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Súdny dvor Európskej únie·12.9.2002

C-44/01

ECLI:EU:C:2002:482

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Súdny dvor Európskej únie
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62001CC0044

PIPPIG AUGENOPTIK

OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL TIZZANO delivered on 12 September 2002 1

1. By order lodged on 2 February 2001, the The legal framework Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court), Vienna, Austria, referred a number of questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of Directive 84/450/EEC 2 relating to the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning misleading The relevant Community provisions advertising, as amended by Directive 97/55/EC 3so as to include comparative advertising (in the following observations, I shall refer to Directive 84/450/EEC, as amended, simply as 'Directive 84/450' or 'the directive'). By these questions, the 2. The purpose of Directive 84/450 is to referring court seeks to ascertain, in par- 'protect consumers, persons carrying on a ticular, the conditions under which com- trade or business or practising a craft or parative advertising is to be regarded as profession and the interests of the public in permissible within the meaning of the general against misleading advertising and directive and the extent to which Member the unfair consequences thereof and to lay States may introduce more restrictive meas- down conditions under which comparative ures in this connection. advertising is permitted' (Article 1).

3. 'Misleading advertising' is defined in Article 2(2) as 'any advertising which in any way, including its presentation, deceives or is likely to deceive the persons 1 — Original language: Italian. to whom it is addressed or whom it reaches 2 — C o u n c i l Directive 84/450/EEC of 10 September 1984 and which, by reason of its deceptive relating to the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning nature, is likely to affect their economic misleading advertising (OJ 1984 L 250, p. 17). behaviour or which, for those reasons, 3 — Direcrive 97/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 1997 amending Directive 84/450/EEC injures or is likely to injure a competitor'; concerning misleading advertising so as to include com- parative advertising (OJ 1997 L 290, p. 18; deadline for in determining whether advertising is mis- implementation: 23 April 2000). leading, Article 3 states that account must

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be taken of all its features. 4 However, (a) it is not misleading according to Article 7(1) provides that the directive Articles 2(2), 3 and 7(1); 'shall not preclude Member States from retaining or adopting provisions with a view to ensuring more extensive protection, with regard to misleading advertising, for consumers, persons carrying on a trade, business, craft or profession, and the gen- eral public'. (b) it compares goods or services meeting the same needs or intended for the same purpose;

4. Comparative advertising is defined in Article 2a of the directive as 'any advertis- (c) it objectively compares one or more ing which explicitly or by implication material, relevant, verifiable and rep- identifies a competitor or goods or services resentative features of those goods and offered by a competitor'. In that connec- services, which may include price; tion, Article 3a of the directive provides as follows:

(d) it does not create confusion in the market place between the advertiser and a competitor or between the advertiser's trade marks, trade names, ' 1 . Comparative advertising shall, as far as other distinguishing marks, goods or the comparison is concerned, be permitted services and those of a competitor; when the following conditions are met:

4 — Among the features to be taken into account, that Article mentions in particular: (a) the 'characteristics of goods or services, such as their availability, nature, execution, com- position, method and date of manufacture or provision, fitness for purpose, uses, quantity, specification, geographi- cal or commercial origin or the results to be expected from their use, or the results and material features of tests or checks carried out on the goods or services'; (b) the 'price or (e) it does not discredit or denigrate the the manner in which the price is calculated, and the conditions on which the goods are supplied or the services trade marks, trade names, other dis- provided'; and (c) the 'nature, attributes and tights of the tinguishing marks, goods, services, advertiser, such as his identity and assets, his qualifications and ownership of industrial, commercial or intellectual activities, or circumstances of a com- property rights of his awards and distinctions'. petitor;

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(f) for products with designation of origin, ensured at national level, with regard to it relates in each case to products with misleading advertising, for consumers, per- the same designation; sons carrying on a trade, business, craft or profession, and the general public, Article 7(2) provides that that paragraph, 'shall not apply to comparative advertising as far as the comparison is concerned'. The reason for that provision is given in par- ticular in the 18th recital in the preamble to (g) it does not take unfair advantage of the Directive 97/55, where it is explained that reputation of a trade mark, trade name the provision on the introduction of more or other distinguishing marks of a restrictive national measures 'should not competitor or of the designation of apply to comparative advertising, given origin of competing products; that the objective of amending the said directive is to establish conditions under which comparative advertising is per- mitted'.

(h) it does not present goods or services as imitations or replicas of goods or services bearing a protected trade mark or trade name. The relevant national provisions

2. Any comparison referring to a special 6. Directive 97/55 was transposed in Aus- offer shall indicate in a clear and unequivo- tria by means of an amendment to the law cal way the date on which the offer ends or, on unfair competition (Bundesgesetz gegen where appropriate, that the special offer is den unlauteren Wettbewerb, hereinafter subject to the availability of the goods and referred to as the 'UWG') which entered services, and, where the special offer has into force on 1 April 2000. However, the not yet begun, the date of the start of the provisions of the UWG were already being period during which the special price or interpreted in the case-law in the light of other specific conditions shall apply'. the provisions on comparative advertising contained in Directive 84/450.

5. For present purposes, it should be noted that although, as we have seen, Article 7(1) 7. According to the order for reference, allows more extensive protection to be before the abovementioned amendment

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entered into force, the second sentence of of origin and that any comparison referring Paragraph 2(1) of the UWG stated that to a special offer must indicate in an comparative price advertising 5 was permis- unequivocal way the period during which sible, so long as it did not infringe Para- the offer was to apply and state, where graph 2(1) itself or Paragraph 1 of the appropriate, that it would last only for so UWG. Paragraph 2(1) provided in particu- long as the goods and services were avail- lar that an injunction may be brought able. against any trader who, to gain a com- petitive advantage, makes statements which are liable to mislead consumers; Paragraph 1 on the other hand, so far as we are given to understand, imposed a general obligation of correct conduct (understood to mean respect for current usage) in business relations. Facts and procedure

9. The main proceedings concern a dispute between Pippig Augenoptik GmbH & Co. KG (hereinafter referred to as 'Pippig') and Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH (here- inafter referred to as 'Hartlauer') and the estate of Franz Josef Hartlauer, deceased, former managing director of Hartlauer.

