← Späť na vyhľadávanie
Súdny dvor Európskej únie·15.3.2001

C-100/99

ECLI:EU:C:2001:167

Súd
Súdny dvor Európskej únie
IČS
61999CC0100

ITALY V COUNCIL AND COMMISSION

OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL JACOBS delivered on 15 March 2001 1

1. In this case, the Italian Republic seeks Agrimonetary arrangements the annulment of two Council regulations adapting agrimonetary arrangements to the introduction of the euro at the beginning of 1999, and concomitantly of the two Com- mission regulations implementing them. It challenges in particular the way in which those regulations determine the amount of Background compensatory aid which Member States may in certain circumstances pay to their farmers, with Community participation. 3. The two principal means whereby the Community aids farmers are guaranteed prices for produce and direct payments based on numbers of hectares, units of livestock etc. Both are, as a matter of principle, uniform throughout the Commu- nity. The former is often referred to as indirect aid and the latter, which is increas- ingly the more important, as direct aid, although those terms are not always used precisely.

2. It argues, essentially, that the same regime should not have been applied to the Member States which had not yet adopted the euro as to those which had, and that the arrangements adopted penalise 4. The amounts involved are calculated in a certain types of agriculture, particularly central currency or accounting unit — those more prevalent in Mediterranean successively the agricultural unit of account countries. (which was based on the gold value of the United States dollar), the European unit of account, the ecu (based on a 'basket' of 1 — Original language: English. Community currencies) and the euro —

I - 5219

OPINION OF MR JACOBS — CASE C-100/99

then converted into the relevant national French and German farmers would have currencies. Although each successive unit ensued. has on introduction been equal to its predecessor, changing exchange rates and definitions have meant that there is now no linkage between the euro and the dollar.

7. The solution initially adopted was the introduction of monetary compensatory amounts ('MCAs'), which were in fact equivalent to import subsidies and export levies or import levies and export subsi- dies — depending on whether a currency had been devalued or revalued — on agri- cultural trade between Member States. In 5. Such a system is unlikely to give rise to addition, in order to maintain the stability disparity where exchange rates are essen- of intervention prices in national currencies tially stable (as was the case during the fluctuating against the central accounting 1960s and until the breakdown of the unit, a fictitious agricultural conversion international monetary system agreed on rate, often known as the 'green' rate and at Bretton Woods) or where a single different from the market rate, was intro- currency is used as an immutable standard duced. by a number of Member States (as has been the case with the euro since 1 January 1999).

8. With the introduction of the European Monetary System and the establishment of the single market, a number of reforms became necessary. Further reform took place in 1995, leading to the system immediately preceding the one in issue in the present case. MCAs finally disappeared, 6. Distortions inevitably arise, however, but the separate agricultural conversion where exchange rates fluctuate to any rate remained, its determination thus appreciable extent. If a national currency acquiring primordial importance. is revalued against the central currency or accounting unit, guaranteed prices and the amount of aid will automatically fall in that national currency unless steps are taken, and the reverse is true in the case of a devaluation. The first and most striking instance occurred in 1969, when the French 9. Before attempting to set out in summary franc was devalued by 11% and the Ger- the measures in force immediately before man mark revalued by 9%. Had no action and after 1 January 1999,1 should perhaps been taken, considerable disparity between point out that the legislation has accrued in

I - 5220

ITALY V COUNCIL AND COMMISSION

piecemeal fashion over the years and has ence between the agricultural conversion occasionally lost in clarity what it has rate and the representative market rate, gained in complexity. expressed as a percentage of the former) exceeded a certain threshold.

The arrangements prior to 1999 12. In the case of a positive monetary gap, where the agricultural rate exceeded the market rate, no adjustment was made to the former until the difference exceeded 5 10. The arrangements in force immediately points at the end of a reference period. In prior to the adoption of the single currency the contrary case of a negative gap, an were governed largely by Council Regula- adjustment was triggered when the differ- tions Nos 3813/92, 1527/95 and 724/97. 2 ence exceeded 2 points in absolute terms or 5 points in relation to any other currency. Where an adjustment was made, the new rate was determined by reducing the abso- lute value of the gap by half. 3

