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Súdny dvor Európskej únie·27.1.2000

C-352/98

ECLI:EU:C:2000:54

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Súdny dvor Európskej únie
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61998CC0352

OPINION OF MR FENNELLY — CASE C-352/98 P

O P I N I O N OF ADVOCATE GENERAL FENNELLY delivered o n 27 January 2000 *

1. This appeal against the judgment of the that technical progress necessitates rapid Court of First Instance in Bergaderm and adaptation of the technical provisions Goupil v Commission 1 is notable princi- defined in that directive and in subsequent pally for raising the question whether a directives in the field. directive may be deemed to be administra- tive rather than legislative in character for the purpose of determining the applicable standard of unlawfulness of the adopting institution's conduct in an action for 3. Article 4 of the Cosmetics Directive damages for non-contractual liability. requires the Member States to prohibit the marketing, beyond the limits and outside the conditions laid down therein, of cos- metic products containing any of the sub- stances specified in, inter alia, the 'List of substances which cosmetic products must not contain' set out in Annex II to that directive. I — Relevant law

4. Article 9 of the Cosmetics Directive 2. The third recital in the preamble to establishes a Committee on the adaptation Council Directive 76/768/EEC of 27 July to technical progress of the directives on 1976 on the approximation of the laws of the removal of technical barriers to trade in the Member States relating to cosmetic the cosmetic products sector (hereinafter products 2 (hereinafter 'the Cosmetics 'the Adaptation Committee'), composed of Directive'), as amended in particular by representatives of the Member States and Council Directive 93/35/EEC of 14 June chaired by a representative of the Commis- 1993, 3 states that the pursuit of the sion. objective of safeguarding public health must inspire Community legislation in the cosmetics sector. The ninth recital states

5. Commission Decision 78/45/EEC of * Original language: English. 19 December 1977 4 established a Scientific 1 — Case T-199/96 [1998] ECR II-2805, hereinafter 'the con- tested judgment'. 2 — OJ 1976 L 262, p. 169. 3 — OJ 1993 L 151, p. 32. 4 — OJ 1978 L 13, p. 24.

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Committee on Cosmetology (hereinafter the urgency of the matter. Article 10(3) 'the Scientific Committee') attached to the provides as follows: Commission. Under Article 2 of that deci- sion, the Committee's task is to give the Commission an opinion on any problem of a scientific or technical nature in the field of cosmetic products and particularly on sub- stances used in the preparation of cosmetic '(a) The Commission shall adopt the pro- products and on the conditions of use of posed measures when they are in these products. The members of the Scien- accordance with the opinion of the tific Committee are to be appointed by the Committee. Commission from among 'highly qualified leading scientific figures with competence in the field [of cosmetic products]' (Arti- cle 4); the representatives of the Commis- sion departments concerned are to attend (b) Where the proposed measures are not the meetings of the Committee (Arti- in accordance with the opinion of the cle 8(2)); the Commission may also invite Committee, or if no opinion is adopted, 'leading figures with special qualifications the Commission shall without delay in the subjects under study' to attend those propose to the Council the measures to meetings (Article 8(3)); and the Scientific be adopted. The Council shall act by Committee may also form working parties qualified majority. which are to meet when convened by the Commission (Articles 7 and 8).

(c) If, within three months of the proposal being submitted to it, the Council has not acted, the proposed measures shall be adopted by the Commission.'

7. After a series of studies and consulta- tions which commenced in 1987, which are 6. Article 8(2) of the Cosmetics Directive briefly outlined below, the Eighteenth provides that the amendments necessary for Commission Directive 95/34/EC of 10 July adapting Annex II to technical progress are 1995 adapting to technical progress Annex- to be adopted in accordance with the es II, III, VI and VII to Council Directive procedure laid down in Article 10. Arti- 76/768/EEC on the approximation of the cle 10(2) provides that the representative of laws of the Member States relating to the Commission shall submit to the Adap- cosmetic products 5(hereinafter 'the con- tation Committee a draft of the measures to tested Directive') inserted the following be adopted. The Committee is required to deliver its opinion on the draft within a time-limit set by the chairman according to 5 —OJ 1995 L 167, p. 19.

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text as reference number 358 in Annex II to oils, eaux de toilette and perfumes. The the Cosmetics Directive: second appellant, Jean-Jacques Goupil, was its chief executive. Bergaderm was formally put into liquidation on 10 October 1995, pursuant to a procedure initiated on 6 July 1995.

'Furocoumarines (e.g. trioxysalan, 8-meth- oxypsoralen, 5-methoxypsoralen) except for normal content in natural essences used.

