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Súdny dvor Európskej únie·25.10.2001

C-247/99

ECLI:EU:C:2001:568

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OPINION OF MR MISCHO — CASE C-247/99 P

OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL MISCHO delivered on 25 October 2001 1

I — Introduction Commission Regulation No 99/63/EEC of 25 July 1963 on the hearings provided for in Article 19(1) and (2) of Council Regu- lation No 17. 3All the undertakings con- cerned submitted observations in June 1988. Except for Shell International Chemical Company Ltd, which had not A — Background to the dispute requested a hearing, they were heard in September 1988.

1. Following investigations conducted in the polypropylene sector on 13 and 14 Oc- tober 1983 pursuant to Article 14 of Council Regulation No 17 of 6 February 1962, First Regulation implementing 3. On 1 December 1988 the Advisory Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, 2 the Committee on Restrictive Practices and Commission of the European Communities Dominant Positions (hereinafter 'the Advis- commenced an inquiry on polyvinyl- ory Committee') delivered an opinion on chloride (hereinafter 'PVC'). It sub- the Commission's draft decision. sequently undertook various investigations at the premises of the undertakings con- cerned and sent them requests for infor- mation.

4. At the end of the proceeding the Com- mission adopted Decision 89/190/EEC of 21 December 1988 relating to a proceeding 2. On 24 March 1988 it instituted on its pursuant to Article 85 of the EEC Treaty own initiative a proceeding under (IV/31.865, PVC), 4(hereinafter 'the PVC I Article 3(1) of Regulation No 17 against decision'). By that decision, the Commis- 14 PVC producers. On 5 April 1988 it sent sion penalised the following PVC producers each of those undertakings a statement of for infringement of Article 85(1) of the EC objections as provided for in Article 2(1) of Treaty (now Article 81(1) EC): Atochem

1 — Original language: French. 3 — OJ, English Special Edition 1963-1964, p. 47. 2 — OJ, English Special Edition 1959-1962, p. 87. 4 —OJ 1989 L 74, p. 1.

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SA, BASF AG, DSM NV, Enichem SpA, 9. On appeal by the Commission, the Hoechst AG (hereinafter 'Hoechst'), Hüls Court of Justice, by judgment of 15 June AG, Imperial Chemical Industries pic (here- 1994 in Commission v BASF mid Others,7 inafter 'ICI'), Limburgse Vinyl Maatschap- set aside the judgment of the Court of First pij NV, Montedison SpA, Norsk Hydro AS Instance and annulled the PVC I decision. (hereinafter 'Norsk Hydro'), Société Arté- sienne de Vinyle SA, Shell International Chemical Company Ltd, Solvay et Cie (hereinafter 'Solvay') and Wacker-Chemie GmbH. 10. The Commission thereupon adopted a fresh decision, on 27 July 1994, in relation to the producers who had been the subject of the PVC I decision, with the exception, however, of Solvay and Norsk Hydro AS 5. All those undertakings except Solvay [Commission Decision 94/599/EC of brought actions to have that decision 27 July 1994 relating to a proceeding annulled by the Community judicature. pursuant to Article 85 of the EC Treaty (IV/31.865 — PVC) (OJ 1994 L 239, p. 14, hereinafter 'the PVC II decision')]. That decision imposed on the undertakings to which it was addressed fines of the same amounts as those imposed by the PVC I 6. The Court of First Instance declared decision. Norsk Hydro's application inadmissible by order of 19 June 1990. 5

11. The PVC II decision contains the fol- lowing provisions: 7. The other cases were joined for the purposes of the oral procedure and the judgment.

'Article 1 8. By judgment of 27 February 1992 in BASF and Others v Commission, 6 the Court of First Instance declared the PVC I decision non-existent. BASF AG, DSM NV, Elf Atochem SA, Enichem SpA, Hoechst AG, Hüls AG, Imperial Chemical Industries plc, Lim- 5 — Casc T-106/89 (not published in the European Court burgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV, Mon- Reports). 6 — Joined Cases T-79/89, T-84/89, T-85/89, T-86/89, T-89/89, T-91/89, T-92/89, T-94/89, T-96/89, T-98/89, T-102/89 and T-104/89 BASF and Others v Commission [1992] LCR 7 — Case C-137/92 P Commission v BASF and Others |1994| 11-315. ECR I-2555.

