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Súdny dvor Európskej únie·17.9.2002

C-137/00

ECLI:EU:C:2002:496

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Súdny dvor Európskej únie
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62000CC0137

OPINION OF MRS STIX-HACKL — CASE C-137/00

OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL STIX-HACKL delivered on 17 September 2002 1

I — Introduction I I — Legal framework

2. The common organisation of the market for milk and milk products was established by Regulation (EEC) No 804/68 of the Council of 27 June 1968 3 (hereinafter 'Regulation No 804/68'). One of the things that regulation does is fix a target price for milk annually. In that connection, Article 3 of the Regulation provides in material part as follows:

1. These proceedings relate to a reference for a preliminary ruling by the High Court of Justice of a series of questions on the relationship between national law and Community law as it affects the common agricultural policy. The Court of Justice is ' 1 . Before 1 August of each year a target essentially being asked to clarify whether price for milk shall be fixed for the national authorities have jurisdiction to Community in respect of the milk year apply their domestic competition law in beginning in the following calendar year.... the area of the common organisation of the market for milk and milk products to a co-operative of milk producers that holds a dominant position 2on the market, and, if so, to identify the Community provisions and limitations to which the exercise of that jurisdiction is subject. 2. The target price shall be that price which it is aimed to obtain for the aggregate of 1 — Original language: German. producers' milk sales, on the Community 2 — Whether the undertaking enjoys market power is a question of national law in this case. It should be assumed for the purposes of this Opinion, following the questions referred for a preliminary ruling, that Milk Marque occupies a 3 — On the common organisation of the market in milk and dominant position on the market. milk products (OJ, English Special Edition 1968 (I), p. 176).

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market and on external markets, during the 4. Article 1 of EEC Council Regulation milk year. No 26 of 4 April 1962, 5 which was adopted on the basis of Articles 42 EC and 43 EC (hereinafter 'Regulation No 26') provides as follows:

'From the entry into force of this Regu- 3. The target price shall be fixed for milk lation, Articles 85 to 90 of the Treaty and containing 3.77% fat, delivered to dairy. provisions made in implementation thereof shall, subject to Article 2 below, apply to all agreements, decisions and practices referred to in Articles 85(1) and 86 of the Treaty which relate to production of or trade in the products listed in Annex II to the Treaty'.

...'

5. Milk is one of the products listed in Annex II to the Treaty.

3. The target price for the milk year 6. Article 2(1) and (2) of Regulation No 26 1997/1998 was fixed by Council Regu- provides as follows: lation (EC) No 1190/97 of 25 June 1997 4 (hereinafter 'Regulation No 1190/97'). The first recital in the preamble to that regu- lation states: 'when fixing the common agricultural prices each year, account should be taken of the objectives of the ' 1 . Article 85(1) of the Treaty shall not common agricultural policy... The objec- apply to such of the agreements, decisions tives of the common agricultural policy are and practices referred to in the preceding in particular to secure a fair standard of Article as form an integral part of a living for the agricultural community and national market organisation or are necess- to ensure that supplies are available and ary for attainment of the objectives set out that they reach the consumers at reasonable in Article 39 of the Treaty. In particular, it prices'. shall not apply to agreements, decisions

4 — fixing the target price for milk and the intervention prices 5 — applying certain rules of competition to production of and for butter and skimmed-milk powder for the 199//1998 trade in agricultural products (OJ, English Special Edition milk marketing year (OJ 1997 L 170, p. 6). 1959-1962, p. 129).

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and practices of farmers, farmers' associ- supply of milk. It is the largest co-operative ations, or associations of such associations of its kind in Great Britain. In 1997/1998 belonging to a single Member State which Milk Marque accounted for 49.6% of concern the production or sale of agricul- supplies of milk in Great Britain. tural products or the use of joint facilities for the storage, treatment or processing of agricultural products, and under which there is no obligation to charge identical prices, unless the Commission finds that competition is thereby excluded or that the objectives of Article 39 of the Treaty are jeopardised.

8. On a reference by the Director-General of Fair Trading on 27 January 1998, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission ('the M M C ) , a competition authority in the United Kingdom, investigated whether 2. After consulting the Member States and there was a monopoly situation for the hearing the undertakings or associations of supply in Great Britain of raw cows' milk undertakings concerned and any other under the Fair Trading Act 1973. The natural or legal person that it considers MMC completed its investigation on appropriate, the Commission shall have 26 February 1999 and sent a 'Report on sole power, subject to review by the Court the supply in Great Britain of raw cows' of Justice, to determine, by decision which milk' (hereinafter 'the Report') to the shall be published, which agreements, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry decisions and practices fulfil the conditions (hereinafter 'the Secretary of State'). specified in paragraph 1.'

III— Facts, the main proceedings, and the 9. In the Report the MMC essentially questions referred for a preliminary ruling found that Milk Marque had 'market power' in relation to sales of raw cows' milk in Great Britain. It had exercised that power contrary to the public interest, by using its selling system to discriminate in terms of price and to control the supply of milk, and by engaging in other practices 7. Milk Marque Limited (hereinafter 'Milk that had had the effect of keeping the price Marque') is a farmers' co-operative society of fresh milk higher than it would have engaged in the collection, distribution and been under normal competitive conditions. I - 7982

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10. It is also important for an understand- 13. Following discussions with the compet- ing of elements of the questions referred ent authorities to that end, Milk Marque that the Report's finding to the effect that none the less announced in a press release the manner in which that market power of 17 September 1999 that it proposed to was exercised had caused prices to increase divide itself into three smaller co-operatives was partially based on a comparison with as from 1 April 2000. the target price set for the purposes of the common organisation of the market in milk and milk products. The producer price of milk was consistently below the target price in the United Kingdom, but seems to have moved nearer to the target price during the period under investigation in the Report.