8. From 1 April 2000, in order to give full effect to the directive, Paragraph 2(2) of the UWG was partly amended, the new version 10. Pippig is a firm of specialist opticians, stating that comparative advertising was with three shops in Linz, selling well- permitted so long as it complied not only known brands of spectacles. It obtains with Paragraphs 1 and 2(1) but also with supplies direct from the manufacturers, Paragraphs 7 and 9(1) and (3) concerning the with whom it has a permanent relationship, prohibition on discrediting competitors, and it has a representative selection of the creating confusion with their distinguishing various brands in each of its shops. marks and taking unfair advantage of their reputation. At the same time a new Para- graph 2(3) was added, providing that in any case comparative advertising must refer only to products with the same designation 11. Hartlauer, on the other hand, is a 5 — The order for reference appears to imply that the provision major distribution chain with large stores in question was interpreted broadly in the Austrian case- throughout Austria, selling products of law, which in practice extended its scope to comparative advertising of any kind. various kinds (electronic goods, computers, I - 3102

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telephones, photographic and optical also made a specific comparison between goods, etc.). Hartlauer stores have optical the price of ATS 5 785 charged by Pippig divisions (more than 100 in all), which also for an Eschenbach flexible titanium frame sell little-known brands of spectacles at low with Zeiss bifocal lenses and the price of prices. As regards the more famous brands ATS 2 000 charged by Hartlauer for the (about 5% of the total), Hartlauer has no same frame with lenses having equivalent direct relationship with the manufacturers features made by Optimed (a less well but obtains supplies through parallel known firm). The same comparison was imports, with the result that only a few also made in a number of commercials models of each brand and a limited number broadcast on various radio and television of examples are generally available in its channels in September 1997 but in this case optical divisions. the brands of the spectacle lenses were not compared and it was not made clear that different brands were involved.6 The televi- sion commercials also included shots of Pippig's shop with the company logo.

12. In September 1997, Hartlauer arranged for a leaflet to be distributed throughout Austria, with a print run of almost two million, advertising its own optical prod- ucts as compared with spectacles on sale at specialist opticians. The leaflet claimed in particular that 52 price comparisons with 14. According to the information provided various Austrian opticians showed that by the referring court, the said comparison spectacles sold by Hartlauer cost ATS was carried out by means of a test purchase 204 777 less overall (on average ATS 3 900 made on 8 July 1997 from one of Pippig's less per pair of spectacles). The leaflet also shops by one of Hartlauer's employees, stated that an optician's profit on the sale who asked to have that particular type of of Zeiss lenses amounted to 717% and that rare and very expensive Zeiss lenses set in the low prices charged by Hartlauer were the Eschcnbach frame. The test spectacles the reason for the constant attacks levelled were collected on 1 August and were then against it by the optical industry. photographed for the advertising leaflet, where they appeared twice, representing

6 — The script of the radio commercial ran as follows: "... here is the result of this new price comparison: on 1 August a pair of near-vision spectacles with the same dioptric iniinher and the same Fschenbach frame cost 5 785 Scnillngs at Pippn; of Linz/ and 2 000 Schillings at Hartlauer. The same goes foi- am· other pair of near-vision or distance spectacles, 'the difference, the price difference, is clear. Yours, Franz Joser Hartlauer...'. The content of the television commercial was smular: 'What does this pair of spectacles cost, including the lenses? At this optician's on the Landstraße in Linz, more than 5 700 Schillings. From me, only 2 000 Schillings. The 13. In addition to these general compari- same goes for any other pair of near-vision or distance sons with specialist opticians, the leaflet spectacles. Yours, Vranz Josef Hartlauer...'.

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both the Pippig and the Hartlauer models. (ii) whether the comparison between a Apparently, Eschenbach frames in flexible b r a n d - n a m e p r o d u c t purchased titanium were not yet on sale in Hartlauer directly from the manufacturer and stores when the test purchase was made. the same product obtained through They became available only later and, even parallel import is a comparison of like then, in small numbers and not in all with like; colours and sizes.

15. Considering itself to be injured by such comparative advertising, Pippig brought an action claiming that the court should (iii) whether a comparison by means of a declare it to be unlawful; authorise the test purchase, made before the offer publication of the judgment to that effect in from the person making the compari- various national newspapers; prohibit the son opened and presented in such a broadcasting of similar advertising in manner as to maximise the price dif- future; and lastly order Hartlauer to pay ference, is lawful; damages. Pippig's first two claims were partly accepted by the court before which the action was brought, in a judgment which was subsequently largely upheld on appeal.

(iv) whether a comparison which gives the general impression that specialist opti- cians charge excessive prices is such as 16. All the parties lodged extraordinary to discredit those opticians. applications for review before the Oberster Gerichtshof. According to the order for reference, four main questions were raised before that court, namely:

17. As there are now specific Community (i) whether the comparison between spec- rules on comparative advertising, in order tacles with brand-name lenses and no- to resolve those issues, the Oberster Ger- name lenses is lawful; ichtshof therefore considered it necessary to

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refer the following questions to the Court Is Article 3a(1)(a) of the directive to be of Justice for a preliminary ruling: interpreted as meaning that the comparison of the price of a brand- name product with the price of a non-name product of equivalent quality is not permitted where the name of the manufacturer is not indi- cated, or do Article 3a(1)(c) and '1. Is Article 7(2) of Directive 97/55/EC of Article 3a(1)(g) of the directive pre- the European Parliament and of the clude indication of the manufacturer? Council of 6 October 1997 amending Is the image of a (brand-name) product Directive 84/450/EEC concerning mis- a feature of the product/service within leading advertising so as to include the meaning of Article 3a1l)(c) of the comparative advertising ("the direc- directive? Does it follow from a (poss- tive") to be interpreted to the effect ible) negative answer to this question that "comparative advertising, as far as that any (price) comparison of a brand- the comparison is concerned" means name product with a no-name product the statements regarding the product of equivalent quality is not permitted? offered by the advertiser himself, the statements regarding the product offered by the competitor and the statements regarding the relationship between the two products (the result of the comparison)? Or is there a "comparison" within the meaning of 2. Is Article 7(2) of the directive to be Article 7(2) of the directive only in so interpreted as meaning that differences far as the statements are made regard- in the procurement of the product/ ing the result of the comparison, with service whose features are compared the consequence that misconceptions with features of the advertiser's prod- regarding other features of the com- uct/service must also be assessed solely pared goods/services may be assessed on the basis of Article 3a of the on the basis of a national standard directive? governing misleading statements which is possibly more strict?

If this question is answered in the affirmative: Is the reference in Article 3a(1)(a) of the directive to Article 7(1) of the directive a lex specialis in relation to Article 7(2) of the directive, with the result that a national standard govern- ing misleading statements which is possibly more strict may be applied to Is Article 3a of the directive to be all elements of the comparison? interpreted as meaning that a (price)

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comparison is permitted only if the price comparisons are repeatedly made compared goods are procured through with the result that the impression is the same distribution channels and are created that the prices of the competi- thus offered by the advertiser and his tor(s) are generally excessive? competitor(s) in a comparable selec- tion?

Is Article 3a(l)(e) of the directive to be interpreted as meaning that the infor- mation on the identification of the 3. Is "comparison" within the meaning of competitor must be restricted to the Article 7(2) of the directive to be extent absolutely necessary and it is construed as including the creation of therefore not permitted if, in addition the bases for comparison through a test to the competitor's name, its company purchase? logo (if it exists) and its shop are shown?'

