C-255/00
ECLI:EU:C:2002:172
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GRUNDIG ITALIANA
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL RUIZ-JARABO COLOMER delivered on 14 March 2002 1
I — Introduction perfectly well been given using the quicker and more efficient r o u t e under Article 104(3) of the Rules of Procedure.4
1. This is not the first time that the Court of Justice, in response to questions put to it by Italian courts seeking a preliminary ruling, has had to rule on whether the 3. The Italian court seeks to ascertain imposition of limitation periods or time- whether the establishment of a transitional limits for bringing actions for the reim- period of 90 days in which to bring actions bursement of tax paid but not due to the which, having been subject to a five-year Administration complies with Community limitation period have, owing to a change law. 2 in legislation introduced with retroactive effect, become subject to a three-year time- limit, infringes the principle of effective- ness.
2. Even if the specific doubt in the mind of the Tribunale di Trento (District Court, Trento) has not in this case been dispelled by Community case-law, the reply is impli- cit in an extensive body of judgments of the II — Facts of the main action and the Court of Justice, 3and could therefore have question referred for a preliminary ruling
1 — Original language: Spanish. 2 —See the three Judgments in Case C-231/96 hits [1998] ECR I-4951, Case C-260/96 SPAC [1998] ECR I-4997 and Joined Cases C-279/96 to C-281/96 Ansaldo Energía and Others [1998] ECR I-5025. See also C-228/96 Aprile 11998] 4. The Italian company Grundig Italiana ECR I-7141 and C-343/96 Dilexport [1999] ECR I-579. I delivered the Opinion m all five cases. Advocate General SpA (hereinafter 'Grundig') brought an Stix-Hackl has recently addressed the issue in the Opinion action against the Ministero delle Finanze which she delivered on 31 January 2002 in Joined Cases C-216/99 and C-222/99. for a declaration that the provisions impos- 3 — Sec, in addition to those cited in the preceding footnote. ing a consumption tax on audiovisual and Case 33/76 Rewe [1976] ECR 1989 and Case 45/76 Camel 11976] ECR 2043. One can also refer to Case 199/82 SMI Giorgio 11983] ECR 3595, C-212/94 FMC and Others [1996] ECR I-389 and C-261/95 Palmisam [1997] ECR I-4025. 4 — Consolidated version published in OJ 2001 C 34, p. 1.
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photo-optic products are incompatible with Ministero delle Finanze that the action is Community rules, 5and an order requiring time-barred, the Tribunale di Trento asks the Italian Administration to repay the the Court of Justice the following ques- sums the company had paid by way of that tions: tax between 1 January 1983 and 31 December 1992, 6 arising from the import of audiovisual products via the Trento customs post.
'Is a national provision, namely the last part of Article 29(1) of Law No 428 of 29 December 1990, compatible with Com- 5. That incompatibility has been estab- munity law and in particular with the often lished since the Court of Justice, in reply stated principle of effectiveness [...] where to a first preliminary question referred by it lays down a period of grace of 90 days the Tribunale di Trento in the same pro- within which, in order to avoid the three- ceedings, held that 'Article 95 of the Treaty year time-limit introduced retroactively in is to be interpreted as precluding a Member place of a previous five-year limitation State from introducing and levying a con- period, a party enjoying a right to recover sumption tax in so far as the taxable a sum paid but not due, based on Commu- amount and the procedure for collecting nity law and resulting from a payment the tax are different for domestic products made prior to the entry into force of the and for products imported from other said provision must bring a legal action?' Member States'. 7
6. Having heard the proceedings on the claim for reimbursement 8 and having regard to the defence advanced by the III — The proceedings before the Court of Justice
5 — Article 4 of Decree-Law No 953 of 30 December 1982 (Official Gazette of the Italian Republic (GURI) No 359, p. 9570), converted into law by Law No 53 of 28 February 1983 (GURI, supplement No 10, p. 1) and subsequently implemented by Ministerial Order of 23 March 1983 (GURI No 83, p. 2326). 6 —LIT 112 236 330 770. 7 — Case C-68/96 Grundig Italiana [1998] ECR I-3775. 8 — That notwithstanding, in a judgment delivered on the same 7. Grundig, the Italian Republic and the date as it issued the order for reference, the Tribunale di Commission have submitted written obser- Trento found that the claim for reimbursement of sums paid prior to 22 July 1988 was time-barred, under the five-year vations in these proceedings, within the limitation period laid down in the last paragraph of Article 4 time-limit set by Article 20 of the EC of Decree Law 953/1982, subsequently converted into law by Law No 53/1983. Statute of the Court of Justice.
