C-35/99
ECLI:EU:C:2001:389
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OPINION OF MR LÉGER — CASE C-35/99
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL LÉGER delivered on 10 July 2001 1
1. This request for a preliminary ruling auspices of the Minister for Justice under concerns Articles 5 and 85 of the EC Articles 52 to 55 of Royal Decree-Law Treaty (now Articles 10 EC and 81 EC). No 1578 of 27 November 1933. 2
4. The CNF is a body composed of 2. The Pretore di Pinerolo (Magistrate, members of the Bar elected by their fellow Pinerolo), Italy, has been asked to rule on members, with one representative for each the legality of a scale setting the minimum appeal court district. One of the purposes and maximum fees chargeable by avvocati of the CNF is to set the scale of fees. and procuratori ('members of the Bar') for their services in that country. The scale in question was adopted by the Italian Min- ister for Justice on the basis of a draft prepared by the National Council of the Bar. B — The legal provisions relating to fees
5. Article 57 of the Decree-Law states that the criteria for determining fees and emolu- I — The national legal background ments payable to members of the Bar in respect of civil and criminal proceedings and out-of-court work are to be set every two years by decision of the CNF.
A — The Consiglio Nazionale Forense
6. When the CNF decides upon the scale of fees, it is referred to the Minister for Justice 3. The Consiglio Nazionale Forense for approval. Before granting this approval, (National Council of the Bar, hereinafter the Minister must obtain the opinion of the 'the CNF') is to be established under the Interministerial Committee on Prices (here-
1 — Original language: French. 2 — As subsequently amended (hereinafter 'the Decree-Law').
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inafter 'the CIP') 3 and consult the Con- C — The contested fee scale siglio di Stato (Council of State). 4The ministerial decree approving the fee scale must then be endorsed and registered by the Corte dei Conti (Court of Auditors). The scale is then binding. 10. The fee scale in issue in the main proceedings was adopted by decision of the CNF of 12 June 1993 and approved by Ministerial Decree No 585 of 5 October 1994 (hereinafter 'Ministerial Decree No 585/94' or 'the contested decree') 5.
7. Under Article 58 of the Decree-Law, the criteria referred to in Article 57 are to be determined on the basis of the monetary value of the dispute and the level of court hearing the case. For each step, or series of 11. Article 1 of the contested decree steps, maximum and minimum limits must approves the CNF decision. be set. Fees for out-of-court work are to be determined on the basis of the complexity of the case.
12. Article 2 of that decree provides that 'the increases set out in the fee scales in the annex shall apply with effect from 1 Oc- tober 1994 as to 50%, and as to the 8. Article 60 of the Decree-Law is con- remaining 50% with effect from 1 April cerned with the settlement of fees by the 1995'. court.
13. Article 1 of the CNF decision states 9. It provides that fees are settled by the that the fees for 'avvocati' are set out in the court on the basis of the criteria established table in Annex A to that decision. The fees under Article 57, having regard to the for 'procuratori' are set out in the table in seriousness and the number of issues deter- Annex B. mined. The settlement must remain within the maximum and minimum limits set by Article 58. However, in certain exceptional circumstances, the court may depart from these limits on condition that it gives reasons for so doing. 14. Under Article 4 of the CNF decision, it is prohibited to depart from the minimum
3 — Under Article 14.20 of Law No 887 of 22 December 1984. 4 — Under Article 17(3) of Law No 400 of 23 August 1988. 5 — GURI No 247 of 21 October 1994.
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fee limits for the services of avvocati and 18. An appeal was brought against that procuratori. judgment before the Corte Suprema di Cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation), Italy, which set aside the judgment. It held that it was unlawful not to apply the contested scale and remitted the case to the Pretore di Pinerolo on this point.
15. However, where the services provided are manifestly disproportionate to the fees allowed, it is possible to depart from the stated maxima. It is also possible to go 19. The referring court states 6 that, in below the minima, provided that the party Italian law, there are two conflicting lines who has an interest in the matter produces of case-law as to whether the scale set by an opinion from the Council of the com- Ministerial Decree No 585/94 constitutes petent Bar. an agreement, decision or concerted prac- tice restricting competition under Article 85 of the Treaty.
According to the first line of case-law, 7the II — Facts and procedure contested decree is similar to the legislation that was the subject of the Court's decision of 18 June 1998. 8The CNF is an associ- ation of undertakings within the meaning of Article 85(1) of the Treaty, and no 16. Mr Arduino was prosecuted for over- statutory provision requires it to adopt taking on a 'no overtaking' stretch of road, decisions in the public interest. Since the contrary to the road traffic legislation. The contested scale is such as to restrict com- accused's vehicle collided with that of Mr petition, the national court is required to Dessi, who claimed damages before the disapply it. Pretore di Pinerolo.
According to the other line of case-law,9 the contested scale is not the product of the 17. At the end of these proceedings, Mr Arduino was ordered to pay Mr Dessi's 6 — Order for reference (paragraphs 12 to 15). costs. Mr Dessi's lawyer presented his fee 7 — The referring court cites Judgment No 791/98 of the Corte note based on the scale set by Ministerial d'Appello Torino (Court of Appeal, Turin) of 19 June and 11 July 1998 (order for reference, paragraph 12). Decree No 585/94. However, the Pretore 8 —Case C-35/96 Commission v Italy [1998] ECR I-3851 di Pinerolo decided not to apply the con- ('CNSD'). tested scale and to set the fees below the 9 — The referring court cites Judgment No 351/98 of the Tribunale Tempio Pausania (District Court, Tempio Paus- minimum rate. ania) (order for reference, paragraph 15).
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CNF's discretion. The Italian public auth- I I I— The questions submitted for a pre- orities play a decisive role in drawing up liminary ruling and approving the scale. It cannot therefore be said that the Italian public authorities have delegated to private economic oper- 21. Consequently, the Pretore di Pinerolo ators responsibility for taking decisions decided to stay proceedings and to refer the affecting the economic sphere. following two questions to the Court:
'(1) Does the decision of the CNF, 20. The referring court explains 10 that, approved by Ministerial Decree faced with these two lines of authority, it No 585/94, fixing binding tariffs for is confronted with the following problem of the professional activity of members of interpretation. the Bar, come within the scope of the prohibition in Article 85(1) of the EC Treaty?
It wonders whether, 'with specific reference If the answer to ( 1 ) is in the affirmative: to the involvement of the public bodies in the approval procedure, the fee scale ... provided for by Ministerial Decree No 585/94 contains the essential elements of a decision by an association of under- (2) Does the case none the less correspond takings which has the effect of ... restrict- to one of the situations envisaged in ing ... competition' within the meaning of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to which Article 85(1) of the Treaty. 11 that prohibition does not apply?'
IV — Admissibility of the reference for a If so, the referring court wonders whether preliminary ruling 'the special nature of the professional activity performed by a member of the Bar ... justifies the laying down of binding tariffs ... , with the result that the CNF 22. The Italian Government expresses decisions are in any event compatible with doubts as to the admissibility of the present the EC Treaty in the light of Article 85(3) reference for a preliminary ruling. 13 It puts [of the Treaty]'. 12 forward two sets of observations in this respect. 10 — Order for reference (English translarion, pp. 5 to 7). 11 —Ibid. (p. 5). 13 — Written observations of the Italian Government (pp. 2 to 12 — Ibid. (p. 7). 5).