If this question is answered in the affirmative: 18. In the proceedings instituted before the Court, in addition to the parties in the main proceedings, the Austrian Government and the Commission intervened. The interven- ing parties, with the exception of the Austrian Government, made their sub- Is Article 3 a of the directive to be missions at the hearing on 23 April 2002. interpreted as meaning that the deliber- ate initiation of a (price) comparison which is favourable to the advertiser through a test purchase which is made before the beginning of the advertiser's own offer and is arranged accordingly makes the comparison unlawful? Legal analysis

4. Is a comparison discrediting within the The first question meaning of Article 3a(l)(e) of the directive if the advertiser selects the goods purchased from the competitor in such a way that a price difference is 19. The first question raises a number of obtained which is greater than the points designed to ascertain, on the one average price difference and/or if such hand, whether a national standard that is

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stricter than the Community rules may be far as we are given to understand, they applied to comparative advertising and, on found that the advertising material com- the other, whether the name of the manu- paring the price charged by Pippig for the facturers must be indicated when compar- Eschenbach frame with Zeiss bifocal lenses ing the price of a brand-name product with and the price charged by Hartlaucr for the the price of a no-name product of equival- same frame with lenses with equivalent ent quality. It will be best to consider these features made by Optimed (a much less two aspects separately, starting with the well known brand) was not permitted in second, in order to preserve a logical cases where there was no indication of the sequence. brand names of the lenses in the spectacles that were being compared. 8 In this con- nection, the referring court is seeking essentially to ascertain, first, whether such comparative advertising is misleading and therefore not permitted under Article 3a(l)(a) of the directive and, sec- ond, whether in such a situation the (a) As to whether the name of the manu- provisions of Article 3a(l)(c) and (g) pre- facturers must be indicated when compar- clude indication of the brand names of the ing the price of a brand-name product with lenses in the spectacles that are being the price of a no-name product of equival- compared. ent quality

20. With regard to this aspect of the 21. On the first point, Hartlaucr contends question, the referring court is in fact that Article 3a(l)(a) of the directive docs starting from the conclusion reached by not require any indication of the brand the national courts of first and second names of the products that are being instance that price comparisons between compared, if only because in many cases brand-name products and no-name (or, to such a requirement would make com- be more precise, less well known brand- parative advertising excessively difficult, if name) 7 products of equivalent quality are not impossible. Pippig and the Commission not permitted if the names of the manu- maintain that, on the contrary, the brand of facturers are not indicated. In particular, so the lenses is one of the factors determining the consumers' choice when they come to purchase a pair of spectacles; they therefore 7 — It is clear from the observations or all the parties intervening in the present case (including observations in response to a take the view that advertising material such specific question asked by the Court in the course of the hearing) and from the order for reference itself that, when as the material at issue, which compares the the national court speaks of 'no-nanic* products, it in fact means less well known brand-name products (in this case, price of spectacles without giving any Optimed lenses). I should make it clear in this connection that I use the term 'brand-name' here in a non-technical sense as a generic term for any distinguishing mark, since it is not clear whether the marks at issue in this case are registered trade marks, de facto trade marks, trade names, 8 — It appears that it was not made clear m the radio .ilul or other distinguishing marks. television commercials that the price comparison was between spectacles with lenses of different bramis.

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indication as to the brand names of the a competitor. 10 The Court has therefore lenses, should be held to be misleading. The held that in order to determine whether Austrian Government expressed substan- advertising is misleading it is in principle tially the same sentiments, though not in necessary to take 'into account the pre- such clear terms. sumed expectations of an average con- sumer who is reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circum- spect'. 11

23. On those criteria, 12 it therefore seems to me obvious that advertising material of the kind at issue in the present case, 22. To my mind, the second view is cer- comparing the retail price charged by two tainly more convincing. 'Misleading adver- traders for a pair of spectacles and stating tising' is defined in Article 2(2) of the that the frames are the same and that the directive as 'any advertising which in any lenses have the same features but not that way, including its presentation, deceives or the lenses have different brand names, one is likely to deceive the persons to whom it is very familiar to the public and the other addressed or whom it reaches and which, not, is misleading. 13 Such advertising is in by reason of its deceptive nature, is likely to fact likely to deceive an average consumer affect their economic behaviour or which, who is reasonably well-informed and rea- for those reasons, injures or is likely to sonably observant and circumspect, who injure a competitor'. For advertising to be may be led to believe that the price considered misleading within the meaning comparison relates to the same pair of of Article 2(2), it is therefore enough that spectacles with the same frames and the there be a likelihood that it will deceive same lenses. Consequently, as the brand consumers and affect 9 their economic behaviour or, for those reasons, injure 10 — The possible injury to competitors does not in fact appear to be a necessary condition for declaring advertising to be misleading, since the provision appears to require that the 9 — With reference to the verb 'pregiudicare' used in the Italian injury be consequent upon deceiving consumers and version of that provision, I consider that it should be affecting their economic behaviour, that is to say two interpreted in the neutral sense of 'incidere' (as in the other factors that are sufficient in themselves to qualify advertis- language versions: 'affect' in English, 'affecter' in French, ing as misleading. 'afectar' in Spanish, 'beeinflussen' in German, etc.), without 11—Judgment in Case C-210/96 Gut Sprmgenbeide [1998] attaching any derogatory meaning to the effect on the ECR 1-4657, paragraph 31. economic behaviour of consumers (on the need to take account of the various language versions when interpreting 12 — On the problems associated with the application of a provisions of Community law, see, among many others, the stricter national standard in national legislation, see judgment handed down by the Court in Case C-268/99 Jany points 34 to 47 below. and Others [2001] ECR 1-8615, paragraph 47, and the 13 — See in this connection the script of Hartlauer's radio and judgments cited therein). television commercial, reproduced in footnote 6 above.

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name of the lenses is undoubtedly one of 25. Having explained that, in my view, the factors that may affect the consumers' advertising of the kind at issue must be choice when they purchase a pair of considered misleading because it gives no spectacles, it follows that the misleading indication as to the brand names of the nature of such advertising may also affect lenses in the spectacles that were being their economic behaviour and thus injure compared, in order to reply to the referring the competitor named in the material. I court it must also be determined whether therefore take the view that failure to the provisions contained in Article 3a(1)(c) mention the brand name of the lenses and (g) preclude indication of brand names makes advertising material of the kind at in such cases. In particular, since issue misleading. Article 3a(1)(c) provides that, to be per- mitted, comparative advertising must objectively compare one or more material, relevant, verifiable and representative fea- tures of the products in question, the referring court wants to know whether the brand name may be such a feature. It then asks whether indication of the brand name is precluded by the provision con- tained in Article 3a(1)(g) that the product advertised must not take unfair advantage of the reputation of a trade mark, trade name or other distinguishing marks of a competitor or of the designation of origin of competing products. 24. Nor do I think there is any merit in Hartlauer's contention that a requirement to indicate the brand names of the products that are being compared would make comparative advertising excessively dif- ficult, if not impossible: that, for example, 26. On this point, the intervening parties it would be impossible to compare the agree that the two provisions in question do prices of two cars of the same make if the not preclude indication of the brand names brand names of all the accessories (tyres, of competing products. Hartlauer and the stereo system, alarm system, etc.) had to be Austrian Government observe, in particu- indicated. I agree that such a requirement lar, that the possibility of including such might be excessive in cases where it meant information in advertising material is indicating the brand names of a great implicitly admitted by the provisions of number of accessories that have little the directive, which state that comparative bearing on the consumers' choice but that advertising is permitted on condition that it certainly cannot be said of material and does not create confusion between the crucial components of the product, which is advertiser's trade marks, trade names or precisely what spectacle lenses are. Also, in other distinguishing marks and those of the present case, indicating the brand name competitors; that it does not discredit or of the lenses would obviously not have denigrate those trade marks, trade names made the comparison impossible, since the or other distinguishing marks; that it does brand name is clearly indicated in the not take unfair advantage of their repu- advertising leaflets. tation; and that it does not present goods or