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8. Since none of them has sought to make deferred application of the new time-limit oral representations, the Court decided, by 90 days. 10 under Article 104(4) of its Rules of Pro- cedure, to dispense with a hearing.
11. Law No 428 entered into force on 27 January 1991, with the effect that those entitled to bring actions seeking recovery of tax paid but not due on the grounds that it was incompatible with Community law IV — The Italian legal context had, until 27 April of that year, a period of grace in which to bring those actions which were subject to a time-limit of five years.
9. Italian Law No 428 of 29 December 1990 (hereinafter 'the Law' or 'Law No 428'), 9laid down the provisions gov- erning the repayment of certain amounts of tax wrongly levied by the customs auth- orities. V — The question referred
12. The Italian Republic argues that the Tribunale di Trento's question is based on 10. Article 29 of the Law was headed an erroneous interpretation of Article 29( 1 ) 'Repayment of taxes recognised to be of Law No 428 and that consequently, in incompatible with the Community rules'. its view, the Court of Justice is not in a Article 29(1) extended the application of position to furnish a reply. Furthermore, the five-year limitation period laid down by the Commission's reading of the afore- Article 91 of the Consolidated version of mentioned provision is different from that the legislative provisions relating to cus- suggested by the referring court. toms duties to cover all actions brought for the refund of sums paid in connection with customs operations. At the same time, it 10 — The provision reads: 'The five-year period laid down in reduced that time-limit to three years and Article 91 of the Consolidated version of the provisions relating to customs duties [...) shall be deemed to apply to all claims and actions which may be brought for the refund of sums paid in connection with customs operations. That period, and also the limitation period laid down in 9 — Law laying down provisions for the fulfilment of obligations Article 85 of the same instrument, shall be reduced to deriving from Italy's membership of the European Commu- three years as from the 90th day following the entry into nities (GURI, Supplement No 10, p. 5). force of this Law.'
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13. Neither party's position is tenable, 15. The Court of Justice has already given since the Court of Justice has no jurisdic- a reply to that second query. It has held on tion to interpret national law, and still less repeated occasions that, in the absence of a to do so otherwise than as it is interpreted Community provision, it is for Member in the order for reference. In proceedings States to regulate the procedures for pro- for a preliminary ruling the referring court tecting the rights which individuals derive is to be given a reply helpful for the from the legal order of the European purposes of determining the dispute pend- Union. That freedom of regulation vested ing before that court and, to that end, the in the domestic legislative authorities is, Court of Justice has power to rephrase the none the less, subject to an initial limit: the question, but may under no circumstances rules governing the channels for bringing determine how national law is to be inter- actions based on Community law must not preted which is a matter, in all cases, for the be less favourable than those laid down for national court. 11 similar domestic actions. This is what is known as the principle of equivalence. 13
1. The principle of equivalence
16. More specifically, however it has been made clear in point 1 of the operative part 14. The Commission proposes that the of the Aprile judgment, with respect to question be rephrased and, going further Article 29(1) of Law No 428, that 'Com- than the referring court, requests the Court munity law does not preclude the appli- of Justice, in addition to giving a reply on cation of a national provision which, for all the 90-day transitional period, to clarify actions for repayment of customs charges, whether, in terms of the principle of imposes a special time-limit of five, and equivalence, the reduction by two years subsequently three, years, instead of the period for bringing actions is compatible ordinary limitation period of 10 years for with the Community legal order. 12 actions for the recovery of sums paid but not due, provided that that time-limit, which is similar to that imposed for certain 11 — See, as an illustration, Case C-37/92 Vanacker and Lesage taxes, applies in the same way to actions [1993] ECR I-4947, paragraph 7. based on Community law for repayment of 12 —It asks the Court of Justice to reply as follows to the question raised: 'Community law does not preclude the such charges as to those based on national application of a national provision which reduces the time-limit on actions for the recovery of customs duties or law'. 14 taxes which are incompatible with the Community legal order provided that: (a) the time-limit referred to applies equally to actions for recovery based on Community law and to those based on internal law; (b) the national law laying down the reduction in the time-limit from five years 13 — See the judgments, cited above, in Edis, paragraph 34, to three establishes a reasonable transitional period for the SPAC, paragraph 38, Ansaldo Energía and Others, reduction, that is, it enables those concerned to safeguard paragraph 16, Aprile, paragraph 18, and Dilexport, their rights to recover sums paid but not due which arose paragraph 25. whilst the previous legislation was in force.' 14 — Emphasis added.
