C-291/00
ECLI:EU:C:2002:27
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OPINION OF MR JACOBS — CASE C-291/00
O P I N I O N O F ADVOCATE GENERAL JACOBS delivered on 17 January 2002 1
1. Under Article 5(l)(a) of the Trade Marks Legislative background Directive 2the proprietor of a registered trade mark may prevent third parties from using in the course of trade any sign which is identical with the trade mark in relation to goods or services identical with those for which it is registered. The Tribunal de Grande Instance (Regional Court), Paris, Community legislation wishes to know whether for that purpose a sign may be considered identical with a trade mark (a) if it reproduces only the distinctive element of the mark or (b) if it 2. Article 4(1) of the Directive provides: reproduces the whole of the mark with the addition of other signs.
'A trade mark shall not be registered or, if registered, shall be liable to be declared invalid:
(a) if it is identical with an earlier trade mark and the goods or services for which the trade mark is applied for or is registered are identical with the goods or services for which the earlier trade mark is protected;
1 — Original language: English. (b) if, because of its identity with, or 2 — First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 similarity to, the earlier trade mark to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks, OJ 1989 L 40, p. 1, hereinafter 'the Directive'. and the identity or similarity of the I - 2802
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goods or services covered by the trade 4. In that regard, the 10th recital in the marks, there exists a likelihood of preamble to the Directive states, inter alia, confusion on the part of the public, that: which includes the likelihood of associ- ation with the earlier trade mark.'
'... the protection afforded by the registered trade mark, the function of which is in 3. Similarly, Article 5(1) provides: particular to guarantee the trade mark as an indication of origin, is absolute in the case of identity between the mark and the sign and goods or services;... the protection applies also in the case of similarity between the mark and the sign and the goods or services;... it is indispensable to 'The registered trade mark shall confer on give an interpretation of the concept of the proprietor exclusive rights therein. The similarity in relation to the likelihood of proprietor shall be entitled to prevent all confusion;... the likelihood of confusion, third parties not having his consent from the appreciation of which depends on using in the course of trade: numerous elements and, in particular, on the recognition of the trade mark on the market, of the association which can be made with the used or registered sign, of the degree of similarity between the trade mark and the sign and between the goods or services identified, constitutes the spe- (a) any sign which is identical with the cific condition for such protection...'. trade mark in relation to goods or services which are identical with those for which the trade mark is registered;
5. In addition, although they are not directly in issue here, it may be noted that Articles 8(1)(a) and (b) and 9(1)(a) and (b) (b) any sign where, because of its identity of the Community Trade Mark Regu- with, or similarity to, the trade mark lation 3 contain provisions substantially and the identity or similarity of the identical to those of, respectively, goods or services covered by the trade Articles 4(1)(a) and (b) and 5(1)(a) and mark and the sign, there exists a (b) of the Directive. likelihood of confusion on the part of the public, which includes the likeli- hood of association between the sign 3 — Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark, OJ 1994 L 11, p. 1, hereinafter and the trade mark.' 'the Regulation'.
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6. Thus, a trade mark is basically accorded 9. Article L.713-3 provides: absolute protection only against other marks or signs which are identical to it and used in respect of products which are identical to those for which it is registered; otherwise a likelihood of confusion must also be established. 'Save where the owner has consented, the following shall be prohibited if there is a risk that they might lead to confusion in the mind of the public:
French legislation
(a) the reproduction, use or affixing of a mark, or the use of a mark which has been reproduced, in respect of goods or services similar to those for which the 7. In France, the law on trade marks is mark is registered; codified in the Code de la Propriété Intel- lectuelle (Intellectual Property Code).
(b) the imitation of a mark or the use of an imitated mark, in respect of products or services identical with, or similar to, 8. Article L.713-2 of the code prohibits 'the those for which the mark is registered.' reproduction, use or affixing of a mark, even with the addition of words such as
10. Those articles were originally intro- duced by Law No 91-7 of 4 January 1991, 4 which was notified by the French auth- "formula, style, system, imitation, type or orities as implementing the Directive. method", or the use of a mark which has been reproduced, in respect of goods or services identical with those for which the 4 — Journal Officiel de la République Française, 6 January mark is registered'. 1991, p. 316; see Article 15(1) and (II).
