C-23/01
ECLI:EU:C:2002:212
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ROBELCO
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL RUIZ-JARABO COLOMER delivered on 21 March 2002 1
1. This case seeks to establish whether First 'Robelco', on 20 November 1996 by two Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 De- investment companies. The objects of the cember 1988 to approximate the laws of company comprise, inter alia: the Member States relating to trade marks ('the Trade Mark Directive') 2 contains criteria for application of the provisions relating to protection against the misuse or unlawful use of a sign otherwise than for the purposes of distinguishing goods or services, within the meaning of Article 5(5) thereof. '— carrying out all forms of transaction directly or indirectly related to the purchase, sale, exchange, taking and granting on lease, construction, reno- vation, division into plots, manage- ment and development of all forms of immovable property; Facts
2. The facts which form the background to this case are set out in the order for reference and may be stated as follows. — granting loans with or without a mort- gage, financing property projects, provision of funding and services to undertakings and companies;
3. Robelco NV ('Robelco') was set up as a limited liability company (naamloze ven- nootschap), with the company name
1 — Original language: Spanish. — all forms of property transaction, 2 — OJ 1989 L 40, p. 1. including renting and leasing.'
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According to a number of brochures, In 1998, Robeco Groep managed more Robelco is noted for its property-related than NLG 170 000 million, the majority of activities in the sphere of business parks which was on behalf of institutional inves- and tailor-made projects. tors.
It is common ground that the Robeco trade Robelco's initial share capital was BEF 6 mark has a sizeable reputation with the million but at the end of 1998 its balance Dutch public. sheet recorded a balance of in excess of BEF 1 400 million.
5. On 2 June 1999, Robeco Groep brought an action against Robelco for an order 4. Robeco Groep NV ('Robeco Groep'), restraining the latter from making use of which is engaged in asset management, the sign Robelco, or of any sign similar to came into existence as a Dutch financial Robeco, as a trade name or company name, group in 1929. It markets financial prod- on penalty of a fine of BEF 100 000 per day ucts and services, principally investment of delay in complying with the order. funds quoted on the stock market, and, at international level, it operates through banks and securities institutions.
Robeco Groep claimed that there had been an infringement of Article 13A(l)(d) of the Uniform Benelux Law on Trade Marks (Benelux Merkenwet; 'the Uniform Law'), The Rotterdam Beleggings Consortium and stated that such an act was contrary to began trading under the name 'Robeco' in the principle of fair trading practices. 1959, since when it has registered a number of other words at the Benelux Trade Mark Office, including 'Robeco', 'Rorento', 'Ro- linco', 'Rogiro', 'Rotrusco' and 'Roparco'. Those words were registered in Class 36, which covers financial and monetary matters and services relating to saving and investing. The judgment granted the application.
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Relevant law 2. Any Member State may also provide that the proprietor shall be entitled to prevent all third parties not having his consent from using in the course of trade any sign which is identical with, or similar to, the trade mark in relation to goods or services which are not similar to those for which the trade Community law mark is registered, where the latter has a reputation in the Member State and where use of that sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the 6. Article 5(1), (2) and (5) of the Trade trade mark. Mark Directive provides:
'1. The registered trade mark shall confer on the proprietor exclusive rights therein. The proprietor shall be entitled to prevent all third parties not having his consent from using in the course of trade: 5. Paragraphs 1 to 4 shall not affect provisions in any Member State relating to the protection against the use of a sign other than for the purposes of distinguish- ing goods or services, where use of that sign without due cause takes unfair advantage (a) any sign which is identical with the of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive trade mark in relation to goods or character or the repute of the trade mark.' services which are identical with those for which the trade mark is registered;
National law (b) any sign where, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade 7. Since 1971, the three States of the mark and the sign, there exists a Benelux Economic Union have been subject likelihood of confusion on the part of to the Uniform Law on Trade Marks. 3 the public, which includes the likeli- hood of association between the sign and the trade mark. 3 — See point 5, above.
