C-276/01
ECLI:EU:C:2002:605
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OPINION OF MRS STIX-HACKL — CASE C-276/01
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL STIX-HACKL delivered on 22 October 2002 1
I — Introductory remarks I I — Relevant legislation
A — Community law
2. Article 6(1) of the directive provides, inter alia:
' 1 . The following shall be subject to inspec- tion:
1. This case concerns the interpretation of Council Directive 89/397/EEC of 14 June 1989 on the official control of foodstuffs 2 (hereinafter 'the directive'). In particular, it concerns whether a manufacturer of food- stuffs has the right to apply for a second opinion where samples have been criticised by the authorities and whether the infringe- ment of that right means that the findings based on the samples must not be used.
1 — Original language: German. 2 — OJ 1989 L 186, p. 23. (d) finished products'.
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3. Article 7 of the directive states: B — National law
5. According to the information provided by the referring court, the relevant legis- lation in the main proceedings is the German Lebensmittel- und Bedarfsgegen- ' 1 . Samples of the products enumerated in ständegesetz (Law on Foodstuffs and Con- Article 6(1 )(b) to (f) may be taken for the sumer Goods) (hereinafter the 'LMBG'). purpose of analysis. Member States shall take the necessary steps to ensure that those subject to inspection may apply for a second opinion. 1. Provisions relating to fines
6. Paragraph 17(1)(2)(b) of the LMBG 2. The analyses shall be carried out by states: official laboratories. Member States may also empower other laboratories to carry out these analyses.'
'It is prohibited to place on the market in the course of business, without sufficiently precise labelling, foodstuffs the composi- tion of which docs not correspond to accepted standards, thus diminishing their value to a not inconsiderable degree, in 4. Article 12(1) of the directive provides: particular their nutritional value and the level of consumer satisfaction they offer'.
7. Paragraph 52(1 )(9) of the LMBG states:
' 1 . Member States shall take the measures necessary to ensure that natural and legal persons concerned by the inspection have a right of appeal against measures taken by the competent authority for the purpose of 'A custodial sentence of up to one year or a inspection.' fine shall be imposed on any person who,
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contrary to Paragraph 17(I)(1) or 17(I)(2), inspection purposes against acknowledge- places foodstuffs on the market without ment of receipt. Part of the sample or, in so sufficiently precise labelling'. far as the sample cannot, or cannot without jeopardising the purpose of the inspection, be divided into portions of equivalent composition, a second piece of the same type and from the same manufacturer as that taken as a sample, shall be left behind. 8. Paragraph 53(1) of the LMBG states: The manufacturer may waive the leaving behind of a sample.
'Whosoever negligently commits one of the acts described in Paragraph 52(I)(2) to (11) o r 5 2 ( 1 1 ) , b u t i n t h e c a s e s of Paragraph 52(I)(6) and 52(II)(3) only if he has used the s u b s t a n c e s defined in (2) Samples to be left behind shall be Paragraph 14 or has brought the foodstuffs officially closed or sealed. They must bear or tobacco products within the area to the date on which the sample was taken which this Law applies, shall be guilty of a and the date after the expiry of which the summary offence'. closure or the seal is to be regarded as being no longer valid.
2. Provisions relating to the taking of samples
9. Paragraph 42 of the LMBG states:
'(1) So far as implementation of the provi- (4) Authorisation to take samples extends sions on trade in products within the to products as defined in the present Law meaning of this Law so requires, the which are sold at markets, on streets or persons charged with supervision and public places or by way of itinerant trade, police officials are authorised to request or which have been transported before or to take samples of their choosing for delivery to the consumer.'
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III — Facts and main proceedings known whether the individual retail traders informed Mr Steffensen or the company that samples had been taken. Nor has it been possible to clarify whether the sample results were in each case notified in suffi- 10. The company Böklunder Plumrose cient time to enable Mr Steffensen or G m b H & Co. KG manufactures small Böklunder Plumrose GmbH & Co. KG to Bockwurst sausages, which are sold in apply for a second opinion. retail outlets in glass jars with metal lids. Mr Steffensen, the person subject to inspec- tion in the main proceedings, is responsible for production supervision.
