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Súdny dvor Európskej únie·22.2.2001

C-326/99

ECLI:EU:C:2001:115

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Súdny dvor Európskej únie
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61999CC0326

OPINION OF MR JACOBS — CASE C-326/99

OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL JACOBS delivered on 22 February 2001 1

1. The present case referred by the Nether- 3. Three of the concepts referred to in lands Hoge Raad (Supreme Court) con- Article 2(1) are defined in Articles 4, 5 and cerns the interpretation of Articles 5(3) and 6 of the Directive, namely the concepts of 13B(b) of the Sixth VAT Directive. 2At 'taxable person', 'supply of goods' and issue is the value added tax treatment of the 'supply of services'. grant of a usufructuary right in respect of immovable property for a term of 10 years. One of the questions is whether a Member State may treat such a transaction as exempted 'leasing or letting of immovable property' within the meaning of Arti- 4. Under Article 4(1) 'taxable person' cle 13B(b) of the Sixth Directive. means any person who independently car- ries out any economic activity specified in paragraph 2 thereof.

5. Under Article 4(2) '[t]he exploitation of tangible or intangible property for the purpose of obtaining income therefrom on Relevant provisions of the Sixth Directive a continuing basis shall also be considered an economic activity.'

6. Article 5, which is the first provision of 2. Under Article 2(1) of the Sixth Directive Title V 'Taxable transactions', provides: the supply of goods or services effected for consideration by a taxable person acting as such is subject to value added tax.

1 — Original language: English. 2 — Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the '1. "Supply of goods" means the transfer of harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the right to dispose of tangible property as turnover tax — Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment, OJ 1977 L 145, p. 1. owner.

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8. Article 13 of the Directive concerns domestic exemptions from VAT. Arti- cle 13A enumerates activities which are exempted 'in the public interest'. Arti- cle 13B contains a list of 'other exemp- tions'. Article 13 C entitles Member States 3. Member States may consider the follow- to grant taxpayers a right to opt for ing to be tangible property: taxation in certain of the cases listed in Article 13B. It must be borne in mind that in some circumstances it may work to the advantage of a taxable person to opt for taxation of a supply in order to be able to reclaim the input tax incurred. (a) certain interests in immovable prop- erty;

(b) rights in rem giving the holder thereof a 9. The exemption at issue in the present right of user over immovable property; case is Article 13B(b) which exempts from VAT the 'leasing or letting of immovable property'. The Member States may subject that exemption to conditions and certain transactions are excluded from its scope. Article 13B(b) provides: (c) shares or interests equivalent to shares giving the holder thereof de jure or de facto rights of ownership or possession over immovable property or part thereof.

'B. Other exemptions ...'

Without prejudice to other Community 7. According to Article 6(1) 'supply of provisions, Member States shall exempt services' means any transaction which does the following under conditions which they not constitute a supply of goods within the shall lay down for the purpose of ensuring meaning of Article 5. the correct and straightforward application

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of the exemptions and of preventing any Member States may apply further possible evasion, avoidance or abuse: exclusions to the scope of this exemp- tion.'

10. Article 13C provides for a related right to opt for taxation:

(b) the leasing or letting of immovable property excluding:

'C. Options

1. the provision of accommodation, Member States may allow taxpayers a right as defined in the laws of the of option for taxation in cases of: Member States, in the hotel sector or in sectors with a similar func- tion, including the provision of accommodation in holiday camps or on sites developed for use as camping sites; (a) letting and leasing of immovable prop- erty;

2. the letting of premises and sites for (b) ... parking vehicles;

Member States may restrict the scope of this right of option and shall fix the details 3. lettings of permanently installed of its use.' equipment and machinery;

11. In certain cases it might appear appro- 4. hire of safes. priate to authorise Member States to take

I - 6836 'GOED WONEN'

or retain special measures derogating from by a Law of 18 December 1995. 5Those the Directive in order to simplify the amendments were expressly designed to levying of tax or to avoid fraud or tax combat tax avoidance arrangements with avoidance. Article 27(1) of the Sixth Direc- regard to immovable property. They were tive therefore provides: given retroactive effect from 6 p.m. on 31 March 1995.

'The Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, may authorise any Member State to introduce special measures for derogation from the 14. For the purpose of the analysis it is provisions of this Directive, in order to perhaps best to set out in full the text of the simplify the procedure for charging the tax two amended provisions. The newly-intro- or to prevent certain types of tax evasion or duced passages are printed in italics. Other avoidance....' relevant provisions of the Law will be summarised.

The Netherlands legal background 15. Article 1(a) of the Law describes the scope of value added tax in terms almost identical to Article 2(1) of the Directive.

12. In the Netherlands value added tax is governed by the Wet op de omzetbelasting 1968 3 (Law on turnover tax 1968, herein- after 'the Law'), as amended. 4

16. Article 3 of the Law clarifies the con- cept of supplies of goods. Under Arti- cle 3(1)(e) a supply of goods consists for example in a transfer of goods as a result of 13. The present dispute centres essentially which the goods in question leave the upon two amendments made to that Law taxable person's business assets.