9. One of Bergaderm's products was Ber- gasol, a sun oil containing, in addition to vegetable oil and filters, bergamot essence. In sun protection and bronzing products, Some of the molecules to be found in furocoumarines shall be below 1 mg/kg.' bergamot essence are 'psoralens', otherwise known as 'furocoumarines'. One of these is 'bergapten', scientifically called 5-methox- ypsoralen (hereinafter '5-MOP'). 5-MOP strongly induces photodynamism, with the result that the presence of bergamot essence Article 2 of the contested Directive requires in Bergasol greatly accelerates the tanning the Member States to take all the necessary process. 6 However, 5-MOP, in its chemi- measures to ensure that, as from 1 July cally pure state, is suspected of being 1996, neither manufacturers nor importers carcinogenic. Different studies have been established in the Community place on the carried out to determine whether the 5- market products which do not comply with MOP present in the bergamot essence used that directive and that, as from 1 July in a tanning product is also carcinogenic. These studies have produced widely differ- 1997, such products can no longer be sold ing conclusions. 7 or otherwise supplied to the final consumer.

10. In March 1987, Germany asked the I I — Facts Commission to consider the possibility of restricting the maximum level of naturally occurring psoralens in sun oil. The Com- mission sought the opinion of the Scientific 8. The first appellant, Laboratoires Phar- Committee. The study carried out by one of maceutiques Bergaderm (hereinafter 'Ber- gaderm'), is a company whose activities at t h e Scientific C o m m i t t e e ' s m e m b e r s con- the relevant time consisted of the manufac- 6 — See further paragraph 8 of the contested judgment. ture, purchase and sale of sun creams and 7 — See paragraphs 11 and 12 of the contested judgment.

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eluded that, in the presence of ultraviolet any conclusions. At a further meeting on rays, 5-MOP is highly phototoxic and 1 June 1992, at which the Commission photomutagenic, hence potentially carcino- asked it to take a position on restricting genic. 8 Despite some disagreement among psoralens in sun products to either 60 mg/ its members, the Scientific Committee kg or 1 mg/kg, half the members of the recommended on 2 October 1990 that the Scientific Committee voted for the former maximum level of 5-MOP in sun oils figure and half for the latter. On 2 June should be set at 1 mg/kg. 1991, the Scientific Committee confirmed its opinion of 4 November 1991 (propos- ing the restriction to 1 mg/kg), as it did again on 24 June 1994 despite continuing controversy in scientific circles. 10

11. The appellants organised a seminar in June 1991 on the effects of psoralens which culminated in a number of scientists signing a document stating that the risk of photo- 13. At a meeting on 16 February 1995, the mutagenic and photocarcinogenic effects working party on 'cosmetic products', was negligible where 5-MOP was com- which was composed of all the members bined with other sun filters. Subsequently, of both the Scientific Committee and the the Scientific Committee invited a number Adaptation Committee, voted, with the of outside experts to a meeting on 24 Sep- sole exception of the French representative, tember 1991 to discuss the results of this to endorse a maximum level of psoralens of seminar. After describing their research on 1 mg/kg in sun products. On 28 April sun oils with bergamot essence containing 1995, the Adaptation Committee recom- 15 to 50 mg/kg of 5-MOP, a number of mended that the level of psoralens in such scientists suggested that sun products con- products should not exceed 1 mg/kg. All taining sunscreens and 5-MOP were no less the delegations within the Committee voted safe than other such products, or were in favour of that opinion save for the possibly safer. 9None the less, the Scientific French delegation. The Finnish delegation Committee confirmed its earlier recom- was absent. The Commission adopted the mendation on 4 November 1991. contested Directive on 10 July 1995.

14. During the administrative procedure 12. The Adaptation Committee first dis- which led to the adoption of the contested cussed psoralens as ingredients in sun oils Directive, the appellants regularly submit- on 17 December 1991, without reaching ted observations on their own initiative, sending the Commission and members of 8 — See the reference to Mr Fielder's study at paragraph 12 of the contested judgment. 9 — See paragraphs 16 to 18 of the contested judgment. 10 — See paragraph 22 of the contested judgment.

