C-12/00
ECLI:EU:C:2001:665
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COMMISSION v SPAIN
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL ALBER delivered on 6 December 2001 1
I — Introduction chocolate products intended for human consumption (hereinafter 'Directive 73/241') 2 contains the following provi- sions:
1. These proceedings concern the free movement of chocolate products that con- tain vegetable fats other than cocoa-butter. Spain prohibits such products lawfully manufactured in other Member States of the Community from being marketed under the name 'chocolate', requiring that they be marketed under the name 'chocolate sub- stitute'. Seventh recital
II — Legal framework 'whereas the use of vegetable fats other than cocoa-butter in chocolate products is permitted in certain Member States, and extensive use is made of this facility; whereas, however, a decision relating to the possibilities and forms of any extension (1) Community law of the use of these fats in the Community as a whole cannot be taken at the present time, as the economic and technical data currently available are not sufficient to enable a final position to be adopted; Council Directive 73/241/EEC of 24 July whereas the situation will consequently 1973 on the approximation of the laws of have to be re-examined in the light of the Member States relating to cocoa and future developments;'
1 — Original language: German. 2 — OJ 1973 L 288, p. 23.
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Article 14(2) (a) 1.16 Chocolate
'2. This directive shall not affect the provi- The product obtained from cocoa nib, sions of national laws: cocoa mass, cocoa powder or fat-re- duced cocoa powder and sucrose with or without added cocoa-butter, having, without prejudice to the definition of chocolate vermicelli, gianduja nut chocolate and couverture chocolate, a (a) at present authorising or prohibiting minimum total dry cocoa solids con- the addition of vegetable fats other tent of 35% — at least 14% of dry than cocoa-butter to the chocolate non-fat cocoa solids and 18% of products defined in Annex I. At the cocoa-butter — these percentages to end of a period of three years 3 from the be calculated after the weight of the notification of this Directive the Coun- additions provided for in paragraphs 5 cil shall decide, on a proposal from the to 8 has been deducted; Commission, on the possibilities and the forms of extending the use of these fats to the whole of the Community;
(b) ...'
7. (a) Without prejudice to Annex I Article 14(2)(a), edible substances, with the exception of flour and starches and of fats and fat prep- arations not derived exclusively from milk, may be added to choc- '1. For the purposes of this directive, the olate, plain chocolate, couverture following definitions shall apply: chocolate, milk chocolate, milk chocolate with high milk content, couverture milk chocolate and to white chocolate.
3 — This requirement was met not after three years, as planned, but only with the adoption of Directive 2000/36/EC. This ...' will be discussed again in point 23.
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(2) Spanish law comments on these drafts pursuant to Article 8(2) of Directive 83/189. By letter of 21 October 1992, which was answered on 18 March 1993, the Commission again criticised what it regarded as failure to 2. Directive 73/241 was transposed into comply with Community law through the Spanish law by Royal Decrees Nos restriction of the free movement of choc- 822/1990 and 823/1990. Article 2(16) of olate lawfully manufactured in other Royal Decree No 822/1990 of 22 June Member States. Despite a number of con- 1990 defines 'chocolate' as a product tacts between the appropriate authorities of manufactured from cocoa beans, cocoa the Spanish Government and the Commis- mass, cocoa powder or fat-reduced cocoa sion an agreement was not subsequently powder and sucrose with or without added reached. The Commission therefore cocoa-butter. This definition complies with repeated its criticism by letter of 20 March point 1.16 of Annex I to Directive 73/241. 1997. This letter remained unanswered. On Article 4(1) of the Decree prohibits the 29 July 1998 the Commission forwarded to addition of vegetable fats other than cocoa- Spain a reasoned opinion, in which it butter to chocolate. Article 2(7) of Royal reiterated its accusation that the free move- Decree No 823/1990 of 28 June 1990 ment of goods was being infringed. On requires products in which cocoa-butter is 9 November 1998 the Spanish Government- replaced by other vegetable fats to be replied that, in its view, Royal Decree designated 'chocolate substitute'. No 822/1990 was compatible with Direc- tive 73/241 and Spanish legislation there- fore complied with Community law. On 14 January 2000 the Commission brought an action against the Kingdom of Spain.
