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Súdny dvor Európskej únie·13.9.2001

C-60/00

ECLI:EU:C:2001:447

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Súdny dvor Európskej únie
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62000CC0060

OPINION OF MRS STIX-HAOCKL. — CASE C-60/00

OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL STIX-HACKL delivered on 13 September 2001 1

I — Introduction United Kingdom, with whom she had been living since October 1995. Mr Carpenter has two children from his first marriage, which was dissolved in 1996. Mrs Carpen- ter now cares for the children. 1. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal asks the Court whether a national of a non- member country who is married to a citizen of the Union may rely on Article 49 EC or on Council Directive 73/148/EEC of 21 May 1973 on the abolition of restric- tions on movement and residence within the Community for nationals of Member 3. Mr Carpenter operates as sole owner an States with regard to establishment and the undertaking which sells advertisements in provision of services, in order to obtain the periodicals and offers the editors of those right of residence in the spouse's State of periodicals various services in connection origin. The present case concerns a Philip- with administration and publication of pine national who is married to a national advertisements. The undertaking is estab- of the United Kingdom. lished in the United Kingdom, as are some of its customers. A substantial part of the undertaking's business is, however, con- ducted with customers established in other Member States. In addition, Mr Carpenter attends meetings for business purposes in other Member States. The undertaking, whose success depends on the direct per- sonal input of Mr Carpenter, has four I I — Facts and main proceedings full-time employees. From 1996 to 1998 its net profit more than doubled. Mr Carpen- ter attributes this to his wife, who relieved him in caring for the children.

2. Mary Carpenter, a Philippine national, was given leave in 1994 to enter the United Kingdom as a visitor for six months. She overstayed that leave, and in May 1996 married Peter Carpenter, a national of the

4. On 15 July 1996 Mrs Carpenter applied 1 — Original language: German. to the Secretary of State for leave to remain

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as the spouse of a United Kingdom can the non-national spouse rely on national. The application was refused on 21 July 1997. Together with the refusal, the Secretary of State took a decision to make a deportation order against Mrs Carpenter.

(i) Article 49 EC and/or

5. Mrs Carpenter appealed to an adjudi- cator against the Secretary of State's decision. The appeal was dismissed on 10 June 1998. She thereupon appealed to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal. The Tribunal granted permission to appeal on 30 November 1998, and referred the fol- lowing question to the Court of Justice: (ii) Directive 73/148/EEC

'In circumstances where:

to provide the non-national spouse with the right to reside with his or her spouse in his or her spouse's Member State of origin?

(a) a national of a Member State, who is established in that Member State and who provides services to persons in other Member States; and

Is the answer to the question referred different if the non-national spouse indi- rectly assists the national of a Member State in carrying on the provision of (b) has a spouse who is not a national of a services in other Member States by carrying Member State; out childcare?'

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I I I— Legal background (d) the relatives in the ascending and descending lines of such nationals and of the spouse of such nationals, which relatives are dependent on them, irre- spective of their nationality.'

A — Community law

7. Article 3(1) states: 6. Article 1(1) of Directive 73/148/EEC states:

'Member States shall grant to the persons referred to in Article 1 [the] right to enter their territory merely on production of a valid identity card or passport.' 'The Member States shall, acting as pro- vided in this Directive, abolish restrictions on the movement and residence of:

8. Article 4(2) states:

(a) nationals of a Member State who are established or who wish to establish themselves in another Member State in 'The right of residence for persons provid- order to pursue activities as self-em- ing and receiving services shall be of equal ployed persons, or who wish to provide duration with the period during which the services in that State; services are provided.

Where such period exceeds three months, (b) nationals of Member States wishing to the Member State in the territory of which go to another Member State as recipi- the services are performed shall issue a ents of services; right of abode as proof of the right of residence.

(c) the spouse and the children under 21 years of age of such nationals, irrespec- Where the period does not exceed three tive of their nationality; months, the identity card or passport with

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which the person concerned entered the Section 3(5) of the Immigration Act 1971 territory shall be sufficient to cover his stay. states: The Member State may, however, require the person concerned to report his presence in the territory.'

'A person who is not a British Citizen shall 9. Article 4(3) provides: be liable to deportation from the United Kingdom —

'A member of the family who is not a national of a Member State shall be issued with a residence document which shall have the same validity as that issued to the national on whom he is dependent.' (a) if, having only a limited leave to enter or remain, he does not observe a condition attached to the leave or remains beyond the time limited by the leave...'.

B — National law

Section 7(1) of the Immigration Act 1988 10. The basic provisions on immigration provides: are to be found in the Immigration Act 1971 (amended by the Immigration Act 1988).

'A person shall not under the [Immigration Under Section 3(1) of the Immigration Act Act 1971] require leave to enter or remain 1971, persons who are subject to immi- in the United Kingdom in any case in which gration control may enter the United King- he is entitled to do so by virtue of an dom only with leave to enter. Leave to enforceable Community right or of any remain may be granted for a limited or provision made under section 2(2) of the unlimited period. European Communities Act 1972.'