3 — Staatsblad 1968, 329. 5 — Wet van 18 december 1995 tot wijziging van de Wet op de omzetbelasting 1968, de Wet op belastingen van rechtsverk- 4 — The Law was in particular amended by law of 28 December eer en enkele andere belastingwetten m verband met de 1978 (Staatsblad1978,677) in order to implement the Sixth bestrijding van constructies met betrekking tot onroerende Directive. zaken. Staatsblad 1995, 659.

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17. The first of the two amended provi- implement Article 13B(b) and 13C(a) of sions which are in issue in the present case the Directive 7 and provides: is Article 3(2) of the Law. It establishes a deemed supply of goods and is intended to make use of the possibility afforded by Article 5(3) of the Directive. 6It provides in its amended version: '1. The following are exempted from tax, subject to the conditions to be laid down by general administrative regulation:

(b) the letting (including the leasing) of '2. The grant, transfer, modification, immovable property, excluding: waiver or termination of limited rights over immovable property, with the exception of mortgages and ground rents must also be viewed as a supply of goods, save where the sum paid therefor plus turnover tax amounts to less than the economic value (1) ... of those rights. The economic value shall be not less than the cost price of the immo- vable property to which the right relates, including turnover tax, which would result if it were created by an independent third party at the time of the transaction'

(5) the letting of immovable property, apart from buildings and parts thereof which are used as accom- modation, to persons using such property for purposes in respect of which there exists a complete or virtually complete right to deduct tax pursuant to Article 15, provi- 18. Article 11(1)(b) as amended is the sec- ded that the lessor and lessee have ond contentious provision. It is intended to jointly submitted a request to that

6 — See paragraph 6 above. 7 — See paragraphs 9 and 10 above.

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effect to the Inspector and provi- 21. By notarial act dated 28 April 1995 the ded that they otherwise fulfil the appellant set up the Stichting 'De Goede conditions to be laid down by Woning' (hereinafter 'the Stichting'). Ministerial regulation;

"letting of immovable property" shall be taken to mean, inter alia, 22. By a further notarial act of the same any other form in which immova- date, the appellant granted the Stichting a ble property is made available for usufructuary right 9 for a term of 10 years use otherwise than by way of the in respect of the new houses in return for a supply thereof.' sum lower than the cost price of those houses.

The facts and the main proceedings

23. The act granting the usufructuary right provided also that the Stichting was to 19. At the material time in 1995 the commission the appellant to appellant in the main proceedings was a housing association called Woningbouw- vereniging 'Goed Wonen'. In 1997 it changed its legal form and became a foundation called Stichting 'Goed Wonen'. Since that change has no bearing on the present case and in order to prevent confusion with the distinct Stichting 'De — manage the buildings and carry out Goede Woning' introduced below 8I will large and small-scale maintenance refer to the housing association and the work or have the same carried out, succeeding foundation simply as 'the appel- lant'.

20. In the course of the second trimester of — collect and administer the rents, issue 1995 three new-built housing complexes receipts for rents received, conclude, with dwellings designed for letting (herein- modify and terminate agreements for after 'the new houses') were supplied to the the rental of the buildings and issue appellant. invoices in respect of rent increases,

8 — See paragraph 21 below. 9 — See below, paragraphs 53 to 60.

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— carry out all such (legal) acts on behalf firmed their decision. By decision of of the usufructuary in relation to the 14 February 1997 they however reduced aforesaid management as the Stichting the assessment to the sum of HFL 639 992 may deem appropriate. which corresponds to the amount recouped by the appellant on the basis of the declaration.

24. In its tax declaration for the period 1 April 1995 to 30 June 1995 the appellant indicated the turnover tax for the grant of the usufructuary right to the Stichting 27. By judgment of 20 May 1998 the (HFL 645 067) and offset the amount of Gerechtshof te Arnhem (Regional Court the turnover tax charged to it in connection of Appeal, Arnhem) annulled the tax with the construction of the new houses authorities' initial assessment but con- (HFL 1 285 059). On the basis of that firmed the assessment in its corrected form declaration the appellant initially recouped of 14 February 1997. The Gerechtshof held HFL 639 992. that the setting-up of the Stichting and the grant of the usufructuary right were of no relevance for VAT purposes and argued essentially as follows.

25. The setting-up of the Stichting and the grant of the usufructuary right may thus have been to the appellant's advantage in particular because under the law in force before the amendments it was able to deduct the input tax. 28. In the first place, the Stichting had to be assimilated to the appellant, because the role of the appellant in its relationship with the Stichting was so dominant. The grant of the usufructuary right was not therefore a transaction between two different taxable persons. 26. Presumably after the entry into force (with retroactive effect) of the amendments made by the law of 18 December 1995 the Netherlands tax authorities issued a sup- plementary assessment in the sum of HFL 1 285 059 corresponding to the amount deducted by the appellant as input tax. The appellant lodged an objection 29. Secondly, even if such an assimilation against that supplementary assessment. was not possible, the grant of the usufruc- The Netherlands authorities initially con- tuary right could not be viewed as giving

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GOED WONEN'

rise to taxation and to the related right to 30. The appellant lodged an appeal against deduct input tax: that judgment before the Hoge Raad.