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8. The original version of Article 13A(1) 10. Since that date, Article 13A(1) has thereof was worded as follows: provided as follows:
'Without prejudice to any application of the ordinary law governing civil liability, 'Without prejudice to any application of the exclusive rights in a trade mark shall the ordinary law governing civil liability, entitle the proprietor to oppose: the exclusive rights in a trade mark shall entitle the proprietor to oppose:
(a) any use, in the course of trade, of the mark in respect of the goods for which the mark is registered;
1. any use of the trade mark or a similar sign in respect of the goods for which the mark is registered or similar goods;
(b) any use, in the course of trade, of the mark or a similar sign in respect of the goods for which the mark is registered or similar goods where there exists a risk of association on the part of the public between the sign and the mark; 2. any other use of the trade mark or a similar sign in the course of trade and without due cause which would be liable to be detrimental to the owner of the trade mark.' (c) any use, in the course of trade and without due cause, of a trade mark which has a reputation in the Benelux countries or of a similar sign for goods which are not similar to those for which the trade mark is registered, where use of that sign would take 9. The amended version of the Uniform unfair advantage of, or would be Law, transposing the Trade Mark Direc- detrimental to, the distinctive character tive, came into force on 1 January 1996. or the repute of the trade mark;
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(d) any use, in the course of trade and meaning of the abovementioned article without due cause, of a trade mark or require that confusion can arise as a of a similar sign other than for the consequence or is likelihood of associ- purposes of distinguishing goods, ation sufficient, in the sense that in the where use of that sign without due minds of those confronted by the trade cause takes unfair advantage of, or is mark and the sign one will suggest the detrimental to, the distinctive character other without any confusion resulting or the repute of the trade mark.' therefrom, or must no likelihood of association at all exist in that regard?'
The questions referred Arguments of the parties
11. During the course of the appeal against the judgment at first instance, the Hof van Beroep (Court of Appeal), Brussels, 12. Written observations were submitted referred the following questions to the by both parties to the proceedings and by Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: the Commission.
'(1) Must Article 5(5) of Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to 13. Robeco Groep contends that the reply approximate the laws of the Member to the first question from the Belgian court States relating to trade marks be inter- should be that the word 'sign', as used in preted as meaning that the possibility Article 5(5) of the Directive, refers to both laid down therein for protection by identical and similar signs and that, under Member States can be afforded only that provision, it is for national legislation against the use of a sign which is to define the degree of similarity required. identical to the trade mark or can it also be afforded in that case against the use of a sign similar to the trade mark?
14. In reply to the second question, Robeco Groep maintains that Article 5(5) of the Directive stipulates clearly the conditions (2) If that protection can also be afforded which give rise to its application ('use against a sign similar to the trade mark, without due cause' 'of a sign' 'which takes does unlawful similarity within the unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to,
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the trade mark') and asserts that it is not restrictive interpretation of the powers of possible to infer any additional conditions, the Member States accords with the har- such as the likelihood of confusion or of monisation objective of the Directive. association raised by the referring court. 4 Otherwise, under Article 5(5), a sign with- out a reputation would be eligible for protection comparable to that afforded to a trade mark with a reputation under Article 5(2). 15. For its part, the focus of Robelco's argument is the distinction between the likelihood of confusion and the likelihood of mere association. Confusion exists where the public confuses the sign with 18. The Commission submits that the the trade mark (direct confusion) or con- Court should reply that the purpose of fuses the proprietor of the sign with the Article 5(5) of the Directive is to exclude proprietor of the trade mark (indirect from harmonisation certain forms of pro- confusion). Mere association exists where tection which are afforded under the legal the perception of the sign evokes the trade systems of the Member States, including mark but does not become confused with the p r o t e c t i o n p r o v i d e d for in it. Article 13A(l)(d) of the Uniform Benelux Law on Trade Marks.
16. Robelco agrees that Article 5(5) of the 19. The Commission starts from the prem- Directive is not a provision of trade mark iss that the referring court has described law. However, Robelco asserts that mere correctly the facts of the dispute — con- similarity is not sufficient and that, in order flict between the proprietor of a trade mark to activate the special type of protection and the proprietor of a company name, concerned, the sign must be identical to the where there is no similarity between the trade mark. To find otherwise would mean goods or services concerned — as being that it would be necessary to prove in each the use of a sign otherwise than for the case that there exists a likelihood of purposes of distinguishing goods or ser- confusion. vices, from which it follows that Article 5(5) is material.
17. Robelco takes the view that the word 'sign' in Article 5(5) must be construed in 20. From an analysis of the scheme of the the same way as it is in Article 5(l)(b); in provision, and in the light of the working other words, the sign must correspond to documents, the Commission concludes that the trade mark. Robelco claims that that the scope of Article 5(5) falls completely outside the remit of Community harmon- isation. Accordingly, the national court is entitled to interpret freely the relevant 4 — In the light of the judgment in Case C-251/95 Sabel [1997] ECR1-6191. national measures in force.
