C-377/98
ECLI:EU:C:2001:329
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OPINION OF MR JACOBS — CASE C-377/98
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL JACOBS delivered on 14 June 2001 1
Table of contents
The Directive I-7085
The action for annulment I-7087
The context of the Directive — patent law I - 7089
The context of the Directive — biotechnology I - 7092
The arguments as to legal basis I - 7095
The relevant recitals and provisions of the Directive I - 7095
The arguments that obstacles to trade have not been shown I - 7098
The argument that Community harmonisation is inappropriate and ineffective I-7100
The argument that Articles 130 and 130f, together with Article 235, were the correct legal basis I-7102 The argument that the Directive infringes Article 100a(3) I-7104
The argument that the Directive creates a new intellectual property right I-7105
The argument as to subsidiarity I-7108
The argument as to legal certainty I-7109
The arguments as to Article 6 I-7111
The relevant recitals and provisions of the Directive I-7111
Are ordre public and morality sufficiently clear concepts? I-7112
What is the meaning and purpose of the proviso in Article 6(1)? I-7116
Does ordre public encompass prejudice to the environment? I-7117
What is the status of recital 38? I-7118
The argument as to plant and animal varieties I-7119
The relevant recitals and provisions of the Directive I-7119
1 — Original language: English.
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The argument as to Articles 8 and 9 I - 7121 The argument that 'animal varieties' is not defined I - 7123 The arguments as to recitals 31 and 32 and Article 4(1)(a) and 4(2) I-7124 The argument as to the infringement of international obligations I-7126 Infringement of the TRIPs Agreement I - 7128 Incompatibility with the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade I-7129 Incompatibility with the European Patent Convention I-7131 Incompatibility with the Convention on Biological Diversity I-7132 The argument as to fundamental rights I-7137 Does Article 5(2) infringe fundamental rights? I - 7140 Does the failure to provide for consent infringe fundamental rights? I-7142 The argument that the correct procedure was not followed I - 7145 Conclusion I - 7147
1. In this case the Netherlands has brought 3. The Directive requires Member States to an action under Article 173 of the EC protect biotechnological inventions under Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 230 national patent law. 3 Although there is no EC) seeking a n n u l m e n t of Directive definition of 'biotechnological inventions', 98/44/EC on the legal protection of bio- it is clear that the concept essentially technological inventions. 2 comprises inventions concerning 'a product consisting of or containing biological mate- rial or a process by means of which biological material is produced, processed or used' 4 or inventions concerning 'a microbiological or other technical process or a product obtained by means of such a The Directive process'. 5 'Microbiological process' is defined as 'any process involving or per- formed upon or resulting in microbiologi-
2. Chapter I (Articles 1 to 7) of the Direc- tive is entitled 'Patentability'.
3 — Article 1(1). 2 — Directive 98/44/E.C of the European Parliament and of the 4 — Article 3(1). Council of 6 July 1998, OJ 1998 L 213, p. 13. 5 — Article 4(3).
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cai material'. 6 'Biological material' is mercial purposes; and (d) processes for defined as 'any material containing genetic modifying the genetic identity of animals information and capable of reproducing which are likely to cause them suffering itself or being reproduced in a biological without any substantial medical benefit to system'. 7Biological material which is iso- man or animal, and animals resulting from lated from its natural environment or such processes. 14 produced by means of a technical process may be the subject of an invention even if it previously occurred in nature; 8 similarly an element isolated from the human body or otherwise produced by means of a technical process, including the sequence or partial sequence of a gene, may constitute a 5. Chapter II of the Directive (Articles 8 to patentable invention, even if the structure 11) concerns the scope of protection con- of that element is identical to that of a ferred by a patent. Chapter III (Article 12) natural element. 9 concerns compulsory cross-licensing. 15 Chapter IV (Articles 13 and 14) concerns the deposit and re-deposit of and access to a biological material. Chapter V (Arti- cles 15 to 18) contains final provisions. The provisions of these chapters are refer- red to below as appropriate.
4. The Directive provides that the follow- ing may not be patented: (i) plant and animal varieties; 10 (ii) essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals; 11 (iii) the human body, at the 6. The Directive has a relatively long various stages of its formation and devel- history, although the version finally opment, and the simple discovery of one of adopted went through the legislative pro- its elements, including the sequence or cess with impressive speed. partial sequence of a gene; 12 and (iv) inventions the commercial exploitation of which would be contrary to ordre public or morality. 13 Examples of the latter are (a) processes for cloning human beings; (b) processes for modifying the germ line 7. In 1988 the Commission presented its genetic identity of human beings; (c) uses first proposal for a Council Directive on the of human embryos for industrial or com- legal protection of biotechnological inven- tions. 16 The proposed Directive started from the premiss that a 'subject matter of 6 — Article 2(1)(b). an invention shall not be considered unpa- 7 — Article 2(1)(a). 8 — Article 3(2). tentable for the reason only that it is 9 — Article 5(2). 10 — Article 4(1)(a). 11 —Article 4(1)(b). 14 — Article 6(2). 12 — Article 5(1). 15 — See note 139. 13 — Article 6(1). 16 — COM(88) 496 of 17 October 1988; OJ 1989 C 10, p. 3.
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composed of living matter'. 17 That propo- The action for annulment sal ultimately foundered, principally because of the Parliament's resistance to an instrument which articulated no funda- mental ethical principles governing the grant of patents in the context of animate 10. The Netherlands has challenged the matter. validity of the Directive. It is clear from its application that its objection is in essence to the notion that plants, animals and parts of the human body may be patentable. The Netherlands considers that the right to a patent in the field of biotechnology should be limited to the biotechnological process and not extended to the products deriving therefrom: in other 8. In 1996 the Commission presented a words, neither plants and animals as such, fresh proposal. 18 After substantial amend- including genetically modified plants and ments proposed by the Parliament, it was animals, nor human biological material adopted on 6 July 1998. The Netherlands should be patentable. voted against the Directive; Italy and Belgium abstained. The Directive required implementation by 30 July 2000. 19
11. The grounds invoked for the annul- ment of the Directive are that it (i) is incorrectly based on Article 100a of the Treaty; (ii) is contrary to the principle of subsidiarity; (iii) infringes the principle of 9. There are 56 recitals in the preamble to legal certainty; (iv) is incompatible with the Directive as adopted, 20 in contrast to a international obligations; (v) breaches fun- mere 18 articles, not all substantive. Many damental rights; and (vi) was not properly of the recitals are clearly designed to adopted since the definitive version of the counter objections raised by the Parlia- proposal submitted to the Parliament and ment, both to the 1996 proposal and to the the Council was not decided on by the 1988 proposal. Not all the recitals are college of Commissioners. reflected in the articles of the Directive. The recitals and the substantive provisions of the Directive are considered further below in the context of the various heads of the Netherlands' claims. 12. As will be seen, some of the above grounds concern the interpretation and 17 — Article2. effect of the Directive in technical areas: 18 — Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive thus for example the second head of the on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions, COM(95) 661 of 13 December 1995; OJ 1996 C 296, p. 4. third ground questions the scope of the 19 —Article 15(1). exclusion from patentability of plant and 20 — Some of the more relevant recitals are set out in paragraphs 42, 91, 113, 149, 167 and 186 below. animal varieties. Other grounds raise sub-
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stantive issues of broader import, such as of the Directive until the Court had ruled the compatibility of the Directive with on the application for annulment. The fundamental rights and with other interna- European Parliament and the Council sub- tional obligations. Finally, the first, second mitted written observations on the applica- and sixth grounds concern more formal tion for interim measures. A hearing was issues relating to the adoption of the held on 18 July 2000 at which the Nether- Directive. Even those grounds, however, lands, the Parliament and the Council involve important issues of principle: one of together with Italy and the Commission, the arguments in the context of the correct which had both been granted leave to legal basis, for example, raises the question intervene, were present. The application whether the Directive, by providing for a for interim measures was dismissed by 'patent on life', creates a new intellectual order of the President of the Court of property right. I propose to deal with the 25 July 2000. grounds for annulment in the order in which the Netherlands has presented them in its application, although other approa- ches can equally be envisaged.
16. Second, the Council and the Parliament 13. The Netherlands is supported by Italy submit as a preliminary point that Nor- (whose written observations in intervention way's statement in intervention is inadmis- focus on the first and third grounds for sible. Article 37 of the Statute of the Court annulment) and Norway (whose observa- of Justice requires an application to inter- tions focus on the first, third and fourth vene by a State which is party to the grounds). The Parliament and Council are Agreement on the European Economic supported by the Commission (whose Area to be limited to supporting the form observations are limited to the sixth of order sought by one of the parties. ground). Article 93(5)(a) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court similarly requires that the statement in intervention contain a state- ment of the form of order sought by the intervener in support of or opposing, in whole or in part, the form of order sought by one of the parties. In the present case, 14. Two procedural matters should be the Netherlands seeks the annulment of the mentioned at this point. Directive. In the introduction to its state- ment in intervention, Norway states that the Netherlands 'raises several questions which may have a bearing on whether or not the Directive falls within the area covered by the EEA Agreement, and on the implementation of the Directive into 15. First, on 6 July 2000 the Netherlands the EEA Agreement'. It is nowhere stated lodged an application for interim measures, that Norway is intervening in support of principally seeking suspension of operation the form of order sought by the Nether-
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lands. The conclusion of the statement in explicitly stated, that Norway supports the intervention is as follows: Netherlands' arguments that Article 100a was the incorrect legal basis for the Direc- tive, that the Directive infringes the princi- ple of legal certainty and that it is incom- patible with the Convention on Biological Diversity. It is also stated that the effect of such incompatibility is in the view of Norway that the Directive would have to 'Several of the questions presented by the be 'repealed', which may be taken to mean Government of the Netherlands in its 'annulled', and that the consequence of the action for annulment of Directive 98/44/ infringement of the principle of legal cer- EC may have a bearing on whether or not tainty is that the Directive should be the Directive falls within the EEA Agree- annulled. I accordingly consider that Nor- ment and on the implementation of the way's statement in intervention is admissi- Directive into the EEA Agreement. Nor- ble. way, therefore, respectfully requests that the Court take due account of the argu- ments set forth herein.'
17. The Council adds that in any event Norway's observations in intervention have The context of the Directive — patent law been largely overtaken by events, since Article 3(4) of Protocol 28 to the EEA Agreement requires the EFTA States to comply in their law with the substantive provisions of the European Patent Conven- tion and since those provisions now include the provisions of the Directive (see further below). 19. A patent is a legal right conferred on an inventor in respect of a specific invention and entitling him to prevent others from making, using or selling the invention for the duration of the patent. Most developed legal systems have had a system of patent law for some time. The earliest known 18. I do not agree with the Council and the English patent, for example, was granted Parliament that Norway's statement in by Henry VI to Flemish-born John of intervention is inadmissible. Norway expli- Utynam in 1449. The patent conferred a citly stated in its application to intervene 20-year monopoly for a method of making that it wished to intervene in support of the stained glass, required for the windows of Netherlands. It is apparent from its state- Eton college, that had not been previously ment in intervention, even if it is not known in England.
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20. Modern patent systems tend to impose which involve an inventive step. 25 A Eur- more or less uniform requirements for the opean patent is not however to be granted grant of a patent. Those requirements may in respect of: be illustrated by the European Patent Convention, which came into force in 1978. Although not a Community instru- ment, 21 since all Member States of the Union are parties to the Convention it in effect unifies the conditions for the grant of a patent throughout the Union. '(a) inventions the publication or exploita- tion of which would be contrary to ordre public or morality, provided that the exploitation shall not be deemed to be so contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation in some or all of the Contracting States;
21. The Convention establishes a 'system of law, common to the Contracting States, for the grant of patents for invention'. 22 A patent granted by virtue of the Convention is called a European patent and in each Contracting State for which it is granted 23 has the effect of and is subject to the same conditions as a national patent granted by (b) plant or animal varieties or essentially that State. 24 Enforcement of a patent biological processes for the production granted by virtue of the Convention is thus of plants or animals; this provision regulated not by the Convention but by does not apply to microbiological pro- national law and procedure. cesses or the products thereof.'26
23. The same criteria are used to define 22. A European patent is to be granted for patentable subject-matter in the TRIPs any inventions which are susceptible of industrial application, which are new and 25 — Article 52(1), reproducing verbatim the first sentence of Article 1 of the 1963 Strasbourg Convention on the unification of certain points of substantive law on patents for invention. That Convention drew extensively upon the 21 — The Contracting States are currently the 15 EU Member preparatory work (dating back to 1950) undertaken by the States plus Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Cyprus Scandinavian countries on a Nordic patent law (subse- and Turkey. quently superseded by the European Patent Convention) 22 —Article 1. and on the work of the six original EEC Member States on a common European patent law. 23 — The applicant must specify at least one Contracting State. 26 — Article 53, reproducing verbatim Article 2 of the Stras- 24 — Article 2. bourg Convention.
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Agreement, 27 although the exclusions from he makes, uses or sells his invention. 31 He patentability are there set out as options. may for example need to obtain a licence or authorisation; he may even patent an invention (a type of weapon for example) the making, use or sale of which is prohib- ited by national law.
24. A further feature common to modern patent systems is a requirement that the patent application disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the art. 28 The description must include a detailed account of at least one way of carrying out the invention claimed and a 26. An example illustrates this point. Sup- statement of how the invention is capable pose that a superior type of copying of industrial application. 29 Since patent machine were patented and that its applications are normally published, 30 the enhanced performance meant that it could sum of knowledge in the public domain is produce high quality counterfeit bank increased with each patent. Although that notes. The existence of a patent (which knowledge cannot of course be used by a would be granted under most patent sys- third party for the duration of the patent to tems, including the European Patent Con- reproduce the invention, since that will vention, on the basis that not all uses of the normally constitute infringement, it can be invention were contrary to ordre public or built on and lead to further inventions. morality 32) would not of course legalise such use.
25. Once conferred, a patent merely enti- tles the holder to prevent others from making, using or selling the patented invention in the territory in which the patent has effect. It confers no right of 27. Normally, only exploitation for indus- ownership as such, nor any absolute right trial and commercial purposes constitutes to manufacture or otherwise exploit the infringement of a patent, and patent laws invention. Thus the holder of a patent will specify that certain acts do not constitute still need to comply with national law when infringement. Experimental use is one such exception: experiments aimed at perfecting, improving or further developing protected 27 — Article 27 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects or inventions do not infringe the patent. Intellectual Property Rights (the TRIPs Agreement), OJ 1994 L 336, p. 213. 28 — European Patent Convention, Article 83; TRIPs Agree- ment, Article 29(1). 31 — Sec generally recital 14 in the preamble to the Directive, set 29 — Rule 27(1)(e) and (f) or the Implementing Regulations to out in paragrapli 42 below. the Convention on the grant of European patents. 32 — See Guidelines for examination in the European Patent 30 — See for example Article 93 of the European Patent Office, as last amended in February 2001, Part C, Chapter Convention. IV, paragraph 3.3.
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The context of the Directive — biotech- such as processes using yeasts and fermen- nology tation 36 were typically regarded as paten- table: 37 there was thus no general prohibi- tion on patents involving such basic types of living matter although more sophisti- cated living matter was normally excluded from patentability by express provision or case-law.