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Proceedings 13. LTJ Diffusion objects to SADAS's use of the mark 'Arthur et Félicie', which it considers to infringe its own mark 'Arthur', just as it has objected to other trade marks including that name. It has successfully opposed the registration in France, by another company, of the trade mark 'Arthur et Nina' for clothing, footwear and headgear, and its opposition to the regis- 11. LTJ Diffusion is a French company tration requested by SADAS of 'Arthur et which produces and sells various items of Félicie' as a Community trade mark is clothing and the like under the trade name currently pending before a Board of Appeal 'Arthur', which is registered in France (and within the Office for Harmonisation in the also internationally for certain countries) as Internal Market (trade marks and designs) a figurative trade mark in a distinctive, (hereinafter 'the OHIM'). However, its handwritten form, with a dot below the objections to the registration as Commu- initial 'A', for goods of class 25 in the Nice nity trade marks of two other figurative classification 5 (clothing, footwear and marks including the word 'Arthur' have headgear). It uses that name to identify been dismissed by the First Board of Appeal both the articles and the outlets in which since the introduction of the present pro- they are sold. ceedings. 6
12. SADAS is a company which operates a mail order business selling in particular clothing for children including a range 14. In its action before the Tribunal de named 'Arthur et Félicie', a designation Grande Instance, LTJ Diffusion challenges which it has registered in France as a word SADAS's use of its French registered trade trade mark for goods in a number of mark 'Arthur et Félicie' and the validity of classes, including class 25, and which it that registration. 7 It relies essentially on has applied to register as a Community Articles L.713-2 and L.713-3 of the French trade mark. From documents produced by Intellectual Property Code and on the way LTJ Diffusion, the graphic form in which in which the former in particular has been that mark is used by SADAS does not interpreted in the case-law and by legal reproduce the type of handwritten script in writers as covering also cases in which a which the mark 'Arthur' is registered. 6 —Decisions of 25 July 2001 in Case R 1196/2000-1 LTJ Diffusion v Moorbrook Textiles and of 3 October 2001 in 5 — See the Nice Agreement concerning the International Case R 433/2000-1 Marc Brown v LTJ Diffusion. Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of 7 — It appears from what was said at the hearing that, when the Registration of Marks of June 15 1957, as revised at 'Arthur et Félicie' was registered as a French trade mark in Stockholm on July 14 1967, and at Geneva on May 13 1993, there was no procedure available to LTJ Diffusion to 1977, and amended on September 28 1979. oppose registration.
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distinctive element of a complex mark is 16. Written observations have been sub- reproduced or in which either that distinc- mitted by the parties to the main proceed- tive element or the whole mark is repro- ings, the United Kingdom Government and duced together with additions which are the Commission, all of whom, together deemed not to affect its identity. 8SADAS with the French Government, presented impugns that interpretation as inconsistent oral submissions at the hearing. with the terms of the Directive.
15. The national court has stayed the proceedings and requests a preliminary Analysis ruling on the following question:
Scope and context of the question 'Does the prohibition in Article 5(1)(a) of Directive 89/104 of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States cover only identical reproduction, without — The Directive addition or omission, of the sign or signs constituting a mark or can it extend to:
17. As framed, the national court's ques- tion relates exclusively to the right of the (1) reproduction of the distinctive element proprietor of a national trade mark to of a mark composed of a number of prohibit the use of a sign identical to that signs? trade mark in relation to goods or services identical to those for which it is registered (Article 5(1)(a) of the Directive).