11. Regulation No 3813/92 laid down the rules governing adjustments to the agricul- tural conversion rates. Essentially, those rates were based initially on the 'represen- tative market rate' for each currency (a monthly average exchange rate with respect to the ecu) but did not immediately 13. There could thus be a difference, not follow any changes in that rate. The wholly or immediately corrected, between agricultural conversion rate was modified the agricultural conversion rate and the only when the 'monetary gap' (the differ- market rate. Farmers in countries whose currencies showed a positive gap would benefit since they would be receiving pay- 2 —Council Regulation (EEC) No 3813/92 of 28 December ments at an exchange rate more favourable 1992 on the unit of account and the conversion rates to be applied for the purposes of the common agricultural policy, than the market rate. In the event of a OJ 1992 L 387, p. 1, as amended principally by Council Regulation (EC) No 150/95 of 23 January 1995, OJ 1995 negative gap, however, farm incomes L 22, p. 1; Council Regulation (EC) No 1527/95 of 29 June 1995 regulating compensation for reductions in the agri- would suffer. To deal with the latter cultural conversion rates of certain national currencies, OJ 1995 L 148, p. 1; and Council Regulation (EC) situation, Regulation No 3813/92 provided No 724/97 of 22 April 1997 determining measures and compensation relating to appreciable revaluations that affect farm incomes, OJ 1997 L 108, p. 9, as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 942/98 of 20 April 1998, 3 — See in particular Articles 1, 3 and 4 of the regulation, as OJ 1998 L 132, p. 1. amended.

I - 5221

OPINION OF MR JACOBS — CASE C-100/99

for an increase in amounts of direct aid and able parities for the currencies of all the allowed Member States to grant compen- participating Member States, 6 it would satory aid to their farmers, subject to clearly no longer be possible for market certain conditions but with a Community rates to vary as between those currencies contribution to its financing. 4 and the euro, so that the previous agrimo- netary arrangements would to that extent lose their purpose. The changeover to the single currency would, however, require certain transitional arrangements and pro- vision would still have to be made for conversion rates for the States not yet participating. 14. Subsequently, Regulations Nos 1527/95 and 724/97 froze the agricul- tural conversion rates for certain categories of direct aid until 1 January 1999 and allowed Member States to make compen- satory payments to farmers in three 12- month tranches, again with a Community contribution, in the event of appreciable revaluation of a currency (equivalent to a negative monetary gap). The maximum amount of the aid was to be determined by multiplying the appreciable part of the revaluation by a flat-rate income loss, both of which were to be calculated in accor- 16. New rules were therefore introduced by dance with specified rules. 5 Council Regulations Nos 2799/98 and 2800/98, 7 with detailed implementing rules in Commission Regulations Nos 2808/98 and 2813/98. 8 It is these regulations which the Italian Republic wishes to see annulled, with particular emphasis on certain specific provisions of the two Council regulations.

The arrangements in issue 6 — In fact, the currency of the participating Member States became the euro as from 1 January 1999, but the euro is also divided, until 31 December 2001, into 'national currency units' equal to the units of the currencies of those States as defined on 31 December 1998; see Articles 1 to 6 of Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 of 3 May 1998 on the introduction of the euro, OJ 1998 L 139, p. 1. 7 — Council Regulation (EC) No 2799/98 of 15 December 1998 establishing agrimonetary arrangements for the euro, OJ 1998 L 349, p. 1; Council Regulation (EC) No 2800/98 of 15 December 1998 on transitional measures 15. With the introduction of the euro on to be applied under the common agricultural policy with a 1 January 1999 and the fixing of irrevoc- view to the introduction of the euro, OJ 1998 L 349, p. 8. 8 — Commission Regulation (EC) No 2808/98 of 22 December 1998 laying down detailed rules for the application of the agrimonetary system for the euro in agriculture, OJ 1998 L 349, p. 36; Commission Regulation (EC) No 2813/98 of 4 — See Articles 7 and 8 of the regulation. 22 December 1998 laying down detailed rules for applying 5 — See Articles 2 and 3 of Regulation No 1527/95 and 3 to 6 of the transitional measures for the introduction of the euro to Regulation No 724/97. the common agricultural policy, OJ 1998 L 349, p. 48.