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the Scientific Committee letters and docu- 1 June 1992. Secondly, the Commission ments containing data and scientific eva- had shown no regard for the rights of the luations on Bergasol. On 5 November defence, by failing to pass on to the 1990, moreover, Mr Goupil addressed the Adaptation Committee scientific informa- working party on 'cosmetic products'. That tion which the appellants had submitted to working party met to discuss Bergasol on a the Scientific Committee. Furthermore, the number of occasions between 1990 and procedure before the Adaptation Commit- 1995, at times on the basis of written or tee had not been inter partes. The appel- oral observations submitted by Bergaderm. lants also contended that the Commission had committed a manifest error of assess- ment, leading to a breach of the principle of proportionality, by failing to distinguish between the possible health risks posed by 5-MOP as a chemical substance in its pure state and those posed by the use in a sun product of 5-MOP occurring in natural essences. I I I— Proceedings before the Court of First Instance

15. On 4 December 1996, the appellants applied to the Court of First Instance IV — The contested judgment pursuant to Articles 178 and 215, second indent, of the EC Treaty (now Article 235 EC and Article 288 EC, second indent) for an order that the Commission pay damages 17. The Court of First Instance analysed of FRF 152 867 090 to Bergaderm and of the conditions governing Community liabi- FRF 161 309 995.33 to Jean-Jacques Gou- lity as follows: pil and pay the costs of the proceedings.

'48 Under the second paragraph of Arti- cle 215 of the Treaty and the general 16. The appellants submitted before the principles to which that provision Court of First Instance that the contested refers, Community liability depends Directive was in reality an administrative on fulfilment of a set of conditions act, as it exclusively concerned the product regarding the unlawfulness of the con- Bergasol. They alleged that the Commis- duct alleged against the institution sion had committed two procedural errors. concerned, the fact of damage and the First, it had failed to submit its proposal to existence of a causal link between the impose a maximum level of psoralens in conduct in question and the damage sun products to the Council when, as the complained of (Case C-257/90 Italso¬ appellants allege, the Adaptation Commit- lar v Commission [1993] ECR I-9, tee delivered an unfavourable opinion on paragraph 33, and Case T-336/94 Efi-

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sol v Commission [1996] ECR II-1343, 51 It is necessary therefore to determine paragraph 30). As regards liability aris- whether or not the Commission disre- ing from legislative measures, the con- garded a higher-ranking rule of law for duct with which the Community is the protection of individuals.' charged must constitute a breach of a higher-ranking rule of law for the protection of individuals (Joined Cases T-195/94 and T-202/94 Quiller and Heusmann v Council and Commission [1997] ECR II-2247, paragraph 49). 18. The Court of First Instance rejected the argument that the Commission's proposal should have been submitted to the Council after the meeting of the Adaptation Com- mittee of 1 June 1992. It did not decide whether or not Article 10 of the Cosmetics Directive contains superior rules of law for the protection of individuals. It stated that 49 In the present proceedings, compensa- it was clear from the minutes of that tion is sought for damage related to the meeting that, as the Member State delega- Commission's conduct in connection tions were evenly divided between the two with the preparation and adoption of a options presented to them, the Commission directive amending the cosmetics direc- decided to withdraw its proposal. This tive. situation was not covered by Arti- cle 10(3)(a) or (b) of the Cosmetics Direc- tive, as the 'proposed measures' no longer existed. The Court of First Instance stated in this regard that the Commission must have enough time to arrange a fresh examination of the relevant scientific issues. 11 50 The application is manifestly con- cerned with legislative measures. The directive is a Community measure of general application, and the fact that the number or even the identity of the persons to whom such a measure applies can be determined is not such 19. With regard to the principle that the as to call in question its legislative procedure should be inter partes, the Court character (order of the Court of Justice of First Instance observed 12 that this was a of 23 November 1995 in Case fundamental principle applicable in all C-10/95 P Asocarne v Council [1995] administrative proceedings initiated against ECR I-4149, paragraph 30). Directive a person which were liable to culminate in 95/34 concerns, in a general and abstract manner, all the traders in the Member States who, on expiry of the 11 — The Court of First Instance cited Case T-105/96 Pharos v Commission [1998] ECR II-285, paragraphs 65 and 68. time-limits set for its transposition into See generally paragraphs 52 to 56 of the contested the various national legal systems, are judgment. 12 — See generally paragraphs 58 to 60 of the contested operating in the sector in question. judgment.