14. Consequently the Secretary of State agreed not to pursue the interim measures, provided however that the three new co- operatives engaged in milk processing, and 11. One of the MMC's recommendations he indicated that he would decide at a later in the Report was that Milk Marque be stage whether he was satisfied that they restructured by dividing it into several were operating independently from one independent and competing bodies. The another. The British authorities also Report also recommended interim meas- informed Milk Marque that the new co- ures temporarily prohibiting Milk Marque operatives would 'remain subject to com- from entering into certain contractual petition law in the usual way' and that 'the arrangements. In particular it was recom- Competition Act 1998 prohibitions come mended that Milk Marque be prevented into force on 1 March 2000'. from making any further 'contract process- ing arrangements', i.e. agreements for the processing of milk.

12. On 6 July 1999 the Secretary of State announced his decisions on the Report 15. Despite those events, both Milk (hereinafter 'the Decisions'). He accepted Marque and the National Farmers' Union, the MMC's findings in relation to Milk an organisation representing the interests of Marque's market power and the recom- farmers in Great Britain (hereinafter 'the mendations as to interim measures, but NFU'), brought an action before the refer- declined the recommendation that Milk ring court against the Report and the Marque be forcibly broken up. Instead he subsequent decisions of the Secretary of announced that action would be taken to State (hereinafter together 'the contested determine what changes should be made to measures'). The two actions were joined by Milk Marque's sales procedures. the court.

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16. They submitted in particular that, in selves in regard to the sale and process- asserting jurisdiction over the activities of ing of their milk: the members of Milk Marque, and in recommending and taking steps pursuant to the Fair Trading Act to prevent them from obtaining a higher price for their milk, the MMC and the Secretary of State had acted contrary to Community law. (a) in all circumstances; or Milk Marque and the NFU also contended that, by taking such steps in future pur- suant to the Fair Trading Act or the Competition Act, the Secretary of State and MMC would be acting contrary to Community law. (b) where the intended or actual effect is to deprive such producers of the ability to increase the price obtained for the milk; or

(c) where the intended or actual effect 17. The High Court considers that in order is to reduce the price that pro- to decide the case, clarification is needed on ducers obtain for their milk in whether the national authorities retain any circumstances where that price is powers in the area of the common organi- already below the target price fixed sation of the market for milk and milk pursuant to Article 3 of Regulation products, and if so the extent of those No 804/68; or powers. It has referred the following ques- tions to the Court of Justice for a pre- liminary ruling:

(d) in a way which is not consistent with any one or more of the following:

' 1 . Are Articles 32 to 38 EC..., Council Regulation 26/62/EEC and Council Regulation (EC) No 804/68, as (i) the objectives set out in amended, to be interpreted as preclud- Article 33 EC...; and/or ing a Member State from applying national laws such as the Fair Trading Act 1973 and the Competition Act 1998 to the manner in which producers of milk choose to organise themselves (ii) the policy, aims or functioning into co-operatives and conduct them- of the common organisation of I - 7984

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the market in milk and milk preted as precluding a Member State products; and/or from applying national laws such as the Fair Trading Act 1973 and the Com- petition Act 1998 in such a way as to prohibit a milk producers' co-operative which has been found to enjoy market power from sending milk produced by (iii) the policy of Article 36 EC... its members to be processed by con- and Regulation 26? tractors on its behalf, including in other Member States, as a step being taken by the co-operative for the purpose of exploiting its position in the market in its favour? 2. Does the function of the target price for milk set by the Council under Regu- lation (EEC) No 804/68 preclude a Member State from:

4. Where large vertically-integrated dairy (a) making use of the target price as an co-operatives exist and are permitted to indicator of the actual price move- operate in other Member States, is the ments due to the common agricul- general principle of non-discrimi- tural policy; and nation, whether independently or as given specific effect in Articles 12 and/or 34 EC..., to be interpreted as precluding a Member State from apply- ing national laws such as the Fair (b) treating the fact that a milk pro- Trading Act 1973 and the Competition ducers' co-operative in that State Act 1998 to prohibit a milk producers' has achieved for its members milk co-operative which has been found to prices that are below the target enjoy market power from: price, but are nearer to the target price in one period of time than another, as supporting a con- clusion that the co-operative exer- cises market power which con- tributes to prices being higher than they would have reached under more competitive conditions. (a) acquiring or building further plant for the processing of milk pro- duced by its members, which would give the co-operative the ability to exploit still further its 3. Are Articles 28 to 30 EC... and position in the market in its favour; Articles 49 and 55 EC... to be inter- or

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(b) sending milk produced by its case, which must assume responsibility for members to be processed by con- the subsequent judicial decision, to deter- tractors on its behalf, whether mine, with regard to the particular aspects within the Member Sate concerned of the case, both the need for a preliminary or in other Member Sates, as a step ruling in order to enable it to deliver being taken by the co-operative for judgment and the relevance of the questions the purpose of exploiting its pos- which it refers to the Court. The Court may ition in the market in its favour?' refuse a request made by such a court only where it is quite obvious that the inter- pretation of Community law sought bears no relation to the actual facts or purpose of the main proceedings or where the problem is hypothetical and the Court does not have IV — Legal appraisal before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted.