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23. Firstly, the Italian Government ques- 25. It should be pointed out that, according tions the genuineness of the dispute in the to settled case-law, the procedure provided main proceedings. for by Article 177 of the EC Treaty (now Article 234 EC) is an instrument of cooper- ation between the Court of Justice and the national courts. 14 Within the context of that cooperation, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial It explains that, following the judgment of decision, to determine both the need for a the Corte Suprema di Cassazione, Mr preliminary ruling and the relevance of the Arduino's insurance company paid the questions which it submits to the Court. 15 costs incurred by Mr Dessi. In the light of Consequently, where the questions sub- this payment, Mr Dessi withdrew from the mitted by the national court concern the remainder of the proceedings, and Mr interpretation of Community law, the Arduino's lawyer requested the Pretore di Court of Justice is, in principle, bound to Pinerolo to order that the case should not give a ruling. 16 proceed to judgment. In the current state of proceedings, the main dispute therefore has no purpose.
However, the Court has also stated that, in exceptional circumstances, it is nevertheless for the Court of Justice, in order to confirm its own jurisdiction, to examine the con- ditions in which the case has been referred In these circumstances, the Italian Govern- to it by the national court. 17 It cannot give ment fails to understand the referring a preliminary ruling on a question sub- court's insistence on determining the com- mitted by a national court where it is quite patibility of the contested fee scale with obvious that the ruling sought by that court Community law. It takes the view that the on the interpretation or validity of Com- Pretore di Pinerolo has seized the oppor- munity law bears no relation to the actual tunity to settle an issue which is controver- facts of the main action, or its purpose, sial in Italy. where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it. 18
24. Secondly, the Italian Government con- 14 - See, in particular, Case 16/65 Schwarze [1965] ECR 877, 886. siders that the order for reference inad- 15 — See, in particular, Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR equately sets out the legal and factual I-4921, paragraph 59. context in which the questions have arisen. 16 — Idem. 17 — Case 244/80 Foglia [1981] ECR 3045, paragraph 21. The Pretore di Pinerolo has not set out the 18 — See, in particular, Case C-36/99 Idéal Tourisme [2000] reasons why it failed to apply the contested ECR I-6049, paragraph 20; Case C-322/98 Kachelmann [2000] ECR I-7505, paragraph 17; and Case C-340/99 fee scale. TNT Traco [2001] ECR I-4109, paragraph 31.
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26. In respect of the Italian Government's Furthermore, it is possible that, notwith- first observation, I consider that there is standing the existence of any agreement insufficient evidence before the Court to between the parties as to costs, the national show that the dispute in the main proceed- court is required of its own motion to ings is hypothetical. determine the lawfulness of the contested fee scale.
It would have been preferable, in the 27. In these circumstances, the evidence interests of the sound administration of before the Court does not lead to the justice, for the Pretore di Pinerolo to have conclusion that the dispute in the main satisfied himself of the genuineness of the proceedings is purely hypothetical in dispute in the main proceedings and, in nature. particular, of the lack of any agreement between the parties on the question of costs. However, the fact remains that the Italian Government has not produced evi- dence that such an agreement exists. In these circumstances, the Court can only refer to the information supplied by the 28. As regards the Italian Government's national court. second observation, I would point out that the requirement adequately to describe the legal and factual context of the dispute principally pursues two objectives.
In the order for reference the Pretore di Pinerolo states that he has to rule on the compatibility of the contested fee scale with 29. Firstly, the information provided in the Community law. Without giving reasons, decision referring the matter for a prelimi- the referring court states that it 'must bring nary ruling must enable the Court to the proceedings to a conclusion and ... provide an interpretation of Community make an order for payment of the costs of law which will be of use to the national the party claiming damages based on the court. 20 Those requirements are of par- note produced by his lawyer ... , applying ticular importance in certain fields, such as the tariffs set out in the [contested] decree, that of competition law, where the factual only being able to depart from them in the and legal situations are often complex.21 exceptional and compelling circumstances provided for in the applicable [Italian] rules'. 19 20 —See, in particular. Case C-83/91 Methcke [1992] ECR I-4871, paragraph 26; and Joined Cases C-320/90 to C-322/90 Telemarsicabruzzo and Others [1993] ECR I-393, paragraph 5. 21 —See, in particular, Case C-176/96 Lehtonen and Castors 19 — Order for reference (paragraph 4, free translation). Brame [2000] ECR I-2681, paragraph 22.
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In the present case, there are certain gaps in preliminary ruling. 25 Whilst it is true that the order for reference. The Pretore di in its written observations, 26 the French Pinerolo only partially sets out the powers Government considered that certain aspects available to the Italian authorities in the of the procedure for approval of the con- procedure for approval of the fee scale set tested fee scale were imprecise, nevertheless by the CNF. However, these pieces of this information was supplemented by the information have been supplemented by written observations of the parties and the Italian Government's replies to the notified to the French Government. At the questions addressed to it by the Court on hearing, that Government put forward a this subject. I therefore consider that, in balanced and definitive view on the ques- spite of these gaps in the order for refer- tions raised by the referring court. ence, the Court is in a position to provide an answer to the questions raised that will be of use to the Pretore di Pinerolo.
31. Consequently, I consider that the ques- tions referred for a preliminary ruling by the Pretore di Pinerolo are admissible.
30. Secondly, the information provided in orders for reference must give the Govern- ments of the Member States and other interested parties the opportunity to submit observations pursuant to Article 20 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice. 22 It is V — The subject-matter of the questions the Court's duty to ensure that that oppor- referred for a preliminary ruling tunity is safeguarded, bearing in mind that only the orders for reference are notified to the interested parties. 23 32. In common with most of the interven- ing parties, I think that the questions referred for a preliminary ruling need to be reformulated.
In the present case, it appears from the observations of the Governments of the Member States 24 that the information 33. As worded, the national court's ques- contained in the order for reference was tions refer only to Article 85 of the Treaty. such as to enable them usefully to adopt a position on the questions referred for a 25 — In its written observations, the Commission stated, how- ever, that it was 'not yet able to adopt a final position' (paragraph 36). However, this failure to adopt a position 22 — See, in particular, Case C-67/96 Albany [1999] ECR does not seem to arise from the lack of information in the I-5751, paragraph 40. order for reference. In Case C-309/99 Wouters and Others, 23 — Idem. the Commission voluntarily refrained from adopting a position on certain questions referred by the Netherlands 24 — In accordance with the EC Statute of the Court of Justice, court (see my Opinion in Wouters delivered today, [2002] written observations have been lodged by the Finnish, ECR I-1577,I-1582, points 98 and 106). French and Italian Governments. The German Govern- ment submitted oral observations. 26 — Paragraph 17.
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The court seeks to know whether the 36. It follows that, to enable the referring contested fee scale is prohibited by court to adjudicate on the compatibility of Article 85(1) and, if so, whether it qualifies the contested fee scale with Community for exemption under Article 85(3). law, the questions referred for a prelimi nary ruling must be understood as referring to Articles 5 and 85 of the Treaty. 28
34. It is apparent, however, from the description of the legal background to the case that the contested fee scale is a State 37. In the current state of the case-law, 29 measure. The decision of the CNF setting the Court considers that a State measure is the scale of fees was formally incorporated liable to negate the effectiveness of the in Ministerial Decree No 585/94. The con competition rules in three situations: (1) tested fee scale thus seems to be a measure where a Member State requires, or favours, of a legislative or regulatory nature. the adoption of agreements, decisions of associations of undertakings or concerted practices contrary to Article 85 of the Treaty; (2) where a Member State rein forces the effects of such conduct; and (3) where a Member State deprives its own rules of their legislative character by del 35. It is settled case-law 27 that, in itself, egating to private economic operators the Article 85 of the Treaty is not concerned responsibility for taking decisions affecting with laws or regulations adopted by the economic sphere. Member States. It is concerned solely with the conduct of undertakings. Only Article 5 of the Treaty, in conjunction with Article 85 of the Treaty, requires the Member States not to introduce or main tain in force measures, even of a legislative or regulatory nature, which may render ineffective the competition rules applicable 38. The subject-matter of the reference therefore needs to be restated in terms of to undertakings. this case-law.