I - 5222

ITALY V COUNCIL AND COMMISSION

— Regulation No 2799/98 19. The remainder of the regulation deals, essentially, with the results of future fluc- tuations in the exchange rates between the euro and the national currencies of non- participating Member States. 11

17. According to its preamble, the aim of Regulation No 2799/98 is to replace the previous agrimonetary system, no longer appropriate, with a simpler one closer to 20. Articles 4 and 5 deal with cases justify- the actual monetary situation, based on the ing the payment of compensatory aid. In euro for participating States and on the such cases, for reasons perhaps inherited actual exchange rate for non-participating from the wording of previous disparate States. 9It was recognised, however, that a legislation, Article 4 refers to a revaluation, major currency revaluation (for non-parti- whereas Article 5 describes what is appar- cipating States) could in certain conditions ently the same phenomenon as a fall in the reduce farm incomes, that aid could tem- exchange rate (of the euro; this is of course porarily be granted to offset such reduc- again the equivalent of what had previously tion, subject to specifically adapted rules also been known as a negative monetary for certain types of direct aid, and that gap, a situation in which an exchange rate provision should be made for the possibility movement implies reduction of the of interim measures. 10 amounts of aid received by farmers in national currency).

21. Article 4 allows Member States, in 18. Under Article 2, prices and amounts cases of appreciable revaluation, to grant fixed in legal instruments relating to the compensatory aid in respect of all prices common agricultural policy are to be and amounts other than those referred to in expressed in euro. They are to be granted Article 5. (An appreciable revaluation is or collected in euro in the participating defined in Article 1(f) as 'a situation where Member States, and in the other Member the annual average exchange rate [of the States to be converted into the national euro] is below a threshold defined as the currency (although provision is made in lowest average annual conversion rate Article 8 for the possibility of such States applied during the preceding three years also using the euro).

1 1— 'National currencies' arc defined i n Article 1(d) so as to exclude the national currency units of participating 9 — See recitals 1 and 2. Member States, and the definitions of 'exchange rate' 10 — See in particular recitals 4 to 7 and 10. and 'appreciable revaluation' flow from that.

I - 5223

OPINION OF MR JACOBS — CASE C-100/99

and the exchange rate of 1 January 1999'.) established for the Member State concerned The Member State concerned may make as a whole, in accordance with rules laid compensatory payments to farmers in three down in the annex to the regulation. successive 12-month tranches, with a max- imum amount to be determined for the first tranche and a progressive reduction for the other two. In addition, under Article 4(4), no aid is to be granted for the portion of the amount that does not exceed appreciable revaluation of 2.6%.

24. In the case of Article 4 payments, that involves multiplying the appreciable part of the revaluation (namely, in accordance with Article 1(g), the percentage by which the annual average falls short of the threshold taken for the definition of an appreciable revaluation in Article 1(f)) by a flat-rate 22. Article 5 covers flat-rate aid calculated income loss. That flat-rate loss is to be per hectare or per livestock unit, compen- equal, according to point 1 of the annex, satory premiums per sheep or goat, and essentially to 1% of final agricultural amounts of a structural or environmental production in the case of cereals, sugar nature. (Aid of those kinds, which all beet, milk and milk products and beef and involve direct payments to farmers, was veal, 1 % of the value of products supplied already grouped together as a specific under a contract imposing a minimum price category in Article 7 of Regulation to the producer in the case of other No 3813/92, and it was in respect of that products, and 1 % of aid or premiums paid category that the agricultural conversion to farmers, other than aid referred to in rate had been frozen by Regulation Article 5. That calculation is essentially the No 724/97.) In such cases, where the same as had previously been applied under applicable exchange rate of the euro falls, Regulation No 724/97. compensatory aid in three 12-month tranches is again permitted, again with a maximum amount and a progressive reduc- tion. Member States may, but need not, waive the grant of compensatory aid when the amount calculated corresponds to a reduction of less than 0.5%.