28. 'Biotechnology' is defined in the 1993 edition of the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary33 as 'the industrial application of biological processes'. The Encyclopaedia Britannica defines it as 'the application to industry of advances made in the techni- ques and instruments of research in the biological sciences'. For the purposes of the Convention on Biological Diversity34 it is defined as 'any technological application that uses biological systems, living organ- isms, or derivatives thereof, to make or 30. Biotechnology in the modern sense of modify products or processes for specific genetic manipulation was made possible by use'. 35 the remarkable advances in biochemistry, molecular biology and genetics in the latter half of the 20th century. The discovery in 1953 by Francis Crick and James Watson of the structure of DNA 38 paved the way for further discoveries. Each DNA mole- cule is constructed as a double helix, or paired spirals, linked by bases of which there are four kinds. The nucleus of a cell
36 — The discovery that yeasts were living cells was first made by a French and a German scientist (independently) in 1836 and 1837; it was initially ridiculed but subsequently accepted when described in 1858 by Pasteur. In 1871 two 29. Biotechnology in that broad sense is as applications for patents were made to the UK Patent Office old as bread, wine, beer and cheese. for a formula for self-raising flour comprising flour and dried yeast. In 1873 the US Patent Office granted Pasteur a Historically, biotechnological inventions patent on 'yeast, free from organic germs of disease, as an article of manufacture'. In 1883 Hansen, then director of the Carlsberg brewery in Copenhagen, who had succeeded in growing pure cultures of yeast from single cells, used one of his cultures to ferment a batch of beer after the 33 — It had no entry in the previous edition. original yeast used had spoiled. The owner of the brewery 34 — Signed by the Community and all the Member States at the refused to patent the culture process; it was accordingly United Nations Conference on Environment and Develop- published and used by most breweries in Europe and ment in Rio de Janeiro on 5 June 1992; Annex A to America. Council Decision 93/626/EEC of 25 October 1993 con- 37 — Although Australia granted its first patent for a living cerning the conclusion of the Convention on Biological organism, a yeast strain having improved properties for Diversity, OJ 1993 L 309, p. 1. bread making, only in 1976. 35 — Article 2. 38 — Deoxyribonucleic acid.
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contains several threads of DNA, called genes from chromosomes by restriction 39 chromosomes. A gene is a segment of a enzymes, which like biological scissors chromosome, and hence a length of DNA, excise a fragment of DNA from a cell. which contains the instructions to make a The DNA can then be inserted into bacter- part of a protein. The sequence of the bases ial, viral or yeast cells by a laboratory of the DNA contained in a cell makes up procedure. A single gene (or several genes) the genetic code of that cell. Cells need can accordingly be transferred between numerous different proteins in order to organisms. The cells incorporating the develop and function. Genes are responsi- foreign DNA can be grown in enormous ble for particular proteins with their own numbers, cloning the imported fragment of function in living cells. When instructing a DNA. cell how to make a particular protein, part of the DNA helix is temporarily 'unzipped' (the two strands separate) so that an imprint of its code may be copied into an RNA molecule (ribonucleic acid). That copy moves out of the nucleus and instructs the cell to assemble a protein or part of a protein. 33. This type of recombinant DNA genetic engineering has made possible a number of processes of unquestionable benefit to mankind, 40 such as the large-scale produc- tion of insulin for treating diabetes, 41 interferon and other drugs for treating certain cancers, vaccines against diseases such as hepatitis B, the human growth hormone for the treatment of certain forms of dwarfism and the clotting factor missing in haemophilia. 31. DNA is present in all organisms (except for some viruses); it is accordingly possible to transfer a gene between unrelated species and even across genera and orders, for example between plants, bacteria, humans and other animals. Thus in principle any genetic characteristic of one organism can be transferred to another organism. 34. Gene transfer is a different method of gene technology. Segments of DNA con- taining a specific gene or genes are first isolated as above and then incorporated into the DNA of a fertilised egg or, later,
39 — So called because they target a restricted segment of DNA. 40 — And indeed to animals, since several vaccines have been engineered, for example against foot and month disease and cattle ticks. Creations of broader environmental benefit include bacteria used to biodegrade oil spills and 32. In the 1970s a method was discovered toxic waste. of extracting specific genes and parts of 41 — Developed in 19S2.
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into embryonic cells. The new gene will be statutory subject matter to 'include any- present in the adult organism and will be thing under the sun that is made by man'. 44 inherited by some descendants of that organism.
37. That ruling prompted the establish- ment of a number of commercial firms that manufacture quantities of gene-engineered substances for a variety of mostly medical 35. Cloning is a process whereby the and ecological uses. nucleus of an unfertilised egg is removed and replaced with the nucleus of a somatic cell (namely a cell from an animal or plant other than the reproductive cells), which contains all the genetic material. If the treated egg survives and develops, the resulting animal will be a genetic clone of 38. In the 1980s Harvard University the animal which was the source of the applied under the European Patent Con- somatic cell. vention for a patent for a mouse genetically engineered to contain a gene sequence making it more susceptible to cancer. In 1990 the Technical Board of Appeal of the European Patent Office ruled that the exception to patentability under Arti- cle 53(b) of the European Patent Conven- tion 45 applied to certain categories of animals but not to animals as such: it noted that Article 53(b), as an exception, 36. The biotechnological industry began to must be narrowly construed. The patent develop seriously after a decision by the US was accordingly granted. 46 Supreme Court in 1980 that 'a live, human- made micro-organism is patentable subject matter'. 42 That case concerned an inven- tion of a human-made, genetically engi- neered bacterium capable of breaking down crude oil. The Supreme Court held (by a 5:4 majority) that the micro-organism 39. Developments in genetic engineering constituted a 'manufacture' or 'composi- have caused concern in many quarters. tion of matter' within the meaning of the Patent Act 1952. 43 The Court noted that the Committee Reports accompanying the 44 — The first patent for a micro-organism in Japan was granted 1952 Act indicated that Congress intended the following year. It may be significant that apparently there is no overriding ground of exclusion from patent- ability on ethical or moral grounds in either the US or Japan (although in the US at least ethical considerations may be relevant to determining whether the utility criteria 42 — Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 US 303 (1980). is satisfied). 43 — The wording derived unchanged from the first Patent Act 45 — Set out in paragraph 22 above. of 1793, authored by Thomas Jefferson. 46 — A patent was also granted in the US in 1988.
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Clearly technology which enables the in Member States which have as their genetic make-up of animals and humans object the establishment and functioning to be modified and which has the potential of the internal market. to create human clones calls for careful regulation. Much of the understandable anxiety about the consequences of insuffi- ciently regulated research in the field has been directed against legislation — such as the Directive — which governs the patent- ability of such inventions. Many commen- 41. The Netherlands, supported by Italy, tators start from the assumption that such submits that Article 100a is not the correct legislation means that any gene or gene legal basis for the Directive on several sequence, or even the entire human gen- grounds and that, if it was considered ome, can now automatically be patented. necessary to regulate biotechnological That assumption is incorrect. The Directive inventions, Article 235 of the EC Treaty leaves untouched the classic requirements (now Article 308 EC), which requires for a patent of novelty, inventive step and unanimity, should have been used. industrial application.47 The mere discov- ery of a gene or gene sequence is no more patentable under the Directive than it was before.
The relevant recitals and provisions of the Directive
The arguments as to legal basis
42. The preamble to the Directive includes the following recitals: 40. The Directive is based on Article 100a of the Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 95 EC), paragraph 1 of which requires the Council to adopt, by qualified majority and in accordance with the code- cision procedure laid down in Article 189b (now Article 251 EC), measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down '(1) Whereas biotechnology and genetic by law, regulation or administrative action engineering are playing an increasingly important role in a broad range of industries and the protection of bio- 47 — See Article 3(1), set out in paragraph 187 below. Arti- technological inventions will certainly cle 5(3) further provides that the 'ndustrial application of be of fundamental importance for the a sequence or partial sequence of a gene must be disclosed in the patent application'. Community's industrial development;
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(2) Whereas, in particular in the field of national case-law interpreting such leg- genetic engineering, research and islation develops differently; development require a considerable amount of high-risk investment and therefore only adequate legal protec- tion can make them profitable;
(7) Whereas uncoordinated development of national laws on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions in the Community could lead to further dis- (3) Whereas effective and harmonised pro- incentives to trade, to the detriment of tection throughout the Member States the industrial development of such is essential in order to maintain and inventions and of the smooth operation encourage investment in the field of of the internal market; biotechnology;
(8) Whereas legal protection of biotechno- logical inventions does not necessitate the creation of a separate body of law in place of the rules of national patent law; whereas the rules of national patent law remain the essential basis for the legal protection of biotechnolo- gical inventions given that they must be adapted or added to in certain specific (5) Whereas differences exist in the legal respects in order to take adequate protection of biotechnological inven- account of technological developments tions offered by the laws and practices involving biological material which of the different Member States; also fulfil the requirements for patent- whereas such differences could create ability; barriers to trade and hence impede the proper functioning of the internal mar- ket;
(9) Whereas in certain cases, such as the exclusion from patentability of plant and animal varieties and of essentially (6) Whereas such differences could well biological processes for the production become greater as Member States of plants and animals, certain concepts adopt new and different legislation in national laws based upon interna- and administrative practices, or [as] tional patent and plant variety conven-
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tions have created uncertainty regard- law. They shall, if necessary, adjust their ing the protection of biotechnological national patent law to take account of the and certain microbiological inventions; provisions of the Directive. whereas harmonisation is necessary to clarify the said uncertainty;
2. This Directive shall be without prejudice to the obligations of the Member States pursuant to international agreements, and in particular the TRIPs Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity.'
(14) Whereas a patent for invention does not authorise the holder to implement 44. Article 11 of the Directive provides: that invention, but merely entitles him to prohibit third parties from exploit- ing it for industrial and commercial purposes; whereas, consequently, sub- stantive patent law cannot serve to replace or render superfluous '1. By way of derogation from Articles 8 national, European or international and 9, the sale or other form of commer- law which may impose restrictions or cialisation of plant propagating material to prohibitions or which concerns the a farmer by the holder of the patent or with monitoring of research and of the use his consent for agricultural use implies or commercialisation of its results, authorisation for the farmer to use the notably from the point of view of the product of his harvest for propagation or requirements of public health, safety, multiplication by him on his own farm, the environmental protection, animal extent and conditions of this derogation welfare, the preservation of genetic corresponding to those under Article 14 of diversity and compliance with certain Regulation (EC) No 2100/94. ethical standards'.
2. By way of derogation from Articles 8 and 9, the sale or any other form of 43. Article 1 of the Directive provides: commercialisation of breeding stock or other animal reproductive material to a farmer by the holder of the patent or with his consent implies authorisation for the farmer to use the protected livestock for an agricultural purpose. This includes making '1. Member States shall protect biotechno- the animal or other animal reproductive logical inventions under national patent material available for the purposes of
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pursuing his agricultural activity but not recourse to Article 100a is justified where sale within the framework or for the 'harmonising measures are necessary to purpose of a commercial reproduction deal with disparities between the laws of activity. the Member States in areas where such disparities are liable to create or maintain distorted conditions of competition [or] in so far as such disparities are liable to hinder the free movement of goods within the 3. The extent and the conditions of the Community'. In that case, the Court con- derogation provided for in paragraph 2 firmed the validity of a regulation concern- shall be determined by national laws, ing the creation of a supplementary protec- regulations and practices.' tion certificate for medicinal products 49 adopted on the basis of Article 100a. The Court noted that, according to the Council, at the time the contested regulation was adopted provisions concerning the creation of a supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products existed in two The arguments that obstacles to trade have Member States and were at the draft stage not been shown in another State. The regulation was inten- ded to establish a uniform Community approach. 50 It thus aimed 'to prevent the heterogeneous development of national 45. First, the Netherlands submits that, laws leading to further disparities which even if it is assumed that, as stated in would be likely to create obstacles to the recitals five and six in the preamble, there free movement of medicinal products are actual or potential differences in within the Community and thus directly national laws on the patenting of biotech- affect the establishment and functioning of nological inventions, it has not been proved the internal market'. 51 that such differences in fact hinder or can hinder trade. Even if they did, the obstacles would be to trade with the United States and Japan, where the manufacture and patenting of biotechnological inventions is more advanced, and not within the internal market. In the absence of any evidence of differences in national laws or of effect on trade, harmonisation by way of a directive cannot be justified.
47. I would note that the above principles laid down in Spain v Council have more recently been refined by the Court in 46. The Council and the Parliament refer to the Court's ruling in Spain v Council 48that 49 — Council Regulation (EEC) No 1768/92 of 18 June 1992 concerning the creation of a supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products, OJ 1992 L 182, p. 1. 48 — Case C-350/92 [1995] ECR I-1985, paragraphs 32 and 33 50 — Paragraph 34 of the judgment. of the judgment. 51 — Paragraph 35 of the judgment.
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Germany v Parliament and Council. 52 In protection of industrial property and the that case the Court stated that, while variations between the different legislative recourse to Article 100a as a legal basis systems are capable of creating obstacles was possible if the aim was to prevent the both to the free movement of patented emergence of future obstacles to trade products and to competition within the resulting from multifarious development common market. 59 It has moreover con- of national laws, the emergence of such sistently recognised that the specific subject obstacles must be likely and the measure in matter of a patent is the guarantee that the question must be designed to prevent patentee, to reward the creative effort of them. 53 With regard to the measure's effect the inventor, has the exclusive right to use on competition, the Court stated that it was an invention with a view to manufacturing required to verify whether the distortion of industrial products and putting them into competition which the measure purported circulation for the first time, as well as the to eliminate was 'appreciable' 54 and thus right to oppose infringements. 60 Patents whether the measure actually contributed thus promote competition through innova- to eliminating appreciable distortions of tion. Indeed the Netherlands implicitly competition. 5 5With regard to the mea- recognises this, noting that the manufacture sure's effect on the free movement of goods, of biotechnological inventions is more the Court appears to have been less exact- advanced in the United States and Japan ing: it is sufficient that obstacles to free where, as mentioned above, biotechnologi- movement 'may well arise'. 56 Although it cal inventions have been readily patentable had been demonstrated that no obstacle since 1980 and 1981 respectively. 61 Het- existed at the material time, the Court erogeneous and potentially or actually accepted that 'in view of the trend in divergent national laws on legal protection, national legislation... it is probable that patentability, the extent of protection, obstacles to the free movement of... pro- ducts will arise in the future' 57 and that in derogations and limitations are clearly principle a harmonising measure could be liable to distort competition within the adopted on the basis of Article 100a. 58 Community and moreover to hinder the free movement of goods. Different levels of protection for an identical product would lead to fragmentation of the market into national markets where the product would be protected and others where it would not; the common market would not be a single environment for the economic activities of undertakings. The Court has explicitly recognised this in the context of intellectual 48. The Court has made it clear since an property rights. 62 early stage that, in the absence of harmo- nisation, the national character of the
52 — Case C-376/98 [2000] ECR I-8419 (tobacco advertising). 53 — Paragraph 86 of the judgment. 59 — See for example Case 24/67 Parke, Davis [1968] ECR 55, p. 7 1 . 54 — Paragraph 106 of the judgment. 60 — See for example Case 15/74 Centrafarm and De Peijper 55 — Paragraph 108 of the judgment. [1974] ECR 1147, paragraph 9 of the judgment. 56 — Paragraph 96 of the judgment. 61 — See note 44. 57 — Paragraph 97 of the judgment. 62 — Spain v Council cited in note 48, paragraph 36 of the 58 — Paragraph 98 of the judgment. judgment.
