C-277/01
ECLI:EU:C:2002:392
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PARLIAMENT v SAMPER
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL GEELHOED delivered on 20 June 2002 1
I — Introduction II — Facts and procedure
2. The facts of the case, as set out in the contested judgment, may be summarised as follows.
3. As the result of an internal competition 1. By its appeal in this case, the European placing him first on the list of suitable Parliament seeks to have the judgment candidates, Mr Samper was appointed, by delivered on 3 May 2001 by the Court of decision of the Parliament of 21 February First Instance in Case T-99/00 Ignacio 1995 and with effect from 1 April 1995, Samper v European Parliament (hereinafter head of division in Grade A 3 at the Madrid 'the contested judgment') set aside. 2That Information Office of the European Parlia- judgment annuls the Parliament's decision ment. He held that post until 18 March of 9 June 1999 to promote Mr Samper to 1999, on which date the Court of Justice, Grade A 4 with effect from 1 January 1998. by its judgment in Case C-304/97 P Car- The Court of First Instance thus accepted bajo Ferrero v Parliament, 3 annulled the one of the applicant's pleas. Mr Samper Parliament's appointment decision of claimed that his promotion to Grade A 4 21 February 1995. should have taken effect on 1 January 1997, since insufficient account had been taken of the fact that he had already been acting as a head of division for two years at that time. The pleas in law put forward by the European Parliament in its application 4. In compliance with that judgment, by allege that the Court of First Instance decision of 14 April 1999, the Parliament distorted the clear sense of the evidence annulled Mr Samper's appointment as head and overstepped the limits of judicial of division and reassigned him, with effect review. from 1 April 1995, to a position at Grade A 5, step 2.
1 — Original language: Dutch. 2 — [2001] ECR-SC I-A-111 and II-507. 3 — [1999] ECR I-1749.
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5. By decision of 9 June 1999, the appoint- ment by not taking sufficiently into account ing authority promoted Mr Samper to the circumstance that Mr Samper had been Grade A 4, step 1, with retroactive effect performing the duties of head of division as from 1 January 1998, in accordance with successfully for two years (paragraphs 52 the unanimous opinion of the Advisory and 53 of the contested judgment). The Committee on Promotions (hereinafter 'the Court of First Instance therefore annuls the decision at issue'). On 8 September 1999 decision in so far as it provided that Mr Samper lodged an objection to that Mr Samper's promotion to Grade A 4 decision, which was rejected by the Presi- was to take effect on 1 February 1998 dent of the Parliament on 20 January 2000. (paragraph 54 of the contested judgment).
6. Subsequently, on 20 April 2000, Mr Samper brought an action before the 8. In its appeal, which was lodged on Court of First Instance seeking the annul- 13 July 2001, the Parliament claims that ment of the decision at issue inasmuch as it the Court should set aside the contested specified 1 January 1998 and not 1 January judgment of the Court of First Instance and 1997 as the date for his promotion to give a final decision on the matter by Grade A 4. In particular, he claimed that dismissing as unfounded the action for the Parliament had failed to take sufficient annulment brought by Mr Samper. In the account, in its consideration of his com- alternative, the appellant claims that the parative merits, of the responsibilities case should be referred back to the Court of which he had exercised as head of division First Instance for it to adjudicate anew on in the Madrid Information Office. the action for annulment brought by Mr Samper. The Parliament also claims that the Court should make an appropriate order as to costs.