(2) full reproduction of the signs making up the mark where new signs are 18. In that context it may be noted that the added?' wording of the French legislation differs noticeably from that of the Directive which it is apparently intended to transpose. That 8 — French lawyers refer to the concepts of 'contrefaçon partielle' (partial infringement) and 'adjonction inopérante' may well be a cause of confusion in French (ineffective addition). In both academic writings and case- courts and may make it more difficult to law, the origin of those concepts dates from a period before the transposition of the Directive into French law. apply that legislation in accordance with
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the Directive. However, it is clear as a identical sign where goods or services are matter of Community law that a national not identical but only similar nor the court which has to interpret such domestic possibility of refusal or invalidation of legislation must do so as far as possible in registration in the same circumstances the light of the wording and purpose of the (Articles 4(1)(b) and 5(1)(b) of the Direc- directive in question, in order to achieve the tive). In such cases, in which a likelihood of result pursued. 9That rule is not contested confusion on the part of the public must be in the present case. established, it is not decisive whether the mark and sign, or the two marks, are themselves identical rather than similar, so that the precise contours of the distinction between identity and similarity will not affect the outcome.
19. The answer to the national court's specific question is also relevant to the grounds on which registration of a trade mark may be refused or declared invalid — The Regulation under Article 4(1)(a), since the criterion of identity — between marks, or between mark and sign — is common to both contexts and the scheme of the Directive calls for a uniform interpretation. (I would stress that the notion of identity to be examined concerns only that between marks, or between mark and sign; when determining identity between goods or 21. In addition, as mentioned above, the services — an issue which is not raised in Community Trade Mark Regulation uses, this case — different considerations may in Articles 8(1)(a) and 9(1)(a), the same be relevant.) criterion as appears in Articles 4(1)(a) and 5(1 )(a) of the Directive and in exactly equivalent contexts. However, LTJ Dif- fusion, having regard to decisions taken by the OHIM, submits that the two sets of provisions should be interpreted differ- ently.
20. However, the Court's ruling will affect neither the right to prohibit use of an
9 — See, for example, with specific regard Co the Directive, Case 22. It argues essentially, first, that the C-3J5/96 Silhouette International Schmied [1998] ECR I-4799, paragraph 36 of the judgment. OHIM cannot be recognised as having
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authority to bind national courts, second, manner — as it clearly did in the field of that in general directives and regulations trade marks — the presumption is very cannot be interpreted in the same way strong indeed that the two measures are because they differ in nature and in the intended to be interpreted in the same way. circumstances of their application and, The fact that they will be applied in third, that a directive whose aim is only different legal and factual circumstances partial harmonisation of national laws, does not detract from that presumption. allowing scope for differences of approach, cannot be interpreted in the same way as a regulation whose aim is to set up a single, uniform, Community regime.
26. It is true that the Directive does not seek to standardise all national trade mark 23. I am unconvinced by those arguments. rules but merely to approximate those provisions which most directly affect the functioning of the internal market. 10How- ever, the Court has held that Articles 5 to 7 of the Directive embody a complete har- monisation of the rules relating to the rights conferred by a trade mark and accordingly define the rights of proprietors 24. Whilst I accept that decisions taken by of trade marks in the Community. 11 the organs of the OHIM in the context of the Regulation cannot bind national courts as regards the interpretation of the Direc- tive, that does not mean that those decisions must necessarily be disregarded; they may none the less be of persuasive authority where they are consistent with rulings of this Court. 27. Moreover, since registration as a Com- munity trade mark must be refused where it clashes with an earlier national trade mark 12but, if valid, confers on the propri- etor rights which may be relied on through-
25. Nor do I agree that a directive and a regulation which use the same criteria and 10 — See in particular the third recital in the preamble to the Directive. the same language in parallel contexts must 11 — See, most recently, the judgment of 20 November 2001 in be interpreted differently simply because Joined Cases C-414/99 to C-416/99 Davidoff and Levi Strauss ECR I-8691, paragraph 39. they are different in nature. On the 12 — Article 8(2)(a)(ii) of the Regulation; the converse — that contrary, when the Community legislature registration as a national mark must be refused if there is a clash with an earlier Community mark — of course takes care to express itself in that follows from Article 4(1) of the Directive.
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out the Community against those using 30. The relevant circumstances are there- identical or similar signs, it is clear that the fore those in which a sign and a registered functioning of the internal market would be trade mark, or two registered marks, are severely undermined if the rights conferred used in relation to identical goods or in each case were to differ to any significant services, with the consequence that the extent. proprietor of the (earlier) mark may exer- cise his rights in accordance with the Directive without having to prove any likelihood of confusion on the part of the public. In those circumstances, what is required to establish that the mark and sign, or the two marks, are identical rather than merely similar?
