T-73/99

MEYER V COUNCIL AND COMMISSION

ORDER OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (Third Chamber) 1 June 1999 *

In Case T-73/99,

Karl L. Meyer, farmer, residing at Uturoa, Isle of Raiatea, French Polynesia, represented by Jean-Dominique des Areis, of the Papeete Bar, with an address for service in Luxembourg at the office of Horst Pakowski, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany, 20-22 Avenue Emile Reuter,

applicant,

v

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ORDER OF 1. 6. 1999 — CASE T-73/99

EEC of 25 July 1991 on the association of the overseas countries and territories with the European Economic Community (OJ 1991 L 263, p. 1),

THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (Third Chamber),

composed of: M. Jaeger, President, K. Lenaerts and J. Azizi, Judges,

Registrar: H. Jung,

2 Under those circumstances, by application lodged at the Court Registry on 11 March 1999, the applicant, a tropical-fruit farmer on the island of Raiatea in French Polynesia, brought this action. Considering that that publication constituted official recognition by the French Republic of the applicability in French Polynesia of the rules of the general agreement on trade in services (OJ 1994 L 336, p. 191, hereinafter the 'GATS agreement') contained in Annex 1B to the agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation (herein- after the 'WTO agreement') approved by Council Decision 94/800/EC of 22 December 1994 concerning the conclusion on behalf of the European Community, as regards matters within its competence, of the agreements reached in the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) (OJ 1994 L 336, p. 1) he is seeking annulment of Article 133(3) of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 184(3) EC) and of Article 106(1) of Council Decision 91/482/EEC of 25 July 1991 on the association of the overseas countries and territories with the European Economic Community (OJ 1991 L 263, p. 1, hereinafter 'Decision 91/482'). Those provisions, he submits, are contrary to the provisions of the general agreement on customs tariffs and trade — Marrakesh Protocol (WTO- GATT 1994) contained in Annex 1A to the WTO agreement (hereinafter '1994 WTO-GATT agreement').

Forms of order sought by the applicant

3 The applicant claims that the Court should:

— declare his claims admissible and well founded in their entirety; II - 1743

ORDER OF 1. 6. 1999 — CASE T-73/99

— hold that Article 133(3) of the Treaty infringes the 1994 WTO-GATT Agreement and must be repealed;

MEYER V COUNCIL AND COMMISSION

5 In the present case the Court considers that the case-file provides sufficient elucidation and decides under that article to give a decision on the action without taking further steps in the proceedings.

6 First, it should be recalled that a Treaty provision is not an act of a Community institution within the meaning of Article 4 of the EC Treaty (now Article 7 EC) and Article 173 of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 230 EC); consequently, the Court has no jurisdiction to annul it (order of the Court of First Instance in Case T-584/93 Roujansky v Council [1994] ECR II-587, paragraph 15). It follows that the claim for annulment of Article 133(3) of the Treaty must be declared inadmissible.

7 Secondly, it is important to remember that, pursuant to Article 44(1 )(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, an application must state the subject-matter of the proceedings and a summary of the pleas in law on which it is based. That statement must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendants to prepare their defence and the Court to adjudicate on the action, in a proper case without any other supporting information. In order to ensure legal certainty and the sound administration of justice, for an action to be admissible, the essential matters of fact and law on which it is based must be apparent, at least in summary form but coherently and comprehensibly, from the body of the application itself (order of the Court of First Instance in Case T-205/98 Clauni and Others v Commission, not published in the ECR, paragraph 14).

1 1 In any event, it is important to point out that, in so far as the action for annulment is directed against Article 106(1) of Decision 91/482, it is inadmissible since, first, it was brought outside the time-limits laid down in the fifth paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty. Secondly, since the applicant has adduced no evidence to show that the provision at issue is of direct and individual concern to him, he does not satisfy the conditions laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty.

12 Finally, the Court does not have jurisdiction under Article 173 of the Treaty to substitute itself for the Community institutions or national authorities entrusted with the implementation of Community law. It cannot therefore rule on the alleged illegality of the fiscal and customs situation prevailing in French Polynesia or determine the resultant liabilities.

13 Furthermore, apart from the fact that the application for interim relief does not fulfil the conditions laid down in Article 104(3) of the Rules of Procedure, that II - 1746

MEYER V COUNCIL AND COMMISSION

application must in any event be dismissed as manifestly inadmissible, since the substantive claims are themselves inadmissible.

14 In light of foregoing, the action must be dismissed as manifestly inadmissible.

ORDER OF 1. 6. 1999 — CASE T-73/99

2. The applicant shall bear his own costs.

Luxembourg, 1 June 1999.

H. Jung M. Jaeger Registrar President

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