11. Over the past number of years public 14. By a decision of 13 September 2000 authorities have on various occasions taken imposing a monetary fine, the fines office from retail outlets samples of products of the Schleswig-Flensburg local authority manufactured by Böklunder Plumrose imposed on Mr Steffensen a fine in the GmbH & Co. KG. The products in ques- amount of DEM 500. He is accused of tion were, in each case, small Bockwurst infringing Paragraphs 17(I)(2)(b), 52(I)(9) sausages in glass jars with metal lids. and 53(1) of the LMBG. An appeal was lodged against that decision in due and proper form and within the specified time- limit.
12. The samples taken underwent labora- tory inspection. In the inspection results, each of the samples taken was criticised on grounds relating to the legislation on food- stuffs, in particular the fact that the prod- ucts had been declared to be 'country-style Bockwurst sausages' ('Landbockwürste''), 15. The Amtsgericht Schleswig (Local which, given their composition, they were Court, Schleswig), the court before which not. the appeal was brought, takes the view that Paragraph 42 of the LMBG fails to take adequate account of the case where — as here — the sample has been taken in a retail trade outlet and [part of] the sample was left behind there. The reason for this is 13. From all of the samples taken, a second that, so far as the Amtsgericht is aware, sample was on each occasion left behind in samples left behind are, as a rule, kept only the retail outlet. None of the samples left for a period of one month. If the authorities behind reached Mr Steffensen or Böklunder fail to inform the manufacturer immedi- Plumrose GmbH & Co. KG. It is not ately that samples have been taken, the
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manufacturer cannot (any longer) apply for for the purposes of analysis and that a second opinion if the sample has been sample has failed to satisfy certain criticised by public authorities. criteria imposed by the legislation on foodstuffs?
16. Against that background, the Amts- gericht Schleswig takes the view that the 2. If the answer to Question 1 is in the question arises as to whether the manu- affirmative: is Article 7(1) of that directive facturer has a right under Article 7(1) of the to be construed as giving rise to a Commu- Council Directive on the official control of nity-law prohibition on the use of findings foodstuffs to apply for a second opinion based on samples removed by public auth- and — if the answer is in the affirm- orities where it has not been made possible ative — whether infringement of that right for the manufacturer of the product which means that the sample may not be used. is the subject of criticism in those findings to apply for a second opinion?
IV — Questions referred
V — Question 1
17. Taking the view that that question involved the interpretation of Community law, the Amtsgericht Schleswig decided, on 5 July 2 0 0 1 , to refer the following ques- tions to the Court of Justice for a pre- A — Submissions of the parties liminary ruling under Article 234 EC:
18. The German Government takes the view that, although Article 7(1) of the 1. Is Article 7(1) of Council Directive directive is to be understood as meaning 89/397/EEC of 14 June 1989 on the that the person subject to inspection should official control of foodstuffs to be be entitled to an unconditional right to construed as conferring on the manu- choose whether or not to seek a second facturer of a product a directly appli- opinion, that provision does not establish a cable right to apply for a second directly applicable right to do so. Directly opinion in the case where public auth- applicable rights can arise only in the case orities have taken from a retail outlet a of non-existent or defective transposition of sample of the manufacturer's product the directive.
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19. In this case, however, the German person suspected of an infringement was Government submits that Article 7 was neither present at the time when the properly transposed by Paragraph 42 of the samples were taken nor informed about it LMBG, which states that, where official as he should have been in those circum- samples are taken, a comparison sample is stances. to be left behind. This gives the person subject to inspection, such as the manu- facturer or retailer, the opportunity to apply for a second opinion. Where samples are taken at a later stage in the marketing chain, the manufacturer and the network of retailers are usually under a contractual obligation to provide each other with 22. As far as the Danish Government is information. concerned, the answer to the first question depends on how the terms 'those subject to inspection' and 'necessary steps' in the second subparagraph of Article 7(1) of the directive are to be interpreted.