27 —See, in particular. Case 267/86 Van Eycke |1988] ECR 4769, paragraph 16; Case 66/86 Ahmed Sciecd Flugreisen 28 — If the replies were confined to the questions asked, the and Silver Line Reisebüro [1989] ECR 803, paragraph 48; referring court would ontybe in a position to determine the Case C-2/91 Meng 119931 ECR I-5751, paragraph 14; lawfulness of the CNF decision. Even if the national court Case C-185/91 Reiff \1993\ ECR I-5801, paragraph 14; held this decision to be unlawful on the basis of Case C-245/91 Ohra Schadeverzekeringen [1993 ECR Article 85(2) of the Treaty it would still be required to I-5851, paragraph 10; Case C-153/93 Delia Schiffahrts- uphold Ministerial Decree No 585/94 which is a legislative und Speditionsgesellschaft [1994] ECR I-2517, paragraph or regulatory measure. 14; Case C-96/94 Centro Servizi Spediporto [1995] ECR 29 — See, in particular. Van Eycke, paragraph 16; Meng, I-2883, paragraph 20; Joined Cases C-140/94 to C-142/94 paragraph 14; Rci/f, paragraph 14; Ohra Schadeverzeker DIP and Others [1995] ECR I-3257, paragraph 14; Case ingen, paragraph 10; Delta Schiffahrts- und Speditionsge C-70/95 Sodemare and Others ĮI997J ECR I-3395, para sellschaft, paragraph 14; Centro Servizi Spediporto, graph 41; CNSD, paragraph 53; Case C-266/96 Corsica paragraph 21; DIP, paragraph 15; Sodemare, paragraph femes France |1998] ECR I-3949, paragraph 35; and 42; CNSD, paragraph 54; Corsica Ferries France, para Albany, paragraph 65. graph 49; and Albany, paragraph 65.
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39. The Pretore di Pinerolo does not men- 41. Lastly, the Pretore di Pinerolo seems to tion the first situation. have the third situation expressly in mind.
It is true that Article 57 of the Decree-Law requires the CNF, every two years, to set It appears from the file 31 that the national the criteria for determining the fees and court made a reference to this Court emoluments payable to members of the following the judgment in CNSD, which Bar. It might thus be wondered whether held that the Italian legislation at issue in this provision requires, or favours, the that case had 'wholly relinquished to pri- adoption of decisions of associations of vate economic operators the powers of the undertakings contrary to Article 85 of the public authorities as regards the setting of Treaty. However, as the Italian Govern- tariffs'. 32 Furthermore, in setting out the ment emphasises, 30 there is no evidence on divergent authorities in Italian case-law, the file to suggest that the referring court is the Pretore di Pinerolo, in my opinion, asks concerned with the compatibility of whether the Italian public authorities have Article 57 of the Decree-Law with the delegated to private economic operators provisions of Articles 5 and 85 of the responsibility for taking decisions affecting Treaty. the economic sphere. 33
40. By contrast, the second situation does 42. Based on the foregoing considerations, seem to me to apply in this case. I propose that the Court reformulate the questions referred for a preliminary ruling in the sense that they seek to determine:
It is not in dispute that the Pretore di Pinerolo seeks an interpretation of Com- munity law so as to enable him to deter- mine the lawfulness of the contested fee — whether Articles 5 and 85 of the Treaty scale. This scale might be incompatible preclude a Member State from adopt- with Articles 5 and 85 of the Treaty if the ing a legislative or regulatory measure Italian authorities, in adopting Ministerial approving, on the basis of a draft Decree No 585/94, reinforced the effects of prepared by a professional body of an agreement, decision or concerted prac- members of the Bar, such as the CNF, a tice within the meaning of Article 85 of the scale setting the minimum and maxi- Treaty. In order to give an answer that will mum fees for services provided by be of use to the referring court, it is therefore necessary to examine this issue. 31 — See order for reference (paragraphs 5 to 9). 32 — CNSD, paragraph 57. 30 — Written observations of the Italian Government (p. 6). 33 — See points 19 and 20 above.
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members of the profession, where that of the Treaty by reinforcing the effects of State measure is adopted following a an agreement, decision or concerted prac- procedure such as that provided for by tice, it is first necessary to see whether the Italian legislation; and conditions for the application of Article 85(1) of the Treaty are met in this case.
— whether Articles 5 and 85 of the Treaty preclude a Member State, in the con- text of such a procedure, from confer- ring on a professional body of members A — Article 85(1) of the Treaty of the Bar, such as the CNF, power to adopt a draft scale setting the mini- mum and maximum fees for services provided by members of the profession. 44. Article 85(1) of the Treaty prohibits 'all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, VI — Reinforcing the effects of an agree- restriction or distortion of competition ment, decision or concerted practice (Ques- within the common market'. tion 1)
43. On the first question, I would point out 45. It is necessary to consider four issues in that the Court's case-law as it now stands succession to determine whether: (1) requires, if a legislative or regulatory meas- members of the Bar practising in Italy ure is to be declared incompatible with constitute 'undertakings'; (2) the CNF is Articles 5 and 85 of the Treaty, that the to be regarded as an 'association of under- State measure be preceded by an agree- takings'; (3) the decisions adopted by the ment, decision or concerted practice that is CNF have as their object or effect the itself contrary to Article 85(1) of the restriction of competition within the com- Treaty. 34 mon market; and (4) those decisions may affect trade between Member States.
In order to determine whether the Italian authorities have infringed Articles 5 and 85 1. The concept of undertaking
34 — See, in particular, Meng, paragraphs 16 and 17; Obra Schadeverzekeringen, paragraph 12; CNSD, paragraphs 53 to 60; Corsica Ferries France, paragraphs 50 to 54; Albany, paragraph 66; and Joined Cases C-180/98 to C-184/98 Pavlov and Others [2000] ECR I-6451, para- 46. According to settled case-law, the graphs 99 and 100. Court considers that the concept of under-
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taking in the context of competition law 48. In these circumstances, the supply of encompasses 'every entity engaged in an legal services by Members of the Bar in economic activity, regardless of the legal Italy must be regarded as an economic status of the entity and the way in which it activity within the meaning of the Court's is financed'. 35 case-law.
49. Contrary to the Italian Government's submission, 40 this conclusion is not altered The Court has also held that the term by the fact that members of the Bar are 'economic activity' applies to any activity required to observe rules of professional involving the offer of goods or services on a conduct, nor by the fact that they carry out particular market. 36 In general, an activity activities related to the administration of is economic in nature when it is carried on, justice. at least in principle, by a private operator with a view to making a profit. 37
In CNSD, the Court characterised Italian customs agents as undertakings within the meaning of Article 85 of the Treaty 41 even 47. In the present case, it appears from the though, like members of the Bar, they are file 38 that members of the Bar practising in governed by disciplinary rules laid down by Italy, as independent operators, offer ser- a professional body. 42 Furthermore, the vices of legal advice and representation of 'public-service' tasks with which members their clients before the courts. Members of of the Bar are entrusted do not remove the Bar in Italy therefore offer services on a them from the sphere of competition law, market, namely the market in legal services. but may, in my opinion, bring them within Furthermore, it is clear from the file 39 that the scope of Article 90(2) of the EC Treaty Members of the Bar in Italy practise with a (now Article 86(2) EC). 43 view to making a profit. The referring court has stated that they demand and receive from their clients remuneration in consider- ation for the services provided.