III — Pre-litigation procedure
IV — Arguments of the parties and forms of order sought 3. On 9 October 1989 the Spanish Govern- ment communicated to the Commission, pursuant to Council Directive 83/189/EEC of 28 March 1983 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations (hereinafter 'Directive 83/189'), 4the drafts (1) The Commission of Royal Decrees Nos 822/1990 and 823/1990, which were subsequently adopted. The Commission made detailed
4. The Commission contends that 4 — OJ 1983 L 109, p. 8. Article 28 EC is being infringed. It con-
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siders that prohibiting products lawfully which it is lawfully manufactured in manufactured in other Member States another Member State. under the name 'chocolate' from being marketed under the name used in the country of origin is a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restric- tion and that the Spanish legislation obstructs the access of these products to 8. The Commission is of the opinion that the market. the Spanish rules do not constitute a selling arrangement within the meaning of the judgment in Keck and Mithouard 5and that what is at issue is the name, composition and labelling of the product.
5. The Commission explicitly criticises only the provision of Royal Decree No 822/1990 which prohibits marketing under the name 'chocolate'. The provision contained in Royal Decree No 823/1990 9. The Commission sees the Spanish legis- requiring such products to be designated lation as restricting the free movement of 'chocolate substitute' is not explicitly criti- goods particularly because it prescribes the cised. use of a name with which a less attractive assessment of the product by the consumer is associated. It maintains that the term 'substitute' always designates a product used in place of another, not all of whose qualities it possesses, these qualities accounting for the value of the product it 6. The Commission claims that the Spanish replaces. The obligation to use a term of Government's interpretation of Directive lesser standing is in itself a restriction of the 73/241 results in the Member States being free movement of goods within the mean- divided into those which permit chocolate ing of the judgment in Dassonville. 6 containing vegetable fats other than cocoa- butter to be marketed under the name 'chocolate' and those, such as Spain, which refuse to allow it.
10. According to the Commission, the requirement that the product be renamed also gives rise to repackaging costs, which again leads to a restriction of the free 7. The Commission sees the obligation to movement of goods. Community law change the name of products from 'choc- requires only that the product be marketed olate' to 'chocolate substitute' as a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative 5 — Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Keck and Mithouard restriction; it prevents the product from [1993] ECR I-6097. being marketed under the name under 6 — Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, paragraph 5.
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in a language that is easily comprehensible 13. The Commission claims that the Court in the Member State concerned. should:
(1) declare that, by prohibiting chocolate products which contain vegetable fats 11. Nor, the Commission argues, is the other than cocoa-butter and which obligation to rename the product justified have been lawfully manufactured in on consumer protection grounds. The com- Member States in which the use of such position of the product does not differ from substances is permitted from being the product usually marketed under this marketed in Spain under the name name to such an extent that it should not be under which they are marketed in their regarded as belonging to the same group of country of origin, the Kingdom of products, since it satisfies the substantive Spain has failed to fulfil its obligations requirements set out in Directive 73/241 under Article 28 EC; concerning the composition of 'chocolate'. The vegetable fats are simply added along with the cocoa-butter: they do not replace it. The product is not denatured as a result of the addition of other vegetable fats. Moreover, the product is accepted in other Member States under the name 'chocolate'. (2) order the Kingdom of Spain to bear the Only Spain and Italy — an action against costs of the proceedings. Italy's legislation having been brought in Case C-14/00 — prohibit the marketing of these products under the name 'chocolate' under which they have been lawfully manu- factured.
14. Spain contends that the Court should:
(1) dismiss the application; 12. Furthermore, less drastic measures could be taken to ensure the same level of consumer protection, such as labelling, which could guarantee that consumers were informed impartially and objectively about the addition of other vegetable fats without the use of a negative term being (2) order the Commission to bear the costs necessary. of the proceedings.
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(2) Spain consumer protection grounds. It ensures that the consumer is informed about the composition of the product in traditional language.
15. The Spanish Government is of the opinion that prohibiting chocolate prod- ucts containing vegetable fats other than cocoa-butter from being marketed under the name 'chocolate' is compatible with Article 28 EC. It argues that Directive 73/241 does not govern the manufacture of such products and that, in the absence of the harmonisation of Community law, the Member States are empowered to legislate 19. The Spanish Government contends that on this question. Spain has done this by 'chocolate substitute' is not a negative adopting the disputed Royal Decrees. term, but is, in fact, a common designation, with which the Spanish consumer has been familiar since 1975. Products thus desig- nated are esteemed no less than products which may be known as 'chocolate'. In the Spanish Government's opinion, 'chocolate 16. Nor, according to the Spanish Govern- substitute' is a neutral term that reflects an ment, does the disputed legislation obstruct objective fact, the fact that, compared to the access of these products to the market. chocolate, the product has been altered in It merely requires them to be marketed terms of quality, taste, consistence and under the name 'chocolate substitute' ('suc- durability. In this instance, the question is cedàneo de chocolate'). not whether the minimum requirements of Directive 73/241 as regards the composi- tion of chocolate products have been satis- fied, but to what extent vegetable fats other than those listed in the Directive may be added. This question is not answered by Directive 73/241. 17. In the Spanish Government's opinion, this requirement does not constitute a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction. It is rather a selling arrangement within the meaning of the judgment in Keck and Mithouard.