20. Consequently, it contends, the manu- facturer's right to be able to apply for a second opinion follows not from the direct applicability of the directive but from the LMBG as interpreted in accordance with the directive. 23. The Danish Government submits that the term 'those subject to inspection' refers exclusively to those undertakings from which samples are actually taken. In its view, it follows from the wording and the context of the second subparagraph of 21. The Italian Government submits that Article 7( 1 ) of the directive that it is only the analysis referred to in Article 7( 1 ) of the to these undertakings, and not to those at directive serves to establish infringements previous stages in the marketing chain, that of Community law and that the adversarial Member States are to afford the oppor- nature of the proceedings and the right to a tunity to apply for a second opinion. An fair hearing of the person subject to inspec- inspected undertaking is free to inform the tion are therefore to be safeguarded. More relevant operators at previous stages in the specifically, therefore, either the taking of marketing chain about the inspection meas- samples itself must be carried out in the ures taken and to send any samples to the presence of the person subject to inspection manufacturers or to subject the samples to or that person must actually be given the a second opinion together with the manu- opportunity to apply for a second opinion. facturers or at the manufacturers' request. Although the rules governing adversarial Moreover, legal certainty for the undertak- proceedings are at the discretion of the ings responsible for the infringement of Member States, the protection of the rights legislation on foodstuffs is also taken into of those involved must in any event be account by the right of appeal under guaranteed, which is not the case where the Article 12 of the directive.
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24. With regard to the 'necessary steps', the Article 7(1) of the directive is an uncon- Danish Government contends, in the event ditional and sufficiently clear provision that operators at previous stages in the which, by way of exception, is capable of marketing chain are also to be regarded as establishing a subjective right accruing to being among 'those subject to inspection', individuals from a directive, although the that the directive does not impose an wording of that provision removes any obligation on the authorities to inform doubts in this regard. those operators that samples are being t a k e n . In its v i e w , t h e s e c o n d subparagraph of Article 7(1) is not suffi- ciently clear, precise and unconditional to support the inference of such a right (to information) on the part of manufacturers. 27. It goes on to state that where, as in the After all, the fact that the authorities leave present case, so much time passes between behind a second sample with the retailer is the taking of a sample by the inspection sufficient to afford operators at previous authorities and the imposition of a fine on stages in the marketing chain the oppor- the basis of the sample that the person tunity to apply for a second opinion. subject to inspection cannot exercise his right to a second opinion, the authorities infringe not only the right to a second opinion under Article 7(1), but also the right of the person subject to inspection to an effective appeal under Article 12. 25. The Commission takes the view that, after samples are taken, those subject to inspection clearly have a right to a second opinion under the second subparagraph of Article 7(1). In its submission, this is 28. As regards the issues of practical apparent, on the one hand, from the 13th implementation raised by the German and recital in the preamble to the directive and, Danish Governments, it was stated at the on the other, from the fact that those hearing that this could be achieved in ways subject to inspection would otherwise not other than those suggested by those two be able to assert fully the right of effective governments; a second, frozen sample appeal laid down in Article 12 of the could be kept by the authorities, for directive. In the Commission's view, the example. word 'gegebenenfalls' ('if appropriate') [see footnote 14] restricts the right to apply for a second opinion only in so far as the second opinion can be in any way relevant.
B — Assessment
26. In view of this, the Commission takes the view that there is no longer any need for 29. In order to be able to give to the first the usual examination as to whether question an answer which will be of assist- I - 3744
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ance in resolving the dispute in the main opinion and whether a right to a second proceedings, it is necessary first of all to opinion exists — are closely connected. discuss in greater detail the purpose of the After all, if Member States — in infringe- question, in particular in the light of the ment of Article 7 of the directive — do not situation in the main proceedings. 3 adequately create the conditions for apply- ing for a second opinion, they thereby also infringe the right to obtain such an opinion which those subject to inspection may derive from that provision.
30. In this connection, the parties to the proceedings clearly proceed on completely different assumptions of emphasis in their submissions, a fact which can be explained by the wording of the provision which the Court has been asked to interpret in this case. Firstly, the second subparagraph of 32. As is apparent from the order for Article 7(1) refers to an obligation on reference, however, the referring court Member States to take the 'necessary steps' proceeds on the premiss that the necessary specifically to ensure that those subject to steps under Article 7( 1 ) of the directive inspection 'may apply for' a second were not sufficiently taken by Paragraph 42 opinion. To that extent the obligation to of the LMBG, and that it was not made create the conditions for applying for a possible to apply for a second opinion. The second opinion appears at first sight to take manufacturer's right to a second opinion, if priority over granting the actual right to a he has one, has thus been infringed. That second opinion. very issue, whether the directive establishes such a right for individuals which it is for the courts to protect, is addressed in the first question referred.