25. The method of calculating the maxi- mum amount for Article 5 payments, how- ever, is less clear. Article 5(2) refers for that purpose simply to the procedure in Arti- cle 9 for adopting implementing rules and to point 4 of the annex. The implementing rules appear to be those contained in 23. The maximum amounts for the first Commission Regulation No 2808/98, Arti- tranche of payment are in both cases to be cle 10(2) of which states that the maximum

I - 5224

ITALY V COUNCIL AND COMMISSION

amount of the aid is to be determined in 27. Under Article 6, the Community con- accordance with Article 5(2) of Regulation tributes 50% to the financing of the aid. No 2799/98. Point 4 of the annex states that the aid is to be calculated as a function of certain data but without specifying how the data are to be used. There is thus apparent circularity and a lack of any clear indication as to quite how the maximum is to be calculated. 28. Those provisions, since they concern changes to the exchange rate as defined in the regulation (that is to say, the rate of exchange between the euro and the national currencies of non-participating States), affect only the situation in Member States not participating in the euro and only after its introduction. Changes result- ing from the transition to the new arrange- ments and affecting all States are covered by Regulation No 2800/98.

— Regulation No 2800/98 26. However, one significant distinction is clear as between the compensatory pay- ments allowed under the two articles: where Article 5 is concerned the fall in the exchange rate is taken fully into account (subject to an optional waiver for amounts corresponding to a reduction of 29. According to its title and preamble, less than 0.5%) but under Article 4 revalu- Regulation No 2800/98 is intended to ation is taken into account only to the make provision for temporary, degressive extent that it exceeds 2.6%. That 2.6% aid in respect of the transition to the euro threshold had already been introduced into on 1 January 1999 which, with the disap- Regulation No 724/97, as from 1 May pearance of the agricultural conversion 1998, by Regulation No 942/98, 12 in order rates, could have the same effects as an to limit the risk of excessive compensation appreciable revaluation. in cases of 'small appreciable revaluations' (sic). 13 Previously, a different type of lower limit had been set in that aid corresponding to less than 0.5% of appreciable revalua- tion was not payable. 14 30. The formula used to define an 'appre- 12 — Both regulations cited m note 2. ciable revaluation' in Article 1 is slightly 13 — Regulation No 942/98, fifth recital. different from that in Regulation 14 — Article 4(3) of Regulation No 724/97, last subparagraph. No 2799/98; it amounts essentially to a

I - 5225

OPINION OF MR JACOBS — CASE C-100/99

reduction in the conversion rate on 1 Jan- lower than that applied previously, aid is to uary 1999 in comparison with the lowest be granted and is to be calculated in levels of the previously applicable rates. accordance with Article 5 of Regulation No 2799/98. Exceptionally, however, the Community contribution in that case is to be 100% for the first year.

31. Under Article 2, where the conversion rate (for the euro into national currency units of participating Member States) or exchange rate (for the euro into national — Regulations Nos 2808/98 and 2813/98 currencies of non-participating States) undergoes an appreciable revaluation on 1 January 1999 in comparison with the agricultural conversion rate on 31 Decem- ber 1998, compensatory aid may be granted in the same way as under Article 4 of Regulation No 2799/98 (thus, Article 2 covers the same types of aid, namely all aid 33. These are Commission regulations lay- other than the direct aid listed in Article 5 ing down detailed rules for the implemen- of Regulation No 2799/98). There is, how- tation of the two Council regulations. ever, a proviso in the second paragraph Although the Italian Government formally under which the maximum amount may be seeks their annulment, it does not put 'reduced or cancelled' 15 depending on the forward any specific criticism of any of development of the exchange rate (the their provisions but rather concentrates its proviso thus concerns only the non-partici- argument on the Council regulations. In its pating Member States) during the first nine reply, it states that it seeks the annulment of months of 1999. the Commission regulations only to pre- clude the institutions from maintaining that they remained valid in the event of the Council regulations being annulled; the claim that the Commission regulations are invalid derives from its arguments against the legality of the Council regulations.

32. As regards direct aid (the list is iden- tical to that in Article 5 of Regulation No 2799/98), Article 3 provides that where the conversion or exchange rate applicable on the day of the operative event in 1999 is

34. In those circumstances, it does not seem 15 — I take the word 'cancelled' here to mean 'reduced to zero' necessary to set out the details of their rather than implying the removal of any upper limit whatever. provisions.