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IV — Submissions of the parties entitled to enact rules to regulate the provision of services in its territory. This power of the Member State follows, according to Mrs Carpenter, from the Court's judgment in Alpine Investments. 2

A — Submissions of Mrs Carpenter

2. The principle of proportionality I. Basic observations

12. Mrs Carpenter considers that the prin- ciple of proportionality is infringed because I I . Mrs Carpenter states that she is the the decision to make a deportation order spouse of Mr Carpenter, a citizen of the against her was made on the sole ground Union. Her spouse exercises the freedom to that she had stayed in the United Kingdom provide services under Community law, in longer than allowed. No grounds of public so far as he travels to other Member States order or public health, as provided for in in order to provide services there. His Article 8 of Directive 73/148, were travelling is made substantially easier by asserted. her: she travels with him, or remains in the United Kingdom when he is travelling and looks after his children. Her expulsion to the Philippines for any length of time 'would hinder the provision of services and hinders the integration of the internal market'. Any substantial restriction of the 13. She refers in this connection to the freedom to provide services is, according to Singh judgment.3 In that judgment the Mrs Carpenter, against the aims of the Court held that a national of a Member Treaty. State who has exercised his rights deriving from Community law in another Member State is entitled to return to his State of origin in the company of his spouse who is a national of a non-member country. According to Mrs Carpenter, it follows from that judgment that the rights of Mrs Carpenter is aware that under Com- Community nationals founded on the munity law she does not herself have the Treaty cannot be fully effective if a Com- right of residence in any Member State. Her munity national is deterred from exercising rights in this respect are, in her opinion, them by obstacles raised in his country of derived from those of her spouse, that is, from his right to provide services and his freedom to travel within the Union. She is 2 — Case C-384/93 Alpine Investments [1995] ECR I-1141. further aware that a Member State is 3 — Case C-370/90 Singh [1992] ECR I-4265.

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origin to the entry and residence of his She supports this argument by reference to spouse who is a national of a non-member the judgment in Moser, 4from which it country. does not, in her view, follow that the situation of Mr and Mrs Carpenter is a wholly internal one. Their situation is completely different from that at issue in Moser. Moser concerned a national of a It also follows from that judgment, in her Member State who had never resided, opinion, that the spouse from a non- worked or provided services in another member country of a citizen of the Union Member State. In that case the Court must have the same right to enter or reside therefore held that the Treaty is not appli- in the State of origin of the citizen of the cable to such a situation. Union as to enter or reside in another Member State.

The situation of Mr Carpenter, however, is comparable rather with the facts of the 14. Mrs Carpenter further states that her Stanton case. 5 Mrs Carpenter points out spouse must have the same Community law rights in the United Kingdom as in another that in that case the Court concluded that Member State. If he took his spouse with the Treaty precludes a national provision him to another Member State, that which places at a disadvantage persons Member State would have to allow both who pursue economic activities in another spouses to enter. Member State.

15. Moreover, while the Singh judgment 3. The principle of non-discrimination concerns freedom of movement for workers and freedom of establishment, persons who provide services should not have less rights. The parallel nature of those fundamental freedoms is apparent from the case-law of the Court. 17. With respect to the principle of non- discrimination, Mrs Carpenter submits that if she had, for example, married a French national who — like Mr Carpenter — had been established in the United King- 16. Mrs Carpenter similarly addresses the question of a wholly internal situation, which in her opinion is not present here. 4 — Case 180/83 Moser [1984] ECR 2539, paragraph 20. 5 — C a s e 143/87 Stanton v INASTI [1988] ECR 3877, para- Since Mr Carpenter provides services graph 14. That case concerned a rule which provided that throughout the internal market, it cannot persons who were gainfully employed in one Member State were exempted from the obligation to pay contributions to be argued that the restriction placed on her the social insurance scheme for self-employed persons in that Member State, but refused that exemption to persons is of purely internal significance. who were gainfully employed in another Member State.

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dom and had provided services from there United Kingdom Government points out to other Member States, Community law that the right to enter a Member State and would preclude her deportation to the reside there derives from that directive, not Philippines. That is because the exercise from primary law. A correct interpretation of the right of freedom to provide services of Article 4(2) and (3) of Directive 73/148 by such a French national would be seri- shows, for example, that a British national ously restricted if his spouse from a non- who wishes to provide services in another member country were deported. A British Member State has the right to reside in that national such as Mr Carpenter may thus Member State for the duration of the not be in a less favourable position than a provision of services. His spouse may also French national in the United Kingdom. As reside there for the same period. Those appears from the Court's case-law, such a provisions do not, on the other hand, found provision concerning 'immigration' is dis- any right of residence for British nationals criminatory and therefore in breach of the in the United Kingdom (that right derives Treaty. from national law).