31. The governments taking part in the p r o c e e d i n g s h a v e all — t o v a r y i n g degrees — commented on the scope of the 'necessary steps' and in particular on the question whether the authorities of the 33. Moreover, in the light of the foregoing, Member States have an obligation under it does not seem appropriate to concur with the directive to inform a manufacturer of the view of the German Government that the fact that samples have been taken from the first question, if it is to be answered in a retailer. Of course, the two issues — the negative, should be so on the ground which measures are necessary to create the that the right to a second opinion derives conditions for applying for a second from national law as interpreted in accord- ance with the directive and not from the directive itself. Here, account should be 3 — See the judgments in Case 1/80 Salmon | 1 9 8 0 | ECR 1937, taken of the findings of the Court in the paragraph 6, and Case 222/84 Juhnston [19861 ECR 1651, paragraph 11. judgment in Simmenthal to the effect that,
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in any event, 'rules of Community law must mented in national law by the end of the be fully and uniformly applied in all the period prescribed. 6 Member States from the date of their entry into force and for so long as they continue in force' and 'every national court must, in a case within its jurisdiction, apply Com- munity law in its entirety and protect rights 35. A provision of Community law is which the latter confers on individuals'. 4 sufficiently precise in order to be relied That principle, that national courts must upon by individuals and applied by courts effectively enforce and protect rights con- where it unequivocally constitutes an obli- ferred on individuals by Community law gation. 7 applies irrespective of whether, in a par- ticular case, those rights can be inferred from national law (as interpreted in accord- ance with Community law) or derive from directly effective Community law where this has been inadequately transposed. It is 36. Moreover, a provision is unconditional ultimately for the national courts to decide where it constitutes an obligation which is whether the full effect of the directive or of neither qualified by any condition, nor any right which it confers on individuals is subject, in its performance or effects, to to be ensured by interpreting national the taking of any measure either by the implementing provisions in accordance institutions of the Community or by the with the directive. 5 Member States. 8
37. In my opinion, in the light of the objective and contents of the directive, 9 Article 7(1) exhibits those characteristics, in particular as regards the question whether those subject to inspection have a right to a second opinion.
34. According to settled case-law, wherever the provisions of a directive appear to be unconditional and sufficiently precise, those provisions may be relied 38. Although it must be assumed that upon by an individual against the State Article 7(1) allows the Member States some and those rights are to be protected where the directive has not been correctly imple- 6 — See in particular the judgments in Case 8/81 Becker [1982] ECR 53, paragraph 25, and Case 103/88 Fratelli Costanzo [1989] ECR 1839, paragraph 29. 4 — Judgment in Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629, 7 — See the judgments in Case 152/84 Marshall [1986] ECR 723, paragraphs 14 and 21. and Case 71/85 Federatie Nederlands Vakbeweging [1986] 5 — See in this connection, for example, the judgments in Case ECR 3855. 51/76 Verbond vati Nederlandse Ondernemingen [1977] 8 — See, in particular, the judgement in Case 28/67 Molkerei- ECR 113, paragraphs 22 to 24, and Case C-72/95 Zentrale Westfalen/Lippe [1968] ECR 143. Aannemersbedrijf P.K. Kraaijeveld and Others [1996] 9 — With regard to this criterion, see, for example, the judgment ECR I-J403, paragraph 59. in Case C-31/90 Johnson [1991] ECR I-3723, paragraph 34.