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services as imitations or replicas of goods missibility of comparative advertising sub- or services bearing a protected trade mark ject to a number of conditions designed to or trade name (Article 3a(l)(d), (e), (g) and prevent it from giving rise to unfair com- (h)). They also point out that the possibility petition. I also agree that the possibility of of indicating the brand names of competi- indicating the brand names of competing tors' products is expressly recognised in the products is clearly confirmed in the 14th 14th and 15th recitals in the preamble to and 15th recitals in the preamble to the the directive, which state respectively that directive, which are at pains to emphasise that in some cases reference to a trade mark or trade name is actually indispensable in order to make comparative advertising effective and that, so long as such reference complies with the conditions laid down by the directive, it is not contrary to the rules on the protection of exclusive rights. (i) 'it may, however, be indispensable, in order to make comparative advertising effective, to identify the goods or ser- vices of a competitor, making reference to a trade mark or trade name of which the latter is the proprietor'; and

28. It must also be pointed out that the (ii) 'such use of another's trade mark, trade possibility of indicating the distinguishing name or other distinguishing marks marks of the products in question in does not breach this exclusive right in comparative advertising was expressly cases where it complies with the con- admitted by Advocate General Léger in ditions laid down by this directive, the his Opinion in Toshiba, where he stated intended target being solely to distin- that 'in order to be effective and fair, guish between them and thus to high- comparative advertising must permit the light differences objectively'. target group to identify the products pres- ented and to distinguish those made by one undertaking from those of its competitor. One cannot therefore exclude every refer- ence by an operator to distinguishing marks used by its competitors'. 14 That argument was implicitly confirmed by the Court in its judgment, in which it essentially acknowl- 2 7 . I agree t h a t those p r o v i s i o n s of edged the distinguishing marks of a com- Article 3a(1) of the directive presuppose petitor may be indicated in comparative the possibility of indicating the brand names of the products that are being compared; that is precisely why, as we 14 — Opinion of Advocate General Léger in Case C-112/99 Toshiba [2001] ECR I-7945, point 65, which cites the 15th have seen, those provisions make the per- recital in a footnote.

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advertising on certain conditions. 15The possibly on their quality, which is assumed Court was also careful to point out that 'it to be equivalent) and that the proposed is apparent from Article 6(1 )(c) of First indication of the brand names of the Council Directive 89/104/EEC of products serves simply to identify them, as 21 December 1988 to approximate the stated in the 14th recital in the preamble to laws of the Member States relating to trade the directive. That being so, I do not think marks (OJ 1989 L 40, p. 1) and the Article 3a(1)(c) of the directive can be held case-law of the Court (Case C-63/97 to preclude indication of the products in BMW [1999] ECR 1-905, paragraphs 58 question in advertising of the kind at issue. to 60) that the use of another person's trade mark may be legitimate where it is necess- ary to inform the public of the nature of the products or the intended purpose of the services offered'. 16 30. Lastly, as to Article 3a(1)(g), which provides that the product that is being advertised must not take unfair advantage of the reputation of a trade mark, trade name or other distinguishing marks of a competitor, it seems obvious to me that that provision does not, generally speaking, preclude indication of the brand name of competitors' products (indeed it even impli- citly admits it) but merely seeks to prevent possible abuses. 29. Turning now more specifically to the question whether the brand name of a product may be considered to be a material, relevant, verifiable and represen- tative feature of that product and con- sequently a feature susceptible of compari- 31. I should point out in this connection son within the meaning of Article 3a(1)(c) that the Court stated in its judgment in of the directive, I must point out that the Toshiba, cited above, that it would in any Austrian court appears to be labouring event be necessary, when assessing whether under a misapprehension in this connec- the condition laid down in that provision tion. Its question seems to be based on the had been observed, 'to have regard to the idea that indication of the brand names of 15th recital in the preamble to Directive the products mentioned in advertising of 97/55, which states that the use of a trade the kind at issue may give rise to a mark or distinguishing mark does not comparison between the different brands, breach the right to the mark where it which may then become the actual subject complies with the conditions laid down by of the comparative advertising. It is how- Directive 84/450 as amended, the aim ever clear that, on the contrary, the being solely to distinguish between the comparison in such advertising turns essen- products and services of the advertiser tially on the price of the products (and and those of his competitor and thus to highlight differences objectively'. 17 On

15 — Judgment m Case C-112/99 Toshiba [2001] ECR I-7945. 16 — Paragraph 34, emphasis added. 17 — Paragraph 51.

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that basis, it held that 'an advertiser cannot fore to take advantage of the reputation of be considered as taking unfair advantage of the trade mark, trade name or other the reputation attached to distinguishing distinguishing marks of a competitor. That marks of his competitor if effective compe- is the case unless, in view of the peculiar- tition on the relevant market is conditional ities of the case at issue, it is clear that such upon a reference to those marks'. 18 The information is given in a manner that is Court went on to say that an indication of likely to create an association in the public the distinguishing marks of a competitor in between the advertiser and his competitor, comparative advertising enables the adver- conferring the reputation of the latter's tiser 'to take unfair advantage of the products on the former's. 21 I do not there- reputation attached to those marks only if fore think that, in the present case, indi- the effect of the reference to them is to cation of the brand name of the lenses create, in the mind of the persons at whom w o u l d have been c o n t r a r y to the advertising is directed, an association Article 3a(l)(g) of the directive since, on between the manufacturer whose products the one hand it has already been explained are identified and the competing supplier, that that indication was necessary to ident- in that those persons associate the repu- ify accurately the products that were the tation of the manufacturer's products with subject of the commercials and to avoid the the products of the competing supplier. In possibility of misleading consumers and, on order to determine whether that condition the other, it is not apparent that it could is satisfied, account should be taken of the have created an association between Zeiss overall presentation of the advertising at and Optimed lenses, conferring the repu- issue and the type of persons for whom the tation of the former on the latter. advertising is intended'. 19

32. In the light of that judgment also, I therefore take the view that indication of the brand name of a competitor's products 33. To conclude my observations on this is not contrary to Article 3a(1)(g) where point, I consider that advertising material such indication is justified by the objective of the kind at issue in the present case, requirement to identify the competitor's comparing the retail price charged by two products and highlight the qualities of the traders for a pair of spectacles and stating products that are being advertised (if that the frames are the same and that the necessary by a direct comparison between lenses have the same features but not that them) 20 and that its sole aim is not there- the lenses have different brand names, one very familiar to the public and the other not, is misleading and therefore not per- 18 — Paragraph 5 4 . mitted under Article 3a(1)(a). In such cases, 19 — Paragraph 6 0 . 20 — I should point out in this connection that the Court stated in the judgment in Toshiba that 'in order for there to be c o m p a r a t i v e a d v e r t i s i n g w i t h i n t h e meaning o f Article 2(2a) of Directive 84/450 as amended, it is... 21 — In that case, indication of the competitor's brand name sufficient for a representation to be made in any form could also be contrary to Article 3a(1)(d), which provides which refers, even by implication, to a competitor or to the that comparative advertising must not create confusion in goods or services which he offers. It does not matter t h a t the market place between the advertiser and a competitor there is a comparison between the goods and services or between the advertiser's trade marks, trade names, offered by the advertiser and those of a competitor' other distinguishing marks, goods or services and those of (paragraph 31). a competitor.