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49. I accordingly conclude that the Council achievement of the objectives set out in and Parliament were entitled to take the paragraph 1 through the policies and activ- view that a harmonising measure was ities it pursues under other provisions of necessary to deal with disparities between this Treaty'. the laws of the Member States concerning the patent protection of biotechnological inventions.
The argument that Community harmonisa- tion is inappropriate and ineffective
50. With regard to the Netherlands' argu- ment that the Directive seeks in particular to make European industry more competi- tive vis-à-vis the United States and Japan, I agree with the Parliament that it is consis- 51. The Netherlands' second argument is tent with Article 100a that the harmonisa- based on the fact that recital 9 in the tion sought should improve the competitive preamble refers to uncertainty deriving position of European undertakings on the from international patent and plant variety world market. Although that objective conventions as a justification for harmoni- could be seen as an industrial policy sation. The Netherlands submits that it is objective, I have no doubt that it can not for the European Union to undertake lawfully guide the Community's action. such harmonisation. It would have been Some would argue that similar considera- preferable on several grounds to harmonise tions underlie the entire internal market by amending the European Patent Conven- programme, as it was conceived in 1985, tion, which would have effected more and competition in world markets has often extensive harmonisation since States other been said to motivate that programme. I than the Member States of the European would also point out that the EC Treaty Union are Contracting Parties. 64 As it is, now 63 contains a title on industry, accord- that convention now incorporates the ing to which the action of the Community Directive (by way of implementing regula- and of the Member States shall also be tions made by the Administrative Council aimed at 'fostering better exploitation of of the European Patent Office 65 ), which is the industrial potential of policies of inno- thus imposed on those Contracting Parties vation, research and technological develop- who are not Member States. Such a proce- ment' (Article 130(1), now Article 157(1) EC). In Article 130(3) of the EC Treaty (now Article 157(3) EC) it is further stated 64 — See note 21. 65 — The decision of the Administrative Council of 16 June that the Community 'shall contribute to the 1999 amended the Implementing Regulations to the European Patent Convention by inserting a new Chapter VI entitled 'Biotechnological inventions' containing provi- sions essentially identical to Articles 2, 3, 4(2) and (31, 5 and 6(2) of the Directive and providing that the Directive 63 — Since the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union. shall be used as a supplementary means of interpretation.
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dure has no place in the external relations vention, even if feasible given the cumber- of the Union with other European States. some procedure 69 and the involvement of third countries, would not guarantee har- monisation for two reasons in particular. First, in proceedings at national level to annul a European patent divergences of interpretation would develop, in contrast to the position under the Directive where 52. That argument is to my mind miscon- national courts can refer questions of ceived, although as the Council suggests it interpretation to the Court of Justice. appears implicitly to recognise that harmo- Second, the Convention does not concern nisation in the area is necessary. In the the extent of protection conferred by a context of the internal market, however, it patent, which is essential with regard to is evident that Community legislation alone biotechnology and which is governed by can guarantee harmonisation and uniform national law. Furthermore those points interpretation. Harmonisation at Commu- themselves provide further support for the nity level not infrequently takes place view that the Convention not merely against a background of international con- 'would not guarantee harmonisation' but ventions the parties to which include both is simply irrelevant for this aspect of the the Member States of the Union and third Directive, since important areas of patent countries: in the area of intellectual prop- law governed by the Directive are outside erty, for example, the Trade Marks Direc- its scope. tive 66 has some overlap with earlier agree- ments such as the Paris Convention for the protection of industrial property 67 and the Madrid Agreement concerning the interna- tional registration of marks. 68 The exis- tence of that context does not however deprive the Community institutions of the competence in the area conferred upon them by the Treaty.
54. As for the fact — criticised by the Netherlands — that the European Patent Convention now incorporates certain pro- 53. Moreover I agree with the Parliament visions of the Directive by means of a that in any event amendment of the Con- decision of the Administrative Council amending the Implementing Regulations, 70 which are thus imposed on those contract- 66 — First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to ing parties who are not Member States, it is trade marks, OJ 1989 L 40. p. 1. not for the Court to rule on the manner in 67 — Of 20 March 1883, as revised at Brussels on 14 December 1900, at Washington on 2 June 1911, at The Hague on which the European Patent Office has 6 November 1925, at London on 2 June 1934, at Lisbon chosen to reflect the Directive in its law on 31 October 1958, and at Stockholm on 14 July 1967. 68 — Of 14 April 1891, as revised at Brussels on 14 December 1900, at Washington on 2 June 1911, at The Hague on 6 November 1925, at London on 2 June 1934, at Nice on 15 June 1957, and at Stockholm on 14 July 1967, and as 69 — Article 172 of the Convention. amended on 28 September 1979. 70 — See note 65.
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and practice. It may however be thought importance of the principle of the free that that choice suggests that the Patent movement of goods in limiting the exercise Office, which has considerable experience of national patent rights. Nor indeed does in handling applications for patents for it mean that Community legislation for the biotechnological inventions, does not harmonisation of national laws relating to anticipate major problems in the interpre- supplementary protection certificates, tation or application of the provisions of which confer protection akin to patent the Directive concerning the grant of such protection, is misconceived, ineffective or patents. unlawful. 73
56. I accordingly do not accept the argu- ment that Community harmonisation is inappropriate and ineffective.
55. Italy adds that the fact that the Direc- tive leaves scope for non-harmonised national rules regulating in particular pub- lic health, safety and environmental protec- tion 71 militates against the Directive's contributing to the free movement of the products concerned. That argument is in The argument that Articles 130 and 130f, my view similarly based on a misconcep- together with Article 235, were the correct tion of the function of patent law. As has legal basis been discussed above, 72 a patent is a right merely to prevent others from infringing the patent and does not confer any absolute entitlement on the proprietor to exploit the patent: exploitation is always subject to national regulation. Many of the Court's 57. Italy submits first that the aims of the rulings to the effect that an exercise of Directive go beyond harmonisation, includ- national patent rights which restricts the ing objectives linked to support for indus- free movement of goods is contrary to trial development in the Community and Article 28 EC and hence unlawful concern for scientific research in the genetic engi- patented pharmaceutical products: the fact neering sector. In support of that argument that the marketing and use of such products it refers to recitals one to three in the is rigorously regulated in all Member States preamble to the Directive. Other provisions at the national level does not diminish the of the Treaty (Articles 130 and 130 f(now Articles 157 and 163 EC)) are appropriate
71 — See recital 14, set out in paragraph 42 above. 72 — See paragraph 25 above. 73 — Spain v Council, cited in note 48.
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for legislation in the sectors of industry and proper functioning of the internal market. research respectively, in conjunction with Recital 7 in particular states that disincen- Article 235. The functioning of the internal tives to trade flowing from the uncoordi- market is a secondary objective of the nated development of national law would Directive, which should therefore not have be 'to the detriment of the industrial been based on Article 100a. 74 development of such inventions and of the smooth operation of the internal market', thus linking the two aims. Recitals 8 and 9 make further reference to the harmonising aim of the Directive.
58. The Court has made it clear that the choice of the legal basis for a measure must be based on objective factors which are amenable to judicial review, including in particular the aim and content of the measure as they appear from its actual wording. 75 Where moreover a measure pursues more than one objective, its prin- cipal objective is decisive for determining the correct legal basis. 76
60. More fundamentally, it appears that, although the laws of all Member States concerning the conditions for the grant of a patent and the exceptions to patentability broadly reflect the European Patent Con- vention and are thus to some extent already 59. The first three recitals in the preamble aligned, there are none the less significant to the Directive do indeed refer to the differences in some areas of national law importance of the protection of biotechno- and practice. It appears for example that logical inventions for the Community's some Member States already grant patents industrial development, research and devel- for biotechnological inventions involving opment in the field of genetic engineering animals: in France, for example, a patent and investment in the field of biotechnol- was granted in 1991 for a process for ogy. Recitals 5 to 7 however stress the need producing a transgenic 77 mouse 78 and in for the elimination of differences in Italy the first patent concerning a trans- national law on the protection of biotech- genic mammal was granted in 1996. 79 The nological inventions which could create barriers to trade and hence impede the 77 — Genetically modified to include a gene from another species. 78 — Mentioned in F. Pollaud-Dulian, La brevetabilité ties 74 — Case C-155/91 Commission v Council [1993] ECR O-939 inventions (1997), paragraph 244. (wasre disposal), paragraph 19 of the judgment. 79 — Mentioned hy G.M. Gradi m 'Patenting biotechnologies: 75 — See e.g. Case C-300/89 Commission v Cornial [1991] ECR the European Union Directive 98/44/ECof the European I-2867 (titanium dioxide), paragraphs 10 and 13 of the Parliament and of the Council of 6th July 1998 on the legal judgment. protection of biotechnological inventions' (retrieved from 76 — See for example Commission v Council, cited in note 74. internet).
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Parliament gives other examples of diver- 63. In the present case, I consider that gences in national law and practice the harmonisation is not an incidental or existence of which is not disputed by the ancillary aim or effect of the Directive but Netherlands. is its essence and that Article 100a was accordingly the correct legal basis. Arti- cle 235 could not therefore have been used as the legal basis of the Directive, whether alone or in conjunction with other provi- sions, since it applies only where the Treaty has not elsewhere provided the necessary powers to legislate.
61. That harmonisation is the principal aim of the Directive is moreover borne out by its content: indeed Article 1(1) unequivo- cally requires Member States to adjust their national patent law to take account of its provisions. The extent to which the provi- sions of the Directive will affect industrial development in the Community and scien- tific research in the genetic engineering sector is more difficult to assess. What The argument that the Directive infringes seems clear however is that the impact of Article 100a(3) the Directive on those areas is indissociably linked with its harmonising effect.
64. Italy refers also to Article 100a(3) of the Treaty, which requires the Commission to 'take as a base a high level of protection' 62. Although Articles 130 and 130f confer in its proposals based on Article 100a powers on the Community to undertake 'concerning health, safety, environmental specific action in the fields they cover, they protection and consumer protection'. Italy do not confer any legislative power and submits that Article 100a cannot be the they leave intact the powers held by the legal basis for a harmonising measure in a Community under other provisions of the field involving fundamental interests such Treaty, even if the measures to be taken as health and the environment unless the under the latter provisions pursue at the contents of the proposal conform to Arti- same time any of the objectives falling cle 100a(3). It is clear from recital 14 in the within Articles 130 and 130f. 80 preamble to the Directive that the Com- munity legislature recognised the impact on health and the environment of the exploi- 80 —See by analogy Case C-62/88 Greece v Council [1990] tation of biotechnological inventions but ECR I-1527, in particular paragraph 19 of the judgment. did not regulate those matters on the basis
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that it was for Member States to do so. The The argument that the Directive creates a conditions for Article 100a are accordingly new intellectual property right not met.
66. The Netherlands submits that the Directive creates a specific right so that it cannot be said simply to harmonise national principles of patent law. The Directive requires Member States to protect biotechnological inventions under national 65. In my view the Directive does not fall patent law. A patent for biotechnological within the scope of Article 100a(3). That inventions is a patent on life. Biological paragraph applies to 'proposals... concern- matter, in particular living animals or ing health, safety, environmental protection plants, cannot be compared to dead matter and consumer protection'. A proposal for a which until a few years ago could alone be directive on the legal protection of biotech- patented. The fact that biological matter nological inventions is not covered by that can reproduce without human intervention paragraph. While it is indisputable that means that protecting it by way of patents both the conduct of research culminating in is different in kind from so protecting dead biotechnological inventions and the use to matter. which such inventions are put may have significant implications for health, safety and environmental protection in particular, the proposed measure did not seek to regulate such research or use from the standpoint of health, safety or environmen- tal or consumer protection (in contrast to, for example, the Community legislation on 67. It seems to me, however, as submitted the release into the environment of geneti- by the Parliament, that the patentability of cally modified organisms 81): indeed recital living material is not an innovation intro- 14 expressly states that 'substantive patent duced by the Directive but the recognition law cannot serve to replace or render of what is actually happening in conformity superfluous national, European or interna- with national law: the Member States have tional law which may impose restrictions long recognised the patentability of certain or prohibitions or which concerns the inventions concerning a living material. monitoring of research and of the use or commercialisation of its results, notably from the point of view of the requirements of public health, safety, environmental protection...'.
81 — Council Directive 90/220/KKC of 23 April 1990 on the 68. The Parliament refers to patents deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms, OJ 1990 L 117, p. 15. granted for yeast in Belgium and Finland
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in 1833 and 1843 respectively.82 More depositary. Applications for such patents recently, in Germany the Bundesgerichtshof have thus for more than 20 years been held in 1975 that new micro-organisms per recognised and regulated at international se were susceptible to patent protection 83 level. and in 1993 acknowledged the patentabil- ity of plants. 84 Patents for biotechnological inventions involving transgenic animals have, as already mentioned, been granted in France and Italy in 1991 and 1996 respectively. 8 5 Numerous European patents for biotechnological inventions have been granted since the early 1980s and recognised in the Member States to 70. The notion of a 'patent on life' further- which they extend. 86 more appears to me to be unhelpful and unclear. As discussed above, 88 a patent does not give rights of ownership or unfettered rights to exploit. It merely entitles the patent-holder to prevent others manufacturing, using or selling the inven- tion without his consent. The patent-holder however is not absolved from compliance with national regulatory requirements in 69. Moreover the Budapest Treaty on the areas such as public health, safety, animal international recognition of the deposit of welfare and compliance with ethical stan- micro-organisms for the purposes of patent dards. The Directive explicitly recognises procedure, which was signed in 1977 and this in recital 14. The Directive also which came into force in 1980, 87 sought to explicitly recognises numerous limits to address the problem of providing, with patentability in line with national laws regard to applications for patents for living and international conventions, as will be organisms such as yeasts and other self- discussed in some detail in the context of replicating organisms, a written description the third ground for annulment. in sufficient detail to satisfy the require- ment in most patent law systems for sufficiency of disclosure. That Treaty per- mitted a specification in a patent applica- tion to be supplemented by the deposit of a sample of the organism at an authorised
82 — See also note 36. 71. The Netherlands adds that in addition 83 — Bäckerhefe decision, mentioned in K. Goldbach, H. Vogel- to creating a new right consisting of a sang-Wenke and E-J. Zimmer, Protection of Biotechnolo- gical Matter under European and German Law, p. 1. patent over the living products of biotech- 84 — Tetraploide Kamille decision, ibidem. nological processes, the Directive also cre- 85 — See paragraph 60 above. ates a new right, so-called 'farmers' privi- 86 — See H.-R. Jaenichen, The European Patent Office's Case Lata on the Patentability of Biotechnology Inventions lege'. That privilege, namely the right of a (1993); K. Goldbach, H. Vogelsang-Wenke and E-J. Zim- farmer to use for agricultural purposes mer, Protection of Biotechnological Matter under Eur- opean and German Law; E.S. van de Graaf, Patent Law and Modern Biotechnology (1997). 87 — All Member States other than Luxembourg are contracting parties. 88 — See paragraph 25.
