailed certificates of ownership in Greece. particularly since they were strengthened No topographical schemata are attached to on the recommendation of the EAGGF staff the existing certificates and the information during the period from 1993 to 1994. regarding the area of the plots is estimated in the 'stremma' unit of measurement. The inaccuracies in the measurements which were criticised for the nomos of Achaios could be explained by the fact that large areas, the borders of which could not be precisely determined, were involved there, 103. There was also cause for complaint at and measurements were made using a the correction applied by the Commission measuring tape and not using topographi- in the clearance of accounts for 1994, since cal instruments. it also took into consideration the 1992 to 1993 and 1994 to 1995 marketing years.
104. Lastly, it is submitted in the alterna- tive that a correction of 8.64% is arbitrary and unjustified, since the figures concerning the areas for which compensatory pay- ments were granted had been only 3.38% higher than the actual areas set aside.
101. With regard to the alleged discrepan- cies between production declarations and yields, it is claimed that the average yield of a plot was calculated with great precision with due regard to the age of the vines, fructification, the strength of the vines and (b) Compulsory distillation irrigation possibilities. Lastly, in order to assess the compensatory payments, the yield of a plot was compared with yields from the preceding years. In addition, the Greek Government refers to the fact that 105. In the view of the Greek Government, harvest declarations were not used to there is no legal basis for the application of
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a financial correction in the area of com- nation of surface areas. It had been found pulsory distillation. The relevant legislation during the inspections conducted by the does not require the Member State to distill Commission that the national inspectors a certain quantity; rather the rules are were not in a position to determine surface addressed to the respective producer. A areas on the basis of objective data and the Member State cannot require the producers ownership status of the plots. to subject a certain proportion of their production to compulsory distillation, since that would mean an infringement of the principle of economic freedom. Moreover, in the present case, the EAGGF has not suffered any loss, since no illegitimate aid was paid. In support of that claim, the Greek Government relies on the fact that none of the producers who participated in compulsory distillation received aid in 107. Secondly, the Commission points out connection with private storage. that financial corrections of 2% had been proposed in respect of the 1992 and 1993 accounting years. In the course of the inspections for the 1994 accounting year, it was found that, despite the deficiencies which had emerged, the national inspectors had not discovered any irregularities. The Commission had found in the nomoi of Achaios and Heraklion, however, that there 4. Submissions of the defendant had been difficulties in locating plots, surveying and determining yields. More- over, there were no controls to verify the proper implementation of set-aside of areas. Large discrepancies could be observed between the surface areas for which aid had been recognised as due and the areas actually set aside. In addition, the (a) Permanent abandonment of wine-grow- documents on the set-aside of the areas ing areas were incomplete. No deduction had been made by the national authorities from the aid paid, even though the areas had not been set aside within the specified period.
106. Firstly, the Commission refers to the fact that the deficiencies in the control system concerning permanent set-aside have been known since the clearance of accounts for 1992 and 1993. The state- ments made by the Hellenic Republic are not such as to dispel the Commission's doubts regarding the existence of an opera- 108. The Commission therefore initially tional system for recognition and determi- proceeded from the assumption of a cor-
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OPINION OF MR ALBER — CASE C-247/98
rection of 17% for the 1993/94 financial 5. Assessment year. As a result of the information subse- quently communicated by the Greek autho- rities, the Commission eventually applied a correction of 8.64%.
(a) Permanent abandonment of wine-grow- ing areas
(b) Compulsory distillation 111. Under Article 2(3) of Regulation N o 1442/88 the competent national authority must calculate the productive capacity of the wine-growing area to be grubbed up. Thus, before payment of the 109. In the view of the Commission, it is premiums, the productive capacity of the apparent from the forty-seventh recital in wine-growing areas to be grubbed up must the preamble to Regulation No 822/87 that be calculated and it must be verified it is incumbent upon each Member State to whether the areas have actually been supervise and implement compulsory dis- grubbed up. Under Article 6(1) of Regula- tillation. The Member States are required tion No 2729/88 the competent authority to take the necessary measures to ensure must likewise, after the complete grubbing that the producers allocate the relevant up of the vines located on the plots, verify quantities for distillation. To that end, the that the operation has taken place and necessary controls have to be implemented certify when it took place. by the Member State in order to achieve the general objective of the regulation in its territory. However, on-the-spot inspections revealed that the Greek authorities were not able to produce a list containing the inspected producers or those producers 112. Under Article 3 of Regulation who had not delivered the full quantity No 2048/89, Member States must take for compulsory distillation. the necessary measures to improve the monitoring of compliance with the rules in the wine sector.
110. As regards loss to the EAGGF, the Commission states that, since a certain quantity of table wine was not delivered 113. In the course of its inspections, the for compulsory distillation, it must be Commission found that there were difficul- assumed that that resulted in an increase ties in the identification, measurement and in costs for private storage in the following determination of the yields of the various marketing year. plots. Moreover, discrepancies occurred
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GREECE V COMMISSION
between the areas declared as set-aside land tillation. The Court has held 42 that Mem- and the areas which were actually set aside. ber States are required to take the measures It was found in particular that, in this case necessary to satisfy themselves that the also, the necessary technical equipment was transactions financed by the EAGGF are not available. actually carried out and are executed correctly, even if the specific Community act does not expressly provide for the adoption of particular supervisory mea- sures.
114. The submissions of the Greek Gov- ernment are not capable of proving that the Commission's findings are incorrect, since the Government has not adduced detailed 117. However, since it is undisputed that or comprehensive evidence that its own the quantity for compulsory distillation laid information and figures are accurate. The down by the Commission under Article 39 Greek Government could not indicate any of Regulation No 822/87 was not complied specific circumstances by reference to with, it must be assumed that the Hellenic which the existence of a reliable and Republic has infringed Article 8(1) of Reg- operational supervisory system could be ulation No 729/70 in conjunction with proven. Similarly, with regard to the level Article 5 of the EC Treaty (now Article 10 of the correction applied by the Commis- EC). sion, the Greek Government could not prove that the calculation was incorrect.
118. The Commission was able to calculate possible risks to the EAGGF only on the basis of the wine remaining in storage. 115. The submissions of the Greek Gov- Although there is no automatic correlation ernment which are based on those argu- between the quantities of wine stored and ments must therefore be rejected. the quantities not distilled, it would be difficult to make the calculation on any other basis. 43 Moreover, the Greek Gov- ernment was unable to supply evidence of actual errors in the calculations.
(b) Compulsory distillation 119. The complaints made by the Greek Government in this regard must therefore be rejected.
116. Under Regulation No 822/87, it is incumbent upon each Member State to 42 — See point 20 above. 43 — See Case C-253/97 Italy v Commission [19991 supervise and implement compulsory dis- ECR I-7529, paragraph 96.
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OPINION OF MR ALBER — CASE C-247/98
V — Costs ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party's plead- ings. Since the Commission has applied for an order that the Hellenic Republic pay the costs, and the latter has been unsuccessful 120. Under Article 69(2) of the Rules of in its submissions, the Hellenic Republic Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be must be ordered to pay the costs.
VI — Conclusion
1 2 1 . In the light of the foregoing, I propose that the Court should:
(1) dismiss the action;
(2) order the Hellenic Republic to pay the costs.
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