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a measure adversely affecting that per- institutions may take protective measures son, 13 but that it did not apply in the without having to wait until the reality and context of the legislative process 14 except seriousness of those risks have become fully in exceptional cases expressly provided apparent. 18 for. 1 5 No such provision was made in the Cosmetics Directive. In any event, it was clear from the facts that the appellants had ample opportunity to express their views to the Scientific Committee and the Commis- sion and that they were allowed to address the ad hoc group of experts. V — The appeal

21. The appellants lodged their appeal on 24 September 1998, requesting the Court to annul the contested judgment and to make the order awarding damages and 20. The Court of First Instance also costs initially sought before the Court of rejected the plea of manifest error of First Instance. The French Republic has assessment and breach of the principle of intervened in support of the Commission. proportionality. 16 It observed that the The appellants rely on three grounds. The Commission had evaluated the effects of Commission contests the admissibility of 5-MOP in combination with sun-product each of these, on the basis that they merely ingredients such as solar filters. There was reiterate arguments already presented nothing to suggest that the Commission before the Court of First Instance. had misunderstood the scientific arguments before it. As the Commission was not in a position to carry out itself the scientific assessments necessary to pursue the Cos- metics Directive's objective of public-health protection, the Scientific Committee had 22. The first ground of appeal is that the the task of assisting it in this respect. 17 Court of First Instance erred in law in Thus, the Commission could not be criti- categorising the contested Directive as a cised for relying upon that body's opinion. normative act rather than as an adminis- Furthermore, in cases of uncertainty trative act. Despite its form, it individua- regarding risks to consumers' health, the lised the appellants relative to all other persons because Bergaderm was the only undertaking producing and marketing sun 13 — Case T-450/93 Lisrestal and Others v Commission [1994] oil containing 5-MOP and Mr Goupil held ECR II-1177, paragraph 42. the only patent for incorporating natural 14 — Case T-521/93 Atlanta and Others v European Commu- citrus essences containing 5-MOP in a sun nity [1996) ECR II-1707, paragraph 70. 15 — In particular, Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of product. By virtue of this patent, he had 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community, OJ 1996 L 56, p. 1. 16 — See paragraphs 62 to 67 of the contested judgment. 18 — Paragraph 66 of the contested judgment. Case C-157/96 R 17 — The Court of First Instance cited Case C-212/91 Angelo- v MAFF and Others, ex parte National Farmers' Union pharm v Hamburg [1994] ECR I-171, paragraphs 32, 34 and Others [1998] ECR I-2211 (hereinafter 'National and 38. Farmers' Onion'), paragraph 63, is cited.

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obliged rival producers to abandon pro- 24. Thirdly, the appellants consider that duction of sun oil containing 5-MOP. It is the Court of First Instance failed to also material that the titles of certain acknowledge three breaches by the Com- reports of the Scientific Committee refer mission of superior rules of law for the expressly to Bergasol. The Commission protection of individuals. The Court of replies that the contested Directive only First Instance should have condemned as affects the appellants because of their such a breach the Commission's failure to involvement in a commercial activity open submit its proposal to the Council, as the to all undertakings. They had not proved Adaptation Committee had adopted a the existence of the relevant patents and the negative opinion on 1 June 1992. In addi- prohibition of other undertakings from tion, it failed to condemn a flagrant breach making or marketing sun creams contain- of the rights of the defence. This was ing 5-MOP. Furthermore, a patent was of compounded by the participation in the limited duration and could be made the Adaptation Committee of Austrian and subject of compulsory licensing. In any Swedish representatives, although they event, the Community institutions could had not been involved in earlier discussions not be prevented from responding by way before the 1995 enlargement of the Com- of legislation to the health risks posed by a munity. Finally, the Commission had brea- product simply because patents had been ched the principles of proportionality and granted in respect of that product. of legitimate expectations by excluding Bergasol from the market without any public-health justification. This was all the more serious because the Commission had failed to take into account the interests of a distinct group of economic opera- tors. 19

23. The appellants' second ground is that VI — Analysis the Court of First Instance committed a manifest error of appreciation regarding the scientific question, as all the scientific evidence suggested that Bergasol was harm- less and provided effective protection against the sun. In addition, they contest A — Admissibility the applicability of the precautionary prin- ciple. The Commission responds that this ground contests the findings of fact of the Court of First Instance and is, therefore, inadmissible. In any event, the appellants 25. The Commission contests the admissi- failed to show that Bergasol was risk-free bility of all three grounds of appeal on the and that the Commission was wrong to accept the recommendation of the Scientific 19 — Joined Cases C-104/89 and C-37/90 Mulder v Council and Committee. Commission [1992] ECR I-3061, paragraphs 16 and 17.