50. Consequently, a member of the Bar 35 —Case C-41/90 Höfner and Eher [1991] ECR I-1979, practising in Italy is to be regarded as an paragraph 21. 36 —Case 118/85 Commission v Italy [1987] ECR 2599, paragraph 7. 37 — Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro in Joined Cases 40 — Written observations of the Italian Government (p. 7). C-159/91 and C-160/91 Poucet and Pistre [1993] ECR I-637, point 8; and in Case C-364/92 SAT Fluggesellschaft 41 — CNSD, paragraphs 36 to 38. [1994] ECR I-43, point 9. 42 — See CNSD, paragraph 7, as well as Advocate General 38 — Order for reference (paragraph 7). Cosmas' Opinion in that case (point 71). 39 — Idem. 43 — See my Opinion in Wouters, points 170 to 178.
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undertaking within the meaning of Com- to take into account certain public-interest munity competition law. criteria in adopting decisions.
54. In the present case, the CNF does not meet this twofold condition. It appears 2. The concept of association of undertak- from the evidence before the Court 47 that ings the CNF is composed exclusively of members of the Bar elected by members of the profession. Furthermore, the refer- ring court states, 48 without contradiction from the Italian Government, that there is 51. The second question is whether the no provision of national law either requi- CNF is to be regarded as an association of ring or encouraging the CNF to set fee undertakings. scales having regard to public-interest criteria.
52. In my Opinion in Wouters, 44 I con- sidered in detail the circumstances in which 55. As a result, the CNF must be regarded the concept of association of undertakings as an association of undertakings within may apply to a professional body of the meaning of Article 85(1) of the Treaty. members of the Bar. I will therefore refer, to a large extent, to my treatment of this topic in that case.
56. In contrast to the Italian Government's submissions, 49 this conclusion is not 53. As set out in CNSD 45 and Pavlov, 46 altered by the fact that the CNF is a body the Court considers that an entity is not an governed by public law, 50 vested with association of undertakings within the disciplinary powers. 51 Nor does it matter meaning of Article 85(1) of the Treaty that the CNF does not itself carry out any where, firstly, it is composed of a majority of representatives of the State and, sec- 47 — See the order for reference (paragraph 9) and the written ondly, it is required by national legislation observations of the Italian Government (p. 8). 48 — Order for reference (paragraph 9). 49 — Written observations of the Italian government (p. 8). 44 — Points 56 to 86. 50 —Case 123/83 BNIC [1985] ECR 391, paragraph 17; 45 — Paragraphs 39 to 44. CNSD, paragraph 40; and Pavlov, paragraph 85. 46 — Paragraphs 83 to 89. 51 — See CNSD, paragraph 7, and Advocate General Cosmas' Opinion in that case, point 71.
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economic activity, 52 that it is entrusted 60. Firstly, it ascertains whether the agree- with tasks in the public interest, 53 or that it ment has as its object the restriction of may, in fact, adopt its decisions in the competition. To this end, it carries out an public interest. 54 objective examination of the aims of the agreement, having regard to the economic context in which it is to be applied. 56 If the agreement has an anti-competitive object it is prohibited under Article 85(1) of the Treaty without its being necessary to take 57. It follows from these considerations account of its concrete effects. 57 The same that the decisions of the CNF constitute considerations apply to decisions of associ- decisions of an association of undertakings ations of undertakings. 58 within the meaning of Article 85(1) of the Treaty.
3. Restriction of competition Therefore, agreements or decisions of associations of undertakings whose sole objective is to restrict or distort compe- tition between the parties, or between the parties and third parties, are contrary to Article 85(1) of the Treaty. This is the case 58. The third question is whether the for horizontal agreements fixing the selling decisions adopted by the CNF 'have as price of goods 59 or services. 60 their object or effect the prevention, restric- tion or distortion of competition'.
61. Where the agreement does not specifi- 59. The Court generally adopts a two-stage cally have as its object the restriction of procedure for determining whether an competition, the Court goes on to deter- agreement is compatible with Article 85(1) mine whether its effect is the prevention, of the Treaty. 55 restriction or distortion of competition.61 In this regard, Article 85(1) of the Treaty 52—Joined Cases 209/78 to 215/78 and 218/78 Van Landewyck and Others v Commission [1980] ECR 3125, paragraphs 87 and 88; and Joined Cases 96/82 to 102/82, 56—Joined Cases 29/83 and 30/83 CRAM and Rheinzink 104/82, 105/82, 108/82 and 110/82 IAZ and Others v [1984] ECR 1679, paragraph 26. Commission [1983] ECR 3369, paragraphs 19 and 20. 57— Joined Cases 56/64 and 58/64 Consten and Grundig v 53 — See the Report for the Hearing in BNIC (paragraph 1.1), paragraph 16 of the judgment, and Commission Decision Commission [1966] ECR 299, 342. 82/896/EEC of 15 December 1982 relating to a proceeding 58 — Case 45/85 Verband der Sachversicherer v Commission under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/29.883 — [1987] ECR 405, paragraph 39. AROW/BNIC) (OJ 1982 L 379, p. 1; paragraphs 2 and 3 59 — Case 73/74 Groupement des Fabricants de Papiers Feints of the account of the facts). See also my Opinion in de Belgique v Commission [1975] ECR 1491, paragraph Wouters, points 79 and 80. 10; and BNIC, paragraph 22. 54 — See IAZ v Commission, paragraphs 19 to 25, and my 60 — Verband der Sachversicherer v Commission, paragraphs Opinion in Wouters, points 81 to 86. 39 to 43. 55 — Case 56/65 Société Technique Minière [1966] ECR 235, 61 — Société Technique Minière, pp. 249 to 250; and Case 249. C-234/89 Delimitis [1991] ECR I-935, paragraph 13.
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prohibits both actual anti-competitive 65. Article 85(1) of the Treaty prohibits effects and purely potential effects, pro agreements, decisions and concerted prac vided that they are sufficiently appreci tices fixing sales prices, 65 minimum able. 62 prices, 66 maximum prices 67 or target prices. 68
62. In the present case, the CNF adopted two separate decisions. The first was that 66. In the present case, I do not think that adopting the draft scale setting the mini these principles apply to the decision of the mum and maximum fees for services pro CNF adopting the draft scale of fees. vided by members of the profession. The second was that submitting the draft scale to the Italian authorities with a view to making the tariffs binding.
67. Firstly, the CNF decision does not have as its object the restriction of competition within the meaning of Article 85(1) of the 63. I will examine those two decisions in Treaty. 69 the light of Article 85(1) of the Treaty.