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tedison SpA, Société Artésienne de Vinyle adherence to any express or tacit agreement SA, Shell International Chemical [Com- or to any concerted practice covering price pany] Ltd and Wacker Chemie GmbH or market-sharing inside the Community. infringed Article 85 of the EC Treaty Any scheme for the exchange of general (together with Norsk Hydro... and Sol- information to which the producers sub- vay...) by participating for the periods scribe concerning the PVC sector shall be identified in this Decision in an agreement so conducted as to exclude any information and/or concerted practice originating in from which the behaviour of individual about August 1980 by which the producers producers can be identified, and in par- supplying PVC in the Community took part ticular the undertakings shall refrain from in regular meetings in order to fix target exchanging between themselves any addi- prices and target quotas, plan concerted tional information of competitive signifi- initiatives to raise price levels and monitor cance not covered by such a system. the operation of the said collusive arrange- ments.

Article 3 Article 2

The following fines are hereby imposed on the undertakings named herein in respect of The undertakings named in Article 1 which the infringement found in Article 1: are still involved in the PVC sector in the Community (apart from Norsk Hydro and Solvay which are already the subject of a valid termination order) shall forthwith bring the said infringement to an end (if they have not already done so) and shall henceforth refrain in relation to their PVC operations from any agreement or con- certed practice which may have the same or (i) BASF AG: a fine of ECU 1 500 000; similar object or effect, including any exchange of information of the kind normally covered by business secrecy by which the participants are directly or indi- rectly informed of the output, deliveries, stock levels, selling prices, costs or invest- ment plans of other individual producers, or by which they might be able to monitor (ii) DSM NV: a fine of ECU 600 000;

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(iii) Elf Atochem SA: a fine of ECU (xi) Shell International Chemical Company 3 200 000; Ltd: a fine of ECU 850 000;

(iv) Enichem SpA: a fine of ECU 2 500 000; (xii) Wacker-Chemie GmbH: a fine of ECU 1 500 000.'

(v) Hoechst AG: a fine of ECU 1 500 000;

B — Procedure before the Court of First (vi) Hüls AG: a fine of ECU 2 200 000; Instance

(vii) Imperial Chemical Industries pic: a 12. By various applications lodged at the fine of ECU 2 500 000; Registry of the Court of First Instance between 5 and 14 October 1994, Lim- burgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV, Elf Ato- chem SA (hereinafter 'Elf Atochem'), BASF AG, Shell International Chemical Company Ltd, DSM NV and DSM Kunststoffen BV, (viii) Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV: a Wacker-Chemie GmbH, Hoechst, Société fine of ECU 750 000; Artésienne de Vinyle SA, Montedison SpA, ICI, Hüls AG and Enichem Spa brought actions before the Court of First Instance.

(ix) Montedison SpA: a fine of ECU 1 750 000;

13. Each sought the annulment of the PVC II decision in whole or in part and, in the alternative, the annulment or reduction of (x) Société Artésienne de Vinyle SA: a fine the fine. Montedison Spa also pleaded that of ECU 400 000; the Commission should be ordered to pay

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damages on account of costs incurred in — dismissed the remainder of the action; putting together a guarantee and any other expenses arising from the PVC II decision.

— ruled on the costs.

C — The judgment of the Court of First Instance

D — Procedure before the Court of Justice

14. By judgment of 20 April 1999 in Lim- burgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission^ (hereinafter 'the contested 15. By application lodged at the Court judgment'), the Court of First Instance: Registry on 29 June 1999, Elf Atochem appealed pursuant to Article 49 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice.

— joined the cases for the purposes of the judgment; 16. It claims that the Court should:

— annulled Article 1 of the PVC II — set aside the contested judgment and decision in so far as it found that give a final ruling in the case; Société Artésienne de Vinyle SA had participated in the infringement com- plained of after the first half of 1981;

— order the Commission to pay the costs.