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21. In the alternative, the Commission 24. Article 5 of the Trade Mark Directive, proposes that the Court should declare that which is headed 'Rights conferred by a Article 5(5) of the Directive does not trade mark', sets out schematically the require any similarity between a sign and levels of protection available to a trade the trade mark concerned. Therefore, mark proprietor and creates a clear division according to the Commission, the question of powers between those matters which fall is not whether there exists a likelihood of within the harmonised Community sphere confusion or of association but, rather, and those matters which continue to be whether an unfair advantage is obtained governed by national law. owing to the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark, or whether there is detriment to the trade mark.
25. Article 5(1) defines the typical content of the exclusive rights in a trade mark, namely the entitlement to prohibit use of an identical sign for the same goods or ser- vices, as in the case of infringement (sub- Analysis of the questions referred paragraph (a)), and to prohibit use of a similar sign for goods or services which are also similar, where there is a likelihood of confusion, or merely of association, on the part of the public (subparagraph (b)).
22. The Hof van Beroep seeks guidance on what degree of similarity between a sign and a trade mark is required to trigger the application of Article 5(5) of the Directive (first question) and on whether, for the same purposes, that similarity must be 26. That is the essential purpose of trade accompanied by a likelihood of confusion mark law: to protect the accuracy of the or of association (second question). information which a registered sign pro- vides about the commercial origin of spe- cific goods.
23. The doubts harboured by the national court do not stem from the wording of the Directive but rather from uncertainty about 27. Article 5(2) extends that protection to whether the provision was transposed cor- trade marks which have a reputation in a rectly into Benelux law and about whether particular territory by permitting Member the legal practices developed prior to the States to prohibit, in such cases, the use of a entry into force of the Directive continue to similar sign, even if there is no connection apply. between the goods or services, where there
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is an attempt to take unfair advantage of 30. It is important, however, in the sphere the repute of the trade mark or where there of trade marks, to delimit the boundary is a likelihood of detriment to its propri- which separates the scope of application of etor. In that way, both the right of the Community law from that of national law. public to be informed about the precise That boundary does not embody an origin of the goods marketed to them and attempt on the part of the Community the right of the trade mark proprietor to legislature to separate trade mark law in protect its goodwill are safeguarded. the strict sense from other related disci- plines, because it is well-known that the approximation of laws is not complete.5
28. Article 5(5) excludes from the scope of the Directive provisions of national law which protect against use of a sign other- 31. Article 5 of the Directive establishes wise than for the purpose of distinguishing two boundaries, one positive and one goods, where such use results in an unfair negative. In the positive sense, the right to advantage on account of the reputation of prohibit use of identical or similar signs for the trade mark or its capacity to distin- identical or similar products, where there is guish, or where it is detrimental to the trade a likelihood of confusion, is a harmonised mark. right of trade mark proprietors. In the negative sense, the strengthened protection of the distinctive character and goodwill of trade marks which have a reputation and the rules relating to use of a sign in a way which is not designed to identify the origin of goods or services are not subject to approximation at Community level. 29. The parties have explored, in varying depths, the application of Article 5(5) to trade mark law. Personally, I do not think that such an assessment has any fundamen- tal importance. While their cognitive use- fulness is undeniable, legal disciplines are always somewhat arbitrary and their boundaries ill-defined, causing them to 32. I must admit to being somewhat undergo frequent spatial and temporal puzzled by the wording of Article 5(5) of alterations. Accordingly, although it may the Directive which, as the Commission has be appropriate to consider that trade mark observed, appears to have been included law covers only those matters which relate primarily to accommodate a similar provi- essentially to the distinguishing function of trade marks, it is not unreasonable to imagine a wider category which 5 — As stated in the preamble to the Directive: "... it does not encompasses the whole range of conflicts appear to be necessary at present to undertake full-scale approximation of the trade mark laws of the Member States which might arise in relation to a trade and it will be sufficient if approximation is limited to those national provisions of law which most directly affect the mark. functioning of the internal market' (third recital).