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the provisions contained in Article 3a(1)(c) which, by virtue of the discretion accorded and (g) of the directive do not preclude to the Member States under Article 7(1), indication of the brand names of the lenses define misleading advertising in stricter in the spectacles in question. terms with a view to ensuring 'more extensive protection... for consumers, per- sons carrying on a trade, business, craft or profession, and the general public'. The court points out however that Article 7(2) of the directive appears to preclude the application of more restrictive national provisions of this kind to comparative (b) As to whether a national standard that advertising inasmuch as it provides that is stricter than the Community rules may be Article 7(1) shall not apply to such adver- applied to comparative advertising tising 'as far as the comparison is con- cerned'. Faced with this apparent contra- diction, it therefore asks the Court whether Member States may make the permissibility of comparative advertising conditional on compliance with national standards that are stricter than those contained in the directive in respect of the definition of 34. Probably on the assumption that the misleading advertising. If so, the court also national courts' assessment of the question wants to know whether the stricter national examined above was based on the appli- standards may apply only to the description cation of a national standard which con- of the products/services that are being tains a stricter concept of what constitutes compared (the two subjects of the compari- misleading advertising than that contained son) or may on the contrary also apply to in the Community rules, the referring court the results of the comparison (the relation- is in fact seeking by this part of the question ship between the products/services that are to ascertain whether a stricter national being compared). standard of this kind may be applied to comparative advertising.

35. In that connection, it should be noted first that, in listing the conditions under which comparative advertising is per- mitted, Article 3a(1) of the directive states 36. Pippig and the Austrian Government under (a) that such advertising must not be consider that stricter national standards misleading according to Articles 2(2), 3 and may apply to comparative advertising and 7(1), that is to say with reference either to they naturally cite Article 7(1), invoked in the concept of 'misleading advertising' Article 3a(1)(a), in support of their view. In defined in Articles 2(2) and 3 of the an attempt to resolve the apparent contra- directive or to any national provisions diction between those provisions and

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Article 7(2) of the directive, Pippig argues Directive is to establish conditions under in particular that, under Article 7(2), the which comparative advertising is per- right to compare products and services mitted'. 22 They claim that, in pursuing must not be subject to further conditions that objective (repeated in Article 1 of over and above those laid down in the Directive 84/450, as amended), the Com- directive except in cases of misleading munity legislature laid down all the con- advertising within the meaning of ditions under which comparative advertis- Article 7(1). Similarly, the Austrian Gov- ing is permitted, adopting an exhaustive ernment considers that Member States may regulation on all the elements of compari- apply stricter standards in assessing son. This is reflected, in their view, in the whether advertising material is misleading prohibition on applying stricter national but not with regard to the definition of standards 'to comparative advertising as far comparative advertising and the conditions as the c o m p a r i s o n is c o n c e r n e d ' under which it may be permitted laid down (Article 7(2)). 23 As to the reference to in Article 3a(1 )(b) and (h). Thus it is clear, Article 7(1) contained in Article 3a(1)(a), even if the Austrian Government does not the Commission explained at the hearing expressly say so, that both consider that that, in its view, this must have been an stricter national standards on misleading oversight on the part of the Community advertising may apply to all elements of the legislature. comparison.

38. For my own part, I feel I must draw attention first to the shortcomings in the order for reference, which does not fully explain the respects in which the national standard contains a stricter concept of what constitutes misleading advertising than that 37. The Commission and Hartlauer take contained in the Community rules. The the opposite view in their observations, ambiguity of the order for reference in this citing in particular the 18th recital in the connection is also clearly apparent in the preamble to Directive 97/55. This states following passage: 'In the present case the that 'Article 7 of Directive 84/450/EEC question of the scope of Article 7(2) is of allowing Member States to retain or adopt importance. The answer to that question provisions with a view to ensuring more extensive protection for consumers, per- sons carrying on a trade, business, craft or 22 — Emphasis added. profession, and the general public, should 23 — On the meaning of that expression, Hartlauer has not apply to comparative advertising, given explained that in its view it covers assertions regarding the product offered by the advertiser, the product offered that the objective of amending the said by the competitor and the relationship between the two.

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determines whether the defendant's adver­ unnecessary to give the national court an tising must be assessed wholly or in part on answer on this point. If it is in fact con­ the basis of the national standard for sidered that, in cases such as the present misleading statements which is possibly one, failure to indicate the brand name of 24 more stricť. It could mean that the the lenses is sufficient to render com­ Austrian court referred the matter to the parative advertising misleading and there­ Court without first establishing whether fore not permitted under the provisions and in what respects the national standard contained in Article 2(2) of the directive, it with regard to misleading advertising was follows that it is unnecessary to determine actually stricter than the Community rules. whether in such cases the national auth­ As the order for reference is unclear and orities may apply a concept of what is imprecise about the national legal frame­ 'misleading' that is stricter than that con­ work and as that part of the question is tained in the aforesaid provisions of the patently hypothetical, it could be declared directive. Solely in the alternative, in case inadmissible without further a d o . 2 5 the C o u r t does not share the view expounded under (a) above, I shall there­ fore now consider that question.