— reduced the fines imposed on Elf Ato- chem, Société Artésienne de Vinyle SA and ICI to EUR 2 600 000, EUR 135 000 and EUR 1 550 000 respec- 17. The Commission contends that the tively; Court should:

8—Joined Cases T-305/94, T-306/94, T-307/94, T-313/94, T-314/94, T-315/94, T-316/94, T-318/94, T-325/94, T-328/94, T-329/94 and T-335/94 Limburgse Vinyl Maats- chappij and Others v Commission [1999] ECR II-931. — dismiss the appeal;

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— order the appellant to pay the costs. 21. It did therefore respond to the appel- lant's argument and, moreover, I shall consider below whether its view was well founded.

II — Assessment 22. Elf Atochem is therefore wrong to complain that the Court did not give a ruling.

18. The appellant puts forward two pleas which should be assessed in turn.

23. Consequently, the plea alleging failure to state the grounds is unfounded and should be rejected.

The first plea

The second plea 19. Elf Atochem complains, first of all, that the Court of First Instance did not rule on a plea alleging that the PVC II decision was an essentially different decision from the PVC I decision, a plea which this and other 24. Elf Atochem maintains that the Court appellants had expanded extensively before of First Instance wrongly held that the the Court, as is apparent from paragraph Commission was not required to open a 222 of the contested judgment. In the new administrative procedure, pursuant to appellant's submission, that failure to state Regulations Nos 17 and 99/63, in order to reasons is on its own sufficient to lead to adopt the PVC II decision. Its plea is the annulment of the contested judgment. subdivided into four limbs.

25. The first two limbs relate to the need to 20. In that regard it should be stated that, carry out preparatory measures, namely, in paragraph 257 of the contested judg- the hearing of the undertakings and the ment, the Court held that 'the Decision consultation of the Advisory Committee, contains only editorial amendments not before adopting the PVC II decision. affecting the objections'. Assessment of these therefore depends on

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whether the preparatory measures carried 28. The question of the effects of the out previously, for the purpose of the PVC I annulment of a decision on the validity of decision, retained their validity, which is the preparatory acts depends, as the Court the subject of the third limb of this plea. of First Instance rightly held in paragraph The third limb should therefore be exam- 184 of the contested judgment, on the ined first. grounds of annulment, and the appellant does not dispute this.

The third limb, alleging that the whole of the PVC I decision was annulled by the judgment in Commission v BASF and 29. That statement, which, moreover, Others, cited above merely reflects the application to this case of the general principle of res judicata, is confirmed by the case-law cited by the Court of First Instance and by the case-law invoked by the appellant itself.

26. Elf Atochem states that that judgment annulled the PVC I decision for infringe- ment both of the authentification rules and of the principle of collegiality. The annul- ment declared applies to the whole meas- ure, since the Court of Justice did not limit 30. Indeed, in the precedents cited by the its scope to certain parts. The preliminary appellant, the nullity of the Commission's administrative procedure is an integral part decision arose — unlike in the present of the measure. Therefore, if the measure is case — from a procedural defect affecting annulled, it is necessary to carry out again measures taken prior to the final adoption the preliminary administrative measures of the text and therefore imposed an provided for in Regulations Nos 17 and obligation on the author of the decision to 99/63. remedy the invalidity affecting the prepara- tory measures.

27. In support of this, the appellant refers to the judgments in Transocean Marine Paint v Commission 9 and British Aero- 31. Thus, in Transocean Marine Faint v space and Rover v Commission. 10 Commission, the partial nullity of the contested decision was due to the fact that, during the preliminary procedure, the 9 — Case 17/74 Transocean Marine Paint v Commission [1974] Commission had not informed the under- ECR 1063. takings of a condition which it sub- 10 — Case C-294/90 British Aerospace and Rover v Commission [1992] ECR 1-493. sequently included in its final decision,

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which explained the need to carry out the procedural defect but also, even mainly, to preliminary procedure again. an infringement of the principle of colle- giality, does not alter that conclusion in any way.