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basis that the appellants have merely reit- protection of individuals is a condition of a erated arguments already submitted to the successful claim for damages flowing from Court of First Instance. I have already a legislative measure. On the other hand, criticised, in my Opinion in Carbajo Fer- any kind of illegality may give rise to rerò v Parliament, 20 over-liberal recourse liability to pay compensation for damage to this argument. As in that case, the appeal caused by an administrative act. in the present case identifies, in respect of each ground of appeal, those elements of the contested judgment with which the appellants take issue, and outlines — some- times at length, sometimes rather laconi- cally — their reasons for doing so.21That this is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of admissibility emerges clearly from the judgment in Carbajo Ferrero v Parliament, in which the Court held the main ground of appeal to be admissible. 22

27. A directive is normally, from its very B — The first ground of appeal nature and method of adoption and trans- position, a measure having general scope. 23 The Court will, none the less, examine, if necessary, whether or not a directive is general in nature in all respects, 24 or is, at least in part, of individual concern to an applicant for its annulment 25 (as distinct 26. The appellants claim that the Court of from an applicant for damages flowing First Instance, in determining which stan- from it). It has, thus, at the very least, left dard to apply when assessing the Commis- open the question whether or not such sion's conduct, erred in law by classifying individual concern may be possible in the contested Directive as a legislative certain circumstances in the case of a measure rather than as an administrative directive, giving rise to standing on the act. Breach of a superior rule of law for the part of the affected person to challenge its

20 — Case C-304/97 P [1999] ECR I-1749, paragraph 8 of my Opinion. 2 3 — Case 70/83 Kloppenburg v Finanzamt Leer [1984] 21 — T h e sole exceptions are the argument of proportionality ECR 1075, paragraph 1 1 ; Case 160/88 R Fédération presented as part of the third ground of appeal, which is Européenne de la Santé Animale and Others v Council substantially identical to the second ground of appeal, and [1988] ECR 4121 (hereinafter 'Fedesa'), paragraph 28; a new argument of breach of the principle of legitimate Case C-298/89 Gibraltar v Council [1993] ECR I-3605 expectations which was also submitted as part of the third (hereinafter 'Gibraltar'], paragraph 16. ground of appeal. I recommend below that the latter 24 — Fedesa, paragraph 28; Gibraltar, paragraphs 19 to 2 3 . argument be rejected as inadmissible pursuant to Arti- 25 — Case 138/88 Flourez and Others v Council [1988] cle 113(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice. ECR 6393 (hereinafter 'Flourez'), paragraphs 10 to 12; Asocarne v Council, op. cit. (hereinafter 'Asocame'), 22 — Ibid., paragraphs 25 to 2 8 . paragraphs 31 and 32.

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validity before the Court of First its mark, a situation which, from the point Instance. 26The reasoning of the Court in of view of the contested provision, differ­ Gibraltar does not distinguish between entiated it from all other traders. 29 The directives and regulations for the purpose Court has subsequently explained that out­ of the assessment of their legislative char­ come by reference to the effect on Codor- acter. The crucial question is 'whether or niu's 'specific rights'. 30 The most impor­ not the measure at issue is of general tant aspect of that case, for present pur­ application'. 27 As I explain below, the poses, is that the Court acknowledged that same test clearly applies, in my view, when the regulation at issue was, none the less, determining the legal standard applicable legislative in character. 31 However, no to a claim for damages. claim for damages was made. Thus, it is unnecessary to seek to distinguish Codor­ niu v Council from the present case.

28. The Court has also held that measures which are of general application, and are, thus, of a legislative character, may, none the less, be of individual concern to certain interested economic agents, thereby permit­ ting such persons to seek their annul­ ment. 2 8 A case in point is Codorniu v Council. Codorniu, a Spanish producer of sparkling wines which held a graphic trade mark including the words 'Gran Cremant', 29. It does not follow from the exceptional was held to be individually concerned by a recognition of standing to seek the annul­ regulation which confined the use of the ment of legislative measures that such term 'cremant' to certain sparkling wines measures can, by the same token, be treated produced in France and Luxembourg. The as being administrative in character for the regulation prevented Codorniu from using purposes of determining the applicable criteria for Community liability in an action for damages under Article 215, 2 6 — See Plourez, p a r a g r a p h 1 1 ; Asocarne, paragraph 32. second indent, of the EC Treaty. The Although the Court expressly declined to address the reasons for the grant of standing to natural question in Asocarne, the Court of First Instance has interpreted the judgments in Gibraltar and Asocarne as and legal persons to bring annulment indicating that 'it is clear from the case-law... that the mere fact that the contested measure is a directive is not proceedings under Article 173 of the EC sufficient to render such an action [for annulment] Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 230 inadmissible' in Case T-135/96 UEAPME v C o u n c i l [19981 ECR II-2335, paragraph 63. EC) in respect of decisions addressed to 27 — Fedesa, paragraph 27. them and other acts of direct and individual 28 — See Joined Cases 239/82 and 275/82 Allied Corporation v Commission [1984] ECR 1005, p a r a g r a p h 1 1 ; Case concern to them differ from those for C - 3 5 8 / 8 9 Extramet Industrie v Council [1991] ECR I-2501, paragraphs 13 and 14; Case C-309/89 Codorniu v Council [1994] ECR I-1853, paragraphs 17 to 19; Asocarne, paragraph 4 3 ; Case C-87/95 P CNPAAP 29 — O p . cit., paragraphs 17 to 22. v Council [1996] ECR I-2003, paragraph 36; see also the judgment of the Court of First Instance in Joined Cases 30 — Asocarne, paragraph 4 3 ; CNPAAP v Council, op. cit., T-480/93 and T-483/93 Antillean Rice Mills and Others v paragraph 36. Commission [1995] ECR II-2305, paragraph 66. 31 — O p . cit., paragraph 19.