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17. In any event, as I have already pointed favourable conditions as regards the time- out, the Commission bases itself on an limit for bringing those actions. analysis of the applicable law which differs from that of the Italian court. According to the Commission, on the dates to which the dispute relates, 15 actions for recovery based on national law were subject to a limitation period of five years, under the last paragraph of Article 4 of the afore- 19. In my Opinion in the case in which the mentioned Law No 53/1983, whilst those Court delivered the Aprile judgment, I was under Community law were subject to a called upon to respond to a similar argu- time-limit of three years, by virtue of ment and there stated that 'according to the Article 29(1) of Law No 428. views expressed in the documents before the C o u r t , the a b o v e - m e n t i o n e d provision [18] applies without distinction to all kinds of actions for recovery of payments to customs, whether based on domestic law or on Community law '. 19 The Court of Justice shared that view in its judgment. 20
18. That is not the interpretation given by the Tribunale di Trento, in whose view the five-year limitation period laid down in the 20. Today I am also in a position to assert aforementioned Article 4 of Law No 53 that, as is to be inferred from the order for also operates in the case before it. 16 The reference, Article 29(1) of Law No 428 referring court maintains that from the applies to indirect taxes on goods, and entry into force of that law the five-year treats actions based on Community law in time-limit and, on expiry of the 90-day the same way as those founded on the transitional period, the three-year limit is national legal order. The Corte di Cassa- applicable. It holds that those time-limits zione held this to be so in the judgment I apply likewise to actions not yet brought have partially reproduced in footnote 19, relating to payments wrongly made prior to and the Court of Justice in paragraph 22 of the entry into force of the law, the right to the Aprile judgment. recover which had already accrued by that date. 17 At no time, however, has it sug- gested that actions for recovery based on 18 — I was referring to Article 29(1) of Law No 428. national law might be subject to more 19 — Paragraph 18. I reached that conclusion following the case-law of the Corte di Cassazione (Court of Cassation) itself which, in a judgment of 6 November 1992, held that 'Article 29(1) of Law No 428 of 1990 [...] imposes a single set of rules on the repayment of sums paid but not due m 15— 1993. relation to a large number of duties (indirect taxes on 16 — In its judgment made on the same date as the order for goods) and treats as being the same, for those purposes, reference, it held that the action for recovery of payments both duties collected under national provisions which are made prior to 22 July 1988 was extinguished as a result of incompatible with Community rules and customs import the five-year limitation period. Grundig hrought the action duties, manufacturing and consumption taxes, etc., thus on 22 July 1993 (see the third plea inlaw in the order for avoiding the creation of a irts singulare for Community- reference). related reimbursements which renders them less easy to 17 — Sec the eleventh and twelfth pleas in law in the order for secure'. referral. 20 — See paragraph 22.
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21. So, the Commission's thesis is wrong, tinued to be five years for the first 90 days and, consequently, the issue it raises, which after that entry into force and, on expiry of stem from the principle of equivalence, is that period, became reduced to three years. misplaced. Accordingly, the Court of Jus- tice should not rule on it.
24. The national court's doubt lies in whether the 90-day transitional period is 2. The principle of effectiveness in keeping with the second of the limits on Member States' freedom to regulate pro- cedures for safeguarding the rights which individuals derive from the Community legal order. That constraint consists of the fact that the rules they lay down must not make the exercise of such rights excessively 22. I therefore come back to the point from difficult or virtually impossible. The rule which discussion of this preliminary ques- thus described is known as the principle of tion should never have departed and on effectiveness of Community law. 22 which the Tribunale di Trento had focused.
23. That court bases its view on a specific understanding of the temporal scope of the provision in Article 29(1) of Law No 428. 25. On that point I must refer, once again, In its opinion, the five and three-year to my Opinion in the case which gave rise periods laid down by that provision 21 to the Aprile judgment. I there maintained apply to actions the cause of which arose that changes to the legal rules governing the through sums paid but not due prior to bringing of actions are permissible, pro- 27 January 1991, the date on which the law vided they are general legislative measures entered into force, but which had not yet which allow the persons affected an been brought. According to its reasoning, adequate period conforming with the prin- the period for bringing such actions con- ciple of effective judicial protection. If the change in the law maintains the possibil-
21 — The first from 27 January and 27 April 1991 and the second from that latter date. 22 — See the judgments cited in footnote 13.