32. In British Aerospace and Rover v Commission, what was at issue was the adoption by the Commission of a new decision in respect of State aid in the 36. Indeed, neither of those two grounds of context of disputes relating to the imple- nullity affects measures predating the final mentation of previous decisions and not the decision. A failure to authenticate the text consequences of a judgment annulling a of the decision, and an infringement of the measure. Unlike in the present case, there principle of collegiality occurring at the was new evidence which might make a new time of its final adoption, are both, by their procedure necessary. very nature, unconnected with the previous conduct of the procedure and cannot there- fore affect its validity. The fact that those grounds of nullity affect the whole of the decision is irrelevant in that regard, since it does not follow that the nullity extends to 33. The Court of First Instance was there- other measures, such as the preparatory fore right to hold that it was necessary to measures. determine, in the light of the operative part and of the grounds of the judgment of the Court of Justice in respect of the PVC I decision, the effect of the annulment of that decision on the preparatory acts. 37. The situation was therefore similar to that considered in the judgment in Spain v Commission, 11 cited by the Court of First Instance in paragraph 184 of the contested 34. That annulment arose from the mere judgment, in which the Court of Justice fact that the Commission infringed the held that the procedure for replacing the procedural rules governing only the annulled measure may be resumed at the detailed procedure for the definitive adop- very point at which the illegality occurred. tion of the decision. Therefore, the nullity could not extend to the procedural stages which predated the occurrence of that irregularity and to which those rules were not intended to apply. 38. The Court of First Instance did not, therefore, err in law by holding that the nullity of the PVC I decision did not extend to the measures taken prior to the annulled decision. 35. The appellant's insistence that the annulment, which it claims applies to the whole measure, is due not only to that 11 — Case C-415/96 Spam v Commission [ 1998] LCR I-6993.

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39. The third limb of this plea should application was declared inadmissible, the therefore be rejected. [PVC I decision] remains valid as against them'. This clearly illustrates that the two decisions — namely, the PVC I decision taken against Norsk Hydro and Solvay and the PVC II decision taken against the other undertakings — coexisted. Yet only the PVC I decision was the subject of a preliminary administrative procedure.

The first limb, alleging infringement of the right to be heard in respect of the adoption of a new decision

42. The second difference arises from the fact that, in the PVC II decision, the Commission, significantly, bases its objec- tions on the actions taken collectively by undertakings, amongst which Norsk Hydro and Solvay are still listed, even though 40. Elf Atochem considers that, for the those two companies are not addressees of purpose of adopting the PVC II decision, that decision. So, paradoxically, the con- the Commission should have applied Regu- duct of those companies, which are third lations Nos 17 and 99/63 again because parties as regards the PVC II decision, is that decision was not only taken six years still taken into consideration by the Com- after the PVC I decision, that is to say, in a mission in order to determine the extent of substantially different economic context, the infringement alleged against the under- which gave a reason for hearing the parties, takings which are the addressees of the but also contains new factors in relation to PVC II decision. The PVC I and PVC II the earlier decision. decisions therefore relate to supposed car- tels and/or collective concerted practices, whose members referred to in 1994 are different from those implicated in 1988.

41. The first difference lies in the fact that the addressees of the PVC II decision are not the same as those of the PVC I decision. 43. I agree with the Commission that this The grounds and operative part of the PVC line of reasoning is the result of a misunder- II decision single out Norsk Hydro and standing of the legal nature of the Com- Solvay, which are not censured, the Com- mission's decision. As the Court of First mission stating in point 59 of the decision: Instance pointed out in paragraph 167 of 'Since Solvay did not make an application the contested judgment, although the to the Court of Justice for the annulment of decision is presented in the form of a single the [PVC I decision], and Norsk Hydro's measure, it is in fact a series of individual

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decisions. Therefore the annulment could 47. It is apparent, from paragraphs 768 to only apply to the undertakings whose 778 of the contested judgment, that the actions had been successful, as the Court Court established, without being contra- of Justice also held in its judgment in dicted by the appellant, that the Commis- Commission v AssiDomän Kraft Products sion did not impute collective responsibility and Others. 12 to each undertaking, but responsibility for the actions in which each had participated.

44. On the other hand, the initial decision remained valid for Solvay and Norsk Hydro, and it was therefore not necessary 48. It follows that the responsibility to address the PVC II decision to them. imputed to each undertaking does not That could only be addressed to the under- depend on the infringements committed takings to which the PVC I decision no by the others. Therefore, it cannot be longer applied. claimed that the PVC II decision, contrary to the PVC I decision, took into account the actions of undertakings which were not addressees of the decision.

45. Therefore, the fact that the PVC I and PVC II decisions had different addressees does not in any way mean that the second contained a difference in respect of which 49. Finally, the Commission's explanations the undertakings should have been heard. concerning limitation 13 do not constitute, either, a difference in respect of which the undertakings should have been consulted.

46. The same is true of the claim that the PVC II decision took into account the conduct of Solvay and Norsk Hydro when — unlike the situation regarding 50. With those explanations, the Commis- the PVC I decision — those undertakings sion supplements its arguments in support were not among the addressees of the of the existing objections, on which the decision. undertakings were consulted prior to the adoption of the PVC I decision, but does

12 — Case C-310/97 P Commission v AssiDomän Kraft Prod- ucts and Others [1999] ECR I-5363. 13 — See points 56 to 58 of the decision.

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not add a new objection. The new decision decisions deal only with those objections in therefore relates only to actions on which respect of which the parties have been the undertakings had the opportunity to afforded the opportunity of making their express their views. views known.

51. The fact that the Commission supple- ments its arguments at a later stage is 55. It considers, therefore, that any Com- therefore permissible without it being mission decision finding an infringement necessary to hear the undertakings again, should be preceded by its own preliminary as is apparent from the case-law of the procedure. Court of Justice. 14

56. It must be pointed out in that regard 52. However, the appellant's arguments that, as indicated above, the validity of reveal that whether or not there are new preparatory measures completed before the objections, or even simple differences authentification of the text of the decision between the two decisions, is not, in its was unaffected by the annulment of the view, in any way decisive. decision.

53. The appellant considers that each decision taken by the Commission contains 57. In the present case, therefore, the its own objections. The Commission can- undertakings concerned were heard and not simply reproduce the objections con- were able to put their case as to the tained in a previous decision which has complaints made against them by the been annulled. Commission.

54. In support of that argument it cites Article 4 of Regulation No 99/63, which 58. Consequently, the condition laid down provides that the Commission shall in its by Article 4 of Regulation No 99/63, cited by the appellant, is fulfilled, since it is not alleged that the Commission stated objec- 14—Joined Cases 100/80 to 103/80 Musique Diffusion fran- tions on which the undertakings had not çaise and Others v Commission [1983] ECR 1825, paragraph 15. had the opportunity to express their views.

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59. It is apparent from that provision only requirement that the rights of the defence that every decision must be based on be 'scrupulously' observed. objections on which the parties have been able to express their views. That does not mean that a previous decision which has been annulled cannot have been based on the same objections. 64. I do not support that assessment.

60. Not only is such a condition not apparent from the wording of the regu- 65. As we have just seen, the aim of the lation, but the aim of that measure provides hearing of the undertakings is to give them no reason for it. the opportunity of expressing their views on the matters to which the Commission has taken objection. In the present case, this was done in the course of the pro- cedure conducted preparatory to the PVC I decision. I cannot see, therefore, in what 61. The provision is designed to protect the respects the rights of the defence required rights of the defence by ensuring that the undertakings to be heard again on the undertakings are not taken by surprise by same facts. the Commission but, on the contrary, are able to put their case at the appropriate time in respect of all the complaints made against them.

66. It should be remembered, in that regard, that the PVC II decision relates only to acts carried out between 1980 and 62. Compliance with that objective does 1984, in respect of which the undertakings not preclude those objections from having were fully able to express their views. already appeared in a previous decision, if that previous decision was, as in the present case, annulled without the annulment affecting the preparatory measures. 67. Therefore, the right to be heard was fully observed, notwithstanding possible subsequent developments in the factual and legal situation. That right cannot be 63. However, Elf Atochem claims in the considered to imply that the Commission is alternative that if the Commission's obli- required to give the undertakings the gation to hear the parties again does not opportunity to make observations in arise under Regulations Nos 17 and 99/63, respect of other aspects of the Commis- it is, in any event, a consequence of the sion's action, such as the exercise of its

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power to assess the expediency of a 71. It follows from the above that the first decision. limb of this plea should be rejected.

68. Furthermore, as the Commission points out, the appellant's request to be allowed to The second limb, relating to a failure to make observations on the differences consult the Advisory Committee between the PVC I and PVC II decisions amounts in practice to a demand for joint scrutiny of the preliminary draft decision. However, it is apparent from the case-law of the Court of Justice that such a claim is inconsistent with the system envisaged by 72. Elf Atochem maintains that the pro- Regulation No 17. 15 cedural requirement to consult the Advis- ory Committee, laid down in Articles 10(3) and 15(3) of Regulation No 17, should have been observed if the measure were not to be void. The aim of consulting the 69. As for the appellant's argument regard- Advisory Committee was to seek the ing the role which the Hearing Officer opinion of the representatives of the might have played in its favour, that Member States and was therefore different consideration does not alter the fact that, from that of hearing the undertakings. The in the present case, the Hearing Officer was fact that the Commission failed to do the called upon and drew up a report during latter did not relieve it of doing the former. the preparation of the PVC I decision. If there was no obligation to hear the under- takings again, there was no need to call for the further intervention of the Hearing Officer. 73. In that regard it need only be noted that, as we have seen above, measures taken preparatory to the PVC I decision, including the consultation of the Advisory 70. I should add that, here too, the refer- Committee, were not affected by the annul- ence to the rule in Transocean Marine Paint ment of the decision. Consequently, since v Commission, cited above, does not sub- that consultation had taken place, the stantiate the appellant's argument. That relevant provisions of Regulation No 17 case was fundamentally different from this were observed in the present case. one in that the contested decision contained one substantial change, in relation to the preliminary procedure, namely the addition of a condition concerning exemption.

15 — Musique Diffusion française and Others v Commission, 74. Accordingly, the second limb of this cited above, paragraph 35. plea should be rejected.

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The fourth limb, alleging infringement of connection with Articles 85 and 86 of the the right of access to the file Treaty, but only as far as concerns State aid. 16 In that context, the solution is explained by the privileged position of the Member States in relation to the Commis- sion and the interested parties. The situ- 75. Elf Atochem maintains that the Com- ation is therefore not comparable with that mission did not spontaneously offer the of the procedures designed to find infringe- undertakings access to the evidence it had, ment of Article 85 by an undertaking. whether in their favour or otherwise, even though the conditions of access to the file had been extended between 1988 and 1994. 79. In any event, according to Elf Atochem, infringement of the principle audi alteram partem is constituted even if the undis- closed documents have not been used 76. The appellant claims that the examin- directly by the Commission. ation of the documents finally made access- ible in connection with a measure of organisation of procedure taken by the Court of First Instance revealed very seri- ous infringements of the principle audi alteram partem inasmuch as certain docu- ments in the appellant's favour had not 80. What are we to make of this line of been disclosed and that, on other docu- argument? ments which had been disclosed, evidence in the appellant's favour had simply been concealed by the Commission.

81. It must be stated, first of all, that, contrary to the appellant's claims, it is apparent from the case-law of the Court of 77. The appellant criticises the Court for Justice that mere non-disclosure of docu- having made the finding of an infringement ments cannot result in the annulment of the of defence rights conditional on proof that decision. non-disclosure of the documents in ques- tion might have influenced the course of the procedure and the content of the decision to the applicant's detriment.

82. It is unquestionably apparent from paragraph 80 of the judgment in Hercules 78. It considers that such a restrictive notion of the rights of the defence was 16 — Case C-142/87 Belgium v Commission [1990] ECU I-959, never confirmed by the Court of Justice in paragraphs 47 and 48.

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Chemicals v Commission 17 that, if an decision having a different content from undertaking fails to establish that the that which it eventually had. documents in question contained evidence useful for its defence and that, con- sequently, its inability to take cognisance of it before the decision infringed its rights of defence, there are not grounds for annulling the Commission's decision. 86. It is true that, in paragraph 1074 of the contested judgment, the Court states that none of the appellants 'establishes that the course of the procedure and the Decision might have been influenced, to the appli- cants' detriment, by failure to disclose documents of which they ought to have 83. The Court of First Instance was there- had knowledge'. fore right in holding that the mere existence of an irregularity in respect of access to the file did not justify annulment of the decision.

87. However, in paragraph 81 of its judg- ment in Hercules Chemicals v Commission, cited above, the Court of Justice expressly held that 'the undertaking concerned does 84. The appellant nevertheless considers not have to show that, if it had had access that the examination of the documents to the replies provided by the other pro- effected by the Court of First Instance in ducers to the statement of objections, the order to determine whether, in this case, Commission decision would have been there had been an infringement of the rights different in content, but only that it would of the defence, was based on an incorrect have been able to use those documents for approach. its defence'.

88. Must it therefore be considered that the 85. It has argued that, instead of looking at Court of First Instance did indeed use an things from the perspective ex ante of the incorrect assessment criterion? undertaking, the Court took an ex post approach. In other words, instead of exam- ining whether the undertaking could have used the disputed documents, it analysed whether the undertaking's use of those documents could have culminated in the 89. I do not think so. Accordingly, to analyse the documents, it also used the 17 — Case C-51/92 P Heralles Chemicals v Commission [1999] terms 'affected the applicants' defence' ECR I-4235. (paragraph 1035 of the contested judg-

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ment), 'in what way their defence rights 93. I therefore consider that the Court have been affected' (paragraph 1036), 'af- complied, in its method of analysis, with fected the u n d e r t a k i n g s ' defence' the aforementioned case-law of the Court (point 1041), 'contain anything relevant of Justice. to the applicants' defence' (paragraph 1073).

94. Even if that were not the case, it is still for the appellant to prove the existence of 90. Furthermore, the expression 'course of documents in respect of which the Court of the procedure', used in paragraph 1074, First Instance was wrong to hold that itself refers, implicitly, to the undertakings' non-disclosure did not compromise the opportunities to defend themselves during rights of the defence. the procedure.

91. Moreover, reading the explanations 95. It is not sufficient merely to state in given by the Court in respect of that abstracto that the Court followed an incor- examination unquestionably shows that it rect criterion, but has to be demonstrated examined whether the documents in ques- that the consequence of that error was that tion would have been of any use at all to a document, which the Court had held the appellant. It did not therefore confine could not lead to the adoption of a different its appraisal to whether the failure to decision by the Commission, could have disclose the disputed documents had had been relied upon by the undertakings. an impact on the content of the final decision.

96. Furthermore, it is not possible to inter- pret the case-law of the Court of Justice as 92. In fact, its account had the effect, meaning that it is sufficient for the under- fundamentally, of showing that the docu- taking to state that it could, in theory, have ments concerned, far from providing the used the document in question for its appellant with an argument, were either defence. Clearly — if absurd consequences unlikely to be relied on by the appellant, are to be avoided — it is necessary to because of their nature or subject-matter, establish that the use of the said document or, because of their content, liable to by the defence, even if it is impossible to be confirm the Commission's conclusions, or sure that it would have changed the Com- in any event not to contradict them in the mission's opinion, had a reasonable chance slightest. of doing so.

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OPINION OF MR MISCHO — CASE C-247/99 P

97. In any event, the appellant is careful that the irregularity committed in respect of not to identify any document which it access to the file had the slightest effect on could have used for its defence and in its opportunity to defend itself. respect of which the Court is alleged to have wrongly held that non-disclosure did not result in an infringement of the rights of the defence.

98. Accordingly, whatever criterion is fol- 99. The fourth limb of this plea should be lowed, the appellant has not established rejected and, consequently, the whole plea.

III — Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, I propose that the Court should:

— dismiss the appeal;

— order the appellant to pay the costs.

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