31. The Hoge Raad appears to have no doubt about three issues. In the Hoge — it could not be regarded as a transfer of Raad's view the Gerechtshof was wrong the right to dispose of the asset in in assimilating the appellant to the Sticht- question as owner within the meaning ing, because the legal transactions at issue of Article 5(1) of the Sixth Directive resulted in the creation of a separate legal and Article 3(1)(e) of the Law, since it entity, in the form of a foundation, which involved merely the grant of a limited was distinct from the appellant. However, right; the Gerechtshof had rightly held that there was no transfer of the right to dispose of the assets in question as owner within the meaning of Article 5(1) of the Sixth Direc- tive and Article 3(1)(e) of the Law. The Stichting obtained only a limited right which did not encompass the right to dispose freely of the houses in question. — it could also not be regarded as a Finally, it was in the present case not open supply of goods within the meaning of to the courts to question the retroactive Article 3(2) of the Law as amended, effect of the Law of 19 December 1995. since the sum paid for it amounted to less than the cost price of the houses in question;

32. The Hoge Raad considers however that several of the appellant's arguments raise questions regarding the interpretation of the Sixth Directive. — since it could not be considered as a supply of goods it had to be considered as a supply of services, taxable in principle; but that supply had to be considered as exempted 'letting of immovable property' within the mean- 33. Before the referring court the appellant ing of the new definition contained in maintained in substance, first, that Arti- Article 11(1)(b) of the Law as amen- cle 3(2) of the Law infringes Article 5(3)(b) ded, since it constituted 'a form in of the Directive. In its view, the Nether- which immovable property is made lands legislature wrongly established a link available for use otherwise than by between the amount of the consideration way of supply thereof'. paid for the grant of a right in rem and the

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question whether that grant is to be regar- may treat the terms "leasing or letting" ded as a taxable supply. Secondly, before as covering not only leasing and/or amending Article 3(2) of the Law the letting in the sense applied to those Netherlands should have sought authorisa- terms by civil law but also any other tion pursuant to Article 27 of the Directive. form in which immovable property is Thirdly, Article 11(1)(b) of the Law is made available for use otherwise than contrary to Article 13B(b) and 13C(a) of by way of the supply thereof?' the Directive in that it exempts from value added tax transactions such as the grant of an usufructuary right which cannot be regarded as leasing or letting of immovable property within the meaning of the Direc- tive. 35. Written observations have been sub- mitted by the Netherlands Government and the Commission. At the hearing the appel- lant, the Netherlands and German Govern- ments, and the Commission were repre- sented. 34. In the light of those arguments the Hoge Raad submitted the following ques- tions for a preliminary ruling:

'1. Is Article 5(3) of the Sixth Directive to Question 1: Article 5(3) of the Sixth Direc- be interpreted as meaning that rights in tive rem entitling the holder thereof to use immovable property may be treated by the national legislature as tangible property only if the remuneration agreed in respect of the grant, transfer, modification, waiver or termination of 36. By its first question the referring court those rights is at least equivalent to the wishes to ascertain whether Article 5(3)(b) financial value of the immovable prop- of the Sixth Directive must be interpreted erty concerned? as precluding a national provision such as Article 3(2) of the Law as amended which subjects the classification as 'supply of goods' of the grant, transfer, modification, waiver or termination of rights in rem, with the exception of mortgages and ground rents, to the condition that the sum paid 2. Are Article 13B(b) and Article 13C(a) therefor plus turnover tax amounts at least of the Sixth Directive to be interpreted to the economic value of the immovable as meaning that the national legislature property to which the rights in rem relate.

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37. The appellant maintains that the is compatible with Article 5(3)(b) of the amendment of Article 3(2) of the Law is Sixth Directive. incompatible with Article 5(3)(b) of the Directive. In its view the Directive allows the Member States only to select within the catalogue of rights in rem existing in their national legal order the rights which should be assimilated to tangible property. It does not however allow them to differentiate on 39. According to Article 5(1) of the Sixth the basis of the sum paid for a transaction Directive 'supply of goods' means the over such a right. The effect of the criterion 'transfer of the right to dispose of tangible chosen by the Netherlands is that depend- property as owner'. The two key elements ing on the sum paid a given right in rem is in the definition are that the supply must regarded as tangible property in some cases entail the 'transfer of the right to dispose of and not in others. It follows that before [the] property as owner' and that the amending Article 3(2) of the Law the supply must concern 'tangible property'. Netherlands should have sought authorisa- tion pursuant to Article 27 of the Directive. Neither at the moment of the grant of the usufructuary right nor when the amend- ments were adopted by the legislature did the Netherlands have such an authorisa- 40. As regards the first element, the Court tion. The authorisation granted in 1996 10 has held that 'supply of goods' does not came too late, allowed a derogation from a refer to the transfer of ownership in different provision of the Sixth Directive accordance with the procedures prescribed and was in any event never used by the by the applicable national law but covers Netherlands. any transfer of tangible property by one party which empowers the other party actually to dispose of it as if he were the owner of the property. 11