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products protected by patents, is well cial reproduction) patented breeding stock known in the field of plant protection but 'or other animal reproductive material' not in patent law. which he has bought. According to the explanatory memorandum in the Commis- sion's proposal for the Directive, 91 the derogation authorises farmers 'to use the protected livestock for breeding purposes on their own farms, in order to replenish 72. The 'farmers' privilege' enshrined in their numbers'. Article 11(3) provides that Article 11 of the Directive has two aspects. the extent and the conditions of the dero- gation are to be determined at national level.
73. First, Article 11(1) permits a farmer to use the seed saved from a crop he has grown from patented seed sold to him for agricultural use in order to grow another crop. That derogation is similar in kind to that in Article 14(1) of Council Regulation No 2100/94 on Community plant variety rights 89 (in turn based on provisions of the UPOV Convention 1961 and 1991), 90 75. In my view it is clear that Article 11 although it is more extensive since Arti- does not create a new right since it is solely cle 14(1) of the Regulation is limited to concerned with limiting the scope of pro- specified plant species of fodder plants, tection conferred by a patent granted cereals, potatoes and oil and fibre plants. pursuant to the Directive. For further The extent and conditions of the deroga- discussion of the protection from which tion are to correspond to those under Article 11 derogates, and the rationale for Article 14 of the Regulation, which pro- that protection, see the discussion of Arti- vides in particular that farmers other than cles 8 and 9 in paragraph 121 et seq. below. small farmers are to pay 'an equitable remuneration' to the holder.
74. Second, Article 11(2) provides an ana- logous privilege for breeding livestock. In other words, a farmer may use for an agricultural purpose (but not for commer- 76. I accordingly conclude that the argu- ment that the Directive was incorrectly based on Article 100a and should therefore 89 — OJ 1994 L 227, p. 1. be annulled must be rejected. 90 — The International Convention for the protection of new varieties of plants (UPOV being the acronym for Union internationale pour la protection des obtentions végétales, the French name of the Union established by the Conven- tion). 91 — See note 18.
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The argument as to subsidiarity and the Council... shall state the reasons on which they are based and shall refer to any proposals or opinions which were required to be obtained pursuant to this Treaty.' 77. Article 3b of the EC Treaty (now Article 5 EC) provides:
'The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. 79. The Netherlands' principal submission is that the Directive infringes the second paragraph of Article 3b. It refers to the points it made in the context of the first head (legal basis), which in its view refute any argument that the objectives of the In areas which do not fall within its Directive could not be sufficiently achieved exclusive competence, the Community by the Member States or that those objec- shall take action, in accordance with the tives could be better achieved by the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so Community by reason of the scale or effects far as the objectives of the proposed action of the proposed action. The recitals in the cannot be sufficiently achieved by the preamble simply state that the legal protec- Member States and can therefore, by rea- tion of biotechnological inventions requires son of the scale or effects of the proposed clarification (recitals 4 and 9) and that action, be better achieved by the Commu- differences exist in the laws and practices of nity. the Member States which could create barriers to trade and hence impede the proper functioning of the internal market (recitals 5 and 7). Since however national patent law has been almost entirely harmo- Any action by the Community shall not go nised by the European Patent Convention, beyond what is necessary to achieve the the required clarification should be effected objectives of this Treaty.' by amending that convention. The Member States are thus perfectly able to achieve that objective.
78. Article 190 of the EC Treaty (now Article 253 EC) provides:
'Regulations, directives and decisions 80. In the alternative, the Netherlands adopted jointly by the European Parliament submits that it is not clear from the recitals
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that the second paragraph of Article 3b It is clear from the case-law of the Court was taken into account as required by that in such circumstances it is not neces- Article 190 and Germany v Parliament and sary for the legislation to make express Council. 92 reference to the principle of subsidiarity. 93
83. Finally, clarification of the law by way of amendment of the European Patent Convention would, as the defendants point 81. In my view and for the reasons dis- out, be inappropriate, ineffective and pos- cussed in the context of the first head of sibly not feasible. argument (as to legal basis), it can properly be considered that the Directive was neces- sary in order to harmonise Member States' legislation on the patent protection of biotechnological inventions. Since — again for the reasons discussed above — 84. I accordingly conclude that the Direc- such harmonisation could be effected only tive does not infringe the principle of by the Community, and since the Commu- subsidiarity. The argument that it should nity has exclusive competence in the be annulled on that basis must therefore be approximation of national rules concerning rejected. the establishment and functioning of the internal market, the case for Community action has been adequately made out and the principle of subsidiarity is accordingly not infringed.
The argument as to legal certainty
85. The Netherlands, supported by Italy 82. That the principle was respected is and Norway, submits that, notwithstanding moreover apparent from, in particular, the statement in its preamble that harmo- recitals 3, 5, 6, 7 and 9, which show that nisation is necessary to clarify the uncer- the Council and the Parliament considered tainty regarding the protection of biotech- the inadequacy of action at national level in nological inventions, 94 the Directive does the field of the legal protection of biotech- not wholly resolve uncertainties concerning nological inventions and recognised the the patentability of biotechnological inven- necessity of harmonising certain principles.
93 — See Gcrnnuty v Parliament and Council, cited in note 92, 92 — Case C-233/94 [1997] ECR I-2405, paragraph 28 of the paragraph 28 of the judgment. judgment. 94 — Recital 9, set out in paragraph 42 above.
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tions; moreover it creates further uncer- 88. Even where a provision of a directive is tainty since the precise meaning and scope open to different interpretations, as the of Articles 4, 6, 8 and 9 are not clear. The Netherlands alleges in the present case, I do Directive accordingly infringes the princi- not consider that that in itself is grounds for ple of legal certainty. annulment. In recent cases in which the Court has held that a Member State, in incorrectly implementing an imprecisely drafted provision of a directive, gave the provision a meaning which it was reason- ably capable of bearing, there has been no suggestion that the directive (or even the provision) should be regarded as invalid merely because it was imprecise and hence open to more than one interpretation.95 86. Before looking more closely at the Similarly the Court in formulating the substance of those arguments, the effect of principle that only those provisions of uncertainty in a Community act such as a directives which are clear and unambiguous directive must be considered. The Nether- may have direct effect has not to my lands has cited no authority for its apparent knowledge suggested that all provisions view that, if the meaning of one or two not so precise and unconditional are provisions of the Directive is not entirely thereby invalid. and exhaustively clear, the Directive should be annulled; nor has Italy or Norway. Nor indeed has the Court ever to my knowledge endorsed such a principle
89. I would on the other hand regard it as at least arguable that a provision in a directive which was wholly devoid of meaning, or manifestly irreconcilable with another provision thereof, may be invalid on that ground, although it does not necessarily follow in my view that the directive as a whole should thereby be 87. Article 249 EC (formerly Article 189 annulled. of the EC Treaty) states that a directive is to be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods. Directives are thus inherently liable not to deal exhaustively with the detail of matters 90. Against that background I will consider within their scope. While that does not of whether the provisions of the Directive course mean that unclear drafting is appro- priate, it does suggest that the mere fact that a directive confers some discretion on 95 — See for example Case C-392/93 British Telecommunica- the Member States is not in itself a ground tions [1996] ECR I-1631 and Joined Cases C-283/94, C-291/94 and C-292/94 Denkauit International [1996] for invalidating it. ECR I-5063.
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alleged to infringe the principle of legal exclusion is not made merely because certainty are meaningless or contradictory the exploitation is prohibited by their to that extent. The arguments focus princi- law; pally on the meaning and scope of, first, Article 6 and, second, Articles 8 and 9.
The arguments as to Article 6
(38) Whereas the operative part of this Directive should also include an illus- trative list of inventions excluded from patentability so as to provide The relevant recitals and provisions of the national courts and patent offices Directive with a general guide to interpreting the reference to ordre public and morality; whereas this list obviously cannot presume to be exhaustive; whereas processes, the use of which offend against human dignity, such as 91. Recitals 36, 38 and 39 in the preamble processes to produce chimeras from read as follows: germ cells or [from] totipotent cells of humans and animals, are obviously also excluded from patentability; 96
'(36) Whereas the TRIPs Agreement pro- vides for the possibility that members of the World Trade Organisation may (39) Whereas ordre public and morality exclude from patentability inven- correspond in particular to ethical and tions, the prevention within their moral principles recognised in a Mem- territory of the commercial exploita- ber State, respect for which is parti- tion of which is necessary to protect cularly important in the field of bio- ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to 96 — See paragraph 111 below for an explanation of sonic of the the environment, provided that such terms used in tins recital.
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technology in view of the potential (b) processes for modifying the germ line scope of inventions in this field and genetic identity of human beings; their inherent relationship to living matter; whereas such ethical or moral principles supplement the standard legal examinations under patent law regardless of the technical field of the invention'. (c) uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes;
(d) processes for modifying the genetic identity of animals which are likely to 92. Article 6 of the Directive provides: cause them suffering without any sub- stantial medical benefit to man or animal, and also animals resulting from such processes.' 97
'(1) Inventions shall be considered unpa- tentable where their commercial exploita- 93. The Netherlands and Italy put forward tion would be contrary to ordre public or four arguments to the effect that Article 6 morality; however, exploitation shall not be infringes the principle of legal certainty. I deemed to be so contrary merely because it propose to deal separately with each of is prohibited by law or regulation. those arguments.
(2) On the basis of paragraph 1, the Are ordre public and morality sufficiently following, in particular, shall be considered clear concepts? unpatentable:
94. First, it is argued that Article 6 gives insufficient guidance and the principles
97 — The germ line is the group of cells which give rise to the reproductive cells. Modifications to the germ line may thus (a) processes for cloning human beings; be passed on to offspring.
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mentioned in the recitals for determining tim Article 2 of the Strasbourg Convention whether there is an infringement of ordre of 1963, 1 00although that provision is public or morality are general and equivo- optional ('The Contracting States shall not cal. According to recital 39, the patent be bound to provide for the grant of patents offices and courts must turn to the ethical in respect of...'). Article 27(2) of the TRIPs and moral principles recognised in a Mem- Agreement is also in similar terms, ber State to supplement the standard legal although again it is permissive rather than examinations under patent law. It is there- mandatory. 1 0 1Provisions such as Arti- fore inevitable that Article 6 will be inter- cle 6(1) have been described as 'a well- preted and applied divergently. known feature of patent law'. 102
96. Community intellectual property legis- lation continues this pattern. The Commu- nity Trade Mark Regulation 103 and the 95. I would note at the outset that the Trade Marks Directive 104 both provide for concepts of ordre public and morality have the refusal of registration or invalidity of a a long and distinguished history as criteria mark which is 'contrary to public policy or for the lawfulness of the grant or exercise to accepted principles of morality' ('contra- of intellectual property rights. In relation to ire à l'ordre public ou aux bonnes trade marks, for example, Article 6 quin- moeurs'). 105 The Community Plant Variety quies (A)(3) of the Paris Convention, dating Rights Regulation 106 provides that there is from the 1911 Washington revision, pro- an impediment to the designation of a vides for an exception to the general variety denomination where 'it is liable to prohibition on denying registration or give offence in one of the Member States or invalidating a trade mark where it is is contrary to public policy' ('est susceptible 'contrary to morality or public order'. In de contrevenir aux bonnes moeurs dans un relation to patents, Article 6(1) of the Directive is, as indicated above, 98 to essen- tially similar effect as Article 53(a) of the 100 — Cited in note 25. European Patent Convention, although the 101 — Presumably to accommodate the US and Japan, where as Convention also prohibits the patenting of indicated (note 44) there is apparently no general ethical exclusion from patentability. inventions the publication of which would 102 — M. Van Empel, The Granting of European Patents be contrary to ordre public or morality. 99 (1975), p. 68, citing an international survey of 10 European countries published in GRUR Int. 1960, p. 105. Article 53 itself reproduces almost verba- 103 — Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark, OJ 1994 L 11, p. 1. 104 — Cited in note 66. 105 — Article 7(1)(f) of the Regulation and Article 3(1)(f) of the 98 — See paragraph 22. Directive. It may be noted that i nhis Opinion delivered 99 — It appears however that the Standing Advisory Committee on 23 January 2001 in Case C-299/99 Philips Electro- heforc the European Patent Office proposed m Septcmhcr nics, at paragraph 18, Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo 1998 that Article 53(a) should be modified so as to refer to Colomer gave as an example of a trade mark registration exploitation only: see Deryck Beyleveld, 'Why Recital 26 of which would be barred because it was contrary to of the EC Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechno- public policy the mark 'Babykiller' for a pharmaceutical logical Inventions Should Be Implemented in National abortifacient. Law' [2000] I.P.Q. 1. 106 — Cited in note 89.
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des États membres ou est contraire à l'ordre particular circumstances justifying recourse public'). 107 Directive 98/71 on the legal to the concept of public policy may vary protection of designs108 provides that a from one country to another and from one design right shall not subsist in a design period to another and that it is therefore which is contrary to public policy or to necessary to allow the competent national accepted principles of morality ('contraire à authorities an area of discretion within the l'ordre public ou à la moralité pub- limits imposed by the Treaty. 113 lique'). 109 The amended proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive approximating the legal arrangements for the protection of inventions by utility model 110 provides that utility models shall not be granted in respect of inventions the exploitation of which would be contrary to public policy or morality ('contraire à l'ordre public ou aux bonnes moeurs'). m
98. The Community legislature has also resorted to the concept of ordre public in numerous harmonising measures, thus apparently seeing no contradiction in con- ferring a degree of discretion on national authorities in an area subject to harmoni- sation. 114 97. The concept of ordre public in particu- lar also has wider significance in Commu- 113 — Case 41/74 Van Duyn [1974] ECR 1337, paragraph 18 nity law. It is for example used in the of the judgment. 114 — Article 11(2)(b) of First Council Directive 68/151/EEC of French text of the Treaty, although it is 9 March 1968 on co-ordination of safeguards which, for usually rendered 'public policy' in Eng- the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies within the lish. 1 1 2 Articles 30, 39(3), 46(1) and meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent 58(1)(b) (formerly Articles 36, 48(3), throughout the Community, OJ English Special Edition 56(1) and 73d(1)(b)) all refer (as grounds 1968 (I), p. 41 (translated as public policy); Arti- cle 10(2)(a) of Council Directive 89/592/EEC of for permitted restrictions of the free move- 13 November 1989 coordinating regulations on insider dealing, OJ 1989 L 334, p. 30 (public policy); Arti- ment of goods, the freedom of movement cle 14(5) of Council Directive 90/619/EEC of 8 Novem- of workers, the freedom of establishment ber 1990 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to direct fife assurance, and the free movement of capital respec- laying down provisions to facilitate the effective exercise of freedom to provide services and amending Directive tively) to ordre public ('public policy' in the 79/267/EEC, OJ 1990 L 330, p. 50 (public policy); English). The Court has recognised that the Article 5(b) of Council Directive 91/477/EEC of 18 June 1991 on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons, OJ 1991 L 256, p. 51 (public order); Arti- cle 15(6) of Council Directive 93/42/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning medical devices, OJ 1993 L 169, p. 1 (public policy); Article 6(2) of Directive 94/22/EC of the 107 — Article 63(3)(e). European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 108 — Directive 98/71/EC of the European Parliament and of on the conditions for granting and using authorisations the Council of 13 October 1998, OJ 1998 L 289, p. 28. for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons, OJ 1994 L 164, p. 3 (public safety); and 109 — Article 8. Article 9(7) of Directive 98/34/EC of the European 110 — OJ 2000 C 248E, p. 56. Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 laying 111 —Article4(a). down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations, OJ 1998 112 — See the Opinion of Advocate General Warner in Case L 204, p. 37, as amended by Directive 98/48/EC of the 30/77 Bouchereau [1977] ECR 1999, pages 2023 to European Parliament and of the Council of 20 July 1998, 2026, for a discussion of the concepts of public policy OJ 1998 L 217, p. 18 (public policy). and ordre public.
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99. The concept of 'bonnes moeurs' seems 101. The application by national authori- not to feature significantly in Community ties of the concepts of ordre public and law apart from the measures of Community morality, however, will always be subject to intellectual property legislation mentioned review by the Court: Member States do not above. However it appears to be used have an unlimited discretion to determine interchangeably with 'moralité publique' their scope. The Court has stated that in those measures so can perhaps be 'recourse by a national authority to the regarded as synonymous. Article 30 of the concept of public policy presupposes, in Treaty includes 'moralité publique' ('public any event, the existence, in addition to the morality') among the permitted grounds for perturbation of the social order which any derogating from the free movement of infringement of the law involves, of a goods. The Court considered the phrase in genuine and sufficiently serious threat to Henn and Darby 115 and Conegate. 116 In the requirements of public policy affecting the former, the Court ruled that it was for one of the fundamental interests of each Member State to determine in accor- society'. 118 That statement clearly demon- dance with its own scale of values and in strates that the Court's approach is essen- the form selected by it the requirements of tially similar to that of the European Patent public morality in its territory. 117 The Office, whose guidelines for substantive Court confirmed that principle in Cone- examination state that the purpose of the gate, although ruling that on the facts the ordre public and morality provision is 'to derogation was not applicable. exclude from protection inventions likely to induce riot or public disorder, or to lead to criminal or other generally offensive beha- viour...'. 119 National patent authorities which have been acting in the light of those guidelines since the European Patent Con- vention came into force in their Member State should accordingly experience no conflict once the Directive is in force.
100. Thus the statement in recital 39 of the Directive that 'ordre public and morality correspond in particular to ethical or moral principles recognised in a Member State' closely reflects the Court's interpretation and application of those concepts in the context of the Treaty. It cannot therefore in 102. It may be added that the discretion of my view be argued that the approach of the a Member State to determine the scope of Directive infringes the principle of legal the concept of public morality in accor- certainty. dance with its own scale of values, so
118 — Bouchereau, cited in note 112, paragraph 35 of the 115 — Case 34/79 [979] ECU 3795. judgment. 116 — Case 121/85 [1986] ECR 1007. 119 — Guidelines for examination i n the European Patent 117 — Paragraph 15 or the judgment. See further the Opinion or Office, as last amended in February 2001, Part C, Advocate General Warner. Chapter IV, paragraph 3.1.
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defined by the Court more than 20 years the proviso in Article 6(1), which states ago, 120 should perhaps now be read with that exploitation of an invention shall not some caution. In this area, as in many be deemed to be contrary to ordre public or others, common standards evolve over the morality merely because it is prohibited by years. It may be that the ethical dimension law or regulation, are not clear. Moreover, of some of the basic issues within the scope the statement in recital 14 1 22that 'a patent of the Directive is now more appropriately for invention does not authorise the holder regarded as governed by common stan- to implement that invention' is contrary to dards. That was clearly the view of Tech- the fundamental principles of national and nical Board of Appeal 3.3.4 of the Eur- international patent law according to opean Patent Office in 1995, when it stated which the grant of a patent confers on the in Plant Genetic Systems that the concept holder the exclusive right commercially to of morality 'is related to the belief that exploit the invention; furthermore, if it some behaviour is right and acceptable were correct, it would be unnecessary to whereas other behaviour is wrong, this exclude the patentability of inventions belief being founded on the totality of the whose commercial exploitation was con- accepted norms which are deeply rooted in trary to ordre public and morality. a particular culture. For the purposes of the EPC, the culture in question is the culture inherent in European society and civilisa- tion.' 121 The fact that some ethical issues may be more appropriately evaluated in the context of the culture of a particular Member State and others are susceptible to a common standard does not however in 104. The proviso appears in both Arti- my view preclude — either here or else- cle 53(a) of the European Patent Conven- where — a degree of harmonisation. tion and Article 2 of the 1963 Strasbourg Convention. 123 It pre-dates both those instruments, however, being drawn from Article 4 quater of the Paris Convention. That provision, which was added by the 1958 Conference of Revision at Lisbon, states:
What is the meaning and purpose of the proviso in Article 6(1)?
'The grant of a patent shall not be refused and a patent shall not be invalidated on the 103. Second, the Netherlands and Italy ground that the sale of the patented pro- submit that the meaning and purpose of duct or a product obtained by means of a
120 — In Herat and Darby, cited in note 115. 122 — Set out in paragraph 42 above. 121 — T 356/93 Plant Genetic Systems/Flam cells [1995] EPOR 123 — Article 27(2) of the TRIPs Agreement contains a similar 357, paragraph 6 of the decision. proviso.
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patented process is subject to restrictions or facture an invention in a Member State limitations resulting from the domestic where the exploitation (but not the manu- law'. facture) of the invention is prohibited, with a view to exporting it to States in which its exploitation is not prohibited.
105. The Bureau international de la pro- priété intellectuelle (the predecessor of the World Intellectual Property Organisation) 107. Accordingly I do not accept that the has explained in a publication 124 that the proviso in Article 6(1) is either unclear in reason for that provision is that restrictions itself or incompatible with the statement in or limitations may be temporary in nature recital 14. Nor do I accept that that so that the patent will acquire value once statement is contrary to the general princi- they have been removed. Moreover the ples of patent law: although it is correct patented invention so restricted may be the that the grant of a patent confers the basis for further patents which do not fall exclusive right to exploit the invention, within the restrictions: there is in that case that right is, as discussed above, 125 to be no reason to deprive the holder of the first exercised in accordance with the applicable patent of licence-fees etc. to which the link national laws and regulations. The grant of between the two inventions might entitle the patent thus in itself confers no absolute, him. positive right to exploit, but merely the right to prevent others from exploiting the invention in the territory where the patent is recognised.
106. It is moreover not correct to assert that it would be purposeless to grant a patent for an invention the exploitation of which is prohibited. As suggested above, the inventor may wish to obtain protection in anticipation of a change in the regulatory Does ordre public encompass prejudice to structure enabling him to exploit his inven- the environment? tion in the future. A good topical example is genetically modified organisms — there is a general moratorium on the use of these in the European Union at the moment, but it will not necessarily be indefinite. Simi- 108. Third, the Netherlands and Italy refei- larly at national level an inventor may to recital 36, which notes that the TRIPs anticipate a change of government. Alter- Agreement recognises in the context of natively, an inventor may wish to manu- ordre public and morality the grounds of protection of human, animal or plant life or 124 — Bureau international de la propriété intellectuelle, Co- vention de Paris - LA PRotection tie h propriété indus¬ trielle de 1883 à 1983 (1983). 125 — See paragraph 25 above.
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health and the avoidance of serious pre- What is the status of recital 38? judice to the environment. That raises the question whether, for the purpose of Arti- cle 6(1), serious prejudice to the environ- ment, or the risk thereof, may fall within the concept of ordre public.
110. Finally, the Netherlands states that, although Article 6(2) lists examples of inventions to be considered unpatentable in accordance with Article 6(1), that list does not include (and the Directive does not otherwise provide for) the important exception to patentability spelt out in the last phrase of recital 38: 'processes, the use 109. I have already discussed in general of which offend against human dignity, terms the scope of the ordre public excep- such as processes to produce chimeras from tion. Preservation of the environment must germ cells or [from] totipotent cells of be regarded in the present state of Com- humans and animals, are obviously also munity law as one of the fundamental excluded from patentability'. The Nether- interests of society. That was recognised by lands thus appears to object to the fact that the Court as long ago as 1988 in Commis- an exception mentioned in a recital is not sion v Denmark 126 and is now enshrined in reflected in the body of the Directive. Article 2 of the Treaty which includes the promotion of 'a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment' among the Community's tasks. The 'fundamental interests of society' referred to by the Court in Bouchereau 127 must to my mind now be understood as extending to the environment. A genuine and sufficiently serious threat to the envir- onment would thus fall squarely within the concept of ordre public; 128 there is accord- ingly no incompatibility between recital 36 and Article 6(1). 111. It appears to me, however, as indi- cated by the Parliament, that that exception falls within the exclusion from patentabil- 126 —Case 302/86 [1988] ECR 4607, paragraph 8 of the ity of 'processes for modifying the germ line judgment (referring further back, to Case 240/83 Asso- ciation de Defense des Brûleurs d'Huiles Usagées [1985] genetic identity of human beings' in Arti- ECR 531). cle 6(2)(b). A chimera is an organism or 127 — Cited in note 112. See paragraph 101 above. recombinant DNA molecule created by 128 — I would mention that that is also the understanding of the European Patent Office: see the decisions of Technical joining DNA fragments from two or more Board of Appeal 3.3.2 in T 19/90 Haruard/Onco-mouse different organisms. A germ cell is a cell [1990) EPOR 501 and Technical Board of Appeal 3.3.4 in Plant Genetic Systems, cited in note 121. destined to become a sperm or an egg. A
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totipotent cell is a cell having unlimited The argument as to plant and animal capability. 129 The production of chimeras varieties from germ cells or from totipotent cells of humans and animals will inevitably modify the germ line genetic identity of human beings.
The relevant recitals and provisions of the Directive
113. Recitals 31 and 32 in the preamble 112. Even if that were not so, I cannot see read as follows: that a legislative measure should be annulled for lack of legal certainty merely because an example of conduct excluded from the scope of that measure appears in its preamble but not in its substantive provisions. 130 It is not moreover an unpre- cedented legislative technique to give an illustrative, non-exhaustive list of examples '(31) Whereas a plant grouping which is of situations where an ordre public excep- characterised by a particular gene tion will apply: see for example Article 9(7) (and not its whole genome) is not of Directive 98/34 laying down a procedure covered by the protection of new for the provision of information in the field varieties and is therefore not exclu- of technical standards and regulations 131 ded from patentability even if it as amended by Directive 98/48 132 and comprises new varieties of plants; Article 3(4)(a)(i) of the Directive on elec- tronic commerce. 133
129 — A fertilised human egg is for example totipotent for the first few days and cycles of cell division after fertilisation: each of the cells into which it divides has the potential to develop into a fetus. After several such cycles however the cells begin to specialise; some will form the placenta, others will form the various tissues of the human body. From that point on no one cell can form an organism (32) Whereas if an invention consists only (since either the placenta or the embryo will not develop). in genetically modifying a particular 130 — Sec by analogy Joined Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95 France tinti others v Commision [1998] ECR I-1375, paragraphs plant variety, and if a new plant 176 and 177 of the judgment. variety is bred, it will still be excluded 131 — Cited in note 114. from patentability even if the genetic 132 — Cited in note 114. 133 — Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of modification is the result not of an the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of essentially biological process but of a information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market, OJ 2000 L 178, p. 1. biotechnological process'.
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114. Article 4(1) and (2) provides: 116. Article 8 provides:
'1. The protection conferred by a patent on '1. The following shall not be patentable: a biological material possessing specific characteristics as a result of the invention shall extend to any biological material derived from that biological material through propagation or multiplication in an identical or divergent form and posses- sing those same characteristics. (a) plant and animal varieties;
2. The protection conferred by a patent on a process that enables a biological material to be produced possessing specific charac- (b) essentially biological processes for the teristics as a result of the invention shall production of plants or animals. extend to biological material directly obtained through that process and to any other biological material derived from the directly obtained biological material through propagation or multiplication in an identical or divergent form and posses- sing those same characteristics.' 2. Inventions which concern plants or ani- mals shall be patentable if the technical feasibility of the invention is not confined to a particular plant or animal variety.'
117. Article 9 provides:
115. 'Plant variety' is defined for the pur- pose of the Directive134 by reference to the 'The protection conferred by a patent on a definition in Article 5 of Regulation product containing or consisting of genetic No 2100/94. 135 information shall extend to all material, save as provided in Article 5(1), in which the product is incorporated and in which 134 — By Article 2(3). the genetic information is contained and 135 —Cited in note 89. performs its function.' I - 7120
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118. In the second argument as to legal 121. A patent for a product normally gives certainty, the Netherlands, Italy and Nor- the holder the exclusive right to manufac- way refer to several aspects of the provi- ture that product (subject to compliance sions of the Directive concerning plant and with applicable laws and regulations). In animal varieties whose meaning and effect the case of patented material which is are allegedly unclear. I propose to deal capable of reproducing itself, the value of separately with each of those points. the patent would clearly be eroded if it did not extend to future generations of such material. For example, if the purchaser of patented seeds were able to use the seeds produced by the crop grown from the purchased seeds, the value of that patent would be much reduced. Article 8(1) accordingly states that in such cases the protection conferred by the original patent The argument as to Articles 8 and 9 extends to future generations of biological material derived through propagation or multiplication. Recital 46 expresses that principle in terms of the patent-holder's entitlement 'to prohibit the use of patented self-reproducing material in situations ana- 119. First, the Netherlands and Norway logous to those where it would be permit- submit that it is not clear whether plant ted to prohibit the use of patented, non- varieties are in all circumstances excluded self-reproducing products, that is to say the from patentability. Article 4(1 )(a) provides production of the patented product itself'. that plant and animal varieties are not (With regard to seeds, as discussed patentable. However, according to Arti- above 136 Article 11(1) derogates from that cles 8 and 9 a patent may be obtained for a protection in prescribed circumstances and biotechnological process and its products, for a fee.) even plants and animals. If that process creates a new variety, the protection con- ferred by the patent will apparently extend to that variety. Moreover, if such a process leads to a new plant variety covered by a plant variety right there may be a conflict between the holders of the patent and of the plant variety right which cannot be wholly resolved by the system of cross- licences under Article 12.
122. Article 8(2) similarly adapts a well- known principle of traditional patent law to the exigencies of biotechnological inven- 120. In my view there is no conflict between Article 4(l)(a) on the one hand and Articles 8 and 9 on the other. 136 — Sec paragraph 73.
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tions. Where the subject-matter of a patent 124. Article 9 caters for the situation is a process, the protection conferred by the where a patent confers protection on a patent extends to the products directly product containing or consisting of genetic obtained by such a process. That principle information, such as a particular DNA has been incorporated in international sequence, or a particular gene. It extends patent legislation since at least 1958, when the protection conferred by such a patent to Article 5 quater was inserted into the Paris all material, subject to the exception in Convention. 137 It finds expression in Arti- Article 5(1), 138 in which the product is cle 64(2) of the European Patent Conven- incorporated and in which the genetic tion, which provides: information is contained and performs its function. Thus where the DNA sequence or gene is incorporated into a host micro- organism which may be multiplied, the patent protection enjoyed by it will extend to that micro-organism.
'If the subject-matter of a European patent is a process, the protection conferred by the patent shall extend to products directly obtained by such process.' 125. The Netherlands and Norway argue that, notwithstanding the exclusion from patentability of plant varieties in Arti- cle 4(1) (a), a plant variety may benefit from patent protection by virtue of Arti- cles 8 and 9. 123. If the products so obtained are them- selves capable of replication, the problem discussed in paragraph 121 will arise. For example, a patented process may result in the production of a micro-organism which can be cloned. If such material could be freely propagated by a purchaser, the value 126. That proposition is to my mind based of the process patent would be nullified. on an incorrect analysis of the position: it Article 8(2) accordingly makes it clear that fails to distinguish the concept of patent- the protection conferred on biological ability from the concept of the protection material directly obtained by a patented conferred by a patent. Both concepts may process extends to future generations of of course be relevant to a single situation: that material. thus where, for example, a patented gene which confers resistance to herbicides is incorporated into a plant variety other than by or with the consent of the patent-holder, 137 — 'When a product is imported into a country of the [Paris] Union [for international protection of industrial prop- erty] where there exists a patent protecting a process of manufacture of the said product, the patentee shall have all the rights, with regard to the imported product, that 138 — 'The human body, at the various stages of its formation are accorded to him by the legislation of the country of and development, and the simple discovery of one of its importation, on the basis of the process patent, with elements, including the sequence or partial sequence of a respect to products manufactured in that country.' gene, cannot constitute patentable inventions.'
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that use of the gene will infringe the patent. where in such circumstances the holder of If the original patent for the gene did not the plant variety right has applied unsuc- protect against such use, it would clearly be cessfully to the patent-holder for a licence of very little value. That does not mean, and where the plant variety constitutes however, that the plant variety will itself be significant technical progress of consider- patentable. An example from the field of able economic interest compared with the traditional technology may help to make invention claimed in the patent. 140 this clear. Historically, many countries prohibited the patenting of pharmaceutical products. If an unpatentable pharmaceuti- cal product were manufactured which incorporated a specific chemical compound which had been patented, clearly that 128. There is thus no conflict between patent would be infringed by the manufac- Article 4(1 )(a) on the one hand and Arti- ture of the pharmaceutical product, not- cles 8 and 9 on the other. withstanding that the latter product could not itself benefit from patent protection.
The argument that 'animal varieties' is not defined
129. The Netherlands objects that the Directive nowhere defines the term 'animal 127. Articles 8 and 9 thus do not mean that varieties', used in Article 4(l)(a). The term plant varieties will be patentable per se. A 'plant varieties', also used in that article, is direct conflict between the holder of a by contrast defined in Article 2(3). The patent for a given plant variety and the scope of the exception for animals is holder of a plant variety right for that accordingly unclear. variety cannot therefore arise. What may frequently happen however is that a plant breeder will wish to purchase or use a plant variety right in circumstances where that purchase or use will infringe an existing patent, for example on a gene incorporated 130. The exclusions from patentability in into that plant variety. Article 12 of the Article 4(1)(a) of the Directive echo those Directive provides for a system of compul- in Article 53(b) of the European Patent sory cross-licences 139 on reasonable terms Convention which are in turn based on Article 2(b) of the Strasbourg Convention. 139 — So called because the article provides also for mirror- imace licences in favour of a patent-holder who cannot exploit the patent without infringing a plant variety right. 140— Article 12(3).
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That context does not in this case help with All the other language versions of the the interpretation of the terms used; one Directive use a word meaning 'breed', must turn therefore to the terms them- which is consistent with the above defini- selves. tion. Understood in that way, the concept of animal variety is in my view not ambiguous.
The arguments as to recitals 31 and 32 and 131. Admittedly, there is no generally Article 4(1)(a) and 4(2) recognised taxonomie definition for 'vari- ety' as there is for 'species' or 'genus', 141 although it may be noted that the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 142 gives as the biological definition of 'variety': 132. The Netherlands, supported by Nor- way, puts forward two arguments to the effect that the above provisions are contra- dictory and hence infringe the principle of legal certainty.
'A taxonomical grouping ranking next below a sub-species 143 (where present) or 133. First, recital 31 states that a plant species, whose members differ from others grouping which is characterised by a parti- of the same species or sub-species in minor cular gene is not covered by the protection but permanent or heritable characters: the of new varieties and is therefore not organisms which compose such a group- excluded from patentability even if it ing'. comprises new varieties of plants. In the text of the Directive however exclusion from patentability is not linked to the 141 — European Patent Office Technical Board of Appeal 3.3.2 possibility of obtaining a plant variety in Lubrizol/Hybrid plants [1990] EPOR 173, paragraph right. Moreover recital 32 states that an 12. 142 — 1993 edition. invention which genetically modifies a 143 — 'Sub-species' is defined as a 'morphologically [i.e. as to plant variety and by which a new plant form] distinct sub-division of a species, especially one geographically or ecologically (though not usually geneti- variety is obtained will still be excluded cally) isolated from other such sub-divisions'. from patentability, which contradicts reci-
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tal 31. However, recital 32 is not logical, 136. In 1961, and hence even before the since the appearance of a new plant variety Strasbourg Convention was signed, the must be irrelevant from the point of view of majority of the States which would subse patentability: no patent may be obtained quently sign the two later conventions 147 for a plant variety as such. signed the UPOV Convention. The UPOV Convention in its original version provided that members could confer either special plant variety protection or patent protection (in either case under national law) on plant varieties within the scope of the Convention, but not both types of protection. Article 2(b) of the Strasbourg Convention and Article 53(b) of the later 134. Second, Article 4 is also illogical: European Patent Convention exclude Article 4(1)(a) excludes from patentability patent protection for plant varieties in plant and animal varieties in the plural recognition of this internationally accepted while under Article 4(2) only inventions approach. 148 concerning one single variety are unpaten table. It is unthinkable in scientific terms that an invention should be technically applicable to one plant or animal variety alone: any invention linked to a genetic modification of a plant or animal will be applicable to several varieties. Article 4(2) is thus meaningless. 137. It is helpful to bear in mind that, at the time the Directive was being drafted and going through the legislative process, the scope of the exception for plant vari eties in Article 53(b) was unclear.
135. As a preliminary point, it is useful to mention the reasons underlying the exclu sion of plant and animal varieties from patentability in the Directive, which is in the same terms as exclusions in the Eur 138. In February 1995 Technical Board of 144 opean Patent Convention and the Stras Appeal 3.3.4 of the European Patent Office bourg Convention 145 (although in the had delivered a decision 1 4 9 widely inter Strasbourg Convention the exclusion is preted as holding — contrary to earlier expressed as an option 1 4 6 ) . case-law — that a claim embracing plant varieties within its subject-matter was not allowable. In November 1995 the Enlarged 144 — Article 53(b). 145 — Cited in note 25, Article 2(b). 146 — For a discussion of the reasons for that difference, and the background in general to the exclusions in the two 147 — See note 90. Conventions, see the decision of the Enlarged Board of Appeal of the European Patent Office in G01/98 Nwar- 148 — The prohibition against parallel protection was removed tts/Transgenic plant [2000] ĽPOR 303, paragraphs 3.4 to in the 1991 revision of the UPOV Convention. 3.7. 149 — Plant Genetic Systems, cited in note 121.
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Board of Appeal stated 150 that, correctly so as to increase its resistance to a herbi- interpreted, that decision had held that cide — may be patented if its technical plants grown from cells into which a gene feasibility is not confined to a particular sequence conferring resistance to herbicides variety, or to put it another way, it will not had been inserted were as a result of that be excluded from patentability solely genetic modification a 'plant variety' because the claim encompasses plant within the meaning of Article 53(b). groupings which embrace more than one variety.
140. It may be noted that the above interpretation of recitals 31 and 32 and Article 4(2) is in accordance with the current case-law of the European Patent Office following the decision in December 1999 of the Enlarged Board of Appeal in the Novartis case. 151 139. Clearly that ruling, the effect of which was that any genetically modified plant was regarded as a plant variety and hence unpatentable, would have seriously under- mined one of the principal objectives of the Directive. The Council and the Parliament 141. I accordingly conclude that all the have confirmed in their written observa- arguments to the effect that the Directive tions to the Court that that case-law of the should be annulled on the ground that it European Patent Office explains the word- infringes the principle of legal certainty ing of the relevant provisions of the Direc- should be rejected. tive, which were drafted so as to ensure that they did not lead to the same result. Recital 31 states that a plant grouping characterised by a particular gene is not covered by the protection of new varieties even if it comprises new varieties. That situation however must be distinguished from an invention which consists only in The argument as to the infringement of genetically modifying a particular plant international obligations variety which itself results in a new variety: in such a case, recital 32 states that the exception to patentability will apply. Arti- cle 4(2) in effect reverses the decision in Plant Genetic Systems: an invention — 142. The Netherlands submits that, in such as the genetic modification of a plant adopting the Directive, the Parliament and Council infringed Article 228(7) of the EC
150 — G03/95 Plant Genetic Systems/Plant cells, decision of 27 November 1995. 151 — Cited in note 146.
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Treaty (now Article 300(7) EC) since the of the TRIPs Agreement, the Agreement on Directive is incompatible with various Technical Barriers to Trade and the Con- international obligations. vention on Biological Diversity by their nature do not have direct effect. Their alleged infringement cannot therefore be invoked as a ground for reviewing the legality of the Directive.
143. Article 228 is concerned with agree- ments concluded between the Community and one or more States or international organisations. Article 228(7) provides:
146. I do not however consider that, on the assumption that the provisions of the international agreements referred to do 'Agreements concluded under the condi- not have direct effect, that necessarily tions set out in this Article shall be binding supports the conclusion which the Council on the institutions of the Community and draws. In Germany v Council, 153 relied on on Member States.' by the Council as authority for its submis- sion, the Court stated that it could review the lawfulness of a Community act from the point of view of international obliga- tions (the GATT rules) which did not have direct effect if the Community intended to 144. The international obligations invoked implement a particular obligation entered by the Netherlands arise under the TRIPs into within the framework of those rules or Agreement, the Agreement on Technical if the Community act expressly referred to Barriers to Trade, the European Patent specific provisions thereof. 154 It is that Convention and the Convention on Biolo- criterion rather than direct effect which gical Diversity. seems appropriate in this context.
145. The Council submits as a preliminary point that the question whether a Commu- nity act is unlawful because it infringes 147. More generally, it might be thought provisions of an international agreement to that it is in any event desirable as a matter which the Community is a party arises only of policy for the Court to be able to review if those provisions have direct effect. 152 the legality of Community legislation in the The Council considers that the provisions light of treaties binding the Community. There is no other court which is in a
152 — Case C-280/93 Germany v Council |1994| ECR 1-4973, paragraphs 103 to 111, confirmed with regard to the \VTO Agreement hy Case C-149/96 Poringai v Council 153 — Cited in note 152. [1999| ECR 1-8395. 154 — Paragraph 111 of the judgment.
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position to review Community legislation; thus if this Court is denied competence, Member States may be subject to conflict- ing obligations with no means of resolving them.
(36) Whereas the TRIPs Agreement pro- 148. I accordingly propose to consider the vides for the possibility that members substance of the Netherlands' arguments of the World Trade Organisation may concerning the alleged infringement by the exclude from patentability inventions, Directive of various international obliga- the prevention within their territory of tions of the Member States notwithstand- the commercial exploitation of which ing the Council's submission. is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the envir- onment, provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is prohibited by their law'.
Infringement of the TRIPs Agreement
149. Recitals 12 and 36 in the preamble to the Directive read as follows: ISO. Article 1(2) of the Directive provides:
'(12) Whereas the Agreement on Trade- Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop- erty Rights (TRIPs)... signed by the European Community and the Mem- 'This Directive shall be without prejudice ber States, has entered into force and to the obligations of the Member States provides that patent protection must pursuant to international agreements, and be guaranteed for products and pro- in particular the TRIPs Agreement and the cesses in all areas of technology; Convention on Biological Diversity.' I - 7128
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151. Article 27(3)(b) of the TRIPs Agree- Member, has chosen, in Article 4(1) of the ment permits members to exclude from Directive, to exclude only part of that range patentability: from patentability. The Community was thereby exercising the option in accordance with Article 27(3). The fact that that option is no longer available to the Nether- lands is a consequence not of any infringe- ment of the TRIPs Agreement but of the 'plants and animals other than micro- harmonising effect of the Directive. organisms, and essentially biological pro- cesses for the production of plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes...'.
155. Moreover the Netherlands cannot rely on Article 1(2) of the Directive. That 152. The Netherlands submits that the provision states that the Directive is to be Directive prevents Member States from without prejudice to Member States' obli- choosing whether to use that option since gations pursuant to the TRIPs Agreement. it provides for a system of patentability The Netherlands' obligations under that which extends to plants and animals other Agreement are however not affected by than plant and animal varieties. The Direc- Article 4(1) of the Directive, which simply tive is accordingly incompatible with the exercises a right (of option) and does not TRIPs Agreement. affect such obligations.
153. It seems to me that that argument can be met without needing to discuss further whether Recitals 12 and 36 and Arti- cle 1(2) of the Directive are sufficient to confer competence on the Court to review the legality of the Directive in the light of Incompatibility with the Agreement on the TRIPs Agreement. Technical Barriers to Trade
154. The option in Article 27(3)(b) of the TRIPs Agreement allows WTO Members 156. The Netherlands submits that the to exclude a wide range of subject-matter Directive contains technical regulations from patentability. The Community, a within the meaning of the Agreement on
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Technical Barriers to Trade, 155 Article 2 of of publication and notification with regard which regulates the adoption of such reg- to technical regulations which may have a ulations. Moreover notice of draft technical significant effect on trade of other Mem- regulations must be published and notified bers. 158 'Technical regulation' is defined as to the Secretariat of the World Trade follows: Organisation in accordance with Arti- cle 2.9 of the Agreement. The Netherlands is not aware that the prescribed procedure has been followed; in any event, it is not apparent from the Directive itself so that the Court cannot monitor compliance. 'Document which lays down product char- acteristics or their related processes and production methods, including the applic- able administrative provisions, with which compliance is mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with terminol- ogy, symbols, packaging, marking or label- ling requirements as they apply to a pro- duct, process or production method.' 159
157. The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade aims to ensure that technical regulations and standards, including packa- ging, marking and labelling requirements, and procedures for assessment of confor- mity with technical regulations and stan- 158. The Agreement on Technical Barriers dards do not create unnecessary obstacles to Trade is, like the TRIPs Agreement, a to international trade. 156 Article 1.3 pro- WTO Agreement. The Directive makes no vides that all products, including industrial reference to it, nor is there any suggestion and agricultural products, are to be subject that the Directive is intended to implement to the Agreement. The Agreement requires it, within the meaning of the Court's case- Members to ensure that technical regula- law. 160 The Agreement cannot therefore in tions are not prepared, adopted or applied my view be invoked in proceedings for the with a view to or with the effect of creating annulment of a directive. unnecessary obstacles to international trade 157 and imposes certain requirements
155 — As far as the Community is concerned, the WTO Agreement and the other agteements concluded in that connection, including the Agreement on Technical Bar- 159. I cannot in any event see any argu- riers to Trade, were approved by Council Decision 94/800/EC of 22 December 1994 concerning the conclu- ment to support the assertion that the sion on behalf of the European Community, as regards Directive is a technical regulation as matters within its competence, of the agreements reached in the Uruguay Round multilateral negotiations (1986- 1994) (OJ 1994 L 336, p. 1). Those agreements are defined by the Agreement and hence within published as annexes to the Decision; the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade is published in OJ 1994 L 336, p. 86. They entered into force on 1 January 1996 for the Community and its Member States. 158 — Article 2.9. 156 — See recital five in the preamble. 159 — Point 1 of Annex 1. 157 — Article 2.2. 160 — See Germany v Council, cited in note 152.
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the scope of the Agreement. It does not lay use which are in particular to be considered down product characteristics within the unpatentable. 161 meaning of the Agreement, nor does it create obstacles to international trade. I accordingly consider that the Netherlands' submission on this head should be dis- missed.
162. The Netherlands notes that the criter- ion of unpatentability under the Directive is thus whether the commercial exploitation of an invention is contrary to ordre public or morality. The criterion under the Con- vention however is whether the 'publica- tion or exploitation' of an invention is Incompatibility with the European Patent contrary to ordre public or morality. More- Convention over a national patent will have to be refused on the specific grounds mentioned in Article 6(2) of the Directive, whereas the Convention provides a more general ground. An invention which has been considered unpatentable under the Direc- tive may thus none the less be lawful in a 160. Article 53(a) of the European Patent Member State as a European patent. The Convention provides that a European Directive and the Convention are accord- patent may not be granted in respect of ingly incompatible, and Article 1(2) of the inventions the publication or exploitation Directive is thus negated. of which would be contrary to ordre public or morality, provided that the exploitation shall not be deemed to be so contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation in some or all of the Contracting States.
163. However, it is clear to me that Arti- cle 228(7) of the EC Treaty does not apply to the European Patent Convention since that Convention is not an agreement con- cluded by the Community. The Community is accordingly not bound by the Conven- 161. Article 6(1) of the Directive provides tion and the Directive cannot infringe it. that inventions shall be considered unpa- The alleged incompatibility between the tentable where their commercial exploita- Convention and the Directive cannot there- tion would be contrary to ordre public or fore, even if substantiated, be a ground for morality; however, exploitation shall not be annulment of the Directive. deemed to be so contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation. Arti- cle 6(2) specifies several processes and one 161 — Article 6 is set out m full in paragraph 92 above.
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164. In any event, any differences between 166. I accordingly consider that the Neth- the substantive requirements of the two erlands' submission on this head should be instruments are to my mind marginal. As dismissed. demonstrated in the context of the Nether- lands' third ground of annulment, and in particular in discussing the scope of the ordre public exception, there is no reason to consider that the concept of ordre public falls to be interpreted differently in the Convention and in the Directive. Any risk that national courts will, when applying Incompatibility with the Convention on national law implementing the Directive, Biological Diversity interpret the concept differently from the European Patent Office when applying the Convention is now moreover even further reduced since the entire text of the Direc- tive has (since the present case was lodged) 167. Recitals 55 and 56 in the preamble to been incorporated in the Implementing the Directive state: Regulations to the Convention, which state that the Directive 'shall be used as a supplementary means of interpretation'. 162
'(55) Whereas following Decision 93/626/ EEC the Community is party to the Convention on Biological Diversity of 5 June 1992; whereas, in this regard, Member States must give particular weight to Article 3 and Article 8(j), the second sentence of Article 16(2) and Article 16(5) of the Convention when bringing into force the laws, regulations and administra- 165. Admittedly there remains the point tive provisions necessary to comply that the prohibition on patentability in the with this Directive; Convention extends to inventions whose publication would be contrary to ordre public and morality whereas the prohibi- tion in the Directive does not, referring solely to commercial exploitation. 163 That difference however to my mind has no (56) Whereas the Third Conference of the practical impact, since an invention whose Parties to the Biodiversity Conven- publication but not whose commercialisa- tion, which took place in November tion would be so contrary seems scarcely 1996, noted in Decision III/17 that conceivable. "further work is required to help develop a common appreciation of the relationship between intellectual 162 — See note 65. property rights and the relevant pro- 163 — See however note 99 above. visions of the TRIPs Agreement and
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the Convention on Biological Diver- approved by the Community on 25 Octo- sity, in particular on issues relating to ber 1993, 164 seeks to ensure the sustain- technology transfer and conservation able conservation and use of biological and sustainable use of biological diversity.165 An important aspect is the fair diversity and the fair and equitable and equitable sharing of the benefits arising sharing of benefits arising out of the out of the utilisation of genetic resources, use of genetic resources, including the including by appropriate access to genetic protection of knowledge, innovations resources and by appropriate transfer of and practices of indigenous and local relevant technologies, taking into account communities embodying traditional all rights over those resources and to lifestyles relevant for the conservation technologies.166 Norway, as a member of and sustainable use of biological the European Economic Area, is also a diversity".' party to the Convention.
170. Genetic resources are defined as 'genetic material of actual or potential value'. Genetic material is defined as 'any 168. Article 1(2) of the Directive provides: material of plant, animal, microbial or other origin containing functional units of heredity'. Technology includes biotechnol- ogy. 167
171. Article 3 of the Convention provides: 'This Directive shall be without prejudice to the obligations of the Member States pursuant to international agreements, and in particular the TRIPs Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity.' 'States have, in accordance with the Char- ter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the
164 — Cited in note 34. 169. The Convention on Biological Diver- 165 — See the recitals in the preamble, in particular the final recital, and Article 1. sity, signed by the Community and all the 166 — Article 1. Member States on 5 June 1992 and 167 —Article 2.
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responsibility to ensure that activities 174. The Netherlands submits that the within their jurisdiction or control do not relationship between the patentability of cause damage to the environment of other biotechnological inventions and the obliga- States or of areas beyond the limits of tions flowing from the Convention on national jurisdiction.' Biological Diversity is unclear. In particular it is not clear to what extent the grant of a patent for a biotechnological invention obtained from, or consisting of, a biological material which is to be found exclusively in developing countries or developed by tradi- tional methods is compatible with the obligation equitably to share the knowl- edge and benefits of genetic resources. 172. Article 8 of the Convention lays down Where a patent has been granted, the rights certain measures to be taken to encourage of the holder cover not only the protected biological diversity in natural habitats. biotechnological invention or material but Paragraph (j) requires the Contracting also the products of that material. Farmers Parties to 'respect, preserve and maintain in developing countries will therefore be knowledge, innovations and practices of able to profit from that invention only after indigenous and local communities embody- payment of dues to the patent-holder. ing traditional lifestyles relevant for the Implementation of the Directive may conservation and sustainable use of biolo- accordingly involve infringing the Conven- gical diversity'. tion.
173. Article 16(2) of the Convention requires the provision and/or facilitation of access to and transfer of technology, including biotechnology, to developing 175. Moreover, although the Directive countries under fair and most favourable draws a clear distinction between inven- terms. The second sentence of Article 16(2) tions, which are patentable, and discover- states that, in the case of biotechnology ies, which are not, there is a risk that subject to patents, such access and transfer traditional products and processes originat- are to be provided on terms which recog- ing in developing countries may be mista- nise and are consistent with the adequate kenly granted a patent even though they are and effective protection of intellectual discoveries rather than inventions: it is in property rights. Article 16(5) states that practice difficult to determine whether patents may have an influence on imple- living material is a discovery or an inven- mentation of the Convention and requires tion, precisely because not all traditional the Contracting Parties to ensure that such products and processes are known. In that rights are supportive of and do not run case, the income from such patents would counter to its objectives. benefit not the developing country con-
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cerned but the (Western) patent-holder. The few highly specific obligations on the developing country would have to launch Member States in that narrow context. lengthy and costly legal proceedings to Patents conferred in accordance with the challenge a patent once granted, which Directive will of course, as with all patents, would conflict with the requirement in the be territorial in effect. Convention that knowledge and the benefit of genetic resources in the developing countries should be justly shared.
179. The Convention, in contrast, is more in the nature of a framework agreement. 176. Norway submits that several aspects Having set out its objectives in Article 1, of the Directive are incompatible with the the Convention proposes a series of object and purpose of the Convention. approaches which Contracting Parties Implementation of the Directive may thus (which as at 5 June 2001 numbered 180 force States to disregard provisions of the States worldwide) are to adopt, in many Convention. Moreover adoption of the cases only 'as far as possible and as Directive in the EEA Joint Committee will appropriate'. 168 The scope of the Conven- create serious problems for Norway, which tion is rather wide; the suggested measures will be subject to conflicting Treaty obliga- are rather varied and in most cases couched tions. The Directive should accordingly be in general terms. annulled.
177. In my view, the arguments that the 180. It is axiomatic that nothing in the Directive is incompatible with the Conven- Directive could require States which are not tion on Biological Diversity betray a failure Member States of the European Union (or to appreciate the respective objectives and Contracting Parties to the Agreement on spheres of application of the two instru- the European Economic Area) to confer ments. patent protection on biotechnological inventions (although of course other inter- national instruments, including the TRIPs Agreement, may have precisely that effect). Thus the approach of developing coun- tries — where, as the Netherlands and 178. The Directive, as is clear from the Norway suggest, much genetic richness is analysis in the context of the earlier concentrated — to the patent protection of grounds for annulment, requires the Mem- biotechnological inventions remains unaf- ber States of the European Union to ensure fected by the Directive. that their national law provides patent protection for biotechnological inventions as there defined. To that effect it imposes a 168 — Articles 5, 6(b), 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 14.
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181. The Directive, being concerned with in one form or another since the Venetian patents, does not seek to regulate matters law of 1474, 172 are not mere formalities, outside the realm of industrial property. but are the essential conditions of patent- Again as discussed both above and ability which must each be satisfied before below, 169 it is not for patent legislation to a patent can be granted. Natural resources provide for broader matters such as mon- as such cannot therefore be the object of a itoring the source of biological material in patent. respect of which patent protection is sought. The Directive does not — nor can it — affect the ability of developing coun- tries to establish controls over their genetic resources in order to prevent the unregu- lated plundering of such resources. At least a dozen countries have already taken such steps, in accordance with the Convention on Biological Diversity, and a similar number are currently developing con- trols. 170 183. In any event, nowhere does the Con- vention prohibit or restrict the patentability of biotechnological materials, or even of genetic resources; on the contrary, Arti- cle 16(2) of the Convention requires that access to and transfer of biotechnology subject to patents shall be provided on terms which recognise and are consistent with the adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights.
182. I do not understand how, as the Netherlands submits, traditional products and processes originating in developing countries may be patented in accordance with the Directive even though they are discoveries not inventions. As the Directive makes explicit,171in order to be patentable an invention must be new, must involve an inventive step and must be susceptible of industrial application. Those requirements, 184. I accordingly reject the arguments that which have been part of patent legislation the Directive and the Convention on Bio- logical Diversity are incompatible, without therefore needing to consider what the 169 — See paragraph 25 above and paragraphs 211-214 below. implications of any such incompatibility 170 — The Philippines, for example, requires bio-prospectors to would be. obtain prior informed consent from both the government and local peoples; Costa Rica's National Institute of Biodiversity has signed an agreement with a major drug company to receive funds and share in benefits from biological materials that are commercialised; countries of 172 — 'any new ingenious contrivance... reduced to perfection, the Andean Pact require bio-prospectors to meet certain so that it can be used and exercised'. See S.P. Ladas conditions (Convention on Biological Diversity website). Patents, Trademarks, and Related Rights — National 171 — In Article 3(1), set out in paragraph 187 below. and International Protection (1975), pp. 6 and 7.
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The argument as to fundamental rights sequence or partial sequence of a human gene, cannot be patented; whereas these principles are in line with the criteria of patentability proper to patent law, whereby a mere discovery cannot be patented; 185. Article F(2) of the Treaty on European Union states:
'The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law.' (20) Whereas, therefore, it should be made clear that an invention based on an element isolated from the human body or otherwise produced by means of a technical process, which is sus- ceptible of industrial application, is not excluded from patentability, even where the structure of that element is 186. Recitals 16, 20, 21, 26 and 43 in the identical to that of a natural element, preamble to the Directive state: given that the rights conferred by the patent do not extend to the human body and its elements in their natural environment;
'(16) Whereas patent law must be applied so as to respect the fundamental principles safeguarding the dignity and integrity of the person; whereas it is important to assert the principle (21) Whereas such an element isolated that the human body, at any stage in from the human body or otherwise its formation or development, includ- produced is not excluded from patent- ing germ cells, and the simple dis- ability since it is, for example, the covery of one of its elements or one result of technical processes used to of its products, including the identify, purify and classify it and to
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reproduce it outside the human body, 187. Article 3(1) of the Directive provides: techniques which human beings alone are capable of putting into practice and which nature is incapable of accomplishing by itself; 'For the purposes of this Directive, inven- tions which are new, which involve an inventive step and which are susceptible of industrial application shall be patentable even if they concern a product consisting of or containing biological material or a process by means of which biological material is produced, processed or used.'
(26) Whereas if an invention is based on biological material of human origin or 188. Article 5 provides: if it uses such material, where a patent application is filed, the person from whose body the material is taken must have an opportunity of expressing free and informed consent thereto, in '1. The human body, at the various stages accordance with national law; of its formation and development, and the simple discovery of one of its elements, including the sequence or partial sequence of a gene, cannot constitute patentable inventions.
2. An element isolated from the human body or otherwise produced by means of a technical process, including the sequence or partial sequence of a gene, may constitute a (43) Whereas pursuant to Article F(2) of patentable invention, even if the structure the Treaty on European Union, the of that element is identical to that of a Union is to respect fundamental natural element. rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions 3. The industrial application of a sequence common to the Member States, as or a partial sequence of a gene must be general principles of Community law'. disclosed in the patent application.'
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189. The Netherlands, citing X v Commis- must at the very least have some control sion, 173 submits that any Community act over the fate of his body, or a part thereof. which infringes any fundamental right is Only in recital 26 however does the Direc- unlawful. In its view, the Directive infringes tive mention the donor's right. Recitals fundamental rights both by commission have no binding legal force. The fact that and by omission. there is nothing in the body of the Directive ensuring that human matter is managed carefully must be considered to be contrary to fundamental rights.
190. The Netherlands submits first that Article 5(2) of the Directive provides that elements isolated from the human body are patentable. The right to human dignity is recognised by the Court as a fundamental 193. Second, there is no provision in the right. The human body is the vehicle for Directive for the protection of the recipient human dignity. Making living human mat- of material which has been processed or ter an instrument is not acceptable from the obtained by biotechnological means. A point of view of human dignity. patient may thus without knowledge or consent receive such treatment. The Neth- erlands submits that the obligation to respect private life, medical confidence, the right to physical integrity and the protection of the right to personal informa- tion, as recognised in the case-law of the Court, may be grouped together as 'perso- nal rights'. In the context of medical 191. The Netherlands submits second that treatment, the right of patients to self- the Directive fails to provide for careful determination is in the same category. The management of human material and for the Directive seriously and without justifica- consent of the persons concerned in two tion infringes that right. contexts.
192. First, the donor of elements isolated 194. Italy supports the submissions of the from the human body which are patented Netherlands, adding that a directive which regulates a matter such as biotechnology whose effect on fundamental rights is 173 — Case C-404/92 P [1994] ECR I-4737. unquestionable but which fails to provide
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the necessary guarantees that its applica- respected and protected. The right to free tion will protect those rights cannot be and informed consent both of donors of valid. elements of the human body and of reci- pients of medical treatment can also prop- erly be regarded as fundamental; it is also now reflected in Article 3(2) of the EU Charter which requires in the fields of medicine and biology respect for 'the free 195. Thus the Netherlands considers that and informed consent of the person con- the Directive violates fundamental rights in cerned, according to procedures laid down two ways: it contains a provision (Arti- by law'. It must be accepted that any cle 5(2)) which is contrary to human dig- Community instrument infringing those nity and it fails to provide for the respect of rights would be unlawful. donors' right of control over donated matter and of medical patients' right of consent to treatment. It is helpful in my view to deal with these arguments sepa- rately.
198. In my view, however, the Directive does not infringe fundamental rights as alleged by the Netherlands and Italy.
196. I would note that the arguments presented to the Court on the compatibility of the Directive with fundamental rights focus on the abovementioned specific issues alone. I must therefore restrict my analysis of the alleged incompatibility of the Direc- tive with fundamental rights to those issues. Does Article 5(2) infringe fundamental rights?
197. There can be no doubt in my view that the rights invoked by the Netherlands are indeed fundamental rights, respect for 199. In the first place, I cannot accept the which must be ensured in the Community Netherlands' assertion in absolute terms legal order. The right to human dignity is that a patent for an element isolated from perhaps the most fundamental right of all, the human body is contrary to human and is now expressed in Article 1 of the dignity. That submission appears to be Charter of Fundamental Rights of the based on the premiss that patent protection European Union, 174 which states that of such an element amounts to an appro- human dignity is inviolable and must be priation of part of the human body con- cerned. A patent however confers no rights of ownership. Moreover, the Directive 174 — Done at Nice, 7 December 2000, OJ 2000 C 364, p. 1. provides that neither the human body itself
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nor the simple discovery of one of its 201. None the less, circumstances in which elements may be patented. 175 As a matter the grant of a patent for an element isolated of general patent law, which is made from the human body offends against explicit in Article 3(1) of the Directive, human dignity may perhaps be imagined; only inventions which are new, which moreover future developments in biotech- involve an inventive step and which are nology may make feasible products or susceptible of industrial application are processes which are unimaginable now patentable. 176 The discovery of an element but which would similarly offend against of the human body, such as a gene, thus human dignity. Such inventions would cannot be patented; only when the gene has however unquestionably be unpatentable been isolated from its natural state by, for under the Directive by virtue of the exclu- example, processing through purifying sion from patentability in Article 6(1) of steps that separate it from other molecules inventions whose commercial exploitation naturally associated with it, can it be would be contrary to morality. The Direc- patented, and then only if its industrial tive thus provides an essential safeguard application, for example the production of against the issue of such a patent. That new drugs, is disclosed in the patent safeguard is moreover so framed as to application in accordance with Article 5(3) accommodate future developments: the of the Directive. The patent will therefore generality of the standard ensures that it not cover the gene as it occurs in the human can be applied to inventions in this fast body, since genes in the body are not in the evolving field the detail of which cannot at isolated and purified form which is the present be foreseen. It is no doubt for that subject of the patent. 177 reason also that the legislature chose not to lay down in Article 6(2) an exhaustive list of examples of inventions which are to be considered unpatentable by virtue of Arti- cle 6(1). A case-by-case evaluation of patent applications in the light of moral consensus is the surest guarantee that the right to human dignity will be respected, and that is the framework established by the Directive.
200. Thus the maxim 'no patent on life' is something of an over-simplification.
175 — Article 5(1). 176 — For examples of revocation or invalidation of a patent granted for a biotechnological product or process on the ground inter aha that the national patent law require- ments of novelty and inventive step had not heen satisfied, see the judgments of the Court of Appeal (England and Wales) in Re Genentech's Pateul |1989| RPC 147 (protein genetically engineered from human cells) and of the House of Lords (England and Wales) in Biogen v Maleva [1997] RPC 1 (DNA sequence coding for Tiepatitis B virus antigen). 1 7 7 — S e e also the decision of the European Patent Office Opposition Division in Howard Horey/Relaxnt ¡1995| EPOR 541, where similar arguments hased on the 202. It thus seems to me that Articles 5 and morality exception m Article 53(a) of the European 6 of the Directive draw a careful line Patent Convention were unsuccessfully adduced against the patentability of isolated DNA fragments encoding between cases where elements of human human H2-relaxin (a protein). origin should not be regarded as patentable
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and those where they can properly be Does the failure to provide for consent regarded as patentable. infringe fundamental rights?
205. It is not however sufficient to say that the provisions of the Directive do not in themselves infringe fundamental rights. The complaint of the Netherlands and Italy 203. The Directive also reflects the conclu- is also that the Directive fails to contain sions of the Group of Advisers to the certain provisions necessary to protect such European Commission on the ethical impli- rights and thereby infringes those rights. In cations of biotechnology. In its report on particular it fails to ensure that such rights the ethical aspects of patenting inventions are respected when patents are initially involving elements of human origin, 178 the granted for biotechnological products and Group of Advisers does not recommend processes and when such patented products excluding the patentability of such inven- and processes are subsequently exploited tions as a matter of principle, but considers and used. that it should be subject to certain ethical principles, with the result that fundamental human rights are respected. Thus it says: 'Whatever is the nature of the biotechno- logical invention involving elements of human origin, the Directive must give 206. The Netherlands submits first that the sufficient guarantee so that refusal to grant Directive should provide for the donor of a patent on an invention in so far as it elements isolated from the human body infringes the rights of the person and the which are patented to have control over the respect of human dignity should be legally fate of his body or a part thereof. founded.' That guarantee is to be found in the exclusion from patentability on the ground of morality in Article 6(1) of the Directive.
207. Recital 26 states that, where a patent application is filed for an invention based on or using biological material of human origin, the donor of that material 'must have had an opportunity of expressing free and informed consent thereto, in accor- dance with national law'. 204. I do not therefore consider that the Directive infringes human dignity by pro- viding that elements isolated from the human body may be patented.
208. That recital has its origins in an 178 — Opinion of 25 September 1996. amendment proposed by the Parliament
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which would have inserted a new Arti- 210. It is of course clearly desirable that no cle 8a(2) in the Directive, requiring inter element of human origin should be taken alia that an applicant for such a patent from a person without their consent. That must provide 'evidence to the patent autho- principle is expressed at the forefront of the rities that the material has been used and EU Charter of Fundamental Rights; 181 it is the patent applied for with the voluntary also enshrined in Chapter II of the Council and informed agreement of the person of of Europe Convention on human rights and origin...'. 179 That amendment was not biomedicine, 182 which provides that an accepted. intervention in the health field may only be carried out after the person concerned has given free and informed consent to it. 183
209. It is not clear from the wording of recital 26 in the various language versions whether the consent must relate to the 211. In my view, however, although the filing of the patent application or to the requirement of consent to all potential uses taking of the material from the donor. of human material may be regarded as Recital 26 therefore may not go as far as fundamental, patent law is not the appro- recommended by the Group of Advisers to priate framework for the imposition and the Commission, 180 which stated: monitoring of such a requirement. A patent, as discussed above, 184 simply con- fers the right to prevent others from using or otherwise exploiting the patented inven- tion; how the grantee of the patent uses or exploits that invention is regulated not by patent law but by national law and practice governing the field concerned. 'The ethical principle of informed and free consent of the person from whom retrievals are performed, must be respected. This principle includes that the information of this person is complete and specific, in particular on the potential patent applica- tion on the invention which could be made from the use of this element. An invention 212. Moreover to make evidence of such based on the use of elements of human consent a condition of granting a biotech- origin, having been retrieved without respecting the principle of consent will 181 — See paragraph 197 above. not fulfil the ethical requirements.' 182 — Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine signed at Oviedo on 4 April 1997; European Treaty Series No 164. 179 — Amendment 76/rev. in the legislative resolution embody- 183 — The Convention has been in force since I December ing the Parliament's opinion on the proposal for the 1999, although of EU Member States only Denmark, Directive, OJ 1997 C 286, p. 87. Greece and Spain have both signed and ratified it. 180 —See note 178. 184 — See paragraph 25 above.
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nological patent — presumably by way of 214. The Netherlands also submits that the the morality principle — to my mind risks Directive, by failing to require that a being unworkable. Biotechnological inven- patient must consent to receiving medical tions may derive from research on possibly treatment involving material which has thousands of blood or tissue samples, been processed or obtained by biotechno- possibly pooled and almost certainly anony- logical means, infringes fundamental rights. mous at the time of analysis. I do not That argument is in my view misconceived. consider that it is reasonable to expect The conditions of exploitation or use of patent examiners to satisfy themselves that patented inventions are, as discussed the chain of consent with regard to each above, 185 outside the scope of patent sample is unbroken and evidenced. It is legislation, falling to be controlled by other rather the responsibility of the medical or means. That is clearly spelt out by recital research staff taking the samples to ensure 14: it is not for substantive patent law, that consent is given; that responsibility, which merely entitles the holder to prohibit together with the form and scope of the third parties from exploiting his inventions consent, will be imposed by national reg- for industrial and commercial purposes, to ulations, codes of practice etc outside the replace ethical monitoring of research or patent arena. That approach is not incon- the commercial use of its results. Similarly, sistent with recital 26, which refers to as the Council points out, the Directive 'national law'. Patentability on the other contains no provision requiring that the hand is to be assessed only on the basis of recipient of biotechnologically processed the nature of the product or process itself, matter must be informed simply because it or on the ground that any commercial or does not and cannot seek to regulate the industrial application would be objection- use or commercialisation of such matter. able.
215. I therefore reach the conclusion that the Directive does not, either by what it provides or by what it fails to provide, 213. Thus in my view the Directive is not infringe, in itself, fundamental rights recog- the proper place for rules governing the nised in Community law. The possibility consent of the donor or of the recipient of cannot of course be excluded that a parti- elements of human origin. Indeed such cular application of the Directive within a questions of consent arise more generally Member State may infringe fundamental with regard to any use of human sub- rights, although it contains provisions stances, such as transplants, organ dona- designed to avoid that consequence. But tion, etc. That supports the view that the the conclusion is clear in my view that the issues are not to be resolved by patent law, and in particular by patent law as it applies in this specific sector. 185 — See paragraph 25 above.
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Directive does not in itself infringe funda- 219. The Netherlands submits that the mental rights. Commission's operations are governed by the principle of collegiality. 186 That prin- ciple is based on the equal participation of the Commissioners in the adoption of decisions, from which it follows in parti- cular that decisions should be the subject of collective deliberations and that all the The argument that the correct procedure members of the college of Commissioners was not followed should bear collective responsibility at political level for all decisions adopted. 187 The formal requirements for effective com- pliance with the principle of collegiality 216. The Netherlands submits that the vary according to the nature and legal Directive was not properly adopted since effects of the acts adopted by that institu- it is based on an unlawful proposal by the tion. 188 The Commission's proposal, which Commission. It accordingly infringes the was indispensable to adoption of the combined provisions of Articles 100a and Directive, should have been adopted by 189b(2) of the EC Treaty or, at least, those the college in its definitive version as provisions combined with Article 190 of presented to the Parliament and Council; the EC Treaty. its text should also have been made avail- able to all the members of the college in all the official languages when it was adopted by the Commission. Nothing in the Direc- tive suggests that this essential procedural requirement was observed. 217. Article 189b(2) (now, after amend- ment, Article 251(2) EC) provides, with regard to legislation governed by that article, that the Commission is to submit a proposal to the European Parliament and the Council.
220. With regard to the argument as to the 218. Article 190 (now Article 253 EC) principle of collegiality, it appears from its provides: reply that the Netherlands is not alleging that that principle was in fact infringed, but merely that the Commission did not verify compliance therewith, or at least that there is no trace of such verification in the preamble to the Directive. 'Regulations, directives and decisions adopted jointly by the European Parliament and the Council... shall state the reasons on 186 —Case C-137/92 P Commission v BASF [1994] ECR which they are based and shall refer to any I-2555, paragraph 62 of the judgment. proposals or opinions which were required 187 — BASP, paragraph 63 of the judgment. to be obtained pursuant to this Treaty.' 188 —Case C-191/95 Commission v Germany [1998] ECR I-5449, paragraph 41 of the judgment.
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221. As for the submission that the Com- 224. In support of that submission, the mission did not verify compliance with the Commission refers to Article 6 of Regula- principle, the Commission states (and the tion No 1 of the Council determining the Netherlands does not dispute) that the languages to be used by the European proposal was adopted by the Commission Economic Community, 189 which states at its meeting of 13 December 1995; the that the institutions of the Community adoption was hence unquestionably lawful. may stipulate in their rules of procedure which of the official and working lan- guages are to be used in specific cases. In implementation of that provision, Article 4 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commis- sion states that 'The agenda and the necessary working documents shall be circulated to the Members of the Commis- sion within the time-limit and in the work- ing languages prescribed by the Commis- 222. As for the submission that the pre- sion in accordance with Article 24', which amble to the Directive is silent, I would latter provision requires the Commission to note that there is nothing in the Treaty determine rules to give effect to the Rules of provisions invoked by the Netherlands Procedure. Those implementing rules pro- which supports its apparent contention vide that the working documents relating to that it must be stated in Community an agenda are to be sent to the Members of legislation that the principle of collegiality the Commission in the languages fixed by has been respected. the President taking account of the mini- mum needs of the members. The proposal for the Directive was presented to the Members of the Commission in English, French and German and — as is custom- ary — sent to the other institutions in all the official languages.
223. With regard to the argument that the proposal should have been made available to all the members of the college in all the official languages when it was adopted by the Commission, it must be borne in mind that a Commission proposal is not a decision taking the form of one of the acts referred to in Article 189 of the EC Treaty and is not therefore required by the Treaty to be adopted in authentic versions in all 225. I would accordingly reject the argu- languages. I accept the Commission's sub- ment that the Directive was not properly mission that it would be inappropriate, and adopted since it was based on an unlawful is not necessary in order to respect the proposal by the Commission. principle of collegiality, to require a pro- posal to be adopted by the college in all languages. 189 — OJ, English Special Edition I (1952-58), p. 59.
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Conclusion
226. It follows, for the reasons I have given, that this action must, in my opinion, fail. But the action may not have been fruitless. It is clear, I think, that it was prompted by understandable concerns, reflecting a general awareness that the irresponsible pursuit of biotechnological research may have consequences which are ethically unacceptable. Although some of the grounds of challenge were of a purely technical character, those concerns were central. The action may not have been fruitless in that it may have shown that those concerns can and should be allayed.
227. Thus the Directive is concerned in particular with the patentability of biotechnological inventions and not with their use. Within that framework, there are adequate moral safeguards going in some respects beyond mere application of the existing criteria for patentability. The fact that the ethical criteria for patentability are not exhaustively defined, far from undermining the moral safeguard, enhances it since future developments will continue to be governed by those criteria even if not currently foreseeable. Biotechnological inventions which are contrary to human dignity consequently neither are now nor can in the future be patentable in accordance with the Directive.
228. The action moreover highlights the importance of regulating at national level the use of biotechnological material, precisely because such use, since it falls outside the parameters of patentability, is not — indeed cannot be — regulated by the Directive. In particular, adequate provision must be made for ensuring that the principle of informed consent is respected whenever material is taken from human beings which might be used for scientific or technological purposes. I - 7147
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229. It is not therefore the Directive itself which is objectionable as a result of what it contains or what it omits. It is of course crucial that its implementation be carefully controlled to ensure especially that the moral safeguard is fully transposed and assiduously observed. I am satisfied however that the Community legislative framework itself is not illegal.
230. In the result I am of the opinion that:
(1) The action should be dismissed;
(2) The Kingdom of the Netherlands should be ordered to pay the costs of the European Parliament and of the Council;
(3) The interveners should bear their own costs.
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