68. It should be pointed out that, under (a) The draft fee scale Article 57 of the Decree-Law, the CNF is required, every two years, to set the criteria for determining the fees and emoluments payable to members of the Bar. The draft fee scale is then submitted to the Minister for Justice who must obtain the opinion of 64. In Community competition law, price- the CIP and of the Consiglio di Stato. On fixing agreements are 'particularly seri 63 ous'. The Court considers that, by its very nature, an agreement fixing the price 65 — Case 41/69 ACT Chcmielarma v Commission Į1970] ECR 661, paragraphs 132 and 133; Case 48/69 ÍC7 v Commis- of goods or services has as its object the sion [19721 ECR 619, paragraphs 115 to 119; and Case restriction of competition on the market. 64 246/86 Belasco and Others v Commission [1989] ECR 2117, paragraphs 12 to 16. 66 — BN1C, paragraph 22; and CNSD, paragraphs 45 and 46. 67 — CNSD, paragraphs 45 and 46. 68 — Case 8/72 Vereeniging van Cenieiithandclaren v Commis- 62 —Casc T-35/92 Deere v Commission [1994] ECR 11-957, sion [1972] ECR 977, paragraphs 15 to 25; Van paragraph 61. Landcwyck and Others v Commission, paragraph 102 et 63 — Joined Cases 240/82 to 242/82, 261/82, 262/82, 268/82 seq.; Verband der Sachversicherer v Commission, para- and 269/82 Stichting Sigarettenindustrie and Others v graphs 34 to 43; and Joined Cases T-213/95 and T-18/96 Commission [19851 ECR 3831, paragraph 82. SCK and FNK v Commission [1997Į ECR II-1739, 64 — BMC, paragraph 22; and Case 243/83 Bmon [1985] ECR paragraphs 157 to 164. 2015, paragraph 44. 69 — See also points 77 to 79 below.
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the basis of all of this information, the The contested decision therefore does not Minister for Justice decides whether it is have the effect of restricting competition on appropriate to incorporate the scale into a the Italian market in legal services. 72 Any legislative measure making the tariffs bind- restriction of competition is only the con- ing. sequence of a subsequent act of the Italian authorities when they adopt the ministerial decree approving the decision of the CNF.
69. It follows that, in contrast to classic price agreements, the decision of the CNF adopting the draft scale is a preparatory act in the legislative procedure laid down by 72. Consequently, I consider that Italian law. It is required by national Article 85(1) of the Treaty does not pre- legislation and enjoys purely consultative clude a professional body of members of status. The object of the contested decision the Bar, such as the CNF, from adopting a is, therefore, to enable the public auth- draft scale setting the minimum and maxi- orities to adopt rules adapted to the mum fees for services provided by members particular features and needs of the pro- of the profession, where this draft scale is fession. 70 intended exclusively for submission to the public authorities of the Member State concerned in the context of a legislative procedure such as that provided for by Article 57 of the Decree-Law.
70. Secondly, the CNF decision on the draft scale does not have the effect of restricting competition within the common market. (b) The submission of the draft fee scale to the public authorities
71. It appears from the evidence on the file 71 that the draft scale is submitted exclusively to the Italian Minister for Jus- tice. Without approval by the Minister, the 73. The second decision of the CNF may be members of the profession and third parties characterised as an application lodged by are legally bound to apply the scale con- private economic operators with the public tained in the preceding ministerial decree.
72 — My opinion on this point would be otherwise if it appeared that the CNF decision was circulated amongst the 70 — It is clear that my opinion on this point would have been members of the profession and that, even without the different if the decision of the CNF adopting the draft scale approval of the Minister for Justice, members of the Bar had not formed a part of the legislative procedure laid based their fees on the tariffs set out in the draft scale. In down by the Italian legal system. that case, the decision of the CNF could be characterised as 71 — See, in particular, the Commission's written observations, a system of target prices such as to restrict competition within the common market. paragraph 19.
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authorities of a Member State for the orities then have to decide whether the purpose of conferring binding effect on proposed action is in the public interest. the draft agreement concluded by those They have sole power, but also sole operators. responsibility for their decision'.
74. In his Opinion in Albany, cited above, 75. Since I endorse this analysis, I propose Advocate General Jacobs clearly set out the that the Court declare that Article 85(1) of reasons why such a request should not be the Treaty does not preclude a professional prohibited by Article 85(1) of the Treaty. body of members of the Bar, such as the Mr Jacobs said that: 73 CNF, from submitting to the public auth- orities of a Member State a draft scale setting the minimum and maximum fees for services provided by members of the pro- fession for the purpose of making the scale binding on all members of the profession 'Mere efforts on the part of undertakings to and third parties. convince public authorities to extend the effects of a certain agreement to other economic actors are not caught by Article 85(1) [of the Treaty].
76. In these circumstances, the two decisions adopted by the CNF are com- patible with the provisions of Article 85(1) of the Treaty. First, such action by itself does not affect the competitive process or the freedom to compete of anyone. Any restriction [of competition] is a consequence of sub- sequent State action. 77. It should be noted that, in BNIC, the Court reached a different conclusion with respect to agreements concluded by the National Inter-Trade Board for Cognac ('BNIC'). Secondly, coordinated application to the State authorities is part of our democratic societies. Natural or legal persons are entitled to organise themselves and to submit jointly their requests to the govern- ment or the legislature. The public auth- The BNIC was a professional body made up of representatives of the dealers' 'group' and the winegrowers' 'group'. It had con- 73 — Paragraphs 291 to 293. cluded an agreement fixing a minimum
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price for certain goods and submitted this 79. It is common ground that most econ- agreement to the French authorities with a omic sectors are characterised by the com- view to making it binding on all members plex nature of the goods or services offered of the professions represented. One of the and their permanent evolution through dealers, against whom the BNIC had insti- rapidly changing knowledge and technical tuted proceedings, had challenged the com- developments. 76 Because of these char- patibility of the agreement with the Treaty acteristics, State authorities can face major provisions on competition. difficulties in adopting, alone, detailed legislative measures that are up to date and adapted to the various sectors con- cerned. It is therefore necessary to enable the State authorities to set up, in one way or another, mechanisms for consultation Before the Court, the BNIC submitted 'that with the representatives of the economic agreements concluded within it are not sectors liable to be affected by particular binding and that its role is solely to advise rules. 77 the central public authorities, which alone may make the said agreements binding by means of ministerial orders'. 74
The Court rejected this argument on the ground that 'for the purposes of Article 85(1) it is unnecessary to take account of the actual effects of an agree- ment where its object is to restrict, prevent or distort competition. By its very nature, an agreement fixing a minimum price for a product which is submitted to the public authorities for the purpose of obtaining As the Commission has emphasised, 78 the approval for that minimum price, so that it principles laid down in BMC are such as to becomes binding on all traders on the prevent the establishment of such mech- market in question, is intended to distort anisms. The risk is that measures by which competition on that market'. 75 economic operators submit proposals — in particular, on prices — to public auth- orities or measures by which these oper- ators respond to requests from the public authorities themselves will have to be characterised as agreements restricting 78. I consider that the principles estab- competition within the meaning of lished in BNIC are too strict to be applied to cases such as this. 76 — Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Pavlov, paragraph 92. 77 — See also, to this effect, the Opinion of Advocate General 74 — BNÍC, paragraph 21. Fennelly in DIP, paragraph 55. 75 — Ibid., paragraph 22. 78 — Written observations of the Commission, paragraph 19.