I - 5226

ITALY V COUNCIL AND COMMISSION

Analysis tions occurring (for participating States) at the moment of the transition from the previous agrimonetary regime to the euro and in respect of those occurring (for non- participating States only) after that moment 35. The Italian Republic seeks the annul- as a result of fluctuations of exchange rates ment of all four regulations (Council Reg- as between the euro and the currencies of ulations Nos 2799/98 and 2800/98, Com- those States. mission Regulations Nos 2808/98 and 2813/98) and the Council and the Commis- sion contend that the application should be dismissed. The Council confines its submis- sions to its own regulations; the Commis- sion essentially challenges the admissibility of the claim for the annulment of the 38. The Italian Republic claims that such implementing regulations and concentrates treatment is contrary to Article 39 of the its own submissions on the validity of the EC Treaty (now Article 33 EC), the second Council regulations. and third subparagraphs of Article 40(3) of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 34(2) EC) and the principle of proportionality.

The Council regulations 39. Since the Italian Republic has not identified either the provision of Article 39 of the EC Treaty which it claims has been breached or the way in which the principle 36. The Italian Republic puts forward three of proportionality has allegedly been pleas in law. infringed, I consider that its plea may be dismissed in so far as those allegations are concerned.

— First plea: illegality of the undifferenti- ated application of the 2.6% threshold 40. As regards Article 40(3), however, the Italian Republic refers to the requirements that common organisation of the agricul- tural markets must exclude any discrimina- tion between producers within the Com- 37. Essentially, the basis of the first plea is munity (second subparagraph) and that any that it was illegal to apply the same 2.6% common price policy must be based on threshold for the payment of compensatory common criteria and uniform methods of aid both in respect of appreciable revalua- calculation (third subparagraph). These are

I - 5227

OPINION OF MR JACOBS — CASE C-100/99

expressions of the basic principle of equal 43. It would be difficult, I consider, to deny treatment, which dictates that similar situa- that the two situations present some points tions may not be treated differently and of dissimilarity; one concerns a single, different situations may not be treated in never-to-be-repeated change in the the same way. exchange rate, the other a series of repeated changes. However, they also present some very strong points of resemblance; they each concern, for every potential applica- tion of the mechanism, a single instance of a currency or currency unit being exchanged at a rate different from that which previously prevailed, and that is the very essence of the mechanism.

41. The continuing 2.6% threshold is jus- tified, it considers, with respect to the non- participating States because it cushions the effects of exchange rate fluctuations and because rates of exchange with the euro continue to evolve. It was not, however, justified when making the adjustments 44. The Council makes the point, correctly required on 1 January 1999, involving in my view, that as regards the transition simply a one-off change with no possibility from the old arrangements to the new, the of further adjustment. These are different first stage is to determine for all currencies situations and should be treated differently. whether there has been an appreciable revaluation and the only difference in treatment depends on whether that has or has not been the case. Thus, there is no breach of the principle of equal treatment. (After the changeover, however, there is a clear difference between the situation of currencies which can continue to fluctuate as against the euro and that of currency units which have an irrevocably-fixed con- version rate. A difference in treatment can 42. In particular, the Italian Republic thus be justified at the later stage.) asserts, the 2.6% threshold was introduced by Regulation No 942/98 to deal with a serious risk of currency speculation in the run-up to the introduction of the euro. Its retention was justified as regards the exchange rates for the currencies of the non-participating States, still subject to fluctuation and thus to speculation, but not as regards the transition itself, a 45. I agree moreover with the Commission situation in which all further change was that there is nothing in Regulation excluded. No 942/98 to suggest that the 2.6% thresh-

I - 5228

ITALY V COUNCIL AND COMMISSION

old was intended to guard against currency of Regulation No 2800/98, the maximum speculation; on the contrary, it is clearly amount of aid payable in those States may stated in the fifth recital that the intention be 'reduced or cancelled' as a result of was to 'limit the risk of excessive compen- exchange-rate developments. sation in the case of small appreciable revaluations' (an aim which could be just as valid in the circumstances of the transition) and that the limitation took account of the fact that, as a result of Article 4 of Regula- tion No 3813/92, 16 the agricultural con- version rate could not decline by less than 2.56% (a consideration which remained valid on 1 January 1999). Nor has any external evidence been adduced of cur- 47. The Italian Republic also alleges unjus- rency-speculation concerns as a factor in tified application of different treatment to the introduction of the 2.6% threshold. similar situations: both the euro and the currencies of the non-participating States, it states, fluctuate against the dollar, with the same effects on farm incomes, but only farmers in the non-participating States can receive any compensatory aid in respect of those fluctuations. It claims, even, that the dollar represents 'real' value and that dollar exchange rates determine the agricultural conversion rates for the non-participating States.