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distinguishing between legislative and that measure has been declared null and administrative measures in the context of void.' 33 actions for damages. The Court made a comparative survey of national laws in HNL v Council and Commission 32 and observed that public authorities in the Member States can only exceptionally and in very special circumstances incur liability for legislative measures which are the result of choices of economic policy, and contin- ued: 30. The Court has since made clear that the fact that an action by a natural or legal person for the annulment of a measure of general application is admissible because of its individual effects on that person does not mean that it will be treated as admin- istrative in character in an action for damages by the same person. Thus, in 'This restrictive view is explained by the Sofrimport v Commission, 34 the Court consideration that the legislative authority, annulled in part certain Commission reg- even where the validity of its measures is ulations at the suit of a closed group of subject to judicial review, cannot always be importers whose goods were in transit to hindered in making its decisions by the the Community when the regulations were prospect of applications for damages when- adopted and whose interests should have ever it has occasion to adopt legislative been taken into account, but applied the measures in the public interest which may test for liability in respect of legislative adversely affect the interests of individuals. measures in the parallel action for damages. In Antillean Rice Mills and Others v Commission, 35 the Court of First Instance annulled part of a Commission decision addressed to the Member States at the suit of certain traders because, notwith- standing its legislative nature inasmuch as that decision applied to all the traders concerned, taken as a whole, it was of individual concern to the applicant traders It follows from these considerations that (who had already entered into contracts) as individuals may be required, in the sectors persons whose interests the Commission coming within the economic policy of the was required to take into account. None Community, to accept within reasonable the less, the Court confirmed on appeal the limits certain harmful effects on their economic interests as a result of a legisla- tive measure without being able to obtain 33 — Ibid., paragraphs 5 and 6. The measure in question had compensation from public funds even if already been declared void pursuant to a request for a preliminary ruling on this point in Case 114/76 Bela- Mühle v Crows-Farm [1977] ECR 1211. 34 —Case C-152/88 [1990] ECR I-2477, paragraphs 10 to 13 32 — Joined Cases 83/76, 94/76, 4/77, 15/77 and 40/77 [1978] and 25. ECR 1209, paragraph 5. 35 — Op. cit. at footnote 28 above.

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Court of First Instance's application to the 5-MOP to a number of undertakings in the parallel action for damages brought by the Community, all such undertakings would same traders of the liability criteria applic- have been subject to the maximum-content able to legislative measures. 36 The Court prescriptions of the contested Directive. stated: Distributors and retailers who held stocks of Bergasol at the moment when the prohibition on supply to the final consumer came into effect would also have been obliged to comply with its terms. Producers of sun products containing 5-MOP derived from non-citric sources would, had they existed, have been equally affected. Finally, 'The fact that the contested measure is in the contested Directive in its current form the form of a decision, and hence in will continue to apply to all producers of principle capable of being the subject of sun products after Mr Goupil's patent an action for annulment,,is not sufficient to rights expire. In these circumstances, the preclude its being legislative in character. In fact that Bergaderm could, allegedly, be the context of an action for damages, that identified as the only producer undertaking character depends on the nature of the to be immediately affected by the contested measure in question, not its form (see, to Directive does not suffice to deprive it of its that effect, the Sofrimport judgment).' 37 legislative character. It is well established in the case-law that the fact that the number or even the identity of the persons to whom a legislative measure applies can be deter- mined is not such as to call into question its legislative character. 38