41. As regards the second element, Arti- cle 5(3)(b) provides that the Member States may consider 'rights in rem giving the 38. The Netherlands Government and the holder thereof a right of user over immo- Commission maintain — and I agree with vable property' to be tangible property. them on this point — that a national That provision was prompted by the exis- provision such as Article 3(2) as amended tence in the private law of several Member States of limited rights in rem such as 'usufruct', 'emphyteusis' and 'superficie' 10 —Council Decision 96/432/EC of 8 July 1996 authorising the Netherlands to apply a measure derogating front Article 11 of Directive 77/388/EEC on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes 11 — Case C-320/88 Shipping and Forwarding Enterprise Safe (Sixth VAT Directive), OJ 1996 L 179, p. 51. [1990] ECR I-285, paragraph 7 of the judgment.

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which give the holder certain rights of Article 5(3)(b) not to be tangible property economic utilisation over immovable prop- at all, they may a fortiori also subject their erty. 12 classification as tangible property to restric- tive conditions. The only limitation which the Member States have to respect is that the conditions imposed must not funda- mentally alter the nature of the choice offered by Article 5(3)(b).

42. On a literal interpretation of Arti- cle 5(1) and (3)(b) Member States may consider only the transfer of the rights in rem mentioned in Article 5(3)(b) as a 'supply of goods' within the meaning of the directive. It follows however from Van Tiem 13 that where a Member State has 44. It will be recalled that the distinguish- made use of the possibility provided for by ing criterion chosen by the Netherlands Article 5(3)(b) to consider certain rights in legislature is the sum paid for the transac- rem to be tangible property, the term tion over the right in rem. That in my view 'transfer' in Article 5(1) must be inter- is not contrary to the objective of Arti- preted as also covering the creation of such cle 5(3) (b) and does not fundamentally a right. alter the nature of the choice offered by that provision. The objective of Arti- cle 5(3)(b) is to allow the Member States to treat as supplies of goods certain trans- actions which are similar in their economic effects to the supplies covered by Arti- cle 5(1). That similarity will in practice often be stronger where the sum paid for 43. As regards the appellant's main argu- the transaction over the right in rem ment that the Member States are not corresponds to the economic value of the entitled to differentiate on the basis of the immovable property concerned and weaker sum paid for a transaction over a given where no price or a price below the right, Article 5(3)(b) provides expressly economic value of the immovable property that Member States may consider rights in in question is paid. rem giving the holder a right of user over immovable property as tangible property. No provision in the Sixth Directive subjects the discretion which the Member States enjoy under that provision to an express limitation. Since the Member States are free to consider the rights in rem mentioned in

45. An alternative criterion could have 12 — See the Explanatory Memorandum to the Commission's been the period for which a limited right first proposal for the Sixth Directive, Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 11/73, p. 10. in rem is granted. That is illustrated by a 13 — Case C-186/89 [1990] ECR I-4363. Council Decision authorising Ireland to I - 6844 •GOED WONEN'

apply a measure derogating from the Sixth as supplies of services, a conflict with Directive.14 It appears incidentally from Article 5(1) as interpreted by the Court 15 that decision that Ireland treats the supply could perhaps arise. Since the present case of long-term lease interests (i.e. a lease of does not concern a transaction of that type 10 years or more) in immovable property as and since no question on the interpretation a supply of goods. The Council stated in of Article 5(1) was referred, the Court does that context that Community law gives the not need to pursue that hypothesis further. Member States a great deal of discretion in determining the VAT treatment to be applied to immovable property, and its transposition has led to considerable varia- tions in the national laws applied in that 48. I accordingly conclude that Arti- field. cle 5(3)(b) of the Sixth Directive must be interpreted as allowing a Member State to subject the classification as 'supply of goods' of a transaction concerning a limited right over immovable property to the condition that the sum paid for the trans- action plus turnover tax amounts at least to the economic value of the immovable 46. Since the disputed amendment is property to which the right relates. allowed by Article 5(3) of the Directive, the Netherlands did not need an authorisa- tion pursuant to Article 27 of the Directive. It is therefore not necessary to discuss the appellant's arguments concerning the authorisation of 1996. Question 2: Article 13B(b) of the Sixth Directive

The disputed amendment and the formula- 47. It is perhaps possible to imagine trans- tion of the question actions by which certain rights in rem over immovable property are granted for a sum below the economic value of that property and which at the same time actually 49. The referring court asks: empower the other party to dispose of the property as if he were the owner thereof. If Article 3(2) were to be interpreted as causing those transactions to be classified 'Are Article 13B(b) and Article 13C(a) of the Sixth Directive to be interpreted as 14 — Council Decision 97/510/EC of 24 July 1997 authorising Ireland to apply a measure derogating from Article 21 of the Sixth Directive (77/388/EEC) on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes, 15 — Sec Case C-320/88 Shipping and Forwarding Enterprise OJ 1997 L 214, p. 37. Safe, summarised in paragraph 40 and cited in note 11.