20. The United Kingdom Government then B — Submissions of the United Kingdom refers to paragraphs 17 and 18 of the Singh Government judgment.6 It appears from that passage, first, that nationals of a Member State are entitled to enter the territory of another Member State and reside there in order to pursue an economic activity. It follows, 18. The United Kingdom Government second, that their spouses have the same states that the national provisions at issue rights. pursue the aim of ensuring the application of the national procedures and rules on immigration. Immigration law distin- guishes between persons who have only a limited right of entry and persons who have the right to reside in the United Kingdom. It must also be ensured that the rules are not evaded. Thus marriages may not be con- 21. It is also apparent from paragraph 23 tracted for the sole purpose of residence. of that judgment that the Treaty does not bestow 'directly' on nationals of a Member State the right to enter their own Member State. Such a right is normally inherent in nationality and thus derives from national law.

19. As regards the applicability of Article 49 EC or Directive 73/148, the 6 — Case C-370/90, cited in note 3.

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22. As regards the application of this in a situation such as Mrs Carpenter's principle from the case-law to the situation cannot therefore derive a right of entry or of Mrs Carpenter, the United Kingdom residence from Community law. A possible Government points out that Mr Carpenter remedy might be provided by the European has not exercised his right to freedom of Convention on the Protection of Human movement. Neither he nor his spouse could Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. therefore rely on the principle defined by the Court in Singh or on the case-law summarised in the Asscher judgment. 7 According to that case-law, nationals may rely on Community law as against their own Member State 'where by reason of their conduct they are, with regard to their C — Submissions of the Commission Member State of origin, in a situation which may be regarded as equivalent to that of any other person enjoying the rights and liberties guaranteed by the Treaty'. 26. According to the Commission, the situation of Mrs Carpenter must be clearly distinguished from that of a spouse, who is a national of a non-member country, of a citizen of the Union who exercises his right to freedom of movement and has thus left 23. It submits that the case-law of the his Member State of origin and moved to Court of Justice cited by Mrs Carpenter another Member State in order to become concerns different situations and cannot established or to work there. The Commis- therefore be applied to the present case. sion observes that Mr Carpenter never intended to become established in a Member State other than the United King- dom, where his undertaking has always been located and where he lives with Mrs Carpenter and his children. 24. The United Kingdom Government then observes that Mr Carpenter's right to extend his business activities to other Member States does not give him the right to indirect assistance by a national of a 27. In the Commission's view, the right of non-member country who has no right of entry and residence for the spouse from a residence in the United Kingdom. non-member country of a citizen of the Union, expressed in paragraph 23 of the Singh judgment, 8may not be extended to a situation in which the citizen of the Union with his spouse never intended to become established in another Member State and 25. In conclusion, the United Kingdom merely provides services from his State of Government submits that a person who is origin.

7 — Case C-107/94 Asscher (1996) ECR I-3089. 8 — Case C-370/90, cited in note 3.

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28. Unlike Mrs Carpenter, Mr and Mrs question of the right of residence of a Singh were moreover lawfully resident in national of a non-member country, married the United Kingdom before transferring to a citizen of the Union who provides their residence to another Member State. services in other Member States, in the State of origin of the citizen of the Union. The second part of the question concerns a specific factual situation, namely where the national of a non-member country indi- The Commission does not see how the rectly assists the citizen of the Union to situation of Mrs Carpenter can be regarded whom he or she is married to provide as a situation subject to Community law. It services in other Member States, by caring is inclined rather to the view that such a for that citizen's children. situation is to be classified as an internal situation in the sense of the Court's judg- ment in the Morson and Jhanjan case. 9

31. The question is moreover addressed to two possible legal bases: Article 49 EC and 29. Moreover, the immigration adjudi- Directive 73/148. cator's conclusion that the circumstance that Mrs Carpenter cares for the children indirectly assists Mr Carpenter to exercise his rights under Article 49 EC, that is, to devote himself more to his business, has nothing to do with the question whether Mr Carpenter actually has exercised his A — First part of the question referred: right of freedom of movement in such a right of residence generally of spouses who way that his spouse comes under Commu- are nationals of non-member countries nity law. The fact that Mrs Carpenter cares for the children merely constitutes a poss- ible factual complex and is based on a free decision of the two spouses. 32. The first part of the question referred must therefore be examined separately according to the two legal bases mentioned above.

V — Assessment

1. Article 49 EC: freedom to provide ser- 30. The question referred consists of two vices parts. The first part concerns the general

9 — Joined Cases 35/82 and 36/82 Morson and ¡hanjan [1982] ECR 3723. That case concerned the right of residence of mothers, nationals of non-member countries, whose 33. First of all, the subject-matter of these children were employed in the Member State whose nationality they possessed. and the main proceedings should be

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remembered: the right of residence of Mrs 38. As a national of the Philippines, how- Carpenter, that is, of a national of a ever, Mrs Carpenter cannot herself rely on non-member country who is married to a the fundamental freedoms, and hence not citizen of the Union. on Article 49. Since she cannot rely on the freedom to provide services, she cannot derive any right of residence therefrom. The relevant provisions concerning the entry and residence of nationals of non- member countries are rather to be found in 34. Many of Mrs Carpenter's submissions, secondary law, which will thus have to be on the other hand, relate to the rights of Mr considered below. Carpenter, raising the question whether the measures taken by the United Kingdom to terminate her residence obstruct Mr Car- penter in providing services in other Member States, in other words, whether the measures constitute a restriction of the freedom to provide services. 39. Accordingly, a spouse of a citizen of the Union who is a national of a non-member country may not base a right of residence on Article 49 EC.