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discretion in implementing at national level 40. As the Commission has rightly sub- the 'necessary steps' to facilitate appli- mitted, that conclusion is confirmed by the cations for a second opinion, 10 that fact 13th recital in the preamble to, and alone does not rule out the possibility that Article 12(1) of, the directive. The 13th the directive is sufficiently clear and precise recital in the preamble to the directive as regards the grant of the right to a second states that the 'legitimate rights' of under- opinion. After all, as the Court has already takings 'must be preserved, in particular the so held, even if a directive allows the right to manufacturing secrecy and the Member States a varying degree of latitude, right of appeal'. individuals may not be denied the right to rely on provisions of the directive insofar as, owing to their particular subject-matter, they are capable of being severed from the general body of provisions and applied as such. 11
41. Article 12 of the directive lays down specific rules to preserve the 'legitimate right' to lodge an appeal. Under that provision, the Member States are to take the measures necessary 'to ensure that natural and legal persons concerned by the inspection have a right of appeal against measures taken by the competent 39. It should be noted, firstly, that, taken authority for the purpose of inspection'. In by itself, the wording of Article 7(1) per- this respect, that provision can be regarded mits the conclusion that it is intended not as reflecting and laying down the general only to make it possible to apply for a principle of effective (judicial) protection second opinion, but ultimately to grant a which underlies the constitutional tradi- right to do so ('that those subject to tions common to the Member States. 13 inspection may'). This is more readily apparent from other language versions. 12
10 — For a provision of a directive with similar wording ('the Member States are to adopt the necessary measures to ensure'), see in this connection the judgment in Case C-287/98 Linster |2000] ECR 1-6917, paragraphs 9 and 36. 11 — S e e , mutatis mutandis, the judgments in Case C-346/97 Braatbens Snerige (19991 ECR 1-3419, paragraph 30, and Case 8/81 (cited in footnote 6), paragraph 25. 42. Effective legal protection against the 12 — 'Member States shall take the necessary steps to ensure taking and analysis of samples in turn that those subiect to inspection may apply for a second opinion,' and '[l|es États membres prennent les disposi- requires that those subject to inspection tions nécessaires afin d'assurer aus assujettis le bénéfice d'une éventuelle contre-expertise.' See also the Spanish have the right to apply for a second version: '... para garantizar que quienes estén sujetos a dicha obligación puedan recurrir a un eventual contra- opinion. pentaie'; the Dutch version: 'opdat de betrokkenen eventueel een tegenexpertise kunnen laten minieren'; and the Danish version: 'for at sikre, at virksomhederne kau lade de paagaeldende produkter underkaste en eventuel 13 — See the judgment in Johnston (cited in footnote 3), which is kontraekspertise'. comparable in this respect, paragraphs 17 to 20.
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43. However, contrary to the view of the Article 7(1) confers in a sufficiently clear Danish Government, there is in my opinion and unconditional manner a right on no doubt that manufacturers too — and manufacturers to apply for a second not just retail traders — are among 'those opinion. The referring court's first question subject to inspection' who enjoy that right. must accordingly be answered in the After all, it is their products that are affirmative. analysed and it is ultimately they who, like Mr Steffensen, are liable to be held respon- sible for defects in the preparation and composition of foodstuffs, and who must therefore be provided with guarantees of legal protection in this regard.
VI — Question 2
44. Lastly, I share the view expressed by A —• Submissions of the parties the Commission and the German Govern- ment in the conclusion to their submissions that the word 'gegebenenfalls' in the second subparagraph of Article 7(1) must not be interpreted as a restriction or qualification 46. In connection with the provisions laid of the right to a second opinion. Rather, down in Article 6 of the ECHR (European this element merely reflects the fact that the Convention for the Protection of Human provision confers a discretion on those Rights and Fundamental Freedoms), subject to inspection. They have a right to Mr Steffensen submitted that, in this case, apply for a second opinion, but they also that provision serves only as a criterion for have a choice as to whether or not to interpreting the directive and is applicable exercise that right depending on the par- to this case too, a circumstance not altered ticular circumstances, such as, for example, even by the fact that the conduct at issue is whether or not the authorities' findings classified in German law as a summary criticise the product. 14 offence. The case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, he contends, can be construed as conferring the right to a second opinion in matters involving evi- dence based on complex examination pro- cedures. That is precisely the case with inspections of foodstuffs.
45. In the light of the foregoing consider- ations, it follows, therefore, that
47. The German Government takes the 14 — Moreover, the English version of that provision contains view that, even in cases where a manu- no such element and merely states: 'may apply for a second opinion'. facturer or other persons subject to inspec- I - 3748
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tion have been given no opportunity to just one of many possible means of defence apply for a (second) opinion, the directive against an accusation of infringement of contains no Community-law prohibition provisions from the legislation on food- on the use of findings from a first analysis. stuffs.
50. The Danish Government expresses the same view as the German Government in 4 8 . Community law, it contends, is in the conclusion to its submissions and con- principle implemented in accordance with tends that it is to be left to national courts national procedural provisions, and the to determine what if any consequences German law of criminal procedure — like under the law of criminal procedure arc German administrative law •—• does not to follow from an infringement of any provide for a general prohibition on the obligation there may be to provide infor- use of evidence as the legal consequence for mation under the second subparagraph of breaches of procedure. Moreover, given the Article 7(1) of the directive. It cannot be principles of ex-officio investigation and inferred cither from the directive or from the free evaluation of evidence that apply to Community law in general that evidence in criminal proceedings in Germany, there is national criminal proceedings may not be no necessity for a second test to challenge used in a case such as this. the results of an analysis.