46. The further argument that a revalua- tion of under 2.6% on 1 January 1999 is forever 'lost' for participating Member States whereas it may subsequently creep over the threshold and give rise to com- pensatory aid for farmers in non-partici- 48. I can see no evidence for those asser- pating States may also be dismissed. On the tions. There is nothing in any of the one hand, it is precisely because the reva- regulations which makes any amount or luation cannot increase in the participating adjustment dependent on variations in any States that no compensatory aid is payable; rate of exchange with the dollar, nor are on the other, the Council stated at the there any grounds for taking that currency hearing that the mechanism could not as the yardstick against which to measure operate in that cumulative manner for the variations in European farm incomes. The non-participating States. In any event it can fact that the euro's ancestor, the agricul- certainly work in the opposite way — tural unit of account, was originally based under the second paragraph of Article 2 on the gold value of the dollar is of purely historical relevance to the current agrimo- netary arrangements. The fall of the euro as 16 — See paragraph 12 above. against the dollar may well have had some

I - 5229

OPINION OF MR JACOBS — CASE C-100/99

(not always adverse) effect on farm — Second and third pleas: illegality of the incomes in Europe, but the contested difference in treatment between agricul- regulations deal solely with changes in tural sectors as regards the maximum exchange rates as between European cur- amount of compensatory aid rencies.

51. In these two pleas, which may be 49. Thus, it seems to me, no plausible considered together, the Italian Republic is evidence has been adduced of any breach claiming essentially that the maximum of the principle of equal treatment, taken amount of compensatory aid for the agri- either in general or in its specific embodi- cultural sectors covered by Article 5 of ments in Article 40(3) of the EC Treaty. Regulation No 2799/98 (and Article 3 of Regulation No 2800/98) is calculated in such a way that it is higher than that covered by Article 4 of Regulation No 2799/98 (and Article 2 of Regulation No 2800/98). Within the latter a more favourable treatment is accorded to sectors benefiting from direct aid. The sectors least favourably affected are, moreover, predo- 50. Furthermore, as both the Council and minantly Mediterranean (olive oil, tobacco, the Commission point out, the arguments wine, etc.). put forward by the Italian Republic appear to relate in reality to political choices, which are not properly a matter for scru- tiny by the Court. There is abundant case- law to the effect that in complex economic situations the Community legislature enjoys significant freedom of assessment and that the Court, when examining the 52. From the rules as I have summarised lawfulness of the exercise of such freedom, them above 18 it appears that, within Arti- cannot substitute its own assessment of the cle 4 of Regulation No 2799/98, in some matter for that of the legislature but must sectors ·—· cereals, sugar beet, milk and restrict itself to examining whether the milk products and beef and veal — one assessment made contains a manifest error factor in the calculation is the total agri- or constitutes a misuse of powers. 17 In cultural production in each sector in the respect of the first plea, there is not even Member State concerned, whereas in others any allegation of manifest error or misuse only the production sold under contracts of powers. imposing a minimum price is taken into account. This appears to mean that less 17 — See, for a recent example, the judgment of 14 December 2000 in Case C-99/99 Italy v Commission, ECR 1-11535, paragraph 26. 18 — See paragraphs 20 to 32 above, in particular paragraph 24.

I - 5230

ITALY V COUNCIL AND COMMISSION

compensatory aid is authorised in respect 55. The Commission states that the meth- of the latter. ods used for the calculation of the flat-rate loss are the same as those which had proved their worth over a number of years — specific treatment for the cate- gories referred to in Article 5 of Regulation No 2799/98 dates back to Article 7 of Regulation No 3813/92 — and points out that the Italian Government has produced no data substantiating its allegation of a 53. There are in addition two differences discriminatory effect. The aim, as stated in between the rules governing Article 4 and recital 4 in the preamble to Regulation those governing Article 5 of Regulation No 2799/98, is to offset the reduction in No 2799/98. For the prices and amounts farm incomes which may result under covered by Article 4, no aid is to be granted certain conditions from a major currency for the portion of the maximum amount revaluation. Such revaluations have a that does not exceed appreciable revalua- greater effect, however, where direct aid is tion of 2.6%, a condition that does not involved (since they have an immediate apply in the cases covered by Article 5. And effect on the amount of aid, which forms a under Article 3 of Regulation No 2800/98, significant part of farm incomes) than in which applies Article 5 of Regulation the case of indirect aid and, within the No 2799/98 to the transitional measures, latter category, a greater effect in some the Community contribution to the aid is sectors (such as cereals, where market exceptionally 100% for the first year, as prices closely follow intervention prices) compared with 50% in all other cases. than in others (for example, the wine sector where wine prices and distillation prices are very different). It is thus justifiable to calculate the amount of compensatory aid differently in order to take account of those different effects.