35. The wording of the question referred shows clearly, however, that it is directed at Article 49 EC as a possible legal basis for a right of residence Mrs Carpenter, not Mr Carpenter, may have. 40. However, the freedom to provide ser- vices is of relevance at any rate as a criterion of the interpretation consistent with Community law of Directive 73/148 and of national law.

36. The question whether and to what extent the provisions of the United King- dom on residence restrict Mr Carpenter's rights deriving from Community law, and whether such restrictions are justified, need 41. According to the principle of interpre- not therefore be considered further for the tation consistent with Community law, present in this connection. firstly, the provisions of secondary law are to be interpreted in the light of primary law; in the present case that means that they must be interpreted in the light of the primary-law freedom to provide services (see below, section 2(b)). Secondly, the 37. The question to be examined here is principle of interpretation consistent with rather whether Mrs Carpenter can rely on Community law also includes the obli- Article 49 EC for her right of residence. gation to interpret national law in the light

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of the corresponding primary and second- 44. Nationals of non-member countries ary Community law. For the present case who are married to citizens of the Union that means that the United Kingdom is thus only have rights derived from those of obliged to interpret its law on foreigners, in their spouses. That includes the right of particular the Immigration Act, in the light residence at issue in the present case. of the freedom to provide services and of Directive 73/148.

2. Directive 73/148 45. First, then, as a basic condition for the national of a non-member-country to be able to derive rights from his or her spouse, it must be examined whether the spouse is exercising rights under Community law at all, in other words, whether there is a Community connection. There must not therefore be a purely internal situation, 42. Under Community law currently in because in that case the necessary point of force, that is, under Directive 73/148 which attachment for the rights of the non- is material in this case, the residence status member-country national would be absent. of a national of a non-member country who is married to a citizen of the Union depends on the legal position of the citizen of the Union.

46. The criteria in the light of which Directive 73/148 and the national law 43. Under Article 1(1)(c) of the directive, it transposing that directive must be inter- applies also to spouses of nationals of preted must then be considered more Member States irrespective of their closely. Besides the freedom to provide nationality, and hence also to Philippine services which is material here, these are nationals who are married to British the general principles of law. As the Court nationals. Under Article 4(3) of the direc- has consistently held, those principles tive, a member of the family who does not include fundamental rights. 10 possess the nationality of a Member State must be issued with a residence document with the same validity as that of the 10 — On the interpretation of a regulation in the light of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, national from whom the rights of the see Case 249/86 Commission v Germany [1989] ECR member of the family who is a national of 1263, paragraph 10; see also Case 222/84 Johnston [1986] ECR 1651, paragraph 18, on the interpretation of a a non-member country are derived. directive in the light of the Convention.

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47. Freedom to provide services and fun- cable to situations which are confined in all damental rights also set limits to the respects within a single Member State. 11 Member States' discretion in connection with transposition. In a case such as that in the main proceedings, they could therefore restrict in principle, as regards legislation and enforcement, the freedom of the United Kingdom to act in the field of the law on foreigners. 50. That principle applies to primary law, in the present case the Treaty provisions on freedom to provide services. But it also applies to the measures adopted to imple- ment the provisions of primary law. 12 The relevant measure of secondary law in the (a) Community connection as a general present case is Directive 73/148. condition for the applicability of Directive 73/148

51. It must therefore always be examined (aa) Principle: Community connection in whether the factual situation to be assessed the context of fundamental freedoms has a point of contact with a factual situation to which Community law refers.

48. Spouses of citizens of the Union who are nationals of non-member countries are afforded a right of residence by Directive 52. If the necessary Community connection 73/148 only if the citizen of the Union also is absent, that is, if a citizen of the Union is exercises his rights deriving from Commu- not exercising his Community law rights, nity law. The right of residence of nationals then he, and with him his spouse who is a of non-member countries thus presupposes national of a non-member country, are a Community connection. In the present subject to national law alone. 13 That case, a possible point of connection could applies also to the right of residence. 14 be the fundamental freedoms. 11 — Case C-97/98 Jägerskiöld [1999] ECR I-7319, paragraph 42, and Case C-134/95 USSL No 47 di Biella [1997] ECR I-195, paragraph 19. 12 — See on this point Case C-206/91 Koua Poirrez [1992] ECR I-6685, paragraph 11 and the cases cited there. 13 — Martin, 'Loi du 15 Décembre 1980', Revue du droit des étrangers, 1996, 722 (725). 49. The Court has consistently held that 14 — 'Wer zu wenig wandert, den bestraft das Leben' — Gutmann, 'Europäisches Aufenthaltsrecht für Drittstaats- the fundamental freedoms are not appli- angehörige', Anwaltsblatt 2000, 482 (484).

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53. Nationals of non-member countries 'has never exercised' 15the right of freedom who are married to citizens of the Union to provide services cannot therefore derive in their State of origin are thus, if those any rights from that spouse under Com- citizens of the Union do not exercise their munity law. rights under Community law, placed in a worse position than nationals of non- member countries who are married to citizens of the Union who exercise their rights under Community law.

57. The fact that application of Commu- nity law — including application to spouses who are nationals of non-member 54. In this way, nationals of non-member countries — to such internal situations is countries who are married to British excluded therefore results in reverse dis- nationals and live in the United Kingdom crimination. 16 could be disadvantaged generally as against nationals of non-member countries whose spouses come from another Member State and exercise their rights. That would be the case if the spouse worked, for example, in another Member State as a migrant worker or provided services there: nationals of non-member countries who were married 58. Such reverse discrimination can be to French nationals and lived with them in eliminated either by the Community legis- the United Kingdom, for example, or who lature itself, for instance by provisions on lived with their British spouses in France, reuniting families, or — without this being would thus come under Community law. required under Community law — by the Member States themselves, 17 if where the question arises they assimilate the status of nationals of non-member countries married to their own nationals to the status of nationals of non-member countries married to nationals of other Member States who 55. Spouses who are nationals of non- exercise their rights under Community law. member countries are therefore placed in This possibility of 'assimilation' has indeed a worse position only where the spouse already been made use of by several who is a citizen of the Union does not Member States. 18 exercise his or her Community law rights.

15 — Case C-206/91, cited in note 12, paragraph 13, concerning a member of a worker's family. 16 — See Dollat, Libre circulation des personnes et citoyenneté européenne: enjeux et perspectives, 1998, 104 f.; Martin, cited in note 13, 725. 17 — On the elimination of disadvantages by national law, see Joined Cases C-64/96 and C-65/96 Uecker and Jacquet 56. A national of a non-member country [1997] ECR I-3171, paragraph 23. whose spouse, as a citizen of the Union, 18 — Martin, cited in note 13, 725.

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(bb) Community connection as a specific 62. According to the Court's case-law, a condition on the facts of the present case situation already has a Community con- nection even where, for instance, 'a degree of extraneity may derive in particular from the fact that an athlete participates in a competition in a Member State other than that in which he is established'. 21

59. To determine the status of Mrs Car- penter in relation to the right of residence, it is thus necessary first to determine the status of Mr Carpenter. It is apparent from the documents in the case that a Commu- nity law right possibly being exercised by Mr Carpenter may at any rate be compared Mr Carpenter is the freedom to provide to such a professional athlete at least in so services. far as he too travels to other Member States in order to provide services there.

60. In the present case Mr Carpenter 63. Besides this 'active' freedom to provide admittedly has his residence and his place services, in view of the nature of Mr of business in the United Kingdom, but his Carpenter's economic activity, 'correspon- business activity is not confined to the dence services' also come into consider- domestic market, 19 he also carries on ation. These comprise services where there economic activities outside the United is no change of place by the provider and Kingdom. recipient of the service but the services themselves are provided across a frontier. Such services too have been recognised by the Court 22 as services with a Community connection.

61. As is also apparent from the documents in the case, Mr Carpenter derives a large part of his turnover from commissions by undertakings from other Member States. Some of the services are to be classified as 64. A substantial argument for Mr Carpen- cross-frontier services, in so far as the ter's situation not being a wholly internal provider of the service travels to another one but falling under Community law is Member State. 20 also provided by the Singh judgment. The

21 —Joined Cases C-51/96 and C-191/97 Deliège [2000] ECR 19 — C o m p a r e Case C-108/98 RI.SAN. [1999] ECR I-5219, I-2549, paragraph 58. paragraph 2 1 , which concerned an undertaking which operated in the market of its State of establishment. 22 — Joined Cases C-34/95, C-35/95 and C-36/95 De Agostini mid TV-Shop [1997] ECR I-3843, Case C-384/93, cited in 20 — Case C-106/91 Ramraih [1992] ECR I-3351. note 2, and Case 155/73 Sacchi [1974] ECR 409

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facts of that case differ from the present 61. That Mr and Mrs Singh consequently one in two points, but these differences are settled in another Member State is not a not legally significant. legally relevant particular feature of the case. That circumstance is connected rather with the fact that they exercised a different fundamental freedom from Mr Carpenter, the freedom of movement for workers.

68. So if Mr Carpenter settled in another 65. One difference is that Mr and Mrs Member State in order to work on an Singh worked in another Member State as employed or self-employed basis there, his employees, not as providers of services like situation would correspond directly to that Mr Carpenter. However, the fact that Mr of Mr and Mrs Singh. Carpenter thus exercised a different funda- mental freedom, namely the freedom to provide services, may not in itself make any essential difference as regards the presence of a Community connection. 69. The principles laid down by the Court in the Singh judgment can therefore, in my opinion, be applied to the present case of a provider of services.

70. According to the Court's observations 66. The second difference between the in paragraph 23 of Singh, what matters is cases is that Mr and Mrs Singh returned that 'when a Community national... returns to the United Kingdom, Mrs Singh's State to his or her country of origin, his or her of origin, after residing in Germany for spouse must enjoy at least the same rights nearly three years. Mr and Mrs Carpenter, of entry and residence as would be granted by contrast, did not return to the United to him or her under Community law if his Kingdom, but were there and wish to or her spouse chose to enter and reside in remain there. That this too makes no another Member State'. essential difference follows, in my opinion, from the fact that in Singh the Court saw the exercise of Community rights not in the return from another Member State to the State of origin within the Union, but in Mrs Singh moving to another Member State to 71. Mr Carpenter thus exercises his Com- exercise her Community rights there, munity rights in two respects, first by namely the freedom of movement for travelling to another Member State for workers. professional reasons to carry on self-em-

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ployed activity there and, second, by also it might be argued that nationals of a providing services across the frontier with- Member State might, for example, take up out himself travelling to another Member employment — even only for a short State. term — in another Member State precisely in order thereby to 'bring' themselves and the non-member-country spouse within the scope of Community law. It might further be argued that the spouses who are nationals of non-member countries would 72. All these circumstances show that the thus be removed from the exclusive appli- essential situation, as regards the present cation of national law and would obtain a proceedings, of Mr and Mrs Carpenter is legal position which might be more favour- not a purely internal one. Rather, it has a able than under national law, by thereby Community connection, with the con- being given the possibility of a right of sequence that Community law is applicable residence based on Community law. to a situation such as that in the main proceedings.

73. It may therefore be concluded that in 75. On this point, it must be observed that the present state of Community law Mrs there is no evidence of such an intention to Carpenter, as the spouse of a citizen of the evade in the present case, since Mr Car- Union, has a right of residence derived penter already operated his business and from her spouse, at least if — and only as offered services across frontiers before the long as 23 — her spouse exercises his rights marriage. Again, the authorities concerned clearly have no doubt that the marriage of under Community law. Mr and Mrs Carpenter is not a sham marriage.

74. Finally, the question of the risk of abuse should be considered, in particular the possible risk that national rules on residence concerning the legal position of (b) Interpretation of Directive 73/148 and spouses of nationals who are nationals of national law in the light of primary law non-member countries could be evaded by the spouse who is a national being tempted to 'create' a Community connection. Thus

23 — Watson, 'Free Movement of Workers: a one way ticket?', IndustrialLaw Journal, 1993, 68 (75), draws attention to the connection between economic activity of the spouse and the right of residence of his or her spouse of non-member-country nationality, referring to the judg- 76. The material provisions of Directive ment in Singh. 73/148 on the right of residence and the

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national provisions concerning the right of penter, from his spouse being granted no residence must therefore, on the basis of the right, or only a limited right, of residence. above considerations, be interpreted in the light of the freedom to provide services.

(c) Interpretation of Directive 73/148 and 77. If the United Kingdom rules on the national law in the light of fundamental right of residence of nationals of non- rights member countries who are married to a British national were in fact applied also to a case — such as the present one — in which the British national exercises his rights under Community law, they would bring about a restriction of those Commu- nity law rights. 80. The relevant provisions of Directive 73/148 on the right of residence and the national provisions concerning the right of residence must also, however, be inter- preted in the light of fundamental rights. 78. That is because, according to the rel- evant case-law of the Court, the right of residence and fundamental freedoms are interlinked. According to the Court's judg- ment in the Singh case, the rights derived from the freedom of movement for workers and the freedom of establishment 'cannot 81. On this point, it must first be stated in be fully effective if [a Community national] principle that the Court has to ensure that may be deterred from exercising them by fundamental rights are observed. 25 'For obstacles raised in his or her country of that purpose, the Court draws inspiration origin to the entry and residence of his or from the constitutional traditions common her spouse'. 24 to the Member States and from the guide- lines supplied by international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member States have collaborated or to which they are signatories. The ECHR has special significance in that respect...'. 26 79. If that principle is taken to apply to all 'Those principles have, moreover, been the fundamental freedoms, then that restated in Article 6(2) [EU]...'. 27 means, in the present case concerning the freedom to provide services, that restric- tions on providing services in other 25 — Joined Cases 60/84 and 61/84 Cinéthèque [1985] ECR Member States could follow, for Mr Car- 2605, paragraph 26, and Case 12/86 Demirel [1987] ECR 3719, paragraph 28. 26 — Case C-274/99 P Connolly v Commission [2001] ECR I-1611, paragraph 37. 24 — Case C-370/90, cited in note 3, paragraph 23. 27 — Case C-274/99 P, cited in note 26, paragraph 38.

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82. The Court does not, however, have from Article 8 of the Convention not to jurisdiction to assess whether a national interfere with the right of spouses to provision of a Member State which lies cohabit. 32 Secondly, it concerns the posi- outside the scope of Community law is tive obligation of the States 33 to afford compatible with fundamental rights. 28 certain members of the family access to their territory. 34

83. For national rules which fall within the scope of Community law, on the other 86. It is obvious that a refusal of per- hand, the referring court must be given all mission to reside and a decision on deport- the information on interpretation which it ation in principle interfere with those needs to be able to assess the compatibility rights. of those national rules with fundamental rights.

87. Conversely, however, the right to 84. The present proceedings concern the respect for family life does not enjoy right to respect for family life enshrined in absolute protection. An interference with Article 8 of the European Convention on that right is permissible under Article 8(2) Human Rights. That includes as a central of the Convention if it 'is in accordance element 29 the protection of marriages. 30 In with the law and is necessary in a demo- the present case there are also the ties cratic society in the interests of national between Mrs Carpenter and her step- security, public safety or the economic children. 31 well-being of the country, for the preven- tion of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others'.

85. The present case therefore concerns, firstly, the negative obligation of the Con- tracting Parties/Member States deriving 88. As regards such an interference with the right to respect for family life, Member 28 — Case C-299/95 Kremzow [1997] I-2629, paragraph 15. 29 — The corresponding provision of the Charter of Fundamen- tal Rights of the European Union proclaimed in Nice on 7 December 2000 is Article 7 (OJ 2000 C 364, p. 1). 32 — On this aspect, see generally De Schutter, 'Le droit au 30 — ECHR, Abdubziz, Cibales and Balkmdali, Series A no regroupement familial au croisement des ordres juridiques 94, § 62. européens', Revue du droit des étrangers, 1996, 531 (546). On the negative obligation, see the judgment of the ECHR 31 — On the recognition of these ties, see the unpublished of 11 July 2000 in Ciliz v the Netherlands, § 62. decision of the Commission of Human Rights of 7 De- cember 1982 in application 9867/82 Moodey v the United 33 — ECHR, Marckx, Series A no 3 1 , § 31. Kingdom. 34 — De Schutter, cited in note 32, 546.

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States admittedly enjoy a certain margin of family life, and primarily the proportional- appreciation. 35 However, that margin for ity of the interference. its part is not unlimited either. Thus the conditions which permit restrictions of the right to respect for family life are to be interpreted strictly.

91. In such an analysis of proportionality, it must be examined in particular whether it is proportionate that Mrs Carpenter may apply for the necessary leave only from abroad. 39 In that connection, the reason- 89. The assessment of whether an inter- ableness of such a procedure for Mrs ference with fundamental rights is permis- Carpenter would have to be considered, in sible therefore depends on taking into particular the reasonableness, for example, account the circumstances of the specific of the waiting time for obtaining leave. It individual case. While it is for the Court to would also have to be examined whether, if give the national court the information on Mrs Carpenter were to stay in the Philip- interpretation which it needs in order to pines, it would be reasonable for Mr decide the particular case before it, 36 it is C a r p e n t e r — p o s s i b l y w i t h his for the national court to assess the facts in children — to live in the Philippines and question by reference to the criteria laid be economically active there. 40 down by the Court. That applies in par- ticular in view of the nature of the analysis to be carried out; 37 the application of provisions of Community law, and of the provisions transposing them, to a particular case remains the task of the national court. 38 92. The analysis of proportionality, that is, of the necessity of the interference, must consist essentially in balancing the severity of the interference, that is, the adverse effect on private interests, against the aim pursued by the provision of the law on foreigners, that is, the interests of the State.

90. As regards the criteria to be taken into account by the national court in its analy- sis, it must first be pointed out that what is concerned here is the necessity of the interference with the right to respect for 93. The severity of the interference, in other words the adverse effect on private 35 — ECHR, Ahmut v the Netherlands, Reports 1996-VI, 2031, interests, should be assessed by reference to § 63. 36 — Case C-28/99 Verdonck and Others [2001] ECR I-3399, paragraph 28. 37 —Case C-446/98 Fazenda Pública [2000] ECR 1-11435, 39 — Compare application 12122/86 Lukka v the United paragraph 23 and the cases cited there. Kingdom, DR 50, 268. 38 — Case C-446/98, cited in note 37, paragraph 23. 40 — ECHR, Beldjoudt v f rance, Series A no 234-A, §§ 78 ff.

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a number of factors. These will include the provisions on the law on foreigners should family circumstances of Mrs Carpenter, also be considered. As is apparent from the that is, her family ties in the United documents in the case, Mrs Carpenter 41 Kingdom and the Philippines. The per­ married after the expiry of her limited sonal circumstances of Mrs Carpenter, that leave. is, her integration into the society and 42 culture of the United Kingdom, should also be assessed.

97. As regards the interests of the State, account should be taken of the aims pur­ sued by the United Kingdom with its 94. In the present case, besides the interests provisions on foreigners, in particular con­ of Mrs Carpenter as a spouse, there are also cerning the right of residence. Of the aims the interests of the stepchildren, which are mentioned in Article 8(2) of the Conven­ also protected in principle by the Conven­ tion, the protection of public order will tion. 43 The intensity of the relationship generally be a possible one. 4 5Finally, the between Mrs Carpenter and her step­ seriousness of the breach of the provisions children and the ages of the children are on foreigners committed by Mrs Carpenter, relevant in this respect. 44 that is, remaining in the United Kingdom after the expiry of her limited leave, would have to be considered.

95. In the present case the geographical distance between the Philippines and the United Kingdom and the possibility or (d) Member States' entitlement to impose impossibility of visits would also have to penalties for breach of national provisions be taken into account. concerning residence

96. Finally, whether the marriage took 98. In conclusion, the possibilities which place before or after the breach of the the Member States retain under Commu­ nity law of penalising infringements of provisions of the law on foreigners may 41 — ĽCHR, Deld/midi v France, Scries A no 234-A, § 78. 42 — ECHR, Mmistaaiiim v Belgium, Scries A no 193, § 45. be noted. The limits which Community 43 — Sec the unpublished decision of the Commission of Human law, including the fundamental rights, sets Rights of 7 December 1982 in application 9867/82 Moodey v tbc United Kingdom. 44 — It may be noted that the welfare of the children mav even play a decisive part in the balancing of interests (ECHR, 45 — Application 12122/86 l.ukka v the United Kingdom, DR Elslmk v Germany, no 25735/94, § 4S). 50, 272.

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the Member States here — once again — clear that deportation is not permissible on apply only, however, in cases where there is the ground of failure to comply with a Community connection. declaration and registration formalities. 49

101. The answer to the first part of the question referred should therefore be that a 99. Thus Member States may, for instance, spouse, who is a national of a non-member impose penalties on spouses from non- country, of a national of a Member State member countries who remain in the terri- resident in that Member State may not rely tory after the expiry of limited leave to on Article 49 EC but may rely on Directive reside. The penalties must comply with the 73/148 to obtain the right to reside with his principle of proportionality, however, as or her spouse in the latter's Member State developed by the Court in its case-law. It of origin, if that spouse provides services to has consistently been held that penalties persons in other Member States. It must be such as fines and imprisonment are per- taken into account here that Directive missible if they are proportionate 46 or — 73/148 is to be interpreted in the light of to put it differently — constitute 'the primary law and fundamental rights, in appropriate punishment for infringe- particular the right to respect for family ment'. 47 life.

100. As regards removal from the territory of a Member State, it must be pointed out B — Second part of the question referred: that the case-law of the Court sets strict the spouse who is a national of a non- limits for such measures. According to the member country cares for the children of Roy er judgment, for instance, expulsion is the citizen of the Union not permissible if it is 'based solely on [the] person's failure to comply with the legal formalities concerning the control of aliens or on the lack of a residence permit'. 48 In Watson and Beimann the Court made it 102. The second part of the question 46 —Case 118/75 Watson and Belmann [1976] ECR 1185, referred to the Court relates to the case paragraph 21. 47 — Case 8/77 Sagulo and Others [1977] ECR 1495, paragraph 6. 48 — Case 48/75 Royer [1976] ECR 497, paragraph 40. 49 — Case 118/75, cited in note 46, paragraph 20.

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where the spouse who is not a national of a no importance in this connection to caring Member State indirectly assists the spouse for children. who is a national of a Member State to provide services in other Member States by caring for the latter's children.

105. Finally, the case-law of the Court on the rights of nationals of non-member countries who are married to citizens of the Union also does not refer expressly to the circumstance that the national of a non-member country contributes to the professional activity of the citizen of the 103. As the Commission rightly submits, Union. Thus in the Singh judgment the the circumstance that Mrs Carpenter cares Court focuses — as stated above — on for Mr Carpenter's children and thus indi- the fact that the rights derived from the rectly assists him to exercise the rights freedom of movement for workers and the deriving from the freedom to provide ser- freedom of establishment 'cannot be fully vices has nothing to do with the question effective if [a Community national] may be whether Mr Carpenter has exercised his deterred from exercising them by obstacles rights in such a way that his spouse comes raised in his or her country of origin to the within Community law. entry and residence of his or her spouse'. 50 That that principle must be taken to apply to all the fundamental freedoms has already been shown.

106. The alternative addressed in the sec- ond part of the question referred is there- 104. The relevant provisions of secondary fore of no legal significance for the answer Community law also argue against the to the question, and so need not be con- circumstance that the spouse cares for the sidered further. children of the citizen of the Union being legally relevant for the right of residence. Thus the relevant Directive 73/148 refers in Article 1(1), with respect to its scope, to a series of circumstances such as the degree of relationship, age, dependency and living together as a household. The care of children is not included in this — exhaus- tive — list. It may be concluded that the Community legislature manifestly attached 50 — Case C-370/90, cited in note 3, paragraph 23.

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VI — Conclusion

107. Accordingly, I propose that the Court should give the following answer to the question referred to it:

Where a national of a Member State resident in that Member State provides services to persons in other Member States and is married to a spouse who is not a national of a Member State, the spouse who is a national of a non-member country may not rely on Article 49 EC but may rely on Council Directive 73/148/EEC on the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence within the Community for nationals of Member States with regard to establishment and the provision of services, to obtain the right to reside with his or her spouse in the latter's Member State of origin. It must be taken into account here that Directive 73/148 is to be interpreted in the light of freedom to provide services and of fundamental rights, in particular the right to respect for family life.

The answer to the question referred is no different if the spouse who is not a national of a Member State indirectly assists the spouse who is such a national to provide services in other Member States by caring for that spouse's children.

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