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Article 85(1) of the Treaty. In other words, B — Articles S and 85 of the Treaty there is a risk that Article 85(1) of the Treaty will be interpreted in such a way as to preclude any concerted action on the part of private operators which is intended to inform the public authorities or to influence the content of their decisions. 79
82. I now turn to consider whether the Italian authorities have infringed Articles 5 and 85 of the Treaty on the ground that they have reinforced the effects of a decision by an association of undertakings within the meaning of Article 85(1) of the Treaty, in adopting Ministerial Decree No 585/94. 80. On the basis of the foregoing consider- ations, I therefore propose that the Court find that Article 85(1) of the Treaty does not preclude a professional body of members of the Bar, such as the CNF, from adopting a draft scale setting the minimum and maximum fees for services supplied by members of the profession and from submitting, in compliance with the 83. In that regard, I would point out that, national measures in force, this draft scale in order for a legislative or regulatory to the authorities of the Member State measure to be declared incompatible with concerned for the purpose of making the Articles 5 and 85 of the Treaty, the case- said scale binding on the whole profession law requires that there be a link between and on third parties. the State measure and private conduct on the part of one or more undertakings.80 This requirement is intended to preclude the examination of State measures on the basis of anti-competitive effects peculiar to them. In their Opinions in Meng, Reiff, Ohra Schadeverzekeringen and DIP, 81 Advocates General Tesauro, 82 Darmon 83 and Fennelly 84 conclusively set out the reasons why the case-law should be upheld 81. Since the two decisions adopted by the on this point. It is not therefore necessary CNF are not such as to restrict compe- to go over those various arguments. tition, it is not necessary to determine whether they may affect trade between Member States. 80 — See the operative part of the judgments in Meng and Ohra Schadeverzekeringen. 81 — Cited above. 79 — For a different analysis of BNIC, see R. Joliét, 'National 82 — Opinion in Meng and Ohra Schadeverzekeringen, already Anti-competitive Legislation and Community Law', Ford- cited. ham International Law Journal, 1989, p. 163, pp. 178 to 83 — Opinion in Reiff. 180. 84 — Opinion in DIP.
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84. However, in certain recent judg- scale is not such as to restrict competition ments, 85 the Court has clarified its require- since any restriction of competition would ments by taking a further step. It has be the result of the subsequent action of the established a parallel between the legality Italian State. Equally, the CNF decision of the private conduct and that of the State submitting the draft scale to the Italian measure. The Court considers that when an authorities is not contrary to Article 85(1) agreement, decision of an association of of the Treaty since only the ministerial undertakings or concerted practice is not decree approving the scale would have contrary to Article 85(1), the State measure effects restricting competition. reinforcing its effects is automatically com- patible with Articles 5 and 85 of the Treaty.
Under the case-law as it now stands, the Ministerial Decree is not caught by 85. In accordance with this recent case- Article 5 of the Treaty on the ground law, it would be right to conclude that that — specifically — the CNF decisions Articles 5 and 85 of the Treaty do not are not such as to restrict competition. It preclude the application of Ministerial follows that, as the case-law now stands, Decree No 585/94. The contested decree Community competition law prohibits would be compatible with those articles on neither the measures adopted by the CNF the sole ground that the measures adopted nor the measure adopted by the State, even by the CNF are not contrary to though the combination of these two Article 85(1) of the Treaty. measures may be such as appreciably to restrict competition.
86. However, I think that this automatic approach is hardly consistent with econ- omic reality. The present case, in my 88. Like Advocate General Jacobs, 87 I opinion, illustrates the limitations of the consider that, in cases such as this, it is case-law as it now stands. 86 more justified to accept that the State measure may infringe Articles 5 and 85 of the Treaty independently of the legality of the conduct of the private operators. In other words, it must be possible to find that a State measure appreciably restricts com- 87. In the present case, I have found that petition even if the conduct of the economic the decision of the CNF adopting the draft operators at the root of the State action is not, in itself, contrary to Article 85(1) of the Treaty. 85 — See, in particular, Corsica Ferries France, paragraphs 50 to 54; Albany, paragraph 66; and Pavlov, paragraphs 99 and 100. 86 — See the reasoning developed by Advocate General Jacobs in his Opinion in Pavlov, paragraph 161. 87 — Ibid., paragraph 163.
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89. I consider that it is also necessary to The first condition, of effective control, permit the State to justify its conduct under would ensure that the State does in fact Article 5 of the Treaty, 88 because a examine the content of the agreement, Member State may have legitimate reasons decision or concerted practice. It would for reinforcing the effects of an agreement, therefore be intended to ensure that the decision or concerted practice within the State authorities do not give 'free rein' to meaning of Article 85 of the Treaty. In that the economic operators. case, the duty to cooperate in good faith under Article 5 of the Treaty cannot pro- hibit a Member State from adopting legis- lative or regulatory measures which, even though they restrict competition, pursue a legitimate goal. The second condition would make it poss- ible to verify that the State measure has indeed been adopted in the public interest, because it 'can be presumed that private economic actors normally act in their own and not in the public interest when they 90. It is therefore necessary to identify conclude agreements between themselves. criteria enabling a Member State to justify Thus, the consequences of their agreements a measure restricting competition on the are not necessarily in the public interest'. 89 basis of Article 5 of the Treaty. By virtue of the second condition, the State authorities would thus be authorised to reinforce the effects of the concertation between the private operators if they are certain that the content of that concertation is in the public interest.
91. In this respect, I suggest that the Court adopt three criteria of assessment. The Court could find that a legislative or regulatory measure which reinforces the effects of an agreement, decision or con- certed practice is compatible with Lastly, the third condition would be Articles 5 and 85 of the Treaty provided intended to ensure that the effects restrict- that: (1) the public authorities of the ive of competition produced by the State Member State concerned exercise effective measure are confined to that which is control over the content of the agreement, necessary in order to achieve the objective decision or concerted practice; (2) the State pursued. measure pursues a legitimate aim in the public interest, and (3) the State measure is proportionate to the aim which it pursues. 89 — Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Albany, paragraph 184. See also, to that effect, A. Bach, note on Reiff, Meng, and Ohra Schadeverzekeringen, in Common Markei Law Review, 1994, p. 1357, footnote 14. The author states that '(¡Instead of presuming corporate rulemaking to be in the 88 — This was also the position put forward by the Commission public interest, however, it seems much more justified to in Joined Cases C-430/93 and C-431/93 Van Schipidel and presume that this kind of rule follows the economic Van Veen (19951 ECR 1-4705, p. 21 of the Report for the interests of those participating in the rulemaking and Hearing. creates restrictive conditions for newcomers and outsiders'.
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92. In accordance with the view I am 95. In this respect, it is settled law that advancing, I will proceed to examine minimum prices constitute a significant whether Ministerial Decree No 585/94 is restriction of competition. 94 They prevent such as appreciably to restrict competition operators from competing by setting prices on the Italian market in legal services. If so, below the minima laid down. Therefore, I will then consider whether the contested they deny consumers the opportunity to decree may be justified under Article 5 of acquire the goods or services concerned at the Treaty. the best price. Furthermore, minimum prices artificially reinforce the barriers to entry for operators wishing to enter the market since they deprive the latter of a fast and effective means of penetrating the market. 95
1. Restriction of competition
93. It should be noted that price is the principal instrument of competition. 90 The 96. Maximum prices are also liable function of price competition is to keep appreciably to restrict competition. One prices down to the lowest possible level and of the primary risks in the professions is for to encourage the movement of goods and maximum prices to become, in practice, services between the Member States, 91 fixed prices, 96 thereby causing an artificial thereby permitting the most efficient poss- increase in market prices. ible distribution of activities in the matter of productivity and the capacity of under- takings to adapt themselves to change. 92
94. In the present case, Ministerial Decree 97. In these circumstances, I find that No 585/94 provides a mandatory system of Ministerial Decree No 585/94 does minimum and maximum tariffs for services appreciably restrict competition on the provided by members of the Bar in Italy. 93 Italian market in legal services.