A. Admissibility of the questions referred for a preliminary ruling

18. The United Kingdom questions the admissibility of the questions referred to the Court. It points out that the Report and the Decisions have been overtaken by events because, as a result of the voluntary dismembering of Milk Marque, the market 20. In this case, however, the referring power on which the investigation, the court has provided the Court of Justice Report and all subsequent decisions and with a detailed outline of the factual and recommendations were based has ceased to legal background to the main proceedings, exist. In so far as they concern possible and of the reasons why it has taken the future competition situations involving view that a ruling on the questions referred agricultural co-operatives, the questions is necessary for it to give judgment. In referred for a preliminary ruling are hypo- particular the national court states in the thetical. order for reference that in order to review the Decisions, it will need to consider the application of both the Fair Trading Act and the Competition Act, which came into force on 1 March 2000, and that an answer 19. According to established case-law, 6it to the question referred is therefore necess- is solely for the national court hearing the ary to enable it to rule effectively on the parties' rights and obligations, the auth- orities' jurisdiction, and the exercise of that 6 — See, inter alia, Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, jurisdiction under the two Acts. Moreover, paragraphs 59 to 61; Case C-60/98 Butterfly Music [1999] ECR I-3939, paragraph 13; and Case C-97/98 Jägerskold the national court expressly does not con- [1999] ECR I-7319, paragraph 21. cur with the United Kingdom's view that

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the Report and the Decisions have been 23. The Court of Justice has therefore 'overtaken' by subsequent events. already had occasion to rule on restrictions on competition affecting the market for the production and processing of milk in the United Kingdom. It has considered the conduct of the Boards in a number of judgments. 9

21. The questions referred for a prelimi- nary ruling are therefore admissible and call for a reply. 24. The Agricultural Act 1993 deregulated the milk market by abolishing the Boards. This occurred in 1994, in England and Wales and in Scotland. The Boards were replaced by voluntary producer organi- sations, and the earlier monopoly situation was brought to an end.

B. The first question referred, on the legal- ity of national measures to combat anti- competitive practices where an undertaking is dominant on a market that is governed 25. The first matter the Court of Justice is by a common organisation being asked to consider is therefore the extent to which the application of national competition rules to such producer organi- sations — in this case Milk Marque — is permissible under Community law. 22. It should be recalled at the outset that the United Kingdom was able to secure the integration of its system for organising the domestic milk market, of which the Milk Marketing Boards (hereinafter 'the 1. Arguments of the parties Boards') were the principal element, as part of its accession negotiations. Article 25 of Regulation No 804/68, as amended by Council Regulation (EEC) No 1421/78, 7 recognised the status of the Boards, which, amongst other things, had been given a 26. Milk Marque and the NFU contend monopoly on purchasing and selling. 8 that it is contrary to Community law for a Member State to apply national legislation

7 — of 20 June 1978 amending Regulation (EEC) No 804/68 on the common organisation of the market in milk and milk 9 — Case 23/84 Commission v United Kingdom [1986] products (OJ 1978 L 171, p. 12). ECR 3851; Case 347/85 Commission v United Kingdom 8 — See Winkler in Immenga/Mestmäcker, EG-Wettber- [1988] ECR 1749; Case 372/88 Cricket St Thomas [19901 werbsrecht, Vol. II, VO no. 26, paragraph 87 et seq. for ECR I-1345; and Case C-40/92 Commission v United further detail. Kingdom [1994] ECR I-989.

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such as the Fair Trading Act or the of measures that seek — even indi- Competition Act to agricultural co-oper- rectly — to affect the producer price of atives or the goods they produce and in so milk infringes the exclusive competence of doing to adopt a measure, in a sphere the Community. governed by a common organisation of the market, that seeks to affect the price of such products — in this case, to reduce the producer price of milk.

29. In this case the British authorities unlawfully encroached upon that compet- 27. Milk Marque and the NFU then sub- ence in seeking, by the contested measures, mit — on essentially the same grounds — to reduce producer prices to 'competitive that the field of agriculture falls within the levels', even though they consistently fell exclusive competence of the Community below the target price set by the Commu- and that the Member States therefore have nity. The authorities thus unilaterally set a no jurisdiction in this area. price which they considered to be in the public interest, but which did not reconcile the Community objectives in Article 33 EC, which the target prices reflect.

28. They argue that agricultural co-oper- atives and the sale of milk are subject to the common organisation of the market for milk and milk products established by Regulation No 804/68. One of the features of this market organisation is the target 30. Milk Marque and the NFU also take price which, Article 3 of the Regulation the view that, even from a competition law provides, is to be fixed annually by the standpoint, there is no scope for applying Council, and which reflects the way in national legislation, such as the Fair Trad- which the Community institutions recon- ing Act or the Competition Act. They cile the objectives of the common agricul- submit in this regard that, under the second tural policy set out in Article 33(1) EC, paragraph of Article 36 EC, Community including in particular that of ensuring a competition law in the agricultural sector is fair standard of living for the agricultural subject to the rules of the common agricul- community. In the view of Milk Marque tural policy and must be applied in accord- and the NFU it follows from the Court's ance with the objectives of Article 33 EC. case-law, particularly the judgment in Tof¬ The application of competition rules in the foli, 10that the adoption by a Member State agricultural sector is specifically governed by Regulation No 26. That Regulation makes it clear with regard to the subject 10 — Case 10/79 Toffoli [1979] ECR 3301. matter of this case — namely the organi-

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sation of agricultural co-operatives and the competition law in so far as in the agricul- fixing of producer prices for milk — that tural sector the competition provisions are EC competition law only finds limited circumscribed by the objectives of the application. So, although Article 82 EC common agricultural policy. Milk Marque does apply, Article 81(1) EC does not. also argues that Member States may not apply their national competition rules in a manner that runs counter to the freedom guaranteed by Article 81(3) EC. 11 That applies a fortiori to the 'safe haven' afforded to agricultural co-operatives by Article 2(1) of Regulation No 26. 31. Community law has therefore exhaus- tively established the nature and scope of the competition rules in the agricultural sector. Like the common organisation of the market, the competition law regime for agricultural products excludes the parallel application of national competition law.