28. In principle, therefore, I am of the view that the relevant parallel provisions of the Directive and the Regulation fall to be interpreted in the same way.
Meaning of 'identical'
— Concluding remarks on scope and con- text 31. The principles seem clear.
32. All the parties submitting observations, with the exception of LTJ Diffusion, have 29. Finally, the national court's question, argued for a strict interpretation of the by its use of the terms 'reproduction', term 'identical' in the context in issue, and I 'omission' and 'addition', might appear to agree. As the Commission in particular envisage purely a situation in which a points out, it would be very difficult to counterfeiter specifically seeks to exploit reconcile a loose interpretation with the an earlier mark by imitation, manipulation dictionary definitions of the word, in what- or modification. However, it should be ever language, which stress the exact same- stressed that the protection afforded under ness of the things compared. Perhaps more the Directive is in no way dependent on importantly, only a strict interpretation such behaviour but applies also where the appears to be consistent with the scheme, clash is the fortuitous result of ignorance history and context of the provisions in and complete good faith. issue.
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33. Articles 4(1)(a) and 5(1)(a) of the The rights conferred on the proprietor Directive confer unconditional rights on under Article 3(1) applied where marks trade-mark proprietors where the relevant and signs, and goods or services, were elements are all identical; Articles 4(1)(b) identical or similar and where there was 'a and 5(1)(b) confer rights dependent on the serious likelihood of confusion' on the part existence of a likelihood of confusion of the public. It was in 1985 that the where some elements are merely similar. amended proposal 15 removed the con- The 10th recital in the preamble makes it dition of a likelihood of confusion in the clear that trade-mark protection is intended case of identity, following, in particular, to be absolute in the case of identity but the Opinion of the Economic and Social that likelihood of confusion is the specific Committee 16 which had pointed out: 'A condition for the protection to apply in the danger of confusion is not required for the case of similarity. Such absolute, uncon- use of an identical mark to be prohibited... ditional protection — which, as the Com- As far as similar signs are concerned, it is in mission points out, leaves little or no the interests of all economic operators to discretion to the national courts — should focus on the likelihood of confusion in the clearly not be extended beyond those course of trade....' 17 situations for which it was intended if the aim of ensuring freedom of trade and undistorted competition in the internal market is to be achieved. 13
35. The Commission and the United King- dom Government have moreover both referred to Article 16(1) of the 1994 'TRIPs Agreement' (Agreement on Trade-Related 34. As the French Government pointed out Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights), 18 at the hearing, absolute, unconditional which is binding on the Community and protection in the case of identity was not which provides: 'In case of the use of an envisaged in the original Commission pro- identical sign for identical goods or ser- posal for the Directive. 14 In that proposal, vices, a likelihood of confusion shall be the preamble stated that 'the protection presumed'. afforded by the trade marks is bound up with the concept of similarity of signs, similarity of goods and services and the 15 — OJ 1985 C 351, p. 4. possibility of confusion arising therefrom'. 16 — OJ 1981 C 310, p. 22. 17 — Point 4; emphasis in the original. 18 — Set out in Annex 1 C to the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation ('the WTO Agreement'), 13 — See the first recital in the preamble to the Directive. approved on behalf of the Community, as regards matters within its competence, by Council Decision 94/800/EC of 14 — OJ 1980 C 351, p. 1. 22 December 1994, OJ 1994 L 336, p. 1.
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36. Such considerations only confirm a the relevant provisions is predicated essen- conclusion which seems to be dictated by tially on the existence of a likelihood of simple logic. confusion, proof of which is superfluous where both the marks (or the mark and sign) and the products covered are not merely similar but identical. Articles 4(1)(a) and 5(1)(a) of the Directive are intended to apply only in such cases, since likelihood of confusion can be presumed without further investigation. 37. Where rigorously identical signs or marks are used in the course of trade for identical goods or services, it is difficult if not impossible to conceive of circumstances in which all likelihood of confusion could be ruled out. In such cases, it would be both redundant and extravagant to require proof of that likelihood. 40. But that does not yet indicate where the boundary between similarity and identity is to be drawn.