39. However, overlooking the shortcom­ ings of the order for reference and turning in a spirit of cooperation to the observa­ tions of the parties to shed light on the reasons for the reference, it may be sup­ posed that the referring court agreed with 40. In this connection, I recognise that the lower courts' view that comparing there appears to be a contradiction between spectacles with brand-name lenses with Article 3a(l)(a) of the directive, which spectacles with no-name lenses is inherently refers to Article 7(1) in defining the con­ misleading and therefore considered that ditions under which comparative advertis­ those assessments were based on a stricter ing may be permitted, and Article 7(2), understanding of the term 'misleading' than which on the contrary precludes the appli­ that contained in the Community rules. cation of Article 7(1) 'to comparative However, even if that were so, in view of advertising as far as the comparison is my earlier remarks it would in any case be concerned'. I do not think it is possible to get round that problem, as Haitianer and the Commission attempt to do, by ignoring 24 — Emphasis added. one of the two provisions (Article 3a(l)(a)) 25 — In that connection, see, among many others, the |tidgments in Case C-343/90 Lourenço Dias [1992] ECR I-4673, on the ground that it is simply the result of paragraphs 17 and 18; Case C-83/91 Medicke | 1 9 9 2 | ECR 1-4871, paragraph 25; Case C-415/93 Bosman (1995) ECR an error or oversight on the part of the 1-4921, paragraph 6 1 ; Case C-437/97 EK W and Wem & legislature. On the contrary, I think it is Co. [2000] ECR I-1157, paragraph 52; and Case C-36/99 Idéal tourisme |2000] ECR I-6049, paragrapll 20. essential to seek an interpretation of the

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provisions in question that will resolve the other traders and the general public from apparent contradiction between them and being afforded different and less extensive reconcile the various requirements under- protection against the danger of anything lying those provisions. misleading in advertising material only in cases where the material makes a compari- son between competing products or ser- vices.

41. To that end, I note first that the primary purpose of Directive 84/450 is 'to protect consumers, persons carrying on a trade or business or practising a craft or profession and the interests of the public in general against misleading advertising and 43. However, as Hartlauer and the Com- the unfair consequences thereof' (Article 1). mission rightly point out, following the That is why Article 7(1) provides that the amendments introduced by Directive directive 'shall not preclude Member States 97/55, Directive 84/450 also seeks to har- from retaining or adopting provisions with monise the laws, regulations and adminis- a view to ensuring more extensive protec- trative provisions of the Member States tion, with regard to misleading advertising, concerning comparative advertising in for consumers, persons carrying on a trade, order to remove the obstacles to the free business, craft or profession, and the gen- movement of goods arising from differ- eral public', such as for example national ences between the national laws on the provisions which contain a concept of subject and to assure the freedom to pro- misleading advertising that is stricter and vide services in that field (third recital in the more restrictive than the definition con- preamble to Directive 97/55). To that end, tained in Articles 2(2) and 3 of the direc- the new Article 3a was added to Directive tive. 84/450, providing that comparative adver- tising is, 'as far as the comparison is concerned', to be permitted in all the Member States when the conditions spec- ified in that article are met. 26 And since the amendments introduced by Directive 97/55 are intended to lay down conditions under which comparative advertising is per- 4 2 . In keeping with that purpose, mitted, as the 18th recital confirms, Article 3a(1) laying down the conditions Article 7(2) of Directive 84/450 provides under which comparative advertising may that paragraph (1) 'shall not apply to be permitted provides in subparagraph (a) comparative advertising as far as the that such advertising must not be mislead- comparison is concerned'. ing according to the relevant provisions of the directive or to any stricter national provisions that may be adopted pursuant to 26 — Following the amendments introduced by Directive 97/55, Article 7(1). In that way, the Community Article 1 expressly states that the purpose of the directive is to lay down conditions under which comparative advertis- legislature sought to prevent consumers, ing is permitted.

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44. Unlike Hartlauer and the Commission, argued that Article 7(2) of the directive however, I do not think Article 7(2) of the provides that Article 7(1) is not to apply to directive precludes the application to com- comparative advertising 'as far as the parative advertising of a national standard comparison is concerned' precisely because that is stricter than the Community rules in Article 3a lays down the conditions under respect of the definition of comparative which such advertising is permitted only 'as advertising. In my view, the sole purpose of far as the comparison is concerned' and that article is to prevent the permissibility does not require those conditions to be met of comparative advertising 'as far as the in the case of comparative advertising comparison is concerned' from being sub- which refers to a competitor or to goods ject to conditions over and above those laid or services offered by a competitor but does down in Article 3a. In other words, what it not make a real and specific comparison means is that the conditions under which between those goods/services and those of comparative advertising is permitted are the advertiser. 27 exhaustive, precisely because the purpose of the directive is to ensure that, under the conditions specified, such comparisons may be made and released in all the Member States. But, as the conditions expressly laid down in Article 3a(1) include the condition that comparative advertising must not be misleading according to the definition of 'misleading' contained in Articles 2(2) and 3 or to any stricter national provisions that 46. But, above all, this solution is prefer- may be adopted pursuant to Article 7(1), I able because it resolves the apparent conclude that Article 7(2) does not preclude contradiction between the various provi- the application of such national provisions sions of the directive and also effectively to comparative advertising. reconciles the two purposes of the directive, namely, on the one hand, to protect con- sumers, traders and the general public from the dangers of misleading advertising (jus- tifying the application of even stricter national measures against anything 'mis- leading' in advertising material) and, on the other, to lay down an exhaustive list of conditions under which comparative adver- tising is permitted so as to ensure that such comparisons can be made and publicised in all the Member States. The problem with the opposite view, held by Hartlauer and

27 — I note in this connection that, as already pointed out in 45. The view that Article 7(2) merely footnote 20, the Court stated in its judgment in Toshiba precludes the introduction of conditions that 'in order for there to be comparative advertising within the meaning of Article 2(2) of Directive 84/450 as over and above those laid down in amended, it is... sufficient for a representation to be made in any form which refers, even by implication, to a Article 3a is also indirectly confirmed by competitor or to the goods or services which he offers. It the fact that both provisions relate only to does not matter that there is a comparison between the goods and services offered by the advertiser and those of a comparative advertising. It can in fact be competitor' (paragraph 31).

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the Commission, is that it assumes without between the description of the products/ any objective justification that consumers, services that are being compared and the traders and the general public are being results of the comparison. afforded different and less extensive pro- tection against the danger of anything misleading in advertising material only in cases where the material makes a compari- son between competing products or ser- vices. Also, on that view, it would still have to be explained why Article 3a(1)(a) should provide that comparative advertising must not be misleading according to Article 7(1) The second question of the directive.

48. The second question arises from the fact that Pippig has a direct relationship with Eschenbach, from which it obtains regular supplies of the advertised frames, in various colours and sizes, whereas Hart- lauer obtains a small selection of the frames in question, through parallel imports. In that connection, so far as we are given to understand, the Austrian court is in fact seeking to ascertain w h e t h e r , on the strength of Article 7(1) of the directive, Member States may establish indepen- 47. In the light of the foregoing consider- dently that a price comparison is permitted ations, I therefore take the view that the only if the trader making the comparison national authorities may apply to com- and his competitors obtain the goods that parative advertising a national standard are being compared through the same which contains a stricter concept of what distribution channels and thus offer a constitutes misleading advertising than that similar selection of those goods or whether, contained in the Community rules. On the under Article 7(2), such a condition for basis of those considerations, it is also comparative advertising to be permitted possible to suggest a satisfactory solution to may lawfully be imposed only in so far as it the other problem raised by the Austrian is among those laid down in Article 3a of court as to the elements of comparative the directive. If that is the case, the national advertising to which such a stricter national court wants to know whether the condition standard may apply. If it is in fact the case in question is in fact covered by Article 3a. that Article 7(2) is merely intended to prevent Member States from adding to the conditions under which comparative adver- tising is permitted, then it is clear that that provision does not preclude the application of a stricter national standard to all the elements of the comparison, nor is it 49. Neither of the intervening parties con- necessary in this connection to distinguish siders that, generally speaking, Article 3 a of