34. The Commission, on the other hand, takes the view that the national measures 32. If the Member States do retain certain are compatible with both competition law powers in the agricultural domain, Milk and the rules of the common organisation Marque and the NFU contend that, by of the market for milk and milk products in seeking to bring about a reduction in the Community. producer prices, the British authorities exercised those powers in a manner contrary to Community law.

33. That submission, too, is founded on their allegation that the basis for the contested measures, namely a balancing of 35. In regard to competition law, it states the various interests involved, that is to say, that Article 2 of Regulation No 26 excludes a view as to what price is in the public only the application of Article 81(1) EC to interest, does not reflect the aims and the agricultural sector. The rules in objectives of the common agricultural pol- Article 82 EC on abuse of a dominant icy under Article 33(1) EC and is contrary position, however, apply to the agricultural to the target price, which represents a balancing of Community interests. The measures also undermine the effectiveness 11 — Milk Marque refers in that connection to the Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro in Case C-70/93 BMW v ALD and uniform application of Community [1995] ECR I-3439, points 36 to 40.

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sector in the usual way. 12 The Member none the less be arrived at on the basis of States are also, as is clear inter alia from the the operation of market forces and in Court's judgment in the Walt Wilhelm competitive conditions. The application of case, 13 permitted to apply national com- national competition legislation such as petition law in so far as this does not that at issue here helps to create such prejudice the uniform application through- conditions. out the common market of the Community competition rules and the full effect of the measures adopted in implementation of those rules. There could have been no such prejudice in this case because the Commis- sion has not taken any steps against Milk Marque pursuant to competition law. 2. Opinion

38. The first question referred for a pre- liminary ruling raises two subsidiary issues 36. With regard to the common organi- which call for separate examination. Are sation of the market for milk, the Commis- national competition authorities competent sion argues that the Member States are not to take action under national law against entirely excluded from taking action in this allegedly anti-competitive practices in a field. They may simply not take any sector governed by a market organisation measures that might interfere with the at all? If they are, what are the limits, if operation of that market organisation. But any, imposed by Community law on the this does not apply to measures, such as powers of the Member States? those at issue here, whose purpose is to curtail a dominant position.

(a) Competence of national competition authorities

37. Both the United Kingdom and the Dairy Industry Federation essentially agree with the Commission. They add that, even if the Member States may not in principle prevent their milk producers from seeking to attain the target price, the price must 39. Contrary to the view of Milk Marque and the NFU, there can be little doubt that national measures adopted by a national 12 — It cites Joined Cases 40/73 to 48/73, 50/73, 54/73, 55/73, authority on home territory to counter 56/73, 111/73, 113/73 and 114/73 Suiker (1975] anti-competitive practices are permissible, ECR 1663, and Case 27/76 United Brandi |1978] ECR 207. even where a sector is governed by a 13 — Case 14/68 Wait Wilhelm [1969] ECR 1, paragraph 4. market organisation.

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40. That is because the agricultural sector on c o m p e t i t i o n , as is clear from is not an area which is 'free from compe- Article 34(1)(a) EC. These tools restrict tition' (see (i) below), and because the competition on the relevant markets. Com- applicability of Community competition petition can develop only if the individual law does not in principle preclude the common organisations of the markets leave application of national competition rules room for it to do so. None the less, while (see (ii) below). undoubtedly real, the tension between agricultural policy and open competition should not be overstated, since to some extent agricultural policy creates the con- ditions for undertakings to be able to compete freely. 15 (i) Competition is an essential component of the common agriculture market

41. Milk Marque and the NFU are correct in their view that, as a result of Article 36 EC, the application of the Treaty compe- tition rules to the production and sale of agricultural goods is subject to the adop- tion by the Council of a decision. It does not however necessarily follow from this that the application of the Treaty compe- 44. The interlocking nature of agricultural tition rules to the agricultural sector is to be and competition policy objectives is also regarded as exceptional under Community illustrated by the other instrument of law. 14 agricultural policy that is relevant here, namely the target price. Target prices are a feature of common organisations of the markets. The target price for agricultural products, however, is intended to have a regulatory function in two respects. First it 42. Article 36 EC is rather to be under- contributes to ensuring a fair standard of stood in the light of the tension between living for the agricultural community. 16 agricultural policy and competition law. But it also enables supply and demand to be managed. It is precisely the latter purpose that requires that operators in the individ- ual agricultural markets should be able to make business decisions, which in turn 43. The common organisations of the mar- kets established thus far use a range of 15 — Winkler, for instance, in Immenga/Mestmäcker, EG-Wett- tools, including in particular common rules berwerbsrecht, Vol. II, VO no. 26, paragraph 12 sees the scheme and purpose of the exception in Article 2(1) of Regulation No 26 as follows: 'It is by allowing farmers to enter into agreements that would be unlawful under cartel law that the legislature enables them to compete at all.' 14 — See however Schwarze-Hix, EU Kommentar, Art. 36 EC Treaty, paragraph 1. 16 —Article 33(1)(b) EC.