7. That plea is the only one examined in the contested judgment. According to the Court of First Instance, it was the duty of the appointing authority, for the purpose of 9. Mr Samper contends that the Court reinstating Mr Samper, to consider his should dismiss the appeal as manifestly merits in the light of the results of the 1997 inadmissible or, in the alternative, as promotion exercise, both as compared with unfounded. In any event, he contends that those of the group of officials who were the Court should uphold the contested eligible for promotion to Grade A 4 at the judgment and order the Parliament to pay time of that exercise and, in particular, as the costs of both sets of proceedings in their compared with those of the officials who entirety. were actually promoted to that grade in that year (paragraph 39 of the contested judgment). The Court of First Instance concludes that, in considering Mr Samper's comparative merits, the appointing auth- ority committed a manifest error of assess- 10. There was no hearing. I - 3022
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11. I shall consider below, first, the It has already promoted him, by decision of admissibility of the appeal as a whole, then 31 July 2001, to Grade A 4 with effect from the Parliament's second plea in law, con- 1 January 1997. 4According to Mr Samper, cerning the limits of judicial review. The that decision was an autonomous measure assessment of the first plea may then be on the part of the appointing authority and dispensed with. By that plea, the Parlia- was unconnected with compliance with the ment alleges that the Court of First Instance contested judgment of the Court of First did not reproduce certain facts correctly, Instance. The judgment does not in fact giving rise to errors in law sufficient to require the Parliament to promote him with justify setting aside the contested judgment. effect from 1 January 1997. The appeal is It concerns the manner in which the Court therefore manifestly inadmissible in its of First Instance describes, at paragraph 40 entirety. of the contested judgment, the 'decisive' criterion for the 1997 promotion exercise; the finding by the Court of First Instance, at paragraphs 46 and 47, that the Pro- motions Committee wrongly assumed that the applicant had experienced difficulties in adjusting to his duties as head of the information office; and the finding, at paragraph 48, that the Promotions Com- 13. The Parliament disputes that view. The mittee had based its view solely on the contested judgment, the operative part of marks awarded in the staff reports. In my which must be read in conjunction with the opinion, those parts of the first plea, in so grounds, does not allow the appointing far as they are admissible, are in essence authority any latitude as to the measures to connected with the grounds of challenge be taken, in particular in view of the put forward under the second plea. ground at paragraph 54 that the decision in question must be annulled in so far as it fails to promote the applicant to Grade A 4 with effect from 1 January 1997. The Parliament adds that its legal interest lies, on the one hand, in securing indemnity against any action for compensation which might be brought by Mr Samper and, on the other hand, in the possibility of recover- III — Admissibility of the appeal ing the arrears of salary paid to him in compliance with the contested judgment. Moreover, the Parliament points out that the letter which it sent to Mr Samper on 16 August 2001 explicitly mentions that his promotion to Grade A 4 with effect from 1 January 1997 took place in order to A — Arguments of the parties comply with the contested judgment and not for any of the appointing authority's own reasons.
12. Mr Samper argues that the Parliament 4 — By decision of 1 August 2001, he was appointed to a post in has no legal interest in bringing the appeal. Grade A 3 with effect front 1 June 2001.
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B — Assessment admissibility seems to me to be established.
IV — The plea alleging that the limits of 14. It is settled case-law of the Court that judicial review were overstepped for an applicant to have an interest in bringing proceedings the appeal must be likely, if successful, to procure an advan- tage for the applicant. 5In the present case, a judgment of the Court setting aside the A — Main arguments contested judgment of the Court of First Instance would procure a distinct advan- tage for the Parliament. It would indemnify it against any claim brought by Mr Samper 16. The Parliament argues that the Court for compensation for damage sustained as a of First Instance substituted its own sub- result of the appointing authority's jective assessment of the applicant's merits decision. 6It is also conceivable that, were for that of the Promotions Committee. the contested judgment to be set aside, the That is contrary to settled case-law. 7 Parliament might be able to recover the extra salary paid to Mr Samper if his promotion did not have to take effect from 1 January 1997 but could validly be deemed effective from 1 January 1998. 17. The Court of First Instance wrongly found, at paragraphs 53 and 54 of the contested judgment, on the basis of a subjective assessment in two stages, that the applicant performed his duties as head of the information office 'successfully', and in so doing it failed to make an objective comparison between the applicant and his colleagues. 15. In the light of the foregoing, the
5 — Case C-19/93 P Rendo and Others v Commission [1995] ECR 1-3319, paragraph 13, and Case C-174/99 P Parlia- 18. In the first stage of that assessment, the ment v Richard [2000] ECR 1-6189, paragraph 3 3 . Court of First Instance compares the total 6 — Parliament v Richard, cited above, paragraph 34. That is, of course, unless the decision at issue is annulled on grounds number of points awarded to Mr Samper other than the complaint examined by the Court of First Instance in the contested judgment. The fact that promoting and the totals received by four of his M r Samper more quickly would have meant that he still had colleagues. The Court does not state why the opportunity to reapply for the post of head of the European Parliament's Information Division in Madrid shows that an action for compensation cannot be ruled out. His candidature was declared inadmissible at that time because he was not eligible for promotion (see paragraph 17 7 — The Parliament refers in particular to Case 324/85 Bouteil- of the contested judgment). ler v Commission [1987] ECR 529.