90 — M. Waelbroeck and A. Frignarli, Commentaire,]. Megret, 94 — See, to this effect, BNIC, paragraph 22. Le droit de la CE, volume 4, Concurrence, Editions de 95 — See, to this effect, Commission Decision 95/188/EC of l'université de Bruxelles, Brussels, 1997, 2 edition, 30 January 1995 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 paragraph 533. of the EC Treaty (IV/33.686 — COAPI) (OJ 1995 L 122, 91 — ICI v Commission, paragraph 115. p. 37, paragraph 38 of the account of the facts). 92 — Idem. 96 — See Politique de la concurrence et professions libérales, 93 — Order for reference, paragraph 11. OECD, Paris, 1985, paragraph 199.
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2. Justification for restricting competition must obtain the opinion of the CIP and consult the Consiglio di Stato. The minis- terial decree must then be endorsed and registered by the Corte dei Conti.
98. The above finding does not, however, imply that Ministerial Decree No 585/94 is incompatible with Articles 5 and 85 of the 101. It appears from the order for refer- Treaty. It remains to determine whether the ence 97 that the CIP is an organ of the State, contested decree can be justified on the composed of eight ministers and three basis of Article 5 of the Treaty. In accord- experts appointed by the President of the ance with the three conditions set out Council of Ministers. Its functions include above, I will examine whether: (1) the fixing the prices of mass consumer goods, Italian authorities have exercised effective monitoring compliance with those prices, control over the CNF decision; (2) Minis- and giving an opinion on the tariffs set by terial Decree No 585/94 pursues an aim in the professions. the public interest; and (3) the contested decree is proportionate to the aim pursued.
102. The Consiglio di Stato is responsible for assessing whether the scale set by the CNF is in accordance with the law and (a) Effective control by the Italian auth- with the criteria which it lays down. 98 orities
103. The order for reference only partially sets out the powers vested in the Minister 99. In relation to the first condition, I for Justice. The Court therefore requested consider that the detailed rules of the the Italian Government to expand on this procedure for approving the fee scale do information at the hearing. afford the Italian authorities the opportun- ity to carry out effective control of the scale set by the CNF.
According to the information provided by the Italian Government,the Minister for
100. I say this because, before approving 97 — Paragraph 13. the scale, the Italian Minister for Justice 98 — Ibid., paragraph 15.
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Justice has no power to substitute his own because it is still necessary to determine decisions for those of the CNF. However, whether, in practice, the State authorities the Minister does have the power, on his genuinely exercise the powers conferred on own initiative, to amend the content of them by law. 100 In the absence of an those decisions. In this case, it is for the effective exercise of these powers, it must CNF to incorporate these amendments into be concluded that the State authorities the original draft fee scale. Furthermore, approve, without discussion, the concer- the Minister for Justice has the — indi- tation which took place within the CNF. rect — power to force the CNF to amend the content of its decisions since, without an approving decree, the scale laid down by the CNF is not binding at all. In this case, the members of the profession and third parties are required to apply the tariffs laid down by the preceding ministerial decree. 107. In the present case, the following information appears from the material in the file. 101 The CIP and the Consiglio di Stato prepared a series of observations on the impact on inflation of the entry into force of the CNF decision of 12 June 1993. 104. Finally, before granting endorsement These bodies proposed a gradual intro- and registration, the Corte dei Conti carries duction of the tariff increases provided for out a review of the legality of the minister- by the CNF. The Minister for Justice ial decree approving the fee scale. 99 endorsed the opinion of the CIP and the Consiglio di Stato: he requested the CNF to amend its decision and to postpone for six months one half of the tariff increases. The CNF incorporated the Minister for Justice's observations in a second decision dated 29 September 1994. 105. It follows from all of this information that the detailed rules of the procedure for approving the fee scale do give the Italian authorities the power to carry out particu- larly extensive control over the decisions of the CNF. Furthermore, in its written observa- tions, 102 the Italian Government stated that 'the Minister [for Justice] prepared a
106. However, this finding is not enough to 100 — On this point, it can be noted that some learned writers have criticised the reasoning in Reiff for its 'lack of conclude that the Italian authorities carry realism' (see A. Bach, cited above, point 2.5). That case out effective control over the content of the concerned the German procedure for approving tariffs for road transport. agreement, decision or concerted practice, 101 — See the preamble to Ministerial Decree No 585/94, the order for reference (English translation, p. 6) and the written observations of tne Italian Government (pp. 9 to 10). 99 — Ibid. (English translation, p. 6). 102 — At p. 10.
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whole series of observations which were The decisive criterion in this respect is not only partly coterminous with those of the whether the public authorities have Consiglio di Stato, and with which the required numerous changes to the draft CNF had, to a large extent, to comply if the scale. It lies in establishing that the Italian new scale was not to be denied effect (for authorities do indeed intervene to control want of approval)'. the content of CNF decisions on aspects which are essential for the profession and third parties.
108. I think that this information is not (b) The public-interest aim pursued by adequate for the Court to be able to rule on Ministerial Decree No 585/94 the question of the effectiveness of the control exercised by the Italian authorities.
109. The file contains little information relevant to the second condition.
The information relating to the postpone- ment of the tariff increases suggests that the public authorities exercise genuine control over the CNF's decisions. Nevertheless, this information must, in my view, be con- 110. The Pretore di Pinerolo and the Italian firmed by further evidence before the Pre- Government have not specified the objec- tore di Pinerolo. tives pursued by Ministerial Decree No 585/94. Only the party claiming civil damages has advanced any comment on this subject in the course of these proceed- ings. At the hearing, he submitted that Ministerial Decree No 585/94 was pri- marily intended to guarantee a high level of quality in respect of the services supplied The national court will, therefore, be able by members of the profession. to examine the Minister for Justice's acts which have been referred to by the Italian Government during these proceedings. It will also be able to determine whether, with regard to the contested scale or other draft scales, the public authorities have made any 111. Since this information comes neither objections or substantive observations vis- from the Italian Government nor from the à-vis the CNF (for example, whether the referring court, I will assume that this is the Minister for Justice has already refused to case. It is, above all, for the Pretore di approve a CNF decision on the ground that Pinerolo to identify the true objectives of the tariff increases were too high). the contested scale and to determine
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whether these objectives are consistent with quality of those services therefore [consti- the public interest. tutes] one of the decisive inputs in many sectors of a national economy'. 104
112. As for the objective referred to by the Lastly, the markets for professional services party claiming civil damages, it should be are characterised by 'asymmetric infor- emphasised that the quality of the services mation'. 10 5Since the consumer is rarely provided by the professions is of crucial in a position to assess the quality of the importance for several reasons. services offered, it is essential to lay down certain rules to maintain the quality of these services.
Firstly, the professions provide services 113. It follows from these considerations which concern essential aspects of society, that the maintenance of the high quality of such as public health (the medical profes- the services supplied by members of the Bar sions), justice (the legal profession) or would undoubtedly constitute a legitimate public safety and town planning (the archi- objective in the public interest. tects' profession). These various services can also have an immediate and direct impact on fundamental aspects of the life of citizens, such as their physical safety.
(c) Proportionality of Ministerial Decree No 585/94
Secondly, from an economic viewpoint, the services provided by the professions do not only have consequences for the recipients. 114. Following the third condition, it As Advocate General Jacobs has pointed remains to consider whether the measures out, 103 they also generate 'externalities' in contained in Ministerial Decree No 585/94 the form of losses or benefits for society as are proportionate to the objective which a whole. The demand for professional they allegedly pursued. 106 services 'is often of a derivative nature, which means that their output (a lawyer's advice, an architect's plan) is an intermedi- 104 — Idem. ate good in a longer production chain. The 105 — Ibid., paragraph 86. 106 — It will be recalled that I am considering this question hypothetically since it is not proven that the objective pursued by the contested decree does indeed consist in maintaining the quality of services supplied by the 103 — Opinion in Pavlov, paragraph 85. members or the profession.