51. With regard to Article 6 of the ECHR and the case-law of the European Court of 49. The German Government submits that Human Rights concerning that article, the such procedural rules must of course Danish Government submits that the provi- comply with the requirements of Commu- sions of the ECHR apply only to judicial nity law, but they do in this case. For, on proceedings and not to the preliminary the one hand, they do not infringe the administrative proceedings pending in this prohibition on discrimination because case. Moreover, it contends, the adversarial infringements of procedural requirements system has been safeguarded. laid down in the directive are dealt with in exactly the same way as irregularities in proceedings concerning the enforcement of provisions of purely national law. On the other hand, the enforcement of Community law is not rendered impossible in practice 52. Even in the light of Article 6 of the by the principle of the free evaluation of ECHR, the Commission opposes a prohib- evidence and therefore fulfils the require- ition — an absolute one at least — on the ment of effectiveness. In its view, the use of findings from samples inspected second opinion under the directive does solely by the public authorities. It takes not serve any purpose in itself, but is rather the view that the rights conferred on those
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subject to inspection by Article 7(1) and made possible for the manufacturer of the Article 12 of the directive w o u l d be product to exercise the right to apply for a stretched too far if sample findings on second opinion conferred on him by the which those subject to inspection were directive. In other words, against the back- unable to obtain a second opinion could ground of the main proceedings, the ques- not be used even if they were so clear that a tion is to be understood as seeking to second opinion could not under any cir- ascertain whether Community law pre- cumstances have invalidated them. It bases cludes the application of a national rule of that qualified view on the word 'gege- evidence which permits findings obtained benenfalls' in [the German language ver- in the circumstances described to be used as sion of] Article 7(1) of the directive, which, evidence in court. it submits, indicates that a second opinion is intended to be possible only in cases where it may lead to findings of use to the defence.
53. At the hearing, the Commission stated that the obligation to provide information 55. In that connection, it should be noted is directly incumbent only on retailers and that, according to settled case-law of the that, with regard to informing manufac- Court, in the absence of a rule of Commu- turers, notification within the marketing nity law, it is for the domestic legal system chain is sufficient. of each Member State to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from Community law, 15 provided, however, that such rules are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and do not render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights B — Assessment conferred by Community law (principle of effectiveness). 1 6
15 — The detailed rules of judicial procedure referred to include national rules of evidence also; see the judgments in Case 199/82 San Giorgio [1983] ECR 3595, paragraph 17, and 5 4 . Generally s p e a k i n g , the referring Case C-228/98 Dounias [2000] ECR I-577, paragraph 69. court's second question concerns the rela- 16 — See, to that effect, the judgments in Case 33/76 Rewe- Zentralfinanz and Rewe-Zentral [1976] ECR 1989, tionship between Community law and paragraph 5, Case 45/76 Comet [1976] ECR 2 0 4 3 , national procedural provisions. The refer- paragraphs 13 and 16, Joined Cases C-430/93 and C - 4 3 1 / 9 3 van Schijndel and van Veen [1995] ring court would like to know whether ECR I-4705, paragraph 17, Case C-261/95 Palmisani [1997] ECR I-4025, paragraph 2 7 , Case C-246/96 Magor- findings which criticise a manufacturer's rian and Cunningham [1997] ECR I-7153, paragraph 37, product may be used as evidence in pro- and Joined Cases C-279/96, C-280/96 and C-281/96 Ansaldo Energia and Others [1998] ECR I - 5 0 2 5 , ceedings before a court if it has not been paragraph 16.
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56. In this case, it is necessary first to place authorities to monitor compliance with those principles in their proper context. As Community law or domestic law. 17 I stated in connection with the first ques- tion, although the directive does confer on individuals the right to apply for a second opinion, the main proceedings are con- cerned only indirectly with the enforcement of that right. Their direct concern is the exercise of the right laid down in Article 12 59. Consequently, it is compatible with the of the directive to an effective legal remedy principle of equivalence for the national against measures taken by the competent procedural rules not to contain a prohib- authority for the purpose of inspection. The ition on the use of findings in cases where it right to apply for a second opinion, as I has not been possible for the manufacturer have again already stated, serves ultimately to apply for a second opinion pursuant to to give expression to the right to an Article 7( 1 ) of the directive. effective legal remedy.