31. It is clear to me that the contested Directive is legislative in character in so far as it affects the present proceedings. As the Court of First Instance rightly observed, it is a measure of general application. It affects, by reference to generally prescribed objective criteria, all traders operating in the sector in question. Thus, undertakings such as Bioderma and Klorane, which the appellants state had at one stage produced 32. Such an outcome seems to me to be and marketed sun products containing 5- consistent with the above-quoted explana- MOP in contravention of Mr Goupil's tion of the different approaches to Com- claimed patent rights, were potentially munity liability in respect of legislative and affected just as much as Bergaderm. Had administrative measures. Just as in the case Mr Goupil licensed the right to produce of the exercise of Community competences and market sun products containing citric in the economic field, the protection of public health and the need to adapt rapidly 36 — Case C-390/95 P [1999] ECR I-769, paragraphs 56 to 61; see paragraphs 189 to 194 of the judgment of the Court of First Instance, op. cit. 38 — See paragraph 50 of the contested judgment; Gibraltar, 37 — Op. cit., paragraph 60. paragraph 17; Asocarne, paragraph 30.

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to technical progress in order to pursue that of Article 168a of the EC Treaty (now objective 39 entails the exercise of broad Article 225 EC) and Article 51 of the EC discretion by the Commission. In particu- Statute of the Court of Justice, as it directly lar, the Commission must be able to take contests the Court of First Instance's find- protective measures against real risks to ing of fact that there was nothing in the health where the existence or extent of documents submitted to it to support the danger is still uncertain and 'without hav- conclusion that the Commission misunder- ing to wait until the reality and seriousness stood the scientific arguments concerning of those risks become fully apparent'. 40 Its the risk posed by sun oil containing berga- freedom to adopt the general measures that mot essence. 41 In any event, I can see no seem necessary to address a threat to public reason to criticise the conclusion of the health should not be hampered by the need Court of First Instance, based, in particular, to take account of possible claims for on the Court's judgment in Angelopharm v compensation by private parties whose Hamburg, 42 that the Commission was economic interests — including their intel- entitled to give effect to the opinion of the lectual-property rights — may be affected Scientific Committee. in the event that those measures are tainted by any form of illegality.

33. Thus, there does not appear to me to be any reason to question the decision of the Court of First Instance to classify the contested Directive as a legislative measure of general application and I recommend that the Court reject the first ground of 35. As regards the second limb of this appeal. ground of appeal, the Court of First Instance did not, in my view, commit an error of law in invoking the precautionary principle already cited by the Court in National Farmers' Union. The argument based on that principle is, if anything, even more compelling in the circumstances of the present case. National Farmers' Union concerned an emergency measure tempora- C — The second ground of appeal rily banning cattle and beef exports from the United Kingdom because of uncertainty as to the risks posed by bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) to human consumers 34. In my view, the first limb of the second of beef products. The measure referred ground of appeal is inadmissible, by virtue expressly in its preamble to the need for additional detailed scientific study.

39 — See the third and ninth recitals in the preamble to the Cosmetics Directive. 41 — Paragraph 63 or the contested judgment. 40 — National Farmers' Union, op. cit. at footnote 18 above, especially paragraph 63. 42 — Loc. cit.

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Although there is evidence of differences legislative measure. Community-law rules between members of the scientific commu- on the interaction of the political institu- nity about the threat posed by the use of 5- tions and of bodies such as the committees MOP in sun products, the research under- provided for in the Comitology Decision 43 taken was much more extensive, and over a are examples par excellence of rules regard- much longer period, than that which pre- ing the division of powers. The Court ceded the adoption of the emergency mea- stated in Vreugdenhil v Commission 4 4 that sure at issue in National Farmers' Union 'the aim of the system of the division of and the recommendation made by the powers between the various Community Scientific Committee was much more deci- institutions is to ensure that the balance sive. In the light of such persuasive evi- between the institutions provided for in the dence, the Commission was justified in Treaty is maintained, and not to protect opting to take protective measures without individuals'. Thus, failure to observe that waiting for the scientific debate to be balance would not, on its own, be sufficient resolved to the satisfaction of all interested to engage the Community's liability to parties. aggrieved individuals. 45