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115. It is settled case-law 107 that, in order they lacked qualifications, competence or to establish whether a measure complies moral conscience. Second, the quality of with the principle of proportionality, it is services is — or ought to be — guaran- necessary to ascertain whether the means teed by measures of a different type, such as which it employs are suitable for the those governing the conditions of entry to purpose of achieving the desired objective the profession and the professional liability and whether they do not go beyond what is of members of the Bar. necessary to achieve it.
116. In the present case, Ministerial Decree No 585/94 provides for a mandatory sys- 118. Consequently, I consider that, if the tem of minimum and maximum tariffs for objective pursued by Ministerial Decree the services supplied by members of the Bar No 585/94 is to maintain the quality of the in Italy. 108 services supplied by members of the Bar in Italy, the contested decree cannot be justi- fied on the basis of the provisions of Article 5 of the Treaty.
117. On the assumption that the objective of the contested decree is to maintain the quality of the services supplied by members of the profession, such a measure does not seem to me to be suitable for the purpose of achieving the desired objective. 109 119. In the light of the foregoing consider- ations, I propose that the Court reply to the first question referred for a preliminary ruling in terms that Articles 5 and 85 of the Treaty do not preclude a Member State from adopting a legislative or regulatory measure approving, on the basis of a draft First, I consider that there is no causal produced by a professional body of effect between the level of fees charged and members of the Bar, a scale setting the the quality of services supplied. I fail to see minimum and maximum fees for the ser- how a system of mandatory prices would vices provided by members of the profes- prevent members of the profession from sion on the threefold condition that: (1) the offering inadequate services if, in any event, public authorities of the Member State concerned exercise effective control over the content of the fee scale proposed by the 107 — See, for example, Case C-426/93 Germany v Council professional body; (2) the State measure [1995] ECR I-3723, paragraph 42; and Case C-84/94 United Kingdom v Council [1996] ECR I-5755, para- approving the fee scale pursues a legitimate graph 57. aim in the public interest; and (3) the State 108 — Order for reference, paragraph 11. 109 — See, to this effect, Decision 95/188, paragraph 41 of the measure is proportionate to the aim which account of the facts. it pursues.
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VII — Delegation of powers to private orities have the power to approve, reject or operators (Question 2) amend it, or to replace it with their own decision. 113 In that case, the legislative nature of the rules is not called in question by the simple fact that it was adopted following consultations with represen- 120. By the second question, the Pretore di tatives of the private economic oper- Pinerolo asks whether, having regard to the ators. 114 detailed rules of the procedure for approv- ing the fee scale, the Italian authorities have infringed Articles 5 and 85 of the Treaty on the ground that they have deprived their own rules of their legislative character by delegating to private operators the respon- sibility for taking decisions affecting the economic sphere. 122. The question in the present case is whether the Italian authorities have reserved to themselves the power to fix the content of the fee scale of members of the Bar. In order to answer this question it 121. On this point, it will be recalled that is necessary to identify what powers the the Court raises an Objection in principle public authorities have in the procedure for to the adoption of legislation in which the approving the scale. Since I have dealt with State gives up its role and confers on this issue in the course of considering the undertakings the powers required to give first question, I will, to a large extent, refer effect to their policy'. 110 to my earlier arguments.
The Court considers that rules retain their legislative character where the public auth- orities reserve to themselves the power to fix the essential terms of the economic 123. At points 99 to 105 of this Opinion, I decision. 1 1 1This is clearly the case where found that the detailed rules of the pro- the State measure itself contains the pro- cedure for approving the scale give the hibition the effects of which may be Italian authorities the power to carry out restrictive of competition.112It is also the particularly extensive control over the case where the decision is taken by private CNF's decisions. economic operators, but the public auth-
113 — Reiff, paragraph 22; Delta Schiffahrts- und Speditions- 110 — R. Joliét, cited above, p. 172. gesellschaft, paragraph 21; and Centro Servizi Spedi- 111 — Van Eycke, already cited, paragraph 19. porto, paragraph 27. 112 — Meng, paragraph 20; Ohra Schadeverzekeringen, para- 114— Van Eycke, paragraph 19; and Corsica Ferries france, graph 13; and Corsica ferries France, paragraph 52. paragraph 52.
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124. As regards the powers of the Minister economic operators their power in setting for Justice, I stated 115 that, according to the tariffs. the information provided by the Italian Government, the Minister for Justice has the power to amend, on his own initiative, the content of the decisions. In that case, it is for the CNF to incorporate these amend- ments into the original draft fee scale. 127. In this respect, I have found 117 that Furthermore, the Minister for Justice has the material in the file is insufficient to the power to force the CNF to amend the enable the Court itself to determine this content of its decisions since, without an question. The matter should therefore be approving decree, the scale laid down by remitted to the Pretore di Pinerolo for the CNF is not binding. In this case, the decision. members of the profession and third parties are required to apply the tariffs laid down by the preceding ministerial decree.
The determining criterion on this issue is whether the Italian authorities do indeed intervene to control the content of the CNF's decisions on aspects which are essential for the profession and third 125. In the light of these factors, I consider parties. that the Italian public authorities have reserved to themselves the — indirect — power to determine the content of the fee scale of members of the Bar.
128. Consequently, I propose that the Court reply to the second question referred for a preliminary ruling in terms that Articles 5 and 85 of the Treaty do not preclude a Member State from conferring on a professional body of members of the 126. However, I maintained that the con- Bar, such as the CNF, the power to adopt a trol exercised by the public authorities over draft scale setting the minimum and maxi- the conduct of private economic operators mum fees for services provided by members had to be effective. 116 It is therefore of the profession on the twofold condition necessary to ascertain whether, in practice, that: (1) the public authorities of the the Italian authorities genuinely exercise Member State concerned reserve to them- the powers conferred on them by law. If selves the power to determine, directly or not, it must be concluded that the public indirectly, the content of the fee scale; and authorities have in fact delegated to private (2) those authorities genuinely exercise the powers conferred on them by law. 115 — See point 103 above. 116 — See point 106 above. See also my Opinion in Wouters (point 221 et seq.). 117 — See points 107 and 108 above.
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OPINION OF MR LÉGER — CASE C-35/99
VIIl — Conclusion
129. In the light of all of the foregoing, I therefore propose that the Court reply to the questions referred by the Pretore di Pinerolo in the following terms:
(1) Articles 5 and 85 of the EC Treaty (now Articles 10 EC and 81 EC) do not preclude a Member State from adopting a legislative or regulatory measure approving, on the basis of a draft produced by a professional body of members of the Bar, such as the Consiglio Nazionale Forense, a scale setting the minimum and maximum fees for services provided by members of the profession on the threefold condition that: (1) the public authorities of the Member State concerned exercise effective control over the content of the fee scale proposed by the professional body; (2) the State measure approving the fee scale pursues a legitimate aim in the public interest; and (3) the State measure is proportionate to the aim which it pursues. It is for the national court to determine whether this is the case.
(2) Articles 5 and 85 of the Treaty do not preclude a Member State from conferring on a professional body of members of the Bar, such as the Consiglio Nazionale Forense, the power to adopt a draft scale setting the minimum and maximum fees for services provided by members of the profession on the twofold condition that: (1) the public authorities of the Member State concerned reserve to themselves the power to determine, directly or indirectly, the content of the fee scale; and (2) those authorities genuinely exercise the powers conferred on them by law. It is for the national court to determine whether this is the case.
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