38. Where however there is similarity rather than identity, it is reasonable to limit the rights of the trade-mark proprietor to cases where a likelihood of confusion can be established since, in its absence, 41. Clearly, absolute identity in every their assertion would constitute a restric- detail is covered by Articles 4(1)(a) and tion on freedom of trade and competition 5(1)(a). And in principle, any difference, lacking any basis in the fundamental trade whether it might be viewed as adding, mark law aim of ensuring that a particular removing or modifying any element, must mark unambiguously identifies a particular involve loss of identity. provenance. 19
39. Thus I take the view that the protection 42. Yet it has been rightly stressed in the afforded to trade-mark proprietors under observations to the Court that there may be slight differences between trade marks so that the two are not rigorously identical 19 — For a rather fuller statement of that aim see, for example, Case C-10/89 HAG GF ('HAG II') (1990) ECR I-3711, with, but none the less remain difficult to paragraphs 13 and 14 of the judgment. distinguish from, each other.
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43. I agree that the concept of identity, in different factual circumstances. It has although to be construed strictly, should referred in general to the difficulty of laying take account of the fact that the likelihood down in advance a detailed rule which will of confusion does not diminish, and may always draw the appropriate distinction thus safely be presumed to exist, unless the between the significant and the insignifi- differences between two marks, or between cant, and in particular to the possible use of a mark and a sign, are noticeable. blatantly imitative designations such as 'Imitation X' ('X' being a protected mark). In such cases, proof of likelihood of confusion may be more problematical — a point addressed in the French legislation but not at issue in the present proceed- ings. 21 It therefore advocates the adoption of a general approach which will enable the national court to decide the present case correctly but should not prejudge other, different cases and may be open to further 44. How then is this to be put into prac- refinement. At the hearing, the Commission tice? How is it possible to define the took a broadly similar approach. boundary between what is minimal or insignificant and what is noticeable or significant? SADAS has adduced a number of decisions of French courts in which that boundary seems to have been stretched unacceptably; to cite but one instance, it appears that 'belle à craquer' has been held to infringe the mark 'elle', on the ground that it reproduced the latter in its enti- rety. 2 0
46. Taking account of all those points, I am of the view that the Court should follow with regard to identity the path traced with regard to similarity in particular by its case-law in SABEL 22 and Lloyd, 23 con- centrating on the need for a global assess-
21 — I have touched on it, in somewhat different circumstances, 45. However, citing a number of English in paragraph 56 of my Opinion of 20 September 2001 in Case C-2/00 Hölterhoff, referring there to the final phrase and Scottish examples to illustrate its point, of Article 6(1) of the Directive and to Article 3a(1)(h) of the United Kingdom has warned the Court Council Directive 84/450/EEC of 10 September 1984 relating to the approximation of the laws, regulations and against giving a ruling in the present case administrative provisions of the Member States concerning misleading advertising, OJ 1984 L 250, p. 17, as amended which might have unforeseen implications by Directive 97/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 1997 amending Directive 84/450/EEC concerning misleading advertising so as to include comparative advertising, OJ 1997 L 290, p. 18. 20 — Although from what the French Government said at the 22 — Case C-251/95 SABEL [1997] ECR I-6191, paragraphs 22 hearing, that line of case-law .appears to have been and 23 of the judgment. superseded by a tendency towards a stricter interpretation 23 —Case C-342/97 Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer [1999] ECR of the concept of identity. I-3819, paragraphs 18, 25 and 26 of the judgment.