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presupposes a certain level of compe- in the Chapter in the Treaty on competition tition. 17 apply in principle. Article 2(1) of Regu- lation No 26 merely contains various exceptions to the prohibition on cartels in Article 81(1) EC, exempting agreements that form an integral part of a national market organisation and those that are necessary for attainment of the objectives of the common agricultural policy set out 45. This also explains why the Court has in Article 33 EC. The Commission, which repeatedly held competition to be an essen- is supported on this point by the United tial component of the common agricultural Kingdom and the Dairy Industry Feder- policy. 18 Article 36 EC accordingly has the ation, is correct to emphasise that Regu- effect of deferring the application of the lation No 26 in no way limits the appli- Treaty rules on competition to the agricul- cation of Article 82 EC on abuse of a tural sector. 19 In view of the above con- dominant position. siderations, this is not to be understood as an exception, but as a necessity for histori- cal reasons. Because the various agricul- tural markets were very differently struc- tured when the Community began, a com- mon competition policy in the agricultural domain that went further than Article 34 47. The point is therefore that, so far as EC was conceivable only after the markets Community law is concerned, the appli- had been integrated and similar competi- cation of the Community competition rules tive conditions created. to the agricultural field generally is not in the nature of an exception but is integral to the system.

46. Given that background it is unsurpris- ing that the Council should have stipulated, 48. Contrary to the view of Milk Marque in Regulation No 26, that for the most part and the NFU, the fact that agricultural the competition rules apply. Thus, Article 1 co-operatives of the kind at issue here and provides that 'subject to Article 2' the rules the sale of milk are subject to the common organisation of the market for milk and milk products under Regulation No 804/68 17 — Maillander in Gemeinschaftskommentar, Müller-Henne- berg/Schwartz, Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen in no way affects that finding. und Europäisches Kartellrecht, EWGB, BER, Ausn, para. 29. Winkler agrees: Immenga/Mestmäcker cited above, Landwirtschaft, first sentence of Art. 42(1), EC, para. 2. 18 — Case 83/78 Redmond [1978] ECR 2347, paragraph 57; Case 177/78 Pigs and Bacon Commission [1979] ECR 2162, paragraph 15. See also Grabitz-Gildorf/Sack, Kommentar zum EWG-Vertrag, Article 42(2) and Winkler in Immenga/Mestmäcker cited above, Landwirtschaft, first sentence of Art. 42(1), EC, para. 2. 19 — Winkler in Immenga/Mestmäcker cited above, Landwirts- 49. It is true that the Community enjoys chaft, first sentence of Art. 42(1), EC, para. 2. exclusive competence to legislate in this I - 7992

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field.20 Milk Marque and the NFU also, ures designed to attain the agricultural not incorrectly, point to the settled case- policy objectives referred to in Article 33 law of the Court whereby 'once the Com- EC by sovereign regulation of the agricul- munity has adopted regulations... establish- tural market for each specific product. ing a common organisation of the market in a given sector, Member States are under an obligation to refrain from taking any measure which might undermine or create exceptions to it'. 21

52. The contested measures do not fall within that definition because they relate precisely to the unregulated section of the relevant market. It may indeed be inferred 50. However it does not follow from that from the case-law that the prohibition on that every measure adopted by a national adopting prejudicial or conflicting meas- authority on the basis of domestic law is to ures also relates to measures that do not fall be regarded as a measure within the within the scope of the rules on market meaning of the case-law quoted above. organisation. 23 The reason for extending the scope of the prohibition is to preserve its effet utile. However, that should be irrelevant in regard to measures of compe- tition law. That is because if it is accepted that sections of agriculture not governed by a market organisation are open to free competition, then measures adopted by the Member States to guarantee such compe- tition may not, for the time being, be 51. In that connection I would refer to the treated as measures which, directly or Court's definition of a market organisation. indirectly, prejudice the instruments Extrapolating from the definition of a adopted to implement a market organi- national organisation of the market, 22 a sation. The United Kingdom is right to European organisation of the market may make the point in this connection that be defined as a totality of structural meas- Member States may, and indeed must, apply their criminal law also and specifi- cally to complement instruments giving 20 — S e e on this Case 10/79 Toffoli [1979] ECR 3 3 0 1 , paragraph 11 and Case 166/82 Commission v Italy [1984] effect to a common organisation of the ECR 459, paragraph 2 3 . There is no need to decide market. 24 whether Article 37(2) EC invests the Community with competing or exclusive jurisdiction since the Community has exercised its jurisdiction in the milk market, so it has exclusive jurisdiction for measures within the common agricultural policy in any event (see generally Case 23 — Case 31/74 Galli [1975] ECR 4 7 and Case 51/74 Van der C - 4 3 8 / 9 2 Rustica Semences [1994] ECR I - 3 5 1 9 , Hulst's v Prodshap voor Siergewassen [1975] ECR 7 9 ; paragraph 16). Case 65/75 Tasca [19761 ECR 2 9 1 ; Joined Cases 88/75 t o 21 — Case 111/76 Officier van Justitie v Van Den Hazel [1977] 90/75 SADAM [1976] ECR 323; Case 154/77 Dechmann ECR 9 0 1 , a n d Redmond, cited in f o o t n o t e 1 8 , [1978] ECR 1573. paragraphs 56 et seq. 24 — In that connection the United Kingdom cites Case 68/88 22 — Case 48/74 Charmasson v Minister for Economic Affairs Commission v Greece [1989] ECR 2 9 6 5 , paragraphs 23 et and Finance [1974] ECR 1383, paragraph 26. seq.

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53. It may no doubt be objected that, Community competition law has, in precisely in view of the abovementioned Article 36 EC, in conjunction with Regu- tension between them, the adoption of a lation No 26, conclusively brought about measure of competition policy is most the necessary reconciliation with various likely to disrupt the effect of measures objectives of agricultural policy. adopted in pursuance of agricultural policy. In the main proceedings the national com- petition authorities' intervention, which could bring about a reduction in producer prices, might therefore be seen as constitut- ing disruption, which could in turn lead to producers' livelihoods being endangered 56. That argument is not persuasive either. contrary to Article 33(1)(b) EC.