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ities of claiming recovery of levies paid and regard to all the factual and legal require- not due at a sufficient level, I do not believe ments, both procedural and substantive, that it should be regarded as incompatible which the domestic legal order imposes for with Community law. 23 the bringing of actions for recovery. Only with that overview, which the Italian courts alone have, is it possible to give a definitive answer.
26. In other words, changes which do not render the exercise of the rights conferred by Community law impossible or excess- ively difficult are not contrary to that law. That answer, which is the only reply the Court of Justice can give to the Italian court, is inherent in the case-law. It is to be found in the judgments in FMC and 28. I have on occasion, it is true, found a Others,24 Edis,25 SP AC,26 Ansaldo Ener- three-year time-limit to be sufficient.30 As gía and Others,27 Aprile28 and Dil- the court which has raised the question in export.29 this case points out, the Court of Justice has found the same period 31 and even a period of one year 32 to be in conformity with Community law, but has in all cases assessed given time-limits on the basis of the principle of equivalence, and never that of effectiveness.33
27. And I say there is no other reply which the Court of Justice can give because the determination of the extent to which changes in the law affect the bringing of actions must, with well-publicised excep- tions, be made on the basis of domestic law. It is not possible to determine whether or not a 90-day transitional period, such as that in the present case, complies with the principle of effectiveness without having 29. The fact is that, since it could not be otherwise and for the reasons I have 23 — Paragraphs 49 and 53. 24 — Paragraph 63 and Article 4 of the operative part of the judgment. 30 — See paragraph 53 of my Opinion in the case which gives rise to tile Aprile judgment. Also paragraph 39 of the 25 — Paragraph 34. Opinion m Dllexport. 26 — Paragraph 18. 31 — Sec, for example, the judgments in Edis, SPAC and Aprile. 27 — Paragraph 16. 32 — Sec the judgment in Palmtstim. 28 — Paragraph 18. 33 — See the operative parts of the judgments cited in the 29 — Paragraph 25. preceding two footnotes.
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already indicated, the Court of Justice has effectiveness of Community law. 37 No held that it falls to the national court to such situation arises in the present case, determine whether, in practice, the appli- however, in which the Italian legislation cable procedure (the same applies as provides for a transitional period of 90 regards the time-limit imposed for the days, the reasonableness of which, in terms bringing of the action) makes it impossible of effectiveness, it is a matter for the or excessively difficult to exercise the rights national court to assess, having regard to conferred by Community law. 34 all the circumstances of fact and law pertaining in the domestic legal order.
31. Mindful of the foregoing consider- ations, I propose that the Court of Justice reply to the Tribunale di Trento that Community law does not preclude the application of a national provision estab- 30. I have on other occasions 35 expressed lishing a transitional period for the entry the doubts I harbour as regards the retro- into force of a new time-limit, shorter than active application of rules such as that in that existing until that time, for persons Article 29(1) of Law No 428. Those doubts entitled to reimbursement of sums paid but turn into certainty in the case of an auto- not due to bring the relevant actions, based matic and retroactive reduction in a limi- on Community law and arising as the result tation period or time-limit, on the grounds of payments made before that national that the reduction is unexpected and provision entered into force, provided that contrary to the principle of the protection the transitional period, by reason of its of legitimate expectations and to the prin- length and of the other procedural and ciple of legal certainty. 36 It would in my substantive circumstances of fact and law submission be contrary to the rule of the present in the national legal order, does not make it virtually impossible or excessively difficult to bring the actions in question. 34 — Paragraph 32, last part, of the Diiexport judgment. 35 — Paragraph 40 of the Opinion in Aprile and paragraph 27 of that in Diiexport. 36 — In the case of Article 29(1) of Law No 428, were it not for 37 — Advocate General Geelhoed expressed a similar view in the 90-day period, parties entitled to bring actions to paragraph 62 of his Opinion delivered on 24 January 2002 enforce rights arising three years prior to entry into force in Case C-62/00, in which judgment has not yet been of the provisions would be fatally deprived of those rights. delivered.
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VI — Conclusion
32. In keeping with the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court of Justice should reply as follows to the question raised by the Tribunale di Trento:
Community law does not preclude the application of a national provision establishing a transitional period for the entry into force of a new time-limit, shorter than that existing until that time, for persons entitled to reimbursement of sums paid but not due to bring the relevant actions, based on Community law and arising as the result of payments made before that national provision entered into force, provided that the transitional period, by reason of its length and of the other procedural and substantive circumstances of fact and law present in the national legal order, does not make it virtually impossible or excessively difficult to bring the actions in question.
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