D — The third ground of appeal

37. In any event, I share the Court of First Instance's assessment that the Commission was entitled to withdraw its proposal in a 36. This ground of appeal concerns alleged situation where the members of the Adap- breaches by the Commission of superior tation Committee were evenly divided over rules of law for the protection of indivi- the merits of two alternative proposals, and duals. Since the contested Directive is a to submit a new proposal after further legislative measure, proof of such a breach study. The appellants' case is based on an is, as I have already said, essential to the unduly literal reading of Article 10 of the success of the appellants' claim. The first Cosmetics Directive. It would be absurd if limb relates to the Commission's alleged the fact that a particular type of measure non-observance of the requirement that its can only be adopted by a prescribed proposal be submitted to the Council after procedure were held to imply that that the Adaptation Committee gave an unfa- procedure, once commenced, must be pur- vourable opinion on 1 June 1992. It is clear to me that non-compliance with Article 10 of the Cosmetics Directive, which sets out 43 —Council Decision 87/373/EEC of 13 July 1987 laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing the relevant procedure, would not consti- powers conferred on the Commission, OJ 1987 L 197, p. 33. tute such a breach of a superior rule as to 44 — Case C-282/90 [19921 ECR I-1937, paragraph 20. impose liability for damages in respect of a 45 — Ibid., paragraph 21.

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OPINION OF MR FENNELLY — CASE C-352/98 P

sued to the end even if the party proposing reject the appellants' arguments in this the measure wishes to reconsider its appro- regard. priateness, or its chances of adoption, in the course of the procedure. The appellants' argument would entail that the Commis- sion would be bound to adopt measures which it no longer favoured in circum- stances where both the Adaptation Com- mittee and the Council failed to act. Article 189a of the EC Treaty (now Arti- cle 250 EC) provides that '[a]s long as the 38. The second limb of this ground of Council has not acted, the Commission appeal relates to the appellants' alleged may alter its proposal at any time during right to be heard.

The Court of First the procedures leading to the adoption of a Instance found as a fact that the appellants Community act'. There is nothing to sug- had had ample opportunity to express their gest that this rule, which includes the views to the Scientific Committee and the possibility of withdrawing a proposal, does Commission and had been able to address not apply to the adoption of Commission the ad hoc group of experts, which appar- measures subject to the participation of ently comprised the members of both the committees in which the Member States are Scientific Committee and the Adaptation represented and/or of the Council. In Committee.

Their arguments are, therefore, Pharos v Commission, the Court stated, in inadmissible to the extent that they contest relation to a legislative procedure materi- this finding. In so far as they may be taken ally identical to that provided for by to argue that they were entitled to an even Article 10 of the Cosmetics Directive, that greater degree of participation in the legis- 'where the measures proposed by the lative procedure, they have not submitted Commission are not in conformity with any argument which would lead me even to the opinion of the Adaptation Committee doubt the analysis of the Court of First [on Veterinary Medicinal Products], or Instance, which accords with the Court's where no opinion is delivered, the Com- consistent case-law. mission is not obliged to submit the same measures, without amendment, to the Council'. 46 By the same token, in the circumstances of the present case, the Commission could withdraw its proposal and submit a fresh one after further exam- ination of the scientific issues by the Scientific Committee.

I would therefore 39. The third limb of this ground of appeal, regarding the participation of Swedish and Austrian representatives in the Adaptation 46 — Case C-151/98 P [1999] ECR I-8157, paragraph 23. This Committee, is entirely and manifestly is the appeal from Case T-105/96 Pharos v Commission, unmeritorious. New Member States are op. cit., cited by the Court of First Instance at para- graph 55 of the contested judgment. The cases differ in immediately entitled, in the absence of that interested parties may apply for measures to be adopted under the legislation at issue in the Pharos case, special conditions in the Act of Accession, with the result that the requirement that proposals be submitted to the Council 'without delay' if they are not to participate on a footing of equality with approved by the relevant Adaptation Committee does impose certain obligations on the Commission which, in the other Member States in all the legisla- my view, are absent in the present context. tive activities of the Community.

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BERGADERM AND GOUPIL V COMMISSION

40. The appellants' contention regarding Court of First Instance. The appellants' breach of the principle of protection of pleadings on appeal on the proportionality legitimate expectations is new, and, thus, point contain nothing liable to undermine inadmissible by virtue of Article 113(2) of my conclusion in respect of the second the Rules of Procedure of the Court of ground of appeal, namely that the Com- Justice. Its arguments regarding propor- mission was entitled to give effect to the tionality before the Court of First Instance factual and scientific assessments of the and on appeal are substantially the same as Scientific Committee in order to protect those in respect of the Commission's public health. I recommend, therefore, that alleged manifest error of assessment of the the Court also reject this aspect of the facts and were addressed together by the appeal as unfounded.

VII — Conclusion

4 1 . In the light of the foregoing, I recommend that the Court:

(1) Reject the appeal; and

(2) Order the appellants to pay the costs.

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