54. The Italian Republic again alleges breach of Articles 39 and 40 of the EC Treaty and of the principles of equal treatment and proportionality, adding a further allegation of inadequate statement of reasons and misuse of powers. Again, the principal criticism is that of unequal treat- 56. In addition, the Commission submits ment. Essentially, the Italian Republic fails that the concept of 'Mediterranean' agri- to understand why there should be any cultural sectors is misleading: Italy has distinction between agricultural sectors and agricultural production in sectors not cov- asserts that the sectors concerned by Arti- ered by Article 5 of R e g u l a t i o n cle 5 of Regulation No 2799/98 corre- No 2799/98 and all Member States have spond largely to those previously treated production in the sectors covered by that separately for socio-economic reasons provision. Even if there were any discrimi- unrelated to the transition to the euro. nation against Mediterranean agriculture,

I - 5231

OPINION OF MR JACOBS — CASE C-100/99

it could affect Italy, as a participating preamble to Regulation No 2799/98, Member State, only in respect of the which state respectively that 'in cases of transitional arrangements under Regula- major currency revaluation with potential tion No 2800/98. effects on prices and amounts other than direct aid, farm incomes may in certain conditions be reduced' and that 'specific rules adapted to the type of aid are required to offset the effects of major currency revaluations on the level of certain direct aids in national currency'. 57. As regards the other alleged grounds of illegality, both the Council and the Com- mission point essentially to the lack of any substantiation in the pleadings and to the margin of discretion enjoyed by the Com- munity legislature in assessing complex economic situations.

58. I can only agree with the Council and the Commission: the Italian Republic has not substantiated any of its claims. 61. It is true that the preamble gives no precise justification for each detailed choice of rule; however, I do not consider such an omission to constitute a defect in the statement of reasons, especially since the 59. It is clear that the common agricultural distinction between the categories covered policy has never been and can never be a respectively by Articles 4 and 5 of Regula- matter of 'one size fits all'. Differences in tion No 2799/98 dates back to Regulation markets call for differences in approach, No 3813/92 and the different methods of and the type of adjustment needed to calculation under Article 4 of Regulation compensate for exchange-rate fluctuations No 2799/98 appeared in Regulation will necessarily vary according to the type No 724/97. It may simply be pointed out of aid and the way in which it is received by that compliance with the obligation to state farmers, as the Commission has convin- reasons must be assessed in the light of the cingly explained. whole context and that where a measure discloses the essential objective pursued there is no need to give a specific statement of reasons for each of the technical choices made. 19

60. That need for differences in treatment 19 — See, for example, Case C-122/94 Commission v Council is referred to in recitals 4 and 5 in the [1996] ECR 1-881, paragraph 29 of the judgment.

I - 5232

ITALY V COUNCIL AND COMMISSION

62. Against that background, the Italian The Commission regulations Republic has not explained why the differ- ent detailed rules applied in the past to respond to exchange-rate fluctuations were no longer appropriate to deal with the changes occasioned by the introduction of the euro, which were of the same nature.

64. Since the Italian Republic has not addressed any independent argument to 63. Since, in addition, the allegation of the validity of Regulations Nos 2808/98 misuse of powers is in no way substantiated and 2813/98, its claims for their annulment in the Italian Republic's pleadings, I con- may be dismissed without there being any clude that its second and third pleas in law need to enquire whether they are, as the must also be dismissed. Commission alleges, inadmissible.

Conclusion

65. I am accordingly of the opinion that the Court should:

(1) dismiss the application and

(2) order the Italian Republic to pay the costs.

I - 5233

Text rozhodnutia bol prevzatý z verejne dostupných úradných zdrojov. Rozhodnutie je úradným dokumentom.
Navrhy_ga C-100/99 – Súdny dvor Európskej únie | AI Pravnik