60. As regards, next, the principle of effec- tiveness, the rule of evidence to the effect that findings of authorities may be used where the manufacturer has been unable to 57. With regard to the principle of equiv- apply for a second opinion must not render alence, it must be examined in this case it virtually impossible or excessively dif- whether the procedure applicable to the ficult for the manufacturer to enjoy the appeal under Article 12 of the directive is legal protection conferred by the directive. less favourable than those applicable to similar remedies which concern only domestic law.
61. It follows from the case-law of the Court that that question must be analysed by reference to the role of the rule of evidence in question 'in the procedure, its progress and its special features, viewed as a whole, before the various national 58. As regards the national rules of evi- instances. In the light of that analysis the dence in question, the documents before the basic principles of the domestic judicial Court show that, in general, German system, such as protection of the rights of procedural law contains no such prohib- ition on the use of evidence and does not therefore distinguish according to whether 17 — See the judgements in [2000] ECR I-10465, C A S e C-88/99RoquetteFreres paragraph 31 et seq., and C a s e legal remedies relate to measures by the C-228/98 (cited i n footnote 15), paragraph 70.
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the defence, the principle of legal certainty legal protection against measures taken by and the proper conduct of procedure, must, the competent authority for the purpose of where appropriate, be taken into consider- inspection. ation'. 18
62. Moreover, it should be observed in this 64. In my opinion, that would be the case connection — as I have already pointed in any event if a second opinion were the out in the context of the first question 19 — only appropriate means by which an indi- that the right of effective appeal laid down vidual could defend himself effectively in Article 12 is the expression of a general against the authority's criticism or produce principle of law which underlies the con- counter-evidence. stitutional traditions common to the Member States. As the Court has already held in this respect in its judgments in Johnston and Heylens, 20 that principle 'is also laid down in Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950', and 'the principles 65. It is, however, for the national court to on which that convention is based must be make certain that that opportunity is avail- taken into consideration in Community able, having regard to the national pro- law'. cedural rules, and in particular taking into consideration the principle of the free judicial evaluation of evidence applicable to the referring court and the specific facts of the case. 21
63. Under the principle of effectiveness as applied to this case, Community law there- fore precludes the use of findings against which the manufacturer has not been able to apply for a second opinion where this 66. Lastly, the parties to the proceedings makes it virtually impossible or excessively considered the question whether and to difficult to provide actual and effective what extent the right to a fair trial laid down in Article 6 of the ECHR imposes a prohibition on the use as evidence of 18—Judgments in Case C-312/93 Peterbroeck, Van Campen- hout & Cie[1995] ECR I-4599, paragraph 14, and Joined findings obtained in circumstances such as Cases C-430/93 and C-431/93 (cited in footnote 16), those of this case. paragraph 19. 19 — See point 41 above. 20—Judgments in Case 222/84 (cited in footnote 3), paragraph 18, and Case 222/86 Heylens and Others 21 — See the judgment in Cbaralampos (cited in footnote 15), [1987] ECR 4097, paragraph 14. paragraph 71.
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STEFFENSEN
67. Firstly, the Danish Government's ceedings and the equality of arms of parties objection that Article 6 of the ECHR is to the proceedings. In accordance with not applicable because this case concerns those principles, a party to a criminal or preliminary administrative proceedings and civil trial must have the opportunity to not judicial proceedings cannot be sus- have knowledge of and comment on all tained. The second question is not con- evidence adduced or observations filed with cerned primarily with whether or not a a view to influencing the court's decision; manufacturer can or is entitled to obtain a moreover, he must be able to present his second opinion in administrative proceed- case in court in circumstances which do not ings, but rather with what conclusions in put him at a significant disadvantage in relation to the use of findings as evidence relation to his adversary. 23 the court in the main proceedings must draw from the fact that the manufacturer is unable to submit a second opinion because it was not made possible for him to apply for one (during the administrative proceed- ings). Consequently, even if the causes of the lack of a second opinion have their 69. Thus, according to the case-law of the origins in the administrative stage of the European Court of Human Rights, the use procedure, the question arises as to whether in court of evidence which is vitiated by the findings can be used in judicial proceed- irregularities is not automatically pre- ings, with the result that the provisions of cluded. What is decisive here too is whether Article 6 of the ECHR must be complied the party to the proceedings can effectively with. defend himself in the circumstances of the case. 24