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the directive allows price comparisons directive, it seems obvious to me that between given products only if they are Member States cannot indiscriminately procured through the same distribution prohibit any advertising that compares the channels, nor do they think such a con- price charged for certain products by com- dition can be independently imposed by peting traders who obtain their supplies M e m b e r States on the s t r e n g t h of through different distribution channels. 28 Article 7(1). However, the Austrian Gov- ernment and the Commission, although they consider that this was not so in the present case, observe that the failure to indicate the difference in distribution chan- nel could theoretically give rise to mislead- ing advertising, with the result that under 51. However, as the Austrian Government Article 3a(l)(a) comparative advertising and the Commission have rightly pointed would not be permitted in certain cases out, that does not rule out the possibility where it is important to consumers that that in certain cases such a comparison there be a direct relationship between the could be misleading and therefore not retailer and the manufacturer. Pippig permitted under Article 3a(l)(a) unless it argues, somewhat confusedly, that when was accompanied by some indication of the different distribution channels or a differ- different distribution channels. That might ent selection of products have a material be so, for example, in cases where it was effect on the price, when advertising refers important for consumers to be able to get to those elements, or when the consumer is spare parts or original accessories from led to believe that the distribution channels their own retailer at any time or avail are the same, comparative advertising must themselves of special after-sales services be considered to be permitted only if it does that require a direct relationship with the not mislead consumers with regard to those manufacturer. I agree that such special elements. circumstances do not appear to obtain in cases such as the present one since, accord- ing to the order for reference, 'it makes no difference... to the purchaser... whether the seller has purchased the spectacles on the basis of a permanent supplier relationship with the manufacturer or by some other method'.

50. For my own part, I must first agree that there is no provision in Article 3a of the 52. I should add that, when different dis- directive to the effect that the price of tribution channels entail significant differ- certain products may be compared only if they are procured through the same dis- tribution channel. Consequently, since, as I 28 — With reference to this question too. 1 fuel I must again draw attention to the shortcomings of the order for have already said, the conditions under reference, which leaves some douht as to whether there is which comparative advertising is permitted in tact a national provision prohibitingprice comparisons hetween products ohtained through different distribution are set out exhaustively in that article of the channels.

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enees in the selection of products offered to not yet begun, the date of the start of the the public, a price comparison could also period during which the special price or be misleading if the advertising material other specific conditions shall apply'. indicates (or suggests) that the retailers are offering a similar selection of the products in question. In that case, the material could mislead consumers about the selection offered by the competing traders and thus 54. For present purposes it must however about an element that could affect their be noted that, in the three cases mentioned choice between two or more traders selling earlier, the permissibility of comparative the same product. However, I do not think advertising will not be determined by advertising material of the kind at issue, whether there is a comparison of the price which compares the price of a specific type charged for products obtained through of frame without giving any indication, different distribution channels but rather directly or by implication, as to the selec- by whether the information contained in tion offered by the traders concerned, is in the advertising material is inadequate or itself such as to mislead consumers on that misleading. I therefore consider that the aspect of the matter. answer to this question should be that there is no provision in Article 3 a of the directive to the effect that comparative advertising relating to the price charged for certain products by competing traders is permitted only if they procure their supplies through the same distribution channels. In view of the fact that the conditions under which comparative advertising is permitted, as laid down in that article, are exhaustive, such a condition cannot be imposed inde- pendently by the national authorities.

53. Lastly, a different problem would arise if the trader obtaining supplies through parallel imports only purchased the adver- The third question tised products occasionally and offered them for sale at a bargain price for short periods until the stocks available from time 55. The third question concerns the test to time were exhausted. In that case, the purchase Hartlauer made for the purposes specific provision contained in Article 3a(2) of the comparative advertising and more of the directive would apply, namely that specifically the fact that: 'any comparison referring to a special offer shall indicate in a clear and unequivocal way the date on which the offer ends or, where appropriate, that the special offer is (i) the purchase was made before the subject to the availability of the goods and spectacles that were being compared services, and, where the special offer has were on sale in Hartlauer stores; and

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(ii) to that end, spectacles (frames and permissibility of such comparative advertis- lenses) were carefully selected so as to ing should be assessed solely in relation to obtain the greatest possible or at least a the conditions laid down in Article 3a of greater than average price difference. the directive but adds that it is for the In that connection, the Austrian court national court to determine whether the is seeking, first, to ascertain whether, deliberate initiation of a price comparison with reference to the method used for which is favourable to the advertiser, the purpose of comparative advertis- through a test purchase made before the ing, Article 7(2) of the directive may start of the advertising campaign, may give nevertheless allow Member States to rise to misleading advertising. Pippig takes impose conditions as to permissibility essentially the same view in its observa- over and above those laid down in tions, in that it recognises that Article 7(2) Article 3a; if that is the case, it wants to of the directive also covers the means used know whether a comparison made by for the purpose of comparative advertising means of a test purchase of the kind at but claims that that is not the real issue in issue is to be regarded as unlawful the present case and that the Court should within the meaning of that article of rule that the question whether comparative the directive. advertising is misleading should also be assessed in relation to such means.

56. In that connection, Hartlauer argues, on the one hand, that Article 7(2) of the directive also covers the means used for the 57. In reply to that question, I must first purpose of comparative advertising and, on repeat that, under Article 7(2) of the the other, that Article 3a does not require directive, Member States may not subject the originator of the comparison to have the permissibility of comparative advertis- the advertised products on sale at the time ing to conditions over and above those laid when the test purchase is made, it being down in Article 3a, even if such conditions sufficient that they be on sale when the relate to the means used to make compari- advertising material is released. The Com- sons. 29 Since therefore, as the intervening mission likewise takes the view that the parties essentially admit, there is no provi- matter must be considered solely in the sion in Article 3a to the effect that com- light of Article 3a of the directive, which parative advertising is permitted only if does not preclude a trader, for the purposes there has been no test purchase of the kind of comparative advertising, from finding at issue, such a condition cannot be out the prices charged by his competitors by any legitimate means (including a test purchase) even before offering the products 29 — With reference to this point too, I feel I must draw attention to the shortcomings of the order for reference, in question on the market. The Austrian which leaves some doubt as to whether there is in fact a national provision prohibiting comparative advertising by Government likewise considers that the means of atest purchase of the kind at issue.

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imposed independently by the national if the comparison is not based on a test authorities. purchase made before the products con- cerned were offered for sale by the orig- inator of the comparison and if it does not concern products carefully selected so as to obtain a very substantial price difference. As the conditions under which comparative advertising is permitted, as laid down in that article of the directive, are exhaustive, such a condition cannot be imposed inde- 58. As to whether advertising material may pendently by the national authorities. be misleading, I consider that a price comparison of the kind at issue may be misleading and consequently unlawful within the meaning of Article 3a(1)(a) of the directive in cases where the advertising material is released before the products in question are offered at the price quoted or where the comparison is presented in such The fourth question a way as to give the false impression that the price difference indicated also applies to other products. However, I do not think a comparison can be regarded as misleading merely because it was based on a test purchase made before the products con- 60. By the fourth question, the Austrian cerned were offered for sale by the orig- court seeks to ascertain, lastly, whether inator of the comparison or because the price comparisons discredit competitors products selected were being sold at very and are therefore unlawful within the different prices by competitors. On the meaning of Article 3a(1)(e) of the directive: second point, it seems to me to be both (i) where products showing a greater than logical and natural for retailers to compare average price difference are selected for the only the price of products which they sell purposes of the comparison and/or on much more favourable terms than their comparisons are repeatedly made so as to competitors. create the impression that the prices charged by competitors are generally excessive, and (ii) where the information on the identity of competitors is not restricted to the extent absolutely necessary and, in particular, where, in addition to their names, their company logos (if they exist) and their shops are shown.

59. In conclusion, I consider that the answer to the third question should be that there is no provision in Article 3a to the effect that comparative advertising con- cerning the price charged for certain prod- 61. Pippig suggests that that question ucts by competing traders is permitted only should be answered in the affirmative,

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pointing out that competitors may be range of products is excessive, without discredited both by the misleading impres- drawing attention to the objective features sion given by the advertising material and (including the brand names of the products) by the indication of their distinguishing that distinguish the range of products in marks in cases where this information is question. However, it takes the view that not essential to an objective price compari- that is a matter for the national court to son. determine, taking account in particular of the definition of misleading advertising contained in Article 2(2) of the directive.

62. Hartlauer takes the opposite view in its observations. On the first point, it observes in particular that a reasonably well-in- formed and shrewd consumer would not 64. Lastly, the Commission considers that be likely to think that the difference advertising material is unlikely to discredit indicated in the advertising material in the c o m p e t i t o r s w i t h i n the m e a n i n g of price charged for some products repre- Article 3a(1)(e) of the directive merely by sented the average difference in the price comparing the price of products that arc charged for all the products sold by the not comparable or by making a comparison competitors. It adds that it would be that is unobjective or downright misleading contrary to Article 3a to allow the prices and that, in such cases, the question charged for certain products to be com- whether the comparative advertising is pared only if the difference between them permissible should on the contrary be represented the average or to introduce determined by reference to the provisions special restrictions as to the number and contained in Article 3a(1)(a) and (c). It adds frequency of comparisons. On the second that, in principle, competitors' shops and point, Hartlauer observes that showing a logos may be shown (without any distor- competitor's shop with the company logo is tions) in price comparisons but such not in itself likely to discredit or denigrate comparisons may be unlawful within the that competitor unduly but is, on the meaning of Article 3a(1)(e) if they indicate contrary, an effective way of identifying one or more competitors at random to him. draw attention to the high prices normally charged in a particular profession.

63. The Austrian Government, on the other hand, observes that selecting a particularly 65. To begin with the first part of the expensive article for comparison might question, I must first repeat that a compari- discredit a competitor by giving the impres- son between the prices charged for certain sion that the average price of the entire products by two or more competing traders

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may be misleading if the comparison is also by pictures of his shop (with his presented in such a way as to give the false company logo) is not in itself sufficient to impression that the price difference indi- discredit him within the meaning of cated also applies to other products. How- Article 3a(1)(e) of the directive. Any dis- ever, in that case, any discredit to com- credit that might theoretically arise from petitors will be directly attributable to the comparative advertising of the kind at issue fact that the comparative advertising is is attributable not to the fact that com- misleading and must therefore be declared petitors are identified by pictures of their unlawful on the basis of Article 3a(1)(a) of shop as well as by their name and address, the directive. but rather to the content and presentation of the comparison. There are in fact only two possibilities: either the comparisons are such as to discredit competitors, in which case they are unlawful within the meaning of Article 3a(1)(e) even if the competitors are identified only by their name and address; or the comparisons do not dis- credit competitors, in which case they are certainly not unlawful within the meaning 66. However, as I have already observed, I of that provision merely because they do not think that simply comparing prod- additionally identify the competitors by ucts sold by different traders at very pictures of their shop. different prices is in itself likely to create the impression that the same difference applies to other products, nor do I think the frequency with which the advertising material is released is in itself likely to create that impression. So, if the advertising material does not suggest that the same price difference applies to other products and does not therefore give the false impression that the prices charged by com- petitors are generally excessive, there can clearly be no presumption of discredit to competitors, as any discredit, in the cases mentioned in the question, would arise precisely from that impression. 68. I therefore consider that the answer to the fourth question should be that price comparisons of the kind at issue do not discredit competitors and are consequently not unlawful within the meaning of Article 3a(1)(e) of the directive merely on the grounds that (i) products showing a greater than average price difference are selected and/or comparisons are repeatedly made, and (ii) the competitors concerned 67. Turning now to the second aspect of are identified, not only by their name and the question, I agree with Hartlauer and the address but also by pictures of their shop Commission that identifying a competitor with their company logo.

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Conclusions

In the light of the foregoing considerations, I therefore propose that the Court give the following answer to the questions referred by the Oberster Gerichtshof:

(1) Advertising material comparing the retail price charged by two traders for a pair of spectacles and stating that the frames are the same and that the lenses have the same features but not that the lenses have different brand names, one very familiar to the public and the other not, must be considered misleading and therefore not permissible under Article 3a(1)(a) of Directive 84/450/EEC as amended by Directive 97/55/EC. In such cases, the provisions contained in Article 3a(1)(c) and (g) of the directive do not preclude indication of the brand name of the lenses in the spectacles in question.

(2) There is no provision in Article 3a of Directive 84/450/EEC as amended by Directive 97/55/EC to the effect that comparative advertising relating to the price charged for certain products by competing traders is permitted only if they procure their supplies through the same distribution channels. In view of the fact that the conditions under which comparative advertising is permitted,

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as laid down in that article, are exhaustive, such a condition cannot be imposed independently by the national authorities.

(3) There is no provision in Article 3a of Directive 84/450/EEC as amended by Directive 97/55/EC to the effect that comparative advertising concerning the price charged for certain products by competing traders is permitted only if the comparison is not based on a test purchase made before the products concerned were offered for sale by the originator of the comparison and if it does not concern products carefully selected so as to obtain a very substantial price difference. As the conditions under which comparative advertising is permitted, as laid down in that article of the directive, are exhaustive, such a condition cannot be imposed independently by the national authorities.

(4) Price comparisons of the kind at issue do not discredit competitors and are consequently not unlawful within the meaning of Article 3a(l)(e) of Directive 84/450/EEC as amended by Directive 97/55/EC, merely on the grounds that:

(i) products showing a greater than average price difference are selected and/or comparisons are repeatedly made, and

(ii) the competitors concerned are identified, not only by their name and address but also by pictures of their shop with their company logo.

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