20. Nor, according to the Spanish Govern- 18. Even if it is seen as restricting the free ment, is there any less drastic means of movement of goods, it is justified on ensuring the same level of consumer pro-
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tection. A reference to 'vegetable fats other V — Legal analysis than cocoa-butter' would not mean any- thing to Spanish consumers. On the other hand, they have been familiar with the term 'chocolate substitute' since 1975.
(1) Absence of harmonisation of Commu- nity law
22. Both parties take the view that the marketing of chocolate products containing vegetable fats other than cocoa-butter is not governed by Directive 73/241. This view can be endorsed. According to the seventh recital, 'a decision relating to the possibilities and forms of any extension of the use of these fats in the Community as a 21. The Spanish Government maintains whole cannot be taken at the present time'. that the use of the prescribed name does Article 14(2)(a) of the Directive therefore not increase the costs to the marketer. states explicitly that it does not affect the Council Directive 79/112/EEC of provisions of national laws 'at present 18 December 1978 on the approximation authorising or prohibiting the addition of of the laws of the Member States relating to vegetable fats other than cocoa-butter to the labelling, presentation and advertising the chocolate products defined in Annex I'. of foodstuffs for sale to the ultimate con- sumer 7as amended by Directive 97/4/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 January 1997 amending Directive 79/112/EEC on the approxi- mation of the laws of the Member States relating to the labelling, presentation and 23. It was to be 2000 — rather than 1976, advertising of foodstuffs 8had been trans- as required by Article 14 of Directive posed into Spanish law in such a way as to 73/241 — before Community law, in the require the marketed product to be labelled shape of Directive 2000/36/EC of the in Spanish. The same applies to the indi- European Parliament and of the Council cation of the composition of the product. of 23 June 2000 relating to cocoa and Thus, if the term 'chocolate' is replaced chocolate products intended for human with the term 'chocolate substitute' at the consumption, 9specified that certain veg- time of the repackaging which then etable fats other than cocoa-butter as listed becomes necessary, the cost of marketing in Annex II of the Directive might account this product is not increased. for up to 5% of the finished product. However, as this provision docs not have to
7 — OJ 1979 L 33, p. 1. 8 — OJ 1997 L 43, p. 21. 9 — OJ 2000 L 197, p. 19.
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be transposed into national law until 26. According to the judgment in the Cassis 3 August 2003, it does not apply to the de Dijon case, it is for the Member States to current action. adopt for their territory all legislation concerning the manufacture and marketing of a product in cases where there are no Community rules. 'Obstacles to movement within the Community resulting from dis- parities between the national laws relating to the marketing of the products in ques- tion must be accepted in so far as those provisions may be recognised as being necessary in order to satisfy mandatory 24. As already pointed out, Directive requirements relating in particular to the 73/241 does not govern the question of effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the pro- the use of vegetable fats other than cocoa- tection of public health, the fairness of butter in chocolate products. This raises the commercial transactions and the defence of question disputed by the parties as to the the consumer.' However, obstacles to legal consequences of this statement. Spain movement are acceptable only if they serve takes the view that, since the adoption of a purpose which is in the general interest this legal act, the Member States have been and such as to take precedence over the free to lay down rules on the use of requirements of the free movement of vegetable fats other than cocoa-butter in goods, which constitutes one of the funda- chocolate products, possibly prohibiting mental rules of the Community. 10 the marketing of products under the name 'chocolate' if they do not comply with national legislation. The Commission, on the other hand, is of the opinion that under Article 28 EC the Member States are under an obligation to permit products lawfully manufactured in other Member States under the name 'chocolate' to be marketed in their territory under the name 'choc- olate' used in the country of origin. 27. It follows from this judgment that, a l t h o u g h the M e m b e r States are empowered to lay down rules in areas in which there is no or no more than partial harmonisation, 1 1which is true, as stated above, of the use of the name 'chocolate' for products containing vegetable fats other than cocoa-butter, such rules must be compatible with the Treaty provisions concerning the free movement of goods. 25. Directive 73/241 does not specify the In other words, where they lead to a extent to which products containing veg- etable fats other than cocoa-butter may be marketed under the name 'chocolate'. It 10 — Case 120/78 Rewe- Zentral ('Cassis de Dijon') [1979] ECR 649, paragraphs 8 and 14); Case C-470/93 Mars therefore represents no more than partial [1995] ECR I-1923, paragraph 12); Keck and Mithouard (cited in footnote 5, paragraph 15). harmonisation, not a conclusive set of rules 11 — For the imposition of language requirements see Case on the use of the name 'chocolate'. C-33/97 Colim [1999] ECR I-3175, paragraph 35.