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meaning that the national legislature may the main proceedings and to consider treat the terms "leasing or letting" as whether a Member State may regard the covering not only leasing and/or letting in grant of a usufructuary right over immo- the sense applied to those terms by civil law vable property for a limited period of time but also any other form in which immova- (for example 10 years) as 'leasing or letting ble property is made available for use of immovable property' within the meaning otherwise than by way of the supply of Article 13B(b) and C(a) of the Sixth thereof?' Directive.

50. The question is thus formulated in abstract terms by reference to the wording of the disputed amendment of Arti- cle 11(1)(b) of the Law 16 which defines The nature of usufruct 'letting of immovable property' as 'inter alia, any other form in which immovable property is made available for use other- wise than by way of supply thereof'. 53. According to Article 3:021 of the Neth- erlands Civil Code a usufructuary right gives the holder thereof the right to use the property of another and to take the fruits of 51. Despite the broad scope of the referring that property. court's question the arguments of the parties in the main proceedings and the observations submitted to the Court have concentrated almost exclusively on the concrete problem discussed in the main proceedings, namely the grant of a usu- 54. Usufruct has its origin in Roman law 17 fructuary right and its classification for where it was defined as the right to use and VAT purposes. It would moreover be enjoy the things of another without impair- difficult to give the referring court a general ing their substance. Its primary purpose reply which takes into account all legal was essentially alimentary, e.g. provision forms available under the laws of the for a widow. Initially Roman lawyers were Member States through which immovable not sure how to classify it and it was argued property can be made available for use. that in many respects usufruct was a fraction of ownership. Only at a later stage did it come to be thought of as a limited ius in rem which was to be classified as a personal servitude. A servitude was a right 52. I therefore propose to reformulate the which encumbered another person's prop- second question in the light of the facts of 17 — See the useful synthesis by A. Borkowski, Textbook on Roman Law, Blackstone Press Limited, London, 1994, 16 — See paragraph 18 above. p. 163 et seq.

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erty and could be either praedial or perso- — the usufructuary is not allowed to alter nal. Praedial servitudes such as rights of fundamentally the nature or the use of way attached to land: they were rights that the property; a person had by virtue of ownership of land over the land of another. Personal servi- tudes such as usufruct attached to a parti- cular person and died with him. 18

— a usufructuary right is granted for life or any fixed period; if given to a legal entity it may in many legal orders not 55. Today in the Community usufruct exceed a period fixed by law (e.g. 30 exists in Austria, Belgium, France, Ger- years); many, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. 19 In those legal orders it is still classified as a personal servitude. It is mainly used in family arrangements and/or for tax rea- sons.

— as a personal servitude it cannot sur- vive the death of the original usufruc- tuary or its dissolution if a legal entity;

56. Usufruct's main features under the national laws concerned are the following:

— usufruct is created inter alia by con- tract, will, operation of law (e.g. usu- fruct over the family home for the surviving spouse) or court decision; — it is the exclusive right in rem to use and take the fruits of a property belonging to another as if the usufruc- tuary were the owner of that property;

18 — See also WAV. Buckland and A.D. McNair, Roman Law and Common Laiw: A Comparison in Outline, second edition revised by EH. Lawson, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1965, p. 127 et seq. — in many legal orders the transfer of a 19 — The following comparisons between the different national usufructuary right is excluded by law legal orders are based on the helpful analysis in A. Hurn- dall (Ed.), Property in Europe: Law and Practice, Butter- or at least subject to the agreement of worths, London, Dublin, Edinburgh 1998. the owner.

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57. Usufruct as such does not exist in The grant of a usufructuary right as 'leasing Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Ireland or the or letting' within the meaning of Arti- United Kingdom. cle 13B(b) of the Sixth Directive

61. The appellant and the Commission 58. In Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Ire- maintain that the grant of a usufructuary land there are comparable but much more right cannot be regarded as exempted limited rights to take the produce from 'leasing or letting' within the meaning of another's land for a determined period (e.g. Article 13B(b) of the Sixth Directive. timber felling rights, grazing licences).

62. In the first place, they recall the Court's 59. Close equivalents to usufruct in Eng- settled case-law that the exemptions pro- land and Wales, Ireland and Northern vided for in Article 13 of the Sixth Direc- Ireland are perhaps life estates and the long tive are to be interpreted strictly since they lease which may be determinable on death constitute exceptions to the general princi- to make it similar to a usufruct for life. In ple that VAT is to be levied on all supplies Scotland the liferent apparently fulfils a of goods or services made for consideration similar purpose. by a taxable person. 20

60. In England and Wales, Northern Ire- 63. Moreover, it follows in their view from land, Ireland and Scotland there was his- the terminology employed in the Sixth torically no need for the legal institution of Directive that the concept of 'leasing or usufruct. In those legal orders the 'lease' letting' in Article 13B(b) must be inter- may be used to obtain very similar results, preted by reference to the common princi- namely to grant to the lessee an exclusive right (similar to limited ownership) to occupy or take the profits from land or 20 — See for example Case C-216/97 Gregg [1999] ECR I-4947, buildings for a fixed period of time. In paragraph 12 of the judgment and with regard to Article 13B(b) Cases C-358/97 Commission v Ireland English law there was also the trust — and C-359/97 Commission v United Kingdom, judgments of 12 September 2000, paragraphs 52 and 64 of the especially to fulfil the 'alimentary' function. judgments with further references.

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ples of the civil laws of the Member States pachting en verhuur'). The latter concept as they derive from Roman law. must be read as relating only to personal rental contracts which do not give rise to rights in rem. If the Community had wanted to bring the grant of rights in rem within the scope of the exemption it could have used in Article 13B(b) a more neutral 64. They refer to the Sixth Directive which formula similar to that used in Article 4(2). uses inter alia the following concepts:

— 'rights in rem giving the holder thereof a right of user of immovable property' in Article 5(3)(b);21 66. According to the appellant and the Commission the main differences between, on the one hand, a rental contract creating rights in personam which is to be consid- ered as exempted 'leasing or letting' and, on the other hand, the grant of a usufruc- — 'leasing or letting of immovable prop- tuary right which is not exempted from erty' (in Netherlands 'verpachting en VAT are the following: verhuur') in Article 13B(b);

— 'exploitation of property for the pur- pose of obtaining income therefrom on a continuing basis' in Article 4(2). 22 — usufruct grants the holder a right in rem, whilst rental contracts grant only rights in personam;

65. The appellant and the Commission maintain that the authors of the Directive were thus aware of the fundamental differ- ences in civil law between, on the one hand, the grant of a right in rem such as a usufructuary right and, on the other hand, 'leasing or letting' (in Netherlands 'ver- — a usufructuary right does not survive the death of the original usufructuary, whilst a rental agreement continues in 21 — See paragraph 6 above. principle with the successors of the 22 — Sec paragraph 5 above. tenant;

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OPINION OF MR JACOBS — CASE C-326/99

— a usufructuary right may be granted common list of exemptions in Article 13 is without remuneration, whilst the con- designed to guarantee that VAT is collected cept of a rental contract presupposes in a uniform manner in all the Member the payment of a remuneration; States. It is therefore well-established case- law that the terms used to specify the exemptions provided for by Article 13 constitute independent concepts of Com- munity law which must be given a Com- munity definition. 24 — the usufructuary has the right to use the property in question fully and thus also to sublet it; in a rental agreement subletting is in principle precluded if not exceptionally allowed by the owner. 70. The wording of Article 13B(b) of the Sixth Directive does not shed any light on the scope of the concept of 'leasing or letting of immovable property'. 25

67. I am not convinced by those arguments. In my view the Netherlands and German Governments are right to maintain that a Member State may regard the grant of a 71. The appellant and the Commission usufructuary right as exempted 'leasing or appear to suggest, if I understand their letting' within the meaning of Arti- arguments correctly, that 'leasing or letting' cle 13B(b) of the Sixth Directive. (in Netherlands 'verpachting en verhuur') must be taken to refer only to personal rental contracts which do not give rise to rights in rem as they are known in the civil laws of the Member States most strongly influenced by Roman law. 68. The Sixth Directive does not expressly define the concept of 'leasing or letting'. Nor does it leave that definition to the legal orders of the Member States. 23

72. I consider however that the Commu- nity definition of 'leasing or letting' cannot be found by simply referring to legal concepts used by only some of the national 69. It follows from the 11th recital of the laws. preamble to the Sixth Directive that the

24 —Cases C-358/97 Commission v Ireland and C-359/97 23 — See by contrast the concept of 'building land' in Arti- Commission v United Kingdom, cited in note 20, at cle 4(3)(b) of the Sixth Directive which 'shall mean any paragraphs 51 and 63 of the judgments. unimproved or improved land defined as such by the 25 — Ibidem at respectively paragraphs 53 and 65 of the Member States'. judgment.

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73. That is, first, because there are impor- to insist so strongly on those systematic tant substantive differences between the differences. 26 legal institutions used in the different Member States.

76. Secondly, those substantive differences are reflected in important linguistic differ- ences of terminology within Article 13B(b) as regards the phrase 'leasing or letting'. The wording of the Danish, Dutch, French, 74. For example the 'lease' to which the German, Italian and Swedish language wording of the English version refers is a versions refers to two distinct types of peculiar institution of the common law contracts. One of those contracts (udlejn- jurisdictions. 'Leasehold' is considered as ing, location, Vermietung, locazione, ver- one of two main types of 'interests in land', huur, uthyrning) consists of granting the the other being 'freehold' (akin to absolute tenant the right to use the property of ownership). Leasehold is traditionally another. The other type of contract (bort- regarded as a kind of limited ownership forpagtning, affermage, Verpachtung, and may thus be even stronger than limited affitto, verpachting, utarrendering) consists rights in rem. A lease may be used to grant of allowing the tenant also to enjoy the a right to occupy or take the profits from gains produced by the property. The Eng- land or buildings either for a fixed term, lish and Spanish versions also use two commonly up to 999 years, or by way of words (leasing or letting, arrendiamento y periodic tenancy, e.g. on a recurring alquiler), but the words do not correspond monthly or yearly basis until determined to two technically distinct types of con- by notice. tracts. The Finnish, Greek and Portuguese versions use only one word referring to one type of contract.

77. Finally, it appears from the first sub- 75. In order to obtain the same range of paragraph of Article 13B(b) that the economic results the civil law jurisdictions authors of the Directive did not have a use several distinct legal vehicles such as purely formalistic idea of the concept of rental contracts and rights in rem (e.g. 'leasing or letting'. That provision excludes usufruct or building rights). In that respect from the scope of the exemption inter alia the Germanic and Romanist legal orders 'the provision of accommodation, as appear to attach importance to the sys- defined in the laws of the Member States, tematic distinction between contracts over immovable property which grant only 26 — Sec un the distinctive modes of legal thinking of the rights in personam such as rental contracts different legal families K. Zweigert and H. Kotz, intro- and arrangements which create rights in duction to Comparative Laif, third revised edition trans- lated from the German hy T. Weir, Clarendon Press rem. The Nordic legal orders do not appear Oxford 1998, p. 69.

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in the hotel sector or in sectors with a ment of a toll by reference to categories of similar function, including the provision of national law. It held instead that the accommodation in holiday camps or on concept 'leasing or letting' could not be sites developed for use as camping sites'. It considered to cover contracts in which the might be argued that the existence of the parties have not agreed on any duration for exclusion in question logically presupposes the right of enjoyment of the immovable that the contract for a hotel room consti- property, which was an essential element of tutes 'leasing or letting' for the purposes of a contract to let. Where access to roads was Article 13B(b). The authors of the Direc- provided, the duration of the use of the tive were however certainly aware that road was not a factor taken into account by such a contract — in view of the over- the parties, in particular in determining the riding importance of the services provided price. 28 More recently in Stockholm Lin- by the hotelier and the control he retains döpark, which concerned the making avail- over the use of the premises — is in some able of a golf course, the Court repeated national laws not considered to be a that agreement on the duration of the right contract to let. of enjoyment of the immovable property was an essential element of 'leasing or letting'. 29 In my Opinion in the same case I emphasised also another essential element: that a lease or let necessarily involved the grant of some right to occupy the property as one's own and to exclude or admit 78. It does not therefore come as a surprise others, a right which is, moreover, linked to that the Court's case-law on the concept of a defined piece or area of property. 30 'leasing or letting of immovable property' instead of referring to legal categories of national law takes a functional approach which takes into account the context in which the concept is used and the general structure of the Sixth VAT Directive.

80. A functional interpretation of the con- cept of 'leasing or letting of immovable property' moreover guarantees the equal treatment of taxable persons 31 who in 79. The Court held for example in two of economic terms perform equivalent trans- the 'road toll' cases that the definition of actions and facilitates the uniform applica- 'leasing or letting of immovable property' tion of exemptions throughout the Com- under Article 13B(b) is 'certainly wider in munity as postulated in the 11th recital of some respects than that enshrined in var- ious national laws'. 27 In the same cases the Court did not attempt to classify the 28 — Ibidem, at paragraphs 56, 57 and 68, 69 of the judgments respectively. contract granting access to roads on pay- 29 — Case C-150/99, judgment of 18 January 2001, at para- graph 27. 30 — Paragraph 38 of the Opinion, which was delivered on 26 September 2000. 27 — Cases C-358/97 Commission v Ireland and C-359/97 31 — Case C-281/91 Muys' en De Winter's Bouw- en Aanne- Commission v United Kingdom, cited in note 20, at mingsbedrijf [1993] ECR I-5405, paragraph 14 of the paragraphs 54 and 66 of the judgments. judgment.

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the preamble to the Sixth Directive. It is account the different language versions of also in line with the Court's functional Article 13B(b) and the divergences between interpretation of the concept of the 'trans- the laws of the Member States. fer of the right to dispose of [the] property as owner' within the meaning of Arti- cle 5(1). 32

84. 'Leasing or letting of immovable prop- erty' within the meaning of Article 13B(b) 81. What then are the essential elements of includes in my view agreements whereby the concept of 'leasing or letting of immo- one party grants the other the right to vable property'? occupy a defined immovable property as his own and to use or even take profits from that property for an agreed (definite or indefinite) duration in exchange for remuneration linked to that duration.

82. In his Opinion in Lubbock Fine Advo- cate General Darmon used a definition which was common ground between the parties, namely that a letting was a contract by which the owner transfers in return for a rent certain rights in his property, such as the right of enjoyment of the property, 85. If one applies that interpretation to the whatever the nuances of national law on present case the grant of a usufructuary that point. In a footnote he added that right as in issue in the main proceedings can leasing or letting for the purposes of properly be considered as exempted 'leas- Community law included in his view a ing or letting of immovable property'. 'lease', a 'licence', a 'bail' or a 'convention d'occupation précaire'. 33

86. It may be recalled that the appellant 83.In the light of the Court's subsequent granted the Stichting a usufructuary right case-law I would tentatively suggest a more over the new houses for a period of 10 specific interpretation which takes into years. There was thus an agreement whereby one party grants the other the right to occupy and to use and even take 32 — See paragraph 40 and note 11 above. the profits from a specified immovable 33 — Case C-63/92 f 1993] ECR I-6665, paragraph 39 and note 27 of the Opinion. It is not clear whether he referred m property. That right was granted for remu- tilat nute to the French or the English term 'licence'. neration and for an agreed duration.

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87. The particularities of usufruct empha- 89. The fact mentioned by the Commission sised by the appellant and the Commis- that usufruct does not survive the death of sion 34 cannot affect that result. the original usufructuary whilst a rental contract continues in principle with the successors of the tenant only confirms my thesis about the irrelevance of the abstract distinction between the legal effects of rental contracts and of usufruct. The the- oretical distinction between rights in rem and rights in personam would lead one to expect exactly the opposite.

88. The fact that usufruct grants the holder a right in rem whilst rental contracts grant only rights in personam is irrelevant. Even in the civil law jurisdictions the practical differences between usufruct and rental contract are much narrower than suggested by the abstract and theoretical distinction 90. The fact that a usufructuary right may between rights in personam and rights in be granted without remuneration is also rem. For example in most civil law juris- irrelevant. It is true that a usufructuary dictions the tenant does not lose his rights right granted without remuneration for arising from a rental contract — which are example in family arrangements cannot be in theory in personam only — where the assimilated to leasing or letting. It must owner sells the property to a third per- however be borne in mind that supplies son. 35 Conversely a usufructuary right (a effected for no consideration fall in any personal servitude) can rarely be transfer- event outside the scope of the Sixth Direc- red freely to third persons and cannot tive. survive the death of the original usufruc- tuary. Those are probably the main reasons why the classification both of the rights flowing from a rental contract as rights in personam and of usufruct as a right in rem were historically disputed. 36 It must also be recalled that in the common law jur- isdictions the lease serves the purposes of both rental contracts and usufruct and may grant the tenant rights which are stronger 91. Finally, I am not convinced that the than limited rights in rem. Commission's contention that the usufruc- tuary may always sublet the property whilst the tenant in a rental contract needs the 34 — See paragraph 66 above. authorisation of the owner is correct. It 35 — H. Coing, Europäisches Privatrecht Bd. H. 19. Jahrhun- appears that the right of the usufructuary to dert: Überblick über die Entivickhtng des Privatrechts in sublet may also be limited by contract. In den ehemals gemeinrechtlichen Ländern, C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung München 1989, p. 482. any event, it cannot be decisive for the 36 — As regards rental contracts see H. Coing, cited in the previous note, p. 482 and as regards usufruct see above, classification of usufruct as 'leasing or paragraph 54 and notes 17 and 18. letting' whether subletting is allowed sub-

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GOED WONEN

ject to contractual limitations or forbidden the grant of a usufructuary right over subject to contractual authorisation. immovable property for a limited period of time (for example 10 years) as leasing or letting of immovable property within the 92. In the light of the foregoing, I conclude meaning of Article 13B(b) and C(a) of the that a Member State can properly regard Sixth Directive.

Conclusion

93. For the above reasons the questions referred should in my view be answered as follows:

(1) Article 5(3)(b) of the Sixth VAT Directive must be interpreted as allowing a Member State to subject the classification as a 'supply of goods' of a transaction concerning limited rights over immovable property to the condition that the sum paid for the transaction plus turnover tax amounts to no less than the economic value of the immovable property to which the rights relate;

(2) Article 13B(b) and C(a) of the Sixth VAT Directive must be interpreted as allowing a Member State to regard the grant of a usufructuary right over immovable property for a limited period of time (for example 10 years) as leasing or letting of immovable property within the meaning of those provisions.

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