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sion in the Benelux Uniform Law. 6 Where would require an assessment of the practi- a sign is not used, directly or indirectly, cal effects of the different types of conduct subliminally or unintentionally, to identify concerned, rather than of predetermined goods or services, I fail to see what categories. 8 relevance it can have to trade for the purposes of trade mark law. The fact that the sign concerned is not used as a trade mark in the formal sense is another matter. If Article 5(5) were interpreted in that way, 34. The situation where a sign is used it could, for example, be relied on to otherwise than for the purpose of distin- exclude from harmonisation provisions of guishing the origin of goods or services is national law governing comparative adver- not covered by Article 5(1), which refers to tising or the misuse of company names. 7 the identification of goods and services, and is instead specifically caught by the reser- vation in favour of the legislatures of the Member States laid down in Article 5(5). That area is outside the scope of the Directive, which, furthermore, and for the avoidance of any doubt, confers on the Member States the power to legislate on such matters.
33. The referring court has decided that it 35. It is also stipulated in the Directive that is faced with the second case, a conclusion such a sign, if not used to distinguish goods not challenged by any of the parties. I will or services, must be used to take advantage therefore restrict myself to that hypothesis. of the reputation of, or to the detriment of, I have no evidence at my disposal which a third party. That would be the most likely would lead me to an alternative view, nor case in practical terms but, even without does an analysis of the questions referred that requirement, I fail to see how the force me to conclude otherwise. However, Directive could apply to a situation where a the question whether, like a trade mark, a sign is used otherwise than for the purpose company name may be used, in the course of distinguishing goods or services. of trade, to distinguish services in particu- lar, and what bearing the reply to that question might have on Community law are issues which are both interesting and problematic. I believe that such an analysis 36. It is, however, beyond doubt that the reservation in Article 5(5) is not con- 6 — Article 13A(1)1 of the original version of the Uniform Law. The current version of Article 13A(1)(d) follows the same idea but is based more on the terms of the Directive (sec 8 — The Benelux Court decided that issue in its judgment in point 8 et seq. above). Case A87/3 Omnisport v Bauweraerts (Jurisprudence de la 7 — That docs not apply to an advertisement concerning repair Cour de justice Benelux 1988, p. 90), holding that use of a and maintenance of a particular make of car, in which case company name is, in principle, not apt to distinguish it must be considered mat the mark is being used to identify products or services, as the public does not associate the the origin of the products to which the service relates (Case company name with the goods sold or offered by the C-63/97 BMW [1999] ECR I-905, paragraphs 38 and 39). undertaking.
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ditional on any other requirement. The 39. Second, although it is true that, for provision makes no reference at all to the Article 5(1) and (2) of the Directive to degree of similarity which the sign must apply, there must be a certain degree of display in relation to the trade mark. That similarity between the two signs concerned, being the case, it is clear that the Member it is equally true that the rationale of States may adopt no legislation at all in that Article 5(5) is different, so that there are regard; alternatively, they may require a no grounds for transposing to the scope of sign and a trade mark to be identical, they provisions on trade mark protection, in the may determine that similarity, however case of use of signs otherwise than for the minimal, will suffice, or equally they may purpose of distinguishing goods, elements specify any other conceivable connection. which are justified on the basis that they do perform that function.
37. There is no need to go into the silence in the legislation as to the nature of the 40. Finally, for similar reasons, it is not connection between the sign concerned and appropriate to compare the powers con- the trade mark, as the referring court ferred on Member States under Article 5(2) would wish. Nor is it appropriate to trans- with those referred to in Article 5(5), pose to paragraph (5) the wording of the because the latter only apply to the previous paragraphs of Article 5, or to restricted sphere of use of a sign otherwise compare its scope with that of paragraph than for the purposes of distinguishing (2), as Robelco claims. goods and services.
38. First of all, defining what relationship must exist between a sign and a trade mark 41. I should also add that, in my opinion, would lead inevitably, and with absolutely there is nothing in the wording of no basis in law, to a restriction of the Article 13A(l)(d) of the Uniform Law freedom of action which the Council which would support the view that the granted to the Member States in areas such Benelux legislature exceeded the powers as unfair competition, consumer protection expressly reserved to it under Community and civil liability. trade mark law.
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Conclusion
In the light of the foregoing considerations, I propose that, in reply to the questions referred for a preliminary ruling by the Hof van Beroep, Brussels, the Court of Justice should declare that:
'Article 5(5) of Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks does not require a specific degree of similarity between a sign and the trade mark concerned, that being a matter which falls within the exclusive powers of the Member States.'
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