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ment of the visual, aural (even, in view of 48. It is not necessary or appropriate in the possible new types of trade mark such as context of the present case to express a scent marks, sensory or organoleptic in the definitive view on the treatment in that broad sense) or conceptual features of the regard of a sign such as 'Imitation X', in marks or signs in question and the overall which the element 'X' taken alone may be impression created by them, in particular identical to an earlier mark but 'Imitation by their distinctive and dominant com- X' is not. In such cases, as I have said, it ponents, in the perception of the average might be difficult to establish a likelihood consumer, such a consumer being assumed of confusion on the part of the public, given to be reasonably well-informed, observant the bold denial of identity with 'X'. and circumspect, although often having to Article 5(1)(b) of the Directive might thus rely on an imperfect picture of a mark not apply and, if those cases were also which he has kept in his mind. That does beyond the reach of Article 5(1)(a), it not mean that the concept of identity may would seem difficult to prevent what seems be watered down but that it must be a blatant abuse. However, it may well be assessed on that basis. that the average consumer would perceive a designation such as 'Imitation X' not as a self-contained sign but as the mark 'X' accompanied by an extraneous element.
49. The national court should therefore first identify what it is that is perceived by the average, reasonably well-informed, observant and circumspect consumer as the relevant marks, or the relevant mark and sign, then perform the global assess- 47. Thus a mark and a sign, or two marks, ment described above in order to determine will always be identical where in the light whether the two are likely to be perceived of such an assessment any differences are as the same or merely similar. In the former minute and wholly insignificant, so that the case, the trade mark proprietor's rights will average consumer would not find any be automatically enforceable whereas, in noticeable difference between the two; the latter, it will be necessary to investigate otherwise, they can be regarded as no more further whether there is a likelihood of than similar. confusion.
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50. It is not for this Court to apply that the registration or use of the contested approach to the facts of the case in the sign. 24 main proceedings, since the assessment in question may require specific familiarity with national circumstances. However, I suggest that the reproduction of LTJ Dif- fusion's trade mark 'Arthur' in the same distinctive script but without the dot under the initial 'A' might well have been per- ceived by the average consumer as identical to the original (the change being minute and wholly insignificant), whereas the use of a noticeably different script and/or the addition of another name might be seen as only similar (such changes, at least taken together, being substantial).
52. In that context, I am not swayed by LTJ Diffusion's arguments to the effect that its preferred, broader interpretation would afford smaller undertakings greater protec- tion against the 'imperialism' of larger corporations. On the contrary, it might be expected that the possibility of absolute, unconditional protection extending beyond the strictly identical would be ruthlessly exploited, primarily by those undertakings having the greatest economic power. In that connection, as I recalled in my Opinion in Procter Sc Gamble, 25an Eng- lish judge once pointed out that 'wealthy 51. That approach — which appears also traders are habitually eager to enclose part to be broadly favoured by all those sub- of the great common of the English lan- mitting observations in the present case, guage and to exclude the general public of with the exception of LTJ Diffusion — is the present day and of the future from not unduly restrictive of the trade-mark access to the enclosure'. 26 proprietor's rights. Even where the rela- tionship between marks, or between mark and sign, falls short of that relatively strict 24 — Even then, greater protection may be available, under Article 4(4)(a) or 5(2) of the Directive, for marks having a definition of identity, it will always be open reputation in the Member State concerned. to him to assert his rights by establishing a 25 — Paragraph 77 of the Opinion of 5 April 2001 in Case C-383/99 P, in which judgment was delivered on likelihood of confusion. And if no such 20 September 2001. likelihood exists, there will normally be no 26 — 'Perfection': Joseph Crosfield & Sons' Application (1909) 26 RPC 837 at 854, Court of Appeal, per Cozens-Hardy, rational basis for allowing him to prevent Master of the Rolls.
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Conclusion
53. In the light of the above considerations, I am of the opinion that the Court should give the following answer to the Tribunal de Grande Instance, Paris:
The concept of identity between mark and sign in Article 5(l)(a) of Council Directive 89/104/EEC covers identical reproduction without any addition, omission or modification other than those which are either minute or wholly insignificant.
In reaching its decision in such cases, the national court must first identify what is perceived by the average, reasonably well-informed, observant and circumspect consumer as the relevant mark and sign, then assess globally the visual, aural and other sensory or conceptual features of the mark and sign in question and the overall impression created by them, in particular by their distinctive and dominant components, in order to determine whether the two would be perceived by such a consumer as the same in the sense that any differences are minute or wholly insignificant, or whether the two would be perceived rather as similar in the sense that the differences are greater than that.
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