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it uses that comparison, but it seems clear Mr Samper, the Court committed the same to the Parliament that the Court is seeking error a second time, since it did not in that way to minimise the significance of compare the merits of those heads of the differences between the numbers of division. points obtained by the five heads of divi- sion concerned. However, according to the Parliament, in making that comparison the Court of First Instance commits a twofold error.
2 1 . The Court's subjective assessment, according to which Mr Samper performed his duties as head of division successfully, becomes still less convincing by reason of 19. First, no comparison of the merits of fact that the Court's second comparison is officials can be legitimate if the total likewise selective. It is limited to the three number of points obtained by them is colleagues who had obtained a comparable completely disregarded. Second, the Court general assessment. of First Instance wrongly found that the difference in numbers of points between the officials was based on a particular aspect of the general assessment in their reports. In fact, as is apparent from the staff reports in question, the number of points obtained by an official represents the total points 22. The Parliament then draws attention to awarded to him on the basis of the eight a further consequence of the use of the term standardised criteria which make up the successful to describe the manner in which analytical assessments in the report. M r Samper performed his duties. It becomes difficult to find language to describe the performances of the other heads of division who obtained higher n u m b e r s of p o i n t s . T h e P a r l i a m e n t wonders how someone who has performed 20. The second stage of the Court of First his duties even better than successfully Instance's assessment is a comparison of should be commended. t h e g e n e r a l a s s e s s m e n t m a d e of Mr Samper — characterised by the Court as favourable — with those made of three other heads of division who had obtained a similar assessment. The Court concludes from that comparison that those general assessments are comparable (last sentence 23. Consequently, according to the Parlia- of paragraph 45 of the contested judg- ment, by holding that the appointing auth- ment). However, by limiting that compari- ority should in fact have concluded that son to the general assessments alone, with- Mr Samper had performed his duties as out taking account of the fact that the three head of division successfully, the Court of heads of division concerned had obtained a First Instance not only encroached con- higher total n u m b e r of p o i n t s t h a n siderably upon the wide discretion avail-
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able to the appointing authority, but also 19 May 1999 show, step by step and in a failed to show that the latter committed a clear and transparent manner, the reason- manifest error of assessment and that it ing and method applied by the committee. overstepped the reasonable limits of that It is clear from those minutes that the discretion. appointing authority's decisions concerning Mr Samper's reinstatement were taken on the basis of a comparative consideration taking into account all relevant factors, in particular marks awarded in staff reports, 24. Finally, the Parliament argues that the mobility and responsibilities exercised, sen- Court of First Instance wrongly took the iority and equality of opportunity. Since view, at paragraphs 52 and 53 of the there was very little to choose between the contested judgment, that the appointing merits of the various officials, a complex authority attached no value to the duties value judgment covering all factors had to performed de facto successfully by the be made. Although such decisions are not applicant during his two years as head of easy, the appointing authority's decision division. It cannot be concluded, on the not to promote Mr Samper in the 1997 basis of that subjective view, that the promotion exercise, which was taken on Promotions Committee committed a mani- the basis of the most appropriate method, fest error of assessment. clearly remained within the limits of its discretion.