70. For example, in the judgment in Kahn, cited by the Danish Government, which 68. It follows from the case-law of the concerned the use of a tape recording as European Court of Human Rights that, evidence in criminal proceedings in breach although the convention does not lay down of the principle of legality, the European rules on evidence as such, the particular Court of Human Rights based its decision proceedings considered as a whole, includ- largely on the fact that the defendant in ing the way in which evidence was taken, those proceedings had sufficient opportun- must meet the requirements of a fair trial ity to challenge the authenticity of the within the meaning of Article 6(1) of the ECHR. 22 Among those requirements are, above all, the adversarial nature of pro- 23 — See, for example, Eur. Court H. R., Vermeulen v. Belgium, judgment of 20 February 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-1, p. 233, j 33, Nideröst-Huber v. Switzerland, judgment of 18 February 1997, Reports of 22 — Inter alia, Eur. Court H. R., Schenk v. Switzerland, judgments and Decisions 1997-I, p. 101, § 23, and Morel judgment of 12 July 1988, Series A no. 140, p. 29, §§45 v. France, judgment of 6 June 2000, Reports of Judgments and 46, and Mantovanelli v. France, judgment of 18 March and Decisions 2000-VI, $ 27. 1997, Reports of judgments and Decisions 1997-11, 24 — See, for example, Eur. Court H. R-, Schenk v. Switzerland pp. 436—37, J 34. (cited in footnote 22), § 46.
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OPINION OF MRS STIX-HACKL — CASE C-276/01
recording and to raise objections to its use opinion fulfils the requirements of a fair in court. 25 trial within the meaning of Article 6(1) of the ECHR is therefore determined on the basis of the specific circumstances of the case concerned, and in particular the type of findings involved and their impact on the decision-making process, and the availabil- ity of possible means of ensuring an effective defence other than a second opinion.
71. More specifically, the question whether the use of findings as evidence in court is consistent with the requirements of a fair trial within the meaning of Article 6(1) of the ECHR in a situation where the party adversely affected by those findings cannot submit a second opinion likewise depends on whether that party is nevertheless in a position to present his case effectively and to submit observations on the findings.26 However, it can be particularly difficult to safeguard the rights of the defence without a second opinion if the findings pertain to a technical field that is not within the judge's knowledge and is therefore likely to have a preponderant influence on the assessment 73. The answer to the referring court's of the facts by the court. 27 second question must, for the reasons given and also in the light of Article 6(1) of the ECHR, be that Community law precludes the use of findings which are based on samples removed by public authorities and on which it has not been made possible for the manufacturer of the product criticised in those findings to apply for a second opinion, where it would otherwise be virtually impossible or excessively difficult to pursue an effective legal remedy against 72. The question whether the use of find- the inspection measures taken by the auth- ings against which there is no second orities. It is for the national court to examine whether, in the absence of a second opinion available to the manufac- 25 — See Eur. Court HR, Kahn v. United Kingdom, judgment of 12 May 2000, Reports of Judgments and Decisions turer in the national proceedings and in 2000-V, § 38. view of the specific circumstances of the 26 — See, in particular, Eur. Court H. R, G.B. v. France, judgment of 2 October 2001, not yet published in Reports case, there is an appropriate means by of Judgments and Decisions, § 69, and Mantovanelli v. which he can effectively defend himself France (cited in footnote 22), § 36. against the authorities' criticism or produce 27 — See Eur. Court H. R, Mantovanelli v. France, judgment (cited in footnote 22), § 36. counter-evidence.
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STEFFENSEN
VII — Conclusion
74. I propose that the Court answer the questions referred for a preliminary ruling as follows:
(1) Article 7(1) of Directive 89/397/EEC is to be construed as conferring on the manufacturer a directly applicable right to apply for a second opinion in the case where public authorities have taken from a retail outlet a sample of the manufacturer's product for purposes of analysis and that sample has failed to satisfy certain criteria imposed by the legislation on foodstuffs.
(2) Community law precludes the use of findings which are based on samples removed by public authorities and on which it has not been made possible for the manufacturer of the product criticised in those findings to apply for a second opinion, where it would otherwise be virtually impossible or excessively difficult to pursue an effective legal remedy against the inspection measures taken by the authorities. It is for the national court to examine whether, in the absence of a second opinion available to the manufacturer in the national proceedings and in view of the specific circumstances of the case, there is an appropriate means by which he can effectively defend himself against the authorities' criticism or produce counter-evidence.
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