57. The Court has clarified the relationship between national competition law and the 54. That objection is not, however, per- Community competition rules in the Walt suasive. Milk Marque and the NFU's alter- Wilhelm case. 25According to its judgment native submission shows that the objectives in that case, the application of Community of the common agricultural policy can be law takes precedence over national legis- duly taken into account when the limits of lation on cartels. In the absence of any national competence are explored. There is Community rules, on the other hand, there therefore no reason why conflicts between is nothing to prevent the application of agricultural and competition policy should national legislation on cartels. The solution stand in the way of recognising the prin- devised for Article 81 EC is generally ciple that national competition authorities regarded as also applying to Article 82 do retain competence. EC.2«

58. However, the extent to which that (ii) The applicability in principle of solution may be transposed to the field of national law alongside Community compe- agriculture remains open to question, given tition law that it is only via the circuitous route of Regulation No 26 that the competition rules have been rendered applicable to it. What is beyond doubt is that the primacy of Community law applies to both primary and secondary law.

55. Milk Marque and the NFU consider that another reason why national compe- 25 — Cited in footnote 13. 26 — See Gavalda/Parleani, Droit des affaires de l'union Euro- tition law may not be applied is that peene, 3rd Edition, para. 410 and following.

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59. In my view there is good reason not to 62. The balance which Community law exclude the application of national compe- seeks to achieve is not, therefore, exhaus- tition provisions in the field of agriculture tive, because it does not apply where, on by arguing that the reconciliation achieved the facts, there is no Community dimen- by Article 36 EC, in conjunction with sion. Accordingly, the application of Regulation No 26, is exhaustive. national competition law cannot in prin- ciple be excluded, as in the Walt Wilhelm case. The only question is the extent to which the application of national compe- tition law is subject to limitations imposed by Community law.

60. This is because, as already explained, 27 Article 36 EC does not prevent the compe- tition rules from applying altogether, but merely defers their application. However, the balance between the objectives of 63. We therefore now turn to the limi- agricultural and competition policy in tations on national measures to combat Article 36 EC, in conjunction with Regu- anti-competitive conduct. lation No 26, necessarily applies only to matters which are governed by the Treaty provisions on competition in the first place.

(b) Limitations on national competence

61. Under Regulation No 26, Article 82 EC finds unlimited application in the agricul- tural field. But as Article 82 only relates to dominant positions on the common market or a substantial part thereof, many situ- 64. The limitations on national competence ations fall outside the Community compe- to apply national competition law follow tition provisions ab initio. Clearly, then, from the primacy of agricultural objectives the balance which Regulation No 26 seeks in the Treaty over competition objectives, to achieve in a manner that reflects the which is enshrined in Article 36 EC. 28 primacy, provided for in Article 36 EC, of agricultural over competition objectives cannot be regarded as exhaustive. 28 — On the supremacy of agricultural policy over the Treaty objectives in the field of competition, see Case 139/79 Maizena v Council [1980] ECR 3393, paragraph 23 a n d Case C-280/93 Germany v Council [1994] ECR I-4973, 2 7 — See points 41 et seq. above. paragraph 6 1 .

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65. National competition law must be 68. However, the Court has also stressed applied in a manner compatible with the that the goal of guaranteeing earnings in objectives of the common agricultural pol- Article 33(l)(b) EC is 'one of the main icy set out in Article 33 EC. aims' 30 of agricultural policy in the milk market.

69. That means, in relation to the main 66. Account must be taken of the principles proceedings, that, when applying national established by the Court's case-law, which competition law, the national authorities provides that 'in pursuing the various aims must give priority to the objectives in laid down in [Article 33 EC], the Commu- Article 33(1) EC, regardless of the objec- nity institutions have a permanent duty to tives of national law. reconcile the individual aims.' In principle, therefore, 'no single aim may be pursued in isolation in such a way as to make the achievement of the others impossible', although 'the Community institutions may allow one of them temporary priority in order to satisfy the demands of the econ- 70. It appears from the arguments of the omic or other conditions in view of which parties that one of the factors to which the their decisions are made'. 29 national authorities had regard was the reasonableness of prices paid by con- sumers. Article 33(l)(e) EC lists the objec- tive of ensuring 'that supplies reach con- sumers at reasonable prices', but there is a clear conflict between that and the objec- tive of ensuing a fair standard of living in Article 33(l)(b) EC. It is for the national court to determine whether the national 67. There seems no reason why the obli- authorities were excessively one-sided in gation on Community institutions to rec- their pursuit of the first objective. oncile the various objectives of agricultural policy in accordance with Article 33 EC should not be extended to national auth- orities. The Court's recognition that there is a wide discretion when assessing individual objectives which even encompasses tem- porarily favouring one agricultural policy 71. The fact that producer prices were objective over another is worthy of note. below the target price even before the

29 —Case 27/85 Vandemoortele v Commission [1987] ECR 30 — Case 59/83 SA Biouilac v European Economic Community 1129, paragraph 20. [1984] ECR 4057, paragraph 16.

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national competition authorities intervened C. The remaining questions does not in itself mean that the contested measures contravene Community law. First, having a price as a guideline does not guarantee producers an income reflect- ing the target price and, secondly, the 1. The second question, on use of the target objective of securing a fair standard of price for the purposes of national compe- living certainly does not extend to attempts tition law to achieve such a standard of living by abusive means. Article 33(1)(b) EC cannot therefore justify an abuse of a dominant position, nor can measures taken to combat such an abuse be regarded as infringing that objective. (a) Arguments of the parties

73. Milk Marque is of the view that use of the target price, within the meaning of Article 3 of Regulation No 804/68, for the purposes described in the second question referred for a preliminary ruling runs counter to the purpose and function of a target price. The price represents an indi- cation by the Council of what it considers to be a reasonable producer price for milk, and the producer has every right to attempt to reach it. 72. I therefore propose that the reply to be given to the first question referred for a preliminary ruling should be that Articles 32 EC to 38 EC, Council Regu- lation No 26 and Council Regulation (EEC) 804/68, as amended, are to be 74. The United Kingdom Government con- interpreted as not precluding a Member siders the second question referred by the State from applying national laws to com- national court to be purely academic and bat abuses by an undertaking in a dominant not to concern the interpretation of Com- position, provided that the Member State munity law. balances all the various objectives set out in Article 33 EC. It is for the national court to examine whether the national authorities have carried out that balancing operation. The objective in Article 33(1)(b) EC of increasing producers' earnings cannot be relied on to justify an abuse of a dominant 75. The Commission, the Dairy Industry position. Federation and — in the alternative —

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the United Kingdom Government contend law and must therefore be regarded as that there is no objection in Community admissible. law to use of the target price in making findings of national competition law, or that this is a matter of national law.

78. How an undertaking's market power is to be assessed at national level is a matter (b) Opinion of national law. As is clear from my proposed reply to the first question, there is no objection in Community law to the basic principle that national proceedings may be brought to investigate whether a particular undertaking that holds a domi- nant position is abusing its economic position or not. Nor, therefore, is there in 76. Article 234 EC provides that the Court principle any objection to using the target of Justice is to give preliminary rulings, price to evaluate an undertaking's market inter alia, on the interpretation of the power, by looking at variations in actual Treaty and acts of the Community institu- prices in comparison with the target price. tions. Consequently, according to settled case-law, the Court does not have jurisdic- tion to interpret national law on a reference for a preliminary ruling. 31

79. This practice does not affect the status of the target price as an instrument of market policy. 77. By its second question, the national court is essentially asking whether the common organisation of the market for milk and milk products precludes using the target price under Article 3 of Regulation No 804/68 when analysing an undertak- ing's market power in national proceed- ings. Contrary to the view of the United 80. The reply to the second question must Kingdom, this is a question of Community therefore be that the function of the target price under Article 3 of Regulation No 804/68 does not preclude that price 31 — See Case 75/63 Unger v Bedrijfsvereniging voor Detail- being used for the purposes of proceedings handel en Ambachten [1964] ECR 177 and Case C-309/96 Annibaldi |1997] ECR I-7493, paragraph 13. before a national competition authority. I - 7998

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2. Third question, on the compatibility of has already been harmonised by means of the contested measures with the free move- the target price system and the common ment of goods and services organisation of the market for milk and milk products.

82. The Commission points out that, (a) Arguments of the parties according to the settled case-law of the Court, Article 29 EC applies only to national measures which have as their specific object or effect the restriction of patterns of exports and thereby the estab- lishment of a difference in treatment between the domestic trade of a Member State and its export trade, in such a way as to provide a particular advantage for national production or for the domestic 81. With regard to the third question, Milk market of the State in question. It also Marque refers to the interim measures observes that Article 28 EC does not apply established by the contested measures, and to goods that are exported purely for in particular the fact that Milk Marque was re-importation in order to circumvent a to be prevented from entering into further provision of national law. In the Commis- 'contract processing arrangements', i.e. sion's view, exporting milk for the purposes milk processing contracts with undertak- of processing in other Member States ings in other Member States. The interim should not be deemed to constitute a supply measures not only limit the export of raw of a service but of goods, pursuant to Case milk from the United Kingdom contrary to 18/84. 32 Article 29 EC, they also prohibit imports and exports of milk products between Member States. They therefore constitute quantitative restrictions on imports and exports within the meaning of Articles 28 and 29 EC. By preventing Milk Marque from using processing services in other Member States, the interim measures also 83. The United Kingdom and the Dairy infringe the freedom to provide services, Industry Federation concur for the most contrary to Article 49 EC. Milk Marque part with the Commission. Even if the says there is no effective justification for contested measures are deemed to consti- these restrictions. They were imposed for tute restrictions on the freedom to provide purely economic reasons, to secure a supply services within the meaning of Article 49 of inexpensive domestic milk to national EC, they can, because they are non-dis- processors. The restrictions are also dis- criminatory. The exceptions in Articles 30 and 46 EC do not apply because this field 32 — Case 18/84 Commission v France [1985] ECR 1339.

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criminatory and indistinctly applicable, be 86. The national measure in the main justified on the basis that they are in the proceedings prohibits the processing of public interest or protect consumers or milk on behalf of Milk Marque in any prevent unfair competition. event in the United Kingdom and in other Member States.

(b) Opinion 87. The first question is whether Article 29 EC precludes a national measure of this kind. Article 29 EC prohibits quantitative restrictions on exports and all measures having equivalent effect. The Commission rightly points out that the Court has consistently interpreted that prohibition narrowly in its case-law. It only applies to 84. By its third question, the national court those measures which 'have as their specific is essentially asking whether the principles object or effect the restriction of patterns of of the free movement of goods or freedom export and thereby the establishment of a to provide services preclude a national rule difference in treatment between the whereby, in order to prevent an agricultural domestic trade of a Member State and its co-operative from abusing a dominant export trade, in such a way as to provide a position, milk from that co-operative is particular advantage for national produc- prohibited from being processed in other tion or for the domestic market of the State Member States. in question'. 34

85. First of all, such a measure must be 88. Whether the measures in the main examined only under the Treaty provisions proceedings do have this as their object or on the free movement of goods. This may effect is open to question because they be inferred from the Court's case-law, prevent processing in the domestic market according to which a service that 'leads as well as in other Member States. It is not directly to the manufacture of a physical necessary to resolve the point, however, article' is to be considered under the free since, under the Court's case-law, reliance movement of goods rules alone, since the freedom to provide services is, pursuant to Article 50 EC, secondary in nature. 33 34 — Case 15/79 Croenvald [1979] ECR 3409, paragtaph 7; Case 155/80 Oebel [1981] ECR 1993, paragraph 15; Case C-47/90 Delhaize et le Lion [19921 ECR I-3669, paragraph 12; Case C-203/96 Dusseldorp and Others [19981 ECR I-4075, paragraph 40; and Case C-388/95 33 — Case 18/84 cited in footnote 32, point 12. Belgium v Spain [2000] ECR I-3123, paragraph 41.

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may not be placed on basic freedoms if they (3) The fourth question on the prohibition are only invoked to circumvent a national of discrimination rule. In this connection the Commission rightly cites the Leclerc v Au blé vert 35 case, which decided that Article 28 EC may not be relied on where the goods in question 'were exported for the sole pur- pose of re-importation in order to circum- vent legislation of the type at issue'. 3 6It should be noted that the Court only (a) Arguments of the parties referred to Article 28 EC in that case.

91. Milk Marque and the NFU argue in 89. The measure at issue here is clearly relation to the fourth question that the intended to prevent circumvention, by the contested measures place Milk Marque at a export and reimportation of milk, of the disadvantage compared to other milk pro- national rule prohibiting conduct constitut- ducers in the United Kingdom and similar ing abuse of a dominant position. agricultural co-operatives in other Member States, contrary to Articles 12 and 34 EC. Because it is barred from vertically integrat- ing its operations and sending its milk to be processed by contractors, Milk Marque is prevented from pursuing an activity that is open to other producers in the United Kingdom and co-operatives in other Member States. The national measures apply to members of Milk Marque only 90. The reply to be given to the third and not to all milk producers in the United question is therefore that Articles 28 to 30 Kingdom, were not adopted on the basis of EC do not preclude a Member State from objective criteria and, because they restrict applying national laws of the kind here at the operation of the common organisation issue in such a way as to prohibit a milk of the market for milk and milk products, producers' co-operative which has been are not objectively justified. found to enjoy market power from sending milk produced by its members to be pro- cessed by contractors on its behalf, includ- ing in other Member States, where appli- cation of such laws is intended to prevent abuse of a dominant position.

35 — Case 229/83 Leclerc v Au blé vert [1985] ECR 1. 92. The Commission, on the other hand, 36 — Ibid., paragraph 27. views this case as at most concerning

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disparities in treatment or distortions, treatment or the distortions which may within the meaning of the Walt Wilhelm result, for the persons and undertakings judgment, 37 which result from divergences subject to the jurisdiction of the Commu- between the laws of the various Member nity, from divergences existing between the States that apply in accordance with objec- laws of the various Member States, so long tive criteria and without regard to national- as the latter affect all persons subject to ity. them, in accordance with objective criteria and without regard to their nationality'. 38

93. The United Kingdom Government and the Dairy Industry Federation also consider that there was no discrimination, or in so far as there may have been discrimination, that it was justified on objective grounds. 96. Milk Marque and the NFU also argue that the contested measures constitute 'dis- crimination between producers or con- sumers within the Community', contrary to Article 34(2) EC.

(b) Opinion

94. By its fourth question the national 97. Whether treating producers in the same court in essentially asking whether the Member State differently is also caught by contested measures place the applicant in Article 34(2) is uncertain. The matter can the main proceedings at an unjustified be left open here, as there is in any event no disadvantage. comparison of situations. The reason for treating Milk Marque differently from other producers and consumers both at home and abroad is that it occupied a dominant position, which it abused. Regardless of any divergences between 95. As regards Article 12 EC, there is laws, as mentioned above, 39 the prohib- nothing in the order for reference to suggest ition on abusing a dominant position that Milk Marque suffered discrimination obviously applies to all undertakings oper- on grounds of nationality. The Commission ating on the market in the United Kingdom. rightly refers to the judgment in Walt There can therefore be no finding of Wilhelm, which states that Article 12 EC unequal treatment. 'is not concerned with any disparities in

38 — Cited above, point 13. 37 — Cited in footnote 13, point 13. 39 — See point 95.

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V — Conclusion

98. In the light of the foregoing I propose that the Court answer the questions referred by the national court as follows:

(1) Articles 32 EC to 38 EC, Council Regulation No 26 and Council Regulation (EEC) No 804/68, as amended, are to be interpreted as in principle not precluding a Member State from applying national laws to combat abuses by a cooperative of milk producers found to enjoy market power, provided that the national competition authorities balance the various objectives set out in Article 33 EC. It is for the national court to examine whether the national authorities have carried out that balancing operation. The objective in Article 33(1)(b) EC of increasing producers' earnings cannot be relied on to justify an abuse of a dominant position.

(2) The function of the target price under Article 3 of Regulation (EEC) No 804/68 does not preclude that price being used by a Member State for the purposes of investigating the pricing policy of such a co-operative and any market power it may enjoy. I - 8003

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(3) Articles 28 EC to 30 EC do not preclude a Member State from applying national laws of the kind here at issue in such a way as to prohibit a milk producers' co-operative which has been found to enjoy market power from sending milk produced by its members to be processed by contractors on its behalf, including in other Member States, where application of such laws is intended to prevent abuse of a dominant position.

(4) Neither the general prohibition on discrimination, nor Articles 12 EC or 34(2) EC in which that prohibition finds expression, in principle preclude the application of national laws of the kind in point here that prohibit a producers' co-operative found to enjoy market power from acquiring or setting up additional milk processing plants, or from sending milk to be processed on its behalf to contractors either in the Member State in question or in other Member States, where such measures are adopted in order to prevent abuse of a dominant position.

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