25. At paragraph 50 of the contested judg- ment, there is criticism of the appointing 27. The fact that the Court of First Instance authority's working method, which con- applied a different method and formulated sisted in comparing the responsibilities its own subjective view is not sufficient to exercised by the individuals concerned. establish that the appointing authority's According to the Court of First Instance, decision was unlawful, according to the there is no evidence to support the pre- Parliament. sumption that the appointing authority actually undertook a comparison between the responsibilities exercised by Mr Samper and those exercised by the other heads of division promoted to Grade A 4. 28. Mr Samper argues, first, that the con- siderations set out by the Parliament in the context of the second plea are of a purely factual nature and cannot be put forward in 26. According to the Parliament, that criti- support of an appeal. cism is untenable. It is settled case-law that the appointing authority has the power under the Staff Regulations to undertake a comparative consideration on the basis of whichever working method it considers 29. He further submits that the Court of most appropriate. The minutes of the First Instance did not substitute its own meeting of the Promotions Committee of subjective assessment of Mr Samper's I - 3026
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merits for that of the appointing authority. conclusion as that reached by the Court in The Court merely confined itself, in the its subjective final assessment and, finally, context of its judicial review, to establish- in not attaching (sufficient) value to that ing the manifest errors committed by the final assessment which would have enabled appointing authority and to annulling the the a p p o i n t i n g authority to p r o m o t e decision at issue. Mr Samper with effect from 1 January 1997. The Parliament repeats its claim that the Court of First Instance thereby over- stepped the limits of its power of judicial review, as established in the Community 30. With regard to the argument that the case-law. appointing authority was not entitled, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, to promote him in the 1997 promotion exercise, the respondent points out that by decision of 30 July 2001 the appointing authority nevertheless decided to promote him with effect from 1 January 1997. That B — Assessment circumstance disproves many of the argu- ments relied on by the Parliament under the second plea. 32. The Parliament's complaint is directed against the C o u r t ' s finding that the appointing authority wrongly took no, or at least insufficient, account of the fact that 31. In its reply, the Parliament maintains the applicant performed his duties as head that the Court of First Instance almost of division successfully for two years. The totally substituted its own assessments for Court thus committed a manifest error of those of the appointing authority. By way assessment. It substituted its own subjective of example, it compares certain key points assessment for the appointing authority's made by the appointing authority, which assessment which was based on objective adopted the assessments of the Promotions criteria. Committee as set out in the minutes of its meeting of 19 May 1999, with those made by the Court of First Instance in the contested judgment. According to the Par- liament, that comparison shows that, by describing Mr Samper's report first as 'très 33. In my view, the plea in question is honorable' then as 'élogíeuse', the Court of admissible. It alleges misrepresentation of First Instance applied its own subjective the facts and improper grounds. The ques- method in order to reach its own final tion whether the grounds of a judgment of assessment, according to which the person the Court of First Instance are insufficient concerned had performed his duties 'avec or contradictory is a question of law which succès'. The manifest error of assessment is amenable, as such, to judicial review on committed by the appointing authority appeal. 8 consisted, according to the contested judg- ment, in not following the Court's sub- 8 — Case C-446/00 P Pascaul Juan Cubero Vermurte v Com- jective method, in not reaching the same mission [20011 ECR I-10315, paragraph 20.
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34. Under the first p a r a g r a p h of 37. However, the discretion which the Article 45(1) of the Staff Regulations of appointing authority is allowed is subject officials of the European Communities ('the to the need to undertake a comparative Staff Regulations'), promotion is to be by consideration of candidatures with care decision of the appointing authority and is and impartiality, in the interests of the to be effected after consideration of the service and in accordance with the principle comparative merits of the officials eligible of equal treatment. 10 If a procedure and for promotion and of the reports on them. method of assessment have been laid down for the annual promotion exercise, the appointing authority must adhere to those rules. 11 Every official eligible for pro- motion is entitled to expect the Promotions Committee to compare his merits with those of other officials eligible for pro-
35. The question of the scope of Article 45 motion to the grade concerned. 12 To that of the Staff Regulations has arisen fre- end the Promotions Committee must quently in the case-law of the Court of undertake an effective comparison with Justice, inter alia as regards the limiting all the officials eligible for promotion, and conditions attaching to the procedure and not only with the merits of, for example, power of assessment of the appointing the officials placed at the top of the list authority and the limits of the review concerned. 13 Promotion decisions presup- which may be undertaken by the Commu- pose that the appointing authority has nity judicature, that is, the Court of Justice considered the comparative merits of the and the Court of First Instance. officials eligible for promotion and the reports on them, in the context of each promotion procedure. That consideration must indeed take account, to an appropri- ate extent, of the periods preceding that to which the current promotion exercise relates, but it must take account of that
36. According to settled case-law, in assess- period as well. 14 ing the interests of the service and the qualifications and merits of the candidates for the purposes of deciding on a pro- motion under Article 45 of the Staff Regu- lations, the appointing authority has a wide discretion. The Court has repeatedