C-381/98
ECLI:EU:C:2000:230
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INGMAR
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL LÉGER delivered on 11 May 2000 *
1. From 1989, the company incorporated 4. In the main proceedings, the Court of under English law, Ingmar GB Ltd Appeal of England and Wales, United ('Ingmar'), was the commercial agent of Kingdom, finds it necessary to ask the Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc., a com- Court about the applicability of the Direc- pany incorporated under Californian law tive to the contract at issue, in the circum- ('Eaton'), in the United Kingdom and the stances of the present case, where the Republic of Ireland. parties had expressly chosen to submit that contract to the law of a non-EU State, rather than to the national legislation implementing the relevant Community leg- islation.
2. After the commercial agency contract came to an end in 1996, Ingmar instituted proceedings to obtain payment of commis- sion and compensation for the damage suffered as a result of the termination of the relationship between the two compa- nies. I — The legislation applicable
3. In response to the claims made by Ingmar, based on the United Kingdom The Directive legislation implementing Directive 86/653/ EEC, 1Eaton contends that the applicable law cannot be that relied on by the applicant, since the contract binding the two companies contains a clause stipulating 5. The Directive, whose purpose is the that the contract is governed by the law of coordination of the laws of the Member the State of California, United States of States relating to commercial agents, is America. justified by the fact that 'the differences in national laws concerning commercial representation substantially affect the con- ditions of competition and the carrying-on * Original language: French. 1 — Council Directive 86/653/EEC of 18 December 1986 on the of that activity within the Community and coordination of the laws of the Member States relating to are detrimental both to the protection self-employed commercial agents (OJ 1986 L 382, p. 17; 'the Directive'). available to commercial agents vis-à-vis
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their principals and to the security of 9. Article 18 lists certain cases in which the commercial transactions'. 2 indemnity or compensation is not to be payable: termination of the contract on the initiative of the principal, because of default attributable to the commercial agent, or termination on the initiative of the commercial agent, in the absence of specific justifications, or even, with the 6. Again under the second recital in the agreement of the principal, assignment by preamble, 'those differences are such as to the commercial agent of his rights and inhibit substantially the conclusion and duties under the agency contract to another operation of commercial representation person. contracts where principal and commercial agent are established in different Member States'.
10. Under Article 19 of the Directive, '[t]he parties may not derogate from Articles 17 and 18 to the detriment of the commercial agent before the agency contract expires'. 7. Article 1(1) of the Directive provides that '[t]he harmonisation measures pre- scribed by this Directive shall apply to the laws, regulations and administrative provi- sions of the Member States governing the relations between commercial agents and their principals'. National law
11. In the United Kingdom, the Directive was implemented by the Commercial Agents (Council Directive) Regulations 8. Under Article 17(1) of the Directive, 1993, 3which entered into force on 1 Jan- 'Member States shall take the measures uary 1994 in accordance with Regulation necessary to ensure that the commercial 1(1). agent is, after termination of the agency contract, indemnified in accordance with paragraph 2 or compensated for damage in accordance with paragraph 3'. Paragraphs 2 to 5 specify the conditions to which the payment of the indemnity and compensa- 12. Regulation 1(2) states that the Regula- tion is subject, and the way in which they tions 'govern the relations between com- are fixed. mercial agents and their principals and,
2 — Second recital in the preamble. 3 — Hereinafter 'the Regulations'.
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subject to paragraph 3, apply in relation to unless there is a public policy reason, such the activities of commercial agents in Great as an overriding provision, for not so Britain'. doing. In such circumstances, are the pro- visions of Council Directive 86/653/EEC, as implemented in the laws of the Member States, and in particular those provisions relating to the payment of compensation to 13. Under Regulation 1(3), 'Regulations 3 agents on termination of their agreements to 22 do not apply where the parties have with their principals, applicable when: agreed that the agency contract is to be governed by the law of another Member State'.
(i) a principal appoints an exclusive agent in the United Kingdom and the Repub- lic of Ireland for the sale of its products I I — Procedure in the main proceedings therein; and and the question referred
14. Ingmar brought the main proceedings before the High Court of Justice of England and Wales which delivered its judgment on (ii) in so far as sales of the products in the 23 October 1997. It held that the Regula- United Kingdom are concerned, the tions did not apply, since the contract at agent carries out its activities in the issue was governed by the law of the State United Kingdom; and of California.
15. Ingmar appealed against the judgment to the Court of Appeal. Since that court (iii) the principal is a company incorpo- took the view that the resolution of the rated in a non-EU State, and in parti- dispute in the main proceedings depended cular in the State of California, USA, on the interpretation of the Directive, it and situated there; and decided to stay proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court for a preliminary ruling:
(iv) the express applicable law of the con- 'Under English law, effect will be given to tract between the parties is that of the the applicable law as chosen by the parties, State of California, USA?'
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III— The question referred for a preli- That argument does not appear to be minary ruling connected with the choice of law made by the parties to the contract. It is worth looking into it separately from the choice- of-law question in order to determine what impact the fact that the contracting parties 16. By the question referred, the national are not both established within the Com- court seeks to know, in substance, whether, munity might have on the law applicable. It since the provisions of the Directive is thus necessary to ascertain the territorial require, after the termination of a commer- scope of the Directive since that is, in fact, cial agency contract, the payment by the the problem raised in this respect. principal of an indemnity to his agent or compensation for the damage suffered by the agent, they apply to a contract under which the principal has given authority to an agent based in a Member State of the Community to sell his products, exclu- sively, in the Community, where, first, the principal is an entity established in a non- EU State and, second, the contracting 19. Second, if the Directive is territorially parties have expressly chosen the law of applicable, it must be determined whether that State as the law applicable to the the provisions thereof relating to the sums contract. payable by the principal to the agent as a result of the termination of the commercial agency contract are materially applicable although the contract is expressly governed by the law of a non-EU State as chosen by the parties. 17. As is clear from its wording, the question formulated by the Court of Appeal actually includes two questions.
18. First, the parties argued about whether the Directive can govern a contract, one of the parties to which is based in a non-EU The territorial scope of the Directive State. At that time, Eaton contended in particular that international comity resisted the extra-territorial application of internal substantive laws. 4
4 — Point 2.3 of the written observations of the defendant in the 20. At the outset, it should be recalled that main proceedings. 'Comity' means 'rules of convention, usage or international courtesy which most often guide the it is common ground that the dispute in the conduct of States. These are not mandatory rules of law', main proceedings concerns the material D. Carreau, Droit international, Pedone, Paris (5th edn., 1997), paragraph 684. and temporal scope of the Directive.
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The dispute, as we know, is between a that they were to have extra-territorial commercial agent and his principal. 5As is effect. 7 clear from Article 1(1) thereof, the Direc- tive is intended to coordinate the laws of the Member States as regards the legal relationships between economic operators of that type. 6 22. In other words, the application of a norm of Community law to an economic operator established in a non-EU State would constitute, in the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary, an unacceptable extension of that law to It follows, in addition, from a reading of persons who, in principle, are not subject Article 22(1) in conjunction with Arti- to it by virtue of their geographical loca- cle 22(3) of the Directive that, unlike the tion. other Member States, who were required to implement the Directive before 1 January 1990, Ireland and the United Kingdom were to adopt implementing measures before 1 January 1994. Just as for the other Member States, by contrast, those measures 23. While examining, amongst the provi- were to apply, at the latest, to contracts in sions of the Directive, those which may operation by 1 January 1994, which covers help us to delimit its territorial scope in the the contract at issue, since it was concluded case of a contract between parties one of in 1989 and terminated in 1996. which is established in a Member State and the other in a non-EU State, some facts about the territorial scope of Community law in general need to be borne in mind.
21. It is apparent from the order for reference that the High Court of Justice, the first court to adjudicate in the main 24. Under Article 227 thereof (now, after proceedings, found that the Regulations amendment, Article 299 EC), the Treaty is applied only where both parties to a to apply to the Member States of the contract were Member State nationals, Community, which, in substance, makes which is not so in this case. In that court's its geographical basis dependent on the view, there was nothing in the Regulations territory of those States. 8 That provision or the Directive which led it to conclude establishes a. principle of coincidence
5 — Article 1(2) of the Directive states that '[f]or the purposes of 7 — Page 9 of the order for reference. this Directive, "commercial agent" shall mean a self- 8 — See A. Stathopoulos: 'the territorial scope of the Commu- employed intermediary who has continuing authority to nity legal order is in principle that of the "territory", in the negotiate the sale or the purchase of goods on behalf of geographical and constitutional sense, of the Member States another person, hereinafter called the "principal", or to including its natural extensions of subsoil, maritime space negotiate and conclude such transactions on behalf of and in (territorial waters) and air space', 'Commentaire du TCE, the name of that principal'. article 299' in Helbing and Lichtenhahn, Commentaire 6 — Case C-215/97 Bellone v Yokohama [1998] ECR I-2191, article par article des traités UE et CE, Dalloz, Bruylant paragraph 10. (1999), p. 1887, No 3.
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between the territorial scope of Community practices between wood-pulp producers on law and that of the law of the Member prices announced periodically to customers States. 9 established in the Community and on actual transaction prices charged to such customers. By its decision, the Commission had imposed fines on the undertakings concerned, on the ground that the conduct found to exist constituted infringements of 25. More specifically, the application of Article 85 of the Treaty. Community law depends on the geographi- cal location of certain elements within the territory of the Member States. 10
29. The producers made an application to the Court for annulment of the decision 26. The idea of the location of economic taken by the Commission, claiming that the operators or of their conduct within the Community did not have jurisdiction to territory of the Community has, in several apply its competition rules to them since articles of the Treaty, a place which cannot their registered offices were all situated be overlooked for the purpose of their beyond the limits of its territory. interpretation and application.
27. Article 85 of the EC Treaty (now In addition to the plea based on an Article 81 EC), for example, refers to incorrect assessment of the territorial scope agreements which may affect trade between of Article 85, the applicants relied on the Member States and which undermine com- existence of a contradiction between the petition 'within the common market'. In contested decision and public international Ahlström and Others v Commission, the law. They claimed that public international Court found it necessary to determine the law precludes the Community from regu- territorial scope of that provision. 11 lating conduct restricting competition adopted outside the territory of the Com- munity merely by reason of the economic repercussions which that conduct produces within the Community.
28. In that case, the Commission had established that there existed concerted
9 — Ibid., No 7. 30. The Court rejected those arguments. 10 — See J. Groux, '"Territorialité" et droit communautaire' [1987] 1 RTDE S. The alleged concertation on prices on the 11 — Joined Cases 89/85..104/85, 114/85, 116/85, 117/85 and part of the applicants, whose activity 125/85 to 129/85 Åhlström and Others v Commission [1988] ECR 5193. consisted in selling their goods directly to
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purchasers established in the Community, legitimise the Community's jurisdiction in had undoubtedly restricted competition cases where economic operators have, with within the common market. 12 The Court the territory of the Community, a link such found that what was crucial was the place that their conduct may affect the interests where the offending agreement had been of the Community. In that case, the terri- implemented and not the place where it had tory of the Community was the place where been formed. 13 In a clear expression of the the agreement had been implemented and legal basis and, at the same time, the had produced effects. criterion of reference underlying its judg- ment, the Court added that '[a]ccordingly the Community's jurisdiction to apply its competition rules to such conduct is cov- ered by the territoriality principle as uni- versally recognised in public international law'. 14 33. It should be observed that, in the present case, one of the objectives pursued by the Directive is to ensure the harmoni- sation of the conditions of competition between economic operators linked by a commercial agency contract, 'within the Community'. 16 31. In ruling on another argument put forward by the parties, based on disregard of international comity, the Court simply observed that that argument amounted to calling in question the Community's juris- diction to apply its competition rules to conduct such as that which had been found Although the legal basis of the norm to be to exist in that case and that, as such, that interpreted is not formally the same in the argument had already been rejected. 15 present case and in Åhlström and Others v Commission, since the Directive is not directly based on the Treaty provisions relating to competition, the Community interest at stake, based on the exercise of fair competition (Article 3(g) of the EC 32. In Åhlström and Others v Commission, Treaty, now, after amendment, Article 3(g) the Court acknowledges the territoriality EC), is indeed the same. principle as a basis for certain essential competition rules laid down by the Treaty. But the main interest of that case, as far as the present case is concerned, lies in the fact that that principle appears to be such as to 34. Since it is a question of defending that principle in the Community, the presence of 12 — Ibid., paragraphs 12 and 13. 13 — Ibid., paragraphs 16 and 17. an economic operator or the pursuit of his 14 — Ibid., paragraph 18, emphasis added. See also the Opinion business activity in a Member State cannot of Advocate General Darmon in Åhlström and Others v Commission, cited above, and, more specifically, P a r tII thereof which is devoted to international law. 15 — Ibid., paragraph 22. 16 — Second recital in the preamble.
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fail to have an effect on the solution to the one Member State and another, which is a dispute. postulate of the Community regime of fundamental freedoms, must be able to be relied on by the economic operator con- cerned, whatever his relations outside the Community.
35. The principles of freedom of establish- ment and of freedom to provide services, laid down in Article 52 of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 43 EC) et seq. and in Article 59 of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 49 EC) et 38. Specifically, in the case in the main seq., are also among the Treaty rules which proceedings, Ingmar is not only established refer to the notion of territoriality. in the United Kingdom, but also pursues there, and in the Republic of Ireland, its activity as Eaton's commercial agent, Eaton being based outside the Community.
36. The reference made by those provisions to the territory of a Member State of the Community reflects, in both regimes, the intention of the Community legislature to limit the benefit of the freedoms in question purely to economic operators already As we know, Ingmar's activity is covered by established on that territory, thereby pro- the definition of commercial agents given in moting their mobility and the mobility of the Directive. The Directive coordinates the the services they provide throughout the national laws which regulate their profes- common market. The territoriality of Com- sion in the Community. It was adopted on munity law constitutes, in this field, an the basis of Article 57(2) of the EC Treaty objective connecting method for indivi- (now, after amendment, Article 47(2) EC), duals which entitles them to pursue their which is applicable, under Article 66 of the economic activity free from any unjustified EC Treaty (now Article 55 EC), to matters restriction. both of establishment and of services.
37. The existence of a territorial link — either through the actual presence of one of 39. Thus the geographical basis which the economic operators in the territory of a distinguishes Community law, according Member State, or through the pursuit of an to the very terms of the Treaty, leads me economic activity in that territory — thus to believe that the existence of an element imposes Community jurisdiction on the of connection with Community territory in legal relationship in question. In that situa- a legal relationship, even if it is contractual, tion, the logic of abolishing restrictions on is such as to justify the application of the the pursuit of economic activities between norm of Community law in question.
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40. That analysis in no way amounts to 44. The defendant in the main proceedings attributing an extraterritorial effect to the contends, in substance, that the coordina- provisions of the Directive, contrary to tion of the national laws which is sought by Eaton's submission. the Directive is designed to promote free- dom of establishment and the free move- ment of services between Member States of the Community. Where they are established in different Member States, the two parties interested in concluding a commercial agency contract could be dissuaded from going ahead because of the differences 41. In my view, a legal norm would pro- between the laws applicable. If, however, duce such an effect if it modified an the principal is not based in the Commu- operator's legal situation by reason of facts nity, his relations with his commercial without direct links with the territory of the agent cannot be dealt with in the light of authorities which adopted it. the principles of the freedom of movement of persons and the free movement of services.
42. We have seen that if competition in the 45. In reality, the idea expressed in the Community is affected by undertakings second recital in the preamble to the which are not resident there, it is legitimate Directive implies that, by virtue of to apply sanctions to them, precisely the harmonisation of the laws applicable because of the territorial location of the in the different Member States, principals offending conduct. There is thus nothing to and commercial agents based in different preclude the actual pursuit of an economic Member States will be able to enter into activity, if it takes place in that territory, contracts more easily. from being governed by the Community law which is materially applicable.
46. However, it does not necessarily follow that the territorial scope of the Directive does not cover a contract, one of the parties to which is not established in the Commu- 43. Eaton also observed that the express nity. reference, in the second recital in the preamble to the Directive, to the establish- ment of the principal and the commercial agent 'in different Member States' consti- tutes an indication against a mandatory 47. The work of harmonisation undertaken application of the Directive to legal rela- is designed to promote the freedom of tions formed with an operator established establishment, in other Member States of outside the Community. the Community, of commercial agents
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established in the Community, even if they minimum level of social protection for are already linked with principals estab- commercial agents. 17 lished in a non-EU State, or their freedom to provide services in respect of other Community principals.
51. In these fields too, of course, the coordination of national laws is such as to promote the mobility of those operators or the services which they provide. The pur- pose of the approximation of national laws 48. So long as one of the parties to the is to abolish obstacles which may dissuade contract is based in the Community, he may them from pursuing their activity in other thus benefit from the Directive's harmonis- Member States or for principals established ing effects where he intends to rely on its in those States, on the ground that the provisions in order to develop his activity social benefits would not ensure a sufficient in that territory. It is not necessary to make level of protection or that those unjustified the territorial application of the Directive restraints on the pursuit of their activity conditional on the presence of all the would disadvantage them as against their parties to the contract in the Community. competitors. The reference, in the second recital in the preamble, to the location of the principal in a Member State cannot, in those circum- stances, be regarded as fixing a general condition for such an application. 52. But the exercise of fair competition and the need for a minimum level of social protection do not constitute merely means at the service of the Community freedoms. They constitute free-standing objectives, which justify the fact that the Directive applies to situations in which the move- ment of economic operators within the 49. It should also be recalled that an Community is not directly and immediately increase in business relations between prin- at issue. cipals and commercial agents established in different Member States constitutes only one of the objectives pursued by the Directive.
53. We have noted that respect for equal competition, a principle to which the Directive expressly refers, cannot be restricted merely to relations between
50. The harmonisation also seeks to reduce 17 — Second recital in the preamble to the Directive. In Bellone, the differences affecting, as we know, the cited above, the Court pointed out that 'the Directive is designed to protect commercial agents, within the meaning conditions of competition and to ensure a of the Directive' (paragraph 13).
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operators established within the Commu- categories of interest at stake. The second nity. 18 This is also what is apparent, as part of the recital, by the express reference regards the protection available to com- which it makes to the place of establish- mercial agents, from the fifth recital in the ment of the contracting parties and to the preamble to the Directive, which states that difficulty it causes for the carrying-on of 'it is appropriate to be guided by the the commercial agent's activity, is clearly principles of Article 117 of the Treaty and linked to the aim of freedom of movement to maintain improvements already made, which underlies the Directive.
On the other when harmonising the laws of the Member hand, the first part, relating to the differ- States relating to commercial agents'. 19 ences in national laws, deals with the conditions of competition and the level of protection available to commercial agents. It makes no reference at all to the location of the contracting parties, which lends credibility to the idea of taking account of 54. The second recital in the preamble to those issues in a way which is not strictly the Directive corroborates that interpreta- dependent on the principles of freedom of
tion. That recital distinguishes between two establishment and freedom to provide ser- vices. The second part, furthermore, is different from the first not only in content, 18 — Point 33 of the present Opinion. but also in wording, as is evident from the 19 — Emphasis added. Atticies 117 to 120 of the EC Tteaty use of the word 'moreover'. have been replaced by Articles 136 EC to 143 EC. The puipose of the first paragraph of Article 117 is clear: 'Member States agree upon the need to promote improved working conditions and an improved standard of living for workers, so as to make possible their harmonisation while the improvement is being maintained'. Although the social objectives laid down are 'essentially in the nature of a programme', the Court has held that they are not devoid of all legal effect and that they constitute an important aid, in particular for the interpretation of other provisions of the Treaty and of secondary Community legislation in social 55. In the light of the foregoing, I conclude matters (Joined Cases C-72/91 and C-73/91 Sloman Neptun v Bodo Ziesemer [1993] ECR I-887, paragraph that the Directive must be interpreted as
26). In the present case, the Directive pursues such an meaning that it is, in principle, territorially objective while undertaking harmonisation under Arti- cle 100 of the EC Treaty (now Article 94 EC). The second applicable to a commercial agency contract paragraph of Article 117 makes express reference, more- over, to that type of action. It provides that improved where, as in the case in the main proceed- working conditions and an improved standard of living for ings, the commercial agent is based in a workers must ensue not only from the functioning of the common market but also from the ptocedures provided for Member State and pursues his activity in in the Treaty and from the approximation of Member States' provisions laid down by law, regulation or admin- one or more Member States.
istrative action. In other words, the harmonisation of national rules, even where they are based on particular considerations linked to the pursuit of specific Community objectives, can provide the Community legislature with the opportunity to improve the level of protection of the working conditions of economic operators. The lack of restrictive conditions in that provision, other than purely
procedural ones, and the express affirmation by the egislature of its intention to improve the general level of 56. I do not, however, mean to make the social protection ensured by the Member States in the field concerned lead me therefore to believe that social measures territoriality principle of the Directive such as those in the Directive must be interpreted independently, without taking account of the fact that absolute. It is necessary to determine the they form part of Community legislation which also seeks to attain the objectives of freedom of movement of persons effect to be given to a contractual clause by and free movement of services (for an example of a directive based exclusively on A r t i c l e100 of the Treaty which the contracting parties have, as in and referring to Article 117, see Council Directive 98/59/ the main proceedings, displayed their com- EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies mon intention to avoid the national legisla- (OJ 1998 L 225, p. 16)). tion adopted to implement the Directive.
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The impact of the choice of the law of a binding force which the Directive requires non-EU State on the legal rules applicable the national implementing provisions to when the contract is terminated have in respect of contracting parties. It is thus necessary to distinguish, among the provisions of the Directive, those which, if any, do not allow of derogations. 57. Like all those who have submitted observations, I believe that account must be taken of the principle of freedom of contract and of the resulting right for the parties to avoid the legal rules applicable. 62. Before interpreting the Directive according to traditional criteria, 20 it is necessary to specify the reasons for which I do not believe that a text like the Rome Convention of 19 June 1980 on the law 58. By including in the contract a clause applicable to contractual obligations, 21 stipulating that it is governed by the law of which is relied on for different purposes the State of California, the parties have by those who have submitted observations, clearly shown their intention not to submit can be regarded as decisive. their contractual relationship to the scheme of the Directive.
63. The Rome Convention is to apply to contractual obligations in any situation involving a choice between the laws of 59. The question referred by the Court of different countries. 22 It entered into force, Appeal seeks to have the precise scope of including with respect to the United King- that agreement clarified in the light of the dom, on 1 April 1991. However, Article 17 requirements of the relevant Community thereof states that the Rome Convention is legislation. to apply to contracts made after the date on which it entered into force, so that the contract concluded in 1989 between Ingmar and Eaton is not subject to the rules it lays down. 60. In its question, the national court refers to the rules of English law under which effect is to be given to the applicable law as chosen by the parties, unless there is a public-policy reason for not so doing. 64. In those circumstances, that Conven- tion cannot be relied on as a source of
20 — See, for example, as regards interpretation according to the wording, context and aim of the Directive, Case C-104/95 61. In order to interpret the Directive I will Kontogeorgas v Kartonpak [1996] ECR I-6643, para- graphs 16 and 25. a d o p t a comparable method. That 21 — OJ 1998 C 27, p. 34. approach assumes a determination on the 22 — Article 1(1).
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positive law. I will refer to it, however, 67. It is clear that a contractual clause by purely for guidance, in so far as it usefully which parties intend to remove their rela- supplements the interpretation of the Direc- tionship from the scope of legislation tive which might be derived from its own designed to establish a uniform legal frame- content. work for the same type of agreement as that which links them brings about a rupture of the desired harmonisation. By definition, the idea of a general right to choose the law applicable clashes head-on with any process of normative coordina- tion. 65. Let us return to the objectives pursued by the legislature by means of the Directive. In harmonising the national laws which govern the relationship between commer- 68. The choice, by the parties, of a law cial agents and their principals, the legis- which omitted the obligation to indemnify lature intended to create equivalent condi- or which neglected it by establishing a less tions for the carrying-on of the profession favourable regime, would reduce the pro- of independent commercial agent for all tection available to the agent. In that case, those who pursue it within the Community. the law would place him at a disadvantage In the same way, the approximation of the as compared with his competitors while at different national legal frameworks seeks to the same time placing his principal at an ensure a minimum level of protection for advantage as compared with other princi- commercial agents, which, as I have said, pals. The. rupture of the conditions for also amounts to promoting the exercise of harmonising the legislation applicable competition, freedom of movement of would thereby bring about a disequilibrium persons and free movement of services, in the competition between economic since economic operators are then subject operators pursuing their activity within to the same social constraints. 23 the Community, which would run counter to the objectives of the Directive.
69. In ruling on the scope of Article 85 of 66. Those objectives assigned to the Direc- the Treaty in Ahlström and Others v tive result in the approximation of national Commission, cited above, the Court for- laws as regards the conditions for carrying mulated the following reasoning: '[i]f the on the activity of commercial agents. In applicability of prohibitions laid down particular, Member States, in accordance under competition law were made to with Article 17 of the Directive, are depend on the place where the agreement, required to put in place a system for decision or concerted practice was formed, indemnifying the commercial agent in the the result would obviously be to give event of the contract's being terminated. undertakings an easy means of evading That provision constitutes both a guarantee those prohibitions'. 24 The reasoning fol- for the agent and a burden for his principal. lowed by the Court can be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the present case.
23 — See Case C-233/94 Germany v Parliament and Council [1997] ECR I-2405, paragraphs 17 to 19. 24 — Paragraph 16.
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In this case, it is not a question of a regime munity process of harmonisation were based on prohibition, but of a regime of systematically to prevail, in this field, over contractual indemnification. In both cases, the freedom afforded to economic opera- however, it is a question of determining the tors to decide on the law applicable to their relevant legal rules while ensuring that the legal relationship. purposes of the territorially applicable legal rules are not compromised. Giving con- tracting parties the right to choose a law which is less protective of the interests of the commercial agent would reflect an incorrect assessment of the reasons under- 73. The validity of a derogating contractual lying the Community legislation. clause depends first on the binding force of the norm which it seeks to replace. The extent of the mandatory nature of that rule must be assessed according to its wording and the general scheme of the Directive.
70. The competitive advantage ensuing from the choice of a different law would encourage any principal, provided that he was in a position of economic superiority 74. Article 19 of the Directive provides vis-à-vis the other prospective contracting that the parties may not derogate from party, to insert in the contract a clause Articles 17 and 18 to the detriment of the designating the law of a non-EU State in commercial agent before the agency con- order to benefit thereby. tract expires.
71. The need not to impede the work of 75. That provision must be understood as harmonisation through Community law meaning that it does not allow the parties must not, however, lead to the automatic to a contract, even by common accord, to condemnation of any intention to derogate avoid the application of the provisions of from the ordinary legal rules applicable the Directive relating to the indemnity at within the Community. the end of the contract or to the compensa- tion for the damage suffered, in such a way that the commercial agent's financial situa- tion would be adversely affected thereby.
72. The principle of autonomy, which, under the Rome Convention, cited above, 25 is to prevail in contractual mat- ters, would be compromised if the Com- It follows that Articles 17 and 18 cannot be disapplied in favour of rules which are less favourable to the commercial agent. On the 25 — The first sentence of Article 3(1) thereof states that '[a] other hand, any other provision which contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties'. finds no counterpart in the Directive could
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prevail over the Directive if it were shown parties would be entitled to agree on a that it worked to the advantage of the regime less favourable to the commercial commercial agent. 26 agent, or even to relieve the principal of any indemnification.
76. A problem of interpretation remains, however, which needs to be resolved if a Such an interpretation does not seem to me precise meaning is to be given to Article 19. plausible. It is difficult to see what could lead a commercial agent to give up his right to indemnification in a situation where he is, by definition, freed of any obligation towards his principal, since the contract has 77. The fact that it is impossible for the come to an end. Conversely, in a case parties to derogate from Articles 17 and 18 where, on the expiry of the contract, 'before the agency contract expires' leads negotiations took place with the purpose me to wonder about the suitability of an of renewing the contract, recognition of a interpretation a contrario of that provision. right to derogate from the Directive's It seems to follow from a reading to that indemnity regime would be tantamount to effect of Article 19 that the rules laid down rendering Article 19 purely and simply by those articles could be ignored once the meaningless. 27 contract had come to an end.
78. Consequently, Article 19 must be read If understood in that way, Article 19 would as precluding the contracting parties from prohibit any derogation from the Direc- substituting for the indemnity regime tive's indemnity regime which took place defined in Articles 17 and 18 of the Direc- during the agency contract. On the other tive indemnity arrangements which are less hand, once the contract had expired, the
27 — An explanation for that uncertain drafting can be found in 26 — At the hearing, Eaton put forward the argument that the the initial proposals for the Directive submitted by the court's task, where it is required to assess the relative Commission (OJ 1977 C 13, p. 2; and OJ 1979 C 56, merits of one law as compared with another, with the p. 5). Article 30(5) of those proposals provided that '[t]he purpose of determining which is most advantageous for the right to goodwill indemnity shall not by prior agreement commercial agent, would face major practical difficulties. be contracted out of or restricted. It may be exercised only The obligation to undertake a complex economic analysis during the period of three months following cessation of of the whole relationship between the contracting parties the contract'. The preceding paragraphs of that article would lead to unforeseeable results, which w o u l d cause fixed the method for calculating the goodwill indemnity. A real legal uncertainty. In truth, an evaluation of the distinction was drawn, in paragraph 4, between the respective advantages of one law as against another is indemnity owed in the event of ordinary termination, by doubtless a complicated exercise. That requirement is notice, and in the event of termination for exceptional evident, however, from the very letter of Article 19, as, reasons (principal's conduct or legitimate reasons particu- moreover, from that of other articles of the Directive lar to the agent), giving rise to indemnities of different (Articles 10(4), 11(3), 12(3)). It cannot, therefore, be amounts, the maximum in the first case being lower than ignored. It is even less possible to avoid the clearly in the second. That difference of method in fixing the expressed intention of the Community legislature in the indemnity explains the reference made in that article to a light of the fact that it reflects the general philosophy of the restriction on the right to the indemnity. It may explain Directive seeking to preserve the balance of the commercial why, in both the initial and final versions of the Directive, agent's interests against those of his principal. Further- the legislature remitted to the time when the contract had more, the difficulty of the exercise of comparison which expired the exercise of the right to restrict the indemnity, the court must undertake does not appear to be such that it except that, in the final version of the Directive, the cannot be resolved, where appropriate, by recourse to an possibility of restricting the indemnity or compensation expert. has disappeared.
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favourable than those which it lays down. to the compulsory norms laid down by Such is the case whatever the origin of the national laws. rules chosen by the parties to the contract, since the text of Article 19 does not, in this respect, draw a distinction between the legal norms of a non-EU State or those which are simply drawn up, ab initio, by That is true, for example, of the provisions the parties themselves. of Article 6(1) of the Directive, which fix the criteria for evaluating the commercial agent's remuneration by reference to what 'commercial agents appointed for the goods forming the subject of his agency contract are customarily allowed in the place where 79. The general scheme of the Directive he carries on his activities'. The same is true confirms the mandatory nature of that of Article 13, the effect of which is, as the provision. Court has held, that the agency contract is not subject to any formal requirement, whilst it is left open to the Member States to require it to be in writing. 28 Similarly, each party is entitled to receive from the other on request a signed written docu- 80. It should be recalled that, although ment. directives leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods, they are binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which they are addressed (the third paragraph of Arti- Those rules sometimes confer on the Mem- cle 189 of the EC Treaty (now the third ber States a right of derogation which the paragraph of Article 249 EC)). The binding parties to the contract do not enjoy. Thus, force of their content can, however, be a Article 2(2) of the Directive confers only on question of degree. '[e]ach of the Member States... the right to provide that the Directive shall not apply to those persons whose activities as commer- cial agents are considered secondary by the law of that Member State'.
81. A reading of the Directive shows us that two types of provision may be distin- guished in this respect. 83. That type of norms corresponds to those which the Community legislature has deliberately chosen to leave to the discretion of the national authorities. They fall within the sovereign power enjoyed by 82. The first category covers rules coupled the Member States in the performance of with a right of derogation. They may be laid down in the absence of any agreement between the parties and without prejudice 28 — Bellone, cited above, paragraph 14.
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their task of implementation. As such, 87. Article 19 of the Directive belongs to those rules reflect the Member States' free- that category of mandatory norms, as is dom to. choose the methods for attaining clearly shown by the prohibition which it the objectives fixed by the Directive. lays down on derogating from Articles 17 and 18.
88. I would add that, as the United King- 84. It should be pointed out that the Court dom rightly pointed out, such a categorisa- has found that whenever the Directive tion concords with what is laid down in allows the Member States to derogate from Article 7(2) of the Rome Convention, cited its provisions, express provision is made to above, which states that '[n]othing in this that effect. 29The Member States are there- Convention shall restrict the application of fore entitled not to follow certain provi- the rules of the law of the forum in a sions of the Directive or to supplement situation where they are mandatory irre- them as they see fit. spective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract'.
85. It can thus be considered that that first 89. It appears that Article 19 of the Direc- group of norms follows a particular pattern tive may be compared with the category of which might be described as 'complemen- laws which, in international law, are cate- tary to intention', it being understood that gorised as 'mandatory rules', that expres- it is a question of the intention either of the sion denoting 'the device of applying a parties or of the Member States and that domestic rule to an international situation those intentions are clearly not inspired by according to its intention to be applied and the same motives. regardless of its designation by a rule of conflict'. 30
90. Article 19 of the Directive requires the 86. A second group, it seems to me, application of mandatory provisions not- requires to be identified, which includes withstanding any choice to the contrary, rules of a mandatory nature. Those rules do even where that choice relates, as in the not refer to any right of derogation. On the present case, to the selection of the law of a contrary, they clearly specify that the non-EU State. parties may not contract out of them.
30 — B. Audit, Droit international privé, Economica, Paris 29 — Ibid., paragraph 15. (1997, 2nd edn.), p. 97.
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91. The interests which the provisions in intention to make those provisions prevail question seek to protect, namely competi- over any expression to the contrary on the tion within the Community and the protec- part of the contracting parties. It is thus tion of commercial agents who carry on necessary to propose that the Court rule to their activities there, are the reason for the that effect. Community legislature's firmly expressed
Conclusion
92. In the light of those considerations, I propose that the Court answer the question referred by the Court of Appeal as follows:
Council Directive 86/653/EEC of 18 December 1986 on the coordination of the laws of the Member States relating to self-employed commercial agents must be interpreted as meaning that, in accordance with Article 19 of that directive, Articles 17 and 18 thereof are applicable to a contract under which a principal has given authority to a commercial agent based in a Member State of the Community to sell his products, exclusively, in the Community, even if, first, the principal is an entity established in a non-EU State and, second, the contracting parties have expressly chosen the law of that State as the law applicable to the contract.
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