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restriction of the free movement of goods, having equivalent effect to a quantitative it must be considered whether the restric- restriction is any measure likely to hinder tion is necessary for compelling reasons and intra-Community trade directly or indi- is therefore justified. The reason for this rectly, actually or potentially.13 restriction is that the Member States would otherwise be authorised to partition their national markets in regard to products not covered by the Community rules, contrary to the objective of free movement pursued by the Treaty. 12 Given the case-law cited, it must therefore be accepted that the appli- 29. It thus needs to be considered how far cation of Article 28 et seq. EC is not the Spanish prohibition of the marketing of excluded by Article 14(2)(a) of Directive products containing vegetable fats other 73/241. What therefore needs to be con- than cocoa-butter under the name 'choc- sidered in the following is the extent to olate' results in an obstruction of the free which the Spanish legislation meets the movement of goods. requirements of Article 28 et seq. EC.
(a) Existence of an obstruction of the free movement of goods
(aa) Distinction from a selling arrangement (2) Compatibility of the Spanish legislation with Article 28 EC
30. The Spanish Government denies that the disputed rules give rise to an obstruc- tion of the free movement of goods, arguing that it amounts to no more than a selling arrangement within the meaning of the judgment in Keck and Mithouard. It considers this judgment applicable to the 28. Article 28 EC prohibits quantitative present circumstances, since the question is import restrictions and all measures having under what name the product in question equivalent effect between Member States. may be marketed. It claims that, as the According to settled case-law, a measure
1 3 — Dassonville (cited in footnote 6, point 5); Keck and 12 — Sec Case C-3/99 Ruwet |2000] ECR I-8749, pararaph 47. Mitbouard (cited in footnote 5, paragraph 11 ).
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disputed rules make no distinction between that the prohibition of the sale of pub- domestic and foreign producers or the lications containing competitions was a marketing of domestic and imported goods, rule that bore on the content of the product a selling arrangement that is permissible in question and was not therefore a selling under the judgment referred to exists. The arrangement. 18 Commission, on the other hand, does not consider this judgment applicable in the present case, since what is at issue here is the name, composition and labelling of the product, to which the derogation pursuant to the judgment in Keck and Mithouard does not apply. 32. The disputed Spanish Decrees restrict the use of the name 'chocolate' to products containing as vegetable fat only cocoa- butter. Products containing other vegetable fats must be marketed under the name 'chocolate substitute'. The Decrees con- sequently govern the composition of prod- ucts marketed under the name 'chocolate'. Unlike Keck and Mithouard, the question here therefore is not how a product is marketed in the importing Member State under the name under which it has been lawfully manufactured in the originating 31. In its judgment in Keck and Mithouard Member State. As in Familiapress, the the Court modified the aforementioned composition of the product itself is at issue. Dassonville 14 and Cassis de Dijon 15 judg- It may not be marketed in Spain, the ments by ruling that national provisions importing Member State, under the name restricting or prohibiting certain selling 'chocolate', under which it has been law- arrangements are not such as to hinder fully manufactured in the originating directly or indirectly, actually or poten- Member State. This argues against the tially, trade between Member States, so Spanish rules being regarded as a selling long as those provisions apply to all arrangement. relevant traders operating within the national territory and so long as they affect in the same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and of those from other Member States. 16 In that case the Court considered a rule generally prohibiting the resale of a product at a loss to be a selling arrangement. 17 In the case of 33. The Spanish Government's view that Familiapress, on the other hand, it ruled the issue is the name, which does not hinder the free movement of goods, is unconvinc- ing in the light of current case-law. In the 14 — Cited in footnote 6. 15 — Cited in footnote 10. 16 — Keck and Mithouard (cited in footnote 5, patagtaphs 16 and 17). 18 —Case C-368/95 Familiapress [1997] ECR I-3689, 17 — Keck and Mithouard (cited in footnote 5, paragraph 18). paragraph 11.
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judgment in the Colim case the Court ruled their free movement in the Community. 20 that measures necessitating the alteration of That is a measure having equivalent effect the packaging or the labelling of imported to a quantitative restriction within the products are not selling arrangements meaning of Article 28 EC. within the meaning of the judgment in Keck and Mithouard. 19 An interim con- clusion to be drawn, therefore, is that, as the Spanish rules do not constitute a selling arrangement, the application of the rules on the free movement of goods is not ruled out. 35. It should be borne in mind, however, that the prohibition docs not entirely exclude the marketing of these products in Spain. They may be marketed under the name 'chocolate substitute'. The Spanish Government therefore disputes the exist- ence of a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction.
(bb) Existence of an obstruction to the free movement of goods
36. Nor, it argues, does the requirement that such products be renamed give rise to additional costs, since they have in any case to be repackaged and labelled in Spanish and the term 'chocolate' can be replaced with 'chocolate substitute' while this is being done. 34. The Royal Decrees prohibit a product lawfully manufactured in other Member States under the name 'chocolate' and containing vegetable fats other than cocoa- butter from being marketed in Spain under that name. It forces manufacturers estab- lished in other Member States to alter the 37. Although the Court has acknowledged composition of their products if they want in principle that the obligation to label a to market them in Spain under the name product in the language or languages of the 'chocolate'. The Decrees therefore restrict country in which it is marketed is a the access of products lawfully manufac- restriction of the free movement of goods tured in other Member States to the Spanish market and consequently hinder 20 — For similar cases concerning the composition of products see Case 193/80 Commission vItaly [1981] ECR 3019, p a r a g r a p h 2 6 , and Case 286/86D e s e r b a i s [1988] 19 — Colim (cited in footnote 11, paragraph 37). ECR 4907, paragraph 12.
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that is compatible with Article 28 EC, 21 it 39. As regards the option of marketing the has also ruled in a number of judgments products in question under the name 'choc- that it would not be compatible with olate substitute', reference must be made to Article 28 EC and the objectives of a the possibility of negative feelings being common market for national legislation to aroused in the consumer by the use of this be allowed to restrict a generic term to one term. 'Substitute' is not an objective, neu- national variety alone to the detriment of tral term that imparts a simple piece of other varieties produced, particularly in information, as does the printed statement other Member States, by compelling the 'contains vegetable fats other than cocoa- producers of the other varieties to use butter'. The addition of the word 'substi- appellations which are unfamiliar to or less tute' implies that the product is not choc- esteemed by the consumer. 22 olate but merely a replacement. It is thus possible that the consumer will consider this product inferior or esteem it less than a product marketed under the name 'choc- olate'. It must therefore be assumed that the option of marketing the product under the name 'chocolate substitute' does not result in the disputed prohibition having no restrictive effect on the free movement of goods. 38. In the present case, the name 'choc- olate' is not restricted to Spanish products. It may, indeed, be used for all products containing only cocoa-butter. However, the marketing of products which have been lawfully manufactured in other Member States under the name 'chocolate', but 40. An interim conclusion to be drawn, contain vegetable fats other than cocoa- therefore, is that the Spanish rules obstruct butter is prohibited. Such chocolate prod- the free movement of goods. This obstruc- ucts have not traditionally been manufac- tion is compatible with Community law tured in Spain. As Spanish products are not only if it is justified. therefore affected by the prohibition, the rules benefit a typically domestic product and discriminate to the same degree against products lawfully manufactured under the name 'chocolate' in other Member States. Such conduct represents, according to the case-law to which reference has been made, (b) Justification of the restriction of the free a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction. 23 movement of goods
21 — Case C-51/93 Meyhu [1994] ECR I-3879, paragraph 21. 22 —Case 182/84 Miro [1985] ECR 3731, paragraph 22; Deserbais (cited in footnote 20, paragraph 12); Commis- sion v Italy (cited in footnote 20, paragraph 26); Case 298/87 Smanor [1988] ECR 4489, paragraph 12; Case 27/80 Fietje [1980] ECR 3839, paragraph 10. 41. In areas in which there are no Com- 23 — See Commission v Italy (cited in footnote 20, paragraph 20). munity rules it is settled case-law that
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obstacles to intra-Community trade result- ing mistakes. The Commission's objection ing from disparities between provisions of to this argument is that consumer protec- national law must be accepted in so far as tion is not one of the grounds that may be such provisions are applicable to domestic cited in justification pursuant to Article 30 and imported products without distinction EC. and may be justified as being necessary in order to satisfy overriding requirements relating inter alia to consumer protection. However, in order to be permissible, such provisions must be proportionate to the objective pursued and that objective must not be capable of being achieved by meas- ures which are less restrictive of intra- 44. Although Article 30 EC does not Community trade. 24 explicitly refer to consumer protection as justifying derogations, the Court has nonetheless acknowledged that consumer protection is an imperative requirement- accepted in principle by Community law as justifying measures that restrict the free movement of goods. 25 Thus the second of the conditions referred to above is similarly satisfied. 42. The Spanish legislation applies to domestic and imported products without distinction. The first condition is thus satisfied.
45. It remains to be determined how far the disputed measure is necessary. The Com- mission is of the opinion that appropriate labelling of the product in the form of an indication of the contents is a less drastic and equally suitable means of achieving the 43. The Spanish Government refers to objective of protecting the consumer consumer protection in justification of its against mistakes. The Spanish Government rules. It claims that to the Spanish con- objects that a reference on the label to the sumer 'chocolate' means only products that fact that the product contains vegetable fats contain no vegetable fats other than cocoa- other than cocoa-butter would not mean butter, that products which do contain anything to the Spanish consumer and other vegetable fats are known in Spain as would not therefore be an equally suitable 'chocolate substitute' and that the disputed means of protecting the consumer against measure is necessary to prevent the con- mistakes. sumer from becoming confused and mak-
25 — Ruwet (cited in footnote 12, paragraph 50); Case 178/84 24 — Ruwet (cited in footnote 12, paragraph 50); Case Commission v Germany [1987] ECU 1227, paragraph 30; C-313/94 Graffimi [1996] ECU I-6039, paragraph 17. Smanor (cited in footnote 11, paragraph 18).
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46. The case-law of the Court shows that, objects that such labelling will mean in the absence of harmonisation at Com- nothing to Spanish consumers, since they munity level, national measures which are are as a rule unfamiliar with the fats in necessary in order to ensure that products question. They are familiar, on the other are accurately described are compatible hand, with the term 'chocolate substitute'. with Article 28 et seq. of the Treaty provided that they avoid any confusion on the part of consumers and ensure fairness in commercial transactions. 26 It must there- fore be considered whether the disputed rules requiring that the product be renamed 'chocolate substitute' are necessary to ensure that the consumer is informed.
47. The prohibition of marketing under the name 'chocolate' and the option of market- ing the products in question under the 49. The Spanish Government's argument is name 'chocolate substitute' are likely to similar to that of the Italian Government in protect Spanish consumers against making the proceedings concerning the name 'vin- a mistake. It is ensured that the only egar', where it was argued that the disputed vegetable fat contained in products which national rules were necessary because the they can acquire under the name 'choc- Italian consumer by time-honoured tradi- olate' is cocoa-butter. This protects them tion treated all vinegars as wine-vinegar. against confusing these products with The Court rejected this objection and ruled products containing other vegetable fats. that under the Combined Nomenclature of These rules are thus likely to ensure con- the Common Customs Tariff vinegar is a sumer protection. generic term which national legislation cannot restrict to domestic products. Suit- able labelling of types of vinegar manu- factured from raw materials other than wine was considered to be generally suffi- cient to ensure the protection of the con- sumer. The Italian rules were regarded as a disproportionate restriction of the free 48. To be compatible with Community movement of goods, given the availability law, however, the rules must not exceed of appropriate labelling as a less drastic what is necessary. As a less drastic measure means of protecting the consumer. 27 Simi- the Commission proposes appropriate larly, the German Government attempted labelling of the products that contain other to justify the purity requirement for beer by vegetable fats. The Spanish Government arguing that the consumer associated the
26 — Case C-51/94 Commission v Germany [1995] ECR I-3599, paragraph 31; Case 216/84 Commission v France 27 — Commission v Italy (cited in footnote 20, paragraphs 25 to [1988] ECR 793, paragraph 11. 27).
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designation 'Bier' with a beverage manu- objection that to Spanish consumers 'choc- factured from only the raw materials listed olate' traditionally means products con- in Article 9 of the Biersteuergesetz. The taining as vegetable fat only cocoa-butter restriction of the generic term 'Bier' to does not in principle seem to justify the products manufactured in accordance with disputed rules. the purity requirement was intended to protect the consumer against confusion about the nature of the product. 28 The Court again rejected this argument on the grounds that consumers' conceptions are likely to vary from one Member State to another and to evolve in the course of time within a Member State, the establishment of the common market playing a major 50. It should also be pointed out, however, contributory role in this context. 'The that the Court has defined the limit of what legislation of a Member State must not can be achieved with appropriate labelling "crystallise given consumer habits so as to as being the stage at which the product consolidate an advantage acquired by concerned is altered in a respect that is national industries concerned to comply essential for its composition. 32 with them".' 29 Here too, appropriate labelling of beers not manufactured in accordance with the purity requirement was considered adequate. In addition, the Court ruled that national legislation which links the appellation 'Jenever' to a mini- mum alcohol content is not compatible with Article 28 EC and that the require- 51. The question is therefore whether the ments of fair trading can also be met with addition of vegetable fats other than cocoa- regard for traditional practices by means of butter leads to a fundamental change in the appropriate labelling of beverages with a composition of the product and whether lower alcohol content. 30 In similar cases appropriate labelling can consequently no concerning the composition of a product longer be regarded as a sufficient means of the Court has also considered labelling informing the consumer adequately and sufficient to protect the consumer's inter- protecting him against mistakes. ests. 31 Given this settled case-law, the
28 — Commission v Germany (cited in f o o t n o t e 2 5 , paragraph 26). 2 9 — Commission v Germany (cited in f o o t n o t e 2 5 , paragraph 32). 30 — Miro (cited in footnote 22, paragraphs 20, 24 and 25). 52. The first point to be made here is that 31 — Commission v Italy (cited in footnote 20, paragraph 23); in what is now very extensive case-law on Commission v Germany p a r a g r a p h 35); Deserbais (cited in f o o t n o t e 2 5 , (cited in f o o t n o t e 2 0 , the use of names of foodstuffs the Court paragraphs 10, 13 and 19). The judgment in Smanor concerned the treatment which the product in question had undergone during its manufacture (cited in footnote 22, paragraph 19 et seq.). 32 — Deserbais (cited in footnote 20, paragraph 13).
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has always geared its rulings to an intelli- market it under the name 'chocolate' would gent consumer who can reasonably be be to mislead the consumer. The Commis- expected and trusted to inform himself. 33 sion feels, on the other hand, that, com- Thus, according to the case-law, it must be pared to chocolate containing only cocoa- assumed that consumers who are guided in butter, the product is not fundamentally their purchasing decisions by the composi- changed, since it still contains, in particu- tion of products first read the list of lar, the proportions of cocoa defined in ingredients. Although the Court has recog- Directive 73/241. nised the danger of consumers being misled in specific cases, 34 and to this extent the objections voiced by the Spanish Govern- ment are in principle justified, this danger must be regarded as slight, according to present case-law, and cannot justify obstacles to the free movement of goods. 35 There is no obvious reason for deviating from the settled case-law in these proceed- ings. 54. Point 1.16 of Annex I to Directive 73/241 defines chocolate as the product obtained from cocoa nib, cocoa mass, cocoa powder or fat-reduced cocoa powder and sucrose, which, though made with or without added cocoa-butter, contains at least 18% cocoa-butter. This indicates that cocoa-butter is to be regarded as an essen- tial ingredient of chocolate within the meaning of Directive 73/241.
53. Prohibiting the use of a name is, more- over, never considered justified unless the product concerned is so different, as regards its composition, from the products generally known by that name in the Community that it cannot be regarded as falling within the same category. 36 The Spanish Government takes the view that 55. It must also be emphasised that the the addition of other vegetable fats changes other vegetable fats added to chocolate the quality, taste, consistency and durabil- products are designated 'cocoa butter ity of the product so fundamentally that to equivalents' by Directive 2000/36. Although, as stated above, this Directive is not applicable in the present case, the 33 — Ruwet (cited in footnote 12, paragraph 53). rules it sets out can be used to show that the 34 — Commission v Germany (cited in footnote 26, paragraph 34). vegetable fats at issue in this case may 35 — Commission v Germany (cited in footnote 26, replace cocoa-butter. As already pointed paragraph 34). out, however, cocoa-butter is, according to 36 —Smanor (cited in footnote 22, paragraph 21); Deserbais (cited in footnote 20, paragraph 13). Directive 73/241, an essential ingredient of
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chocolate. This might indicate that the 57. It should be borne in mind, on the other products which — in excess of the hand, that, according to an undisputed required minimum content of cocoa- submission by the Commission, the prod- butter — may replace cocoa-butter as ucts in question are lawfully manufactured equivalents are also to be regarded as under the name 'chocolate' in six Member essential ingredients, with the result that States. According to a further undisputed their addition should lead to a fundamental submission by the Commission, the mar- change in the product. keting of these products under the name 'chocolate' is prohibited only in Spain and Italy. All the other Member States permit them to be marketed under the name 'chocolate'. These facts indicate that the addition of vegetable fats other than cocoa- butter does not result in so fundamental a change in the composition of the product that it can no longer be regarded as falling within the category of chocolate.
56. It should be pointed out, however, that the products which may not be marketed in Spain under the name 'chocolate' do comply with Directive 73/241 in respect of the prescribed minimum content of cocoa-butter. If cocoa-butter is regarded as an essential ingredient of chocolate, it must be said that even the products which do not comply with the Spanish rules contain this essential ingredient. To this extent, then, there has been no fundamental change to the product known as 'choc- 58. It should also be pointed out that the olate'. At best, the question is whether the addition of vegetable fats other than cocoa- addition of yet other vegetable fats to a butter is explicitly permitted by Directive product which complies with Directive 2000/36 up to a maximum of 5% of the 73/241 in respect of the prescribed mini- total weight. Although this Directive does mum content of cocoa-butter results in a not, as explained above, apply to this case, fundamental change in the composition of the new rules can be regarded as reflecting this product. This can hardly be assumed, the acceptance by the market and thus, in however, since it contains all the minimum particular, by the consumer of the use of ingredients considered essential. Compared the name 'chocolate' for products that to the original product, a fundamental contain vegetable fats other than cocoa- change cannot therefore have occurred as butter. This is not to suppress the public a result of the addition of other vegetable debate on this subject that raged during the fats to the minimum ingredients because consideration of Directive 2000/36. These this adds to rather than takes away from future rules indicate, however, that the this original product. addition of other vegetable fats should not
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be seen as so fundamentally changing the 61. The reservations which the Spanish product that it can no longer justifiably be Government derives from legitimate con- deemed to fall within the category of cern for consumer protection should be chocolate. taken into account by ensuring that the consumer is informed clearly enough of the addition of such other fats.
59. This conclusion is endorsed by the 62. The final conclusion to be drawn is Combined Nomenclature (CN) of the therefore that prohibiting the use of the Common Customs Tariff. Chocolate is name 'chocolate' is not the least drastic listed under CN Code 1806 with other means of informing the Spanish consumer food preparations containing cocoa. Prod- of the fact that the product contains ucts containing cocoa-butter are listed vegetable fats other than cocoa-butter. under subheadings 1806 20 10, 1806 20 The requirement that the product be appro- 30 and 1806 20 50. All other subheadings, priately labelled has less of an adverse some of which explicitly use the term impact on the free movement of goods. The 'chocolate', such as subheading 1806 90, Spanish Government rules are thus dispro- do not refer to the content in cocoa-butter portionate and so fail to justify the restric- or other vegetable fats. This indicates that tion of the free movement of goods which the name 'chocolate' should be regarded as has been identified. The Commission's a generic term whose use does not depend action should therefore be upheld. on the addition or absence of vegetable fats other than cocoa-butter.
VI — Costs 60. The conclusion to be drawn, therefore, is that the addition of other vegetable fats to products having the minimum content of cocoa-butter required by Directive 73/241 does not result in so fundamental a change in the product that it can no longer 63. Under Article 69(2) of the Rules of justifiably be deemed to fall within the Procedure the unsuccessful party is to be category of chocolate. In the light of the ordered to pay the costs if they have been case-law to which reference has been made applied for. As the Kingdom of Spain has an obligation to rename products lawfully been unsuccessful and the Commission has manufactured in other Member States made an application, Spain should be under the name 'chocolate' is not justified. ordered to pay the costs.
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VII— Conclusion
64. For the foregoing reasons it is proposed that the Court should rule as follows:
(1) The Kingdom of Spain has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 28 EC by prohibiting chocolate products which contain vegetable fats other than cocoa-butter and which have been lawfully manufactured in Member States where the use of such substances is permitted from being marketed in Spain under the name under which they are marketed in their country of origin.
(2) The Kingdom of Spain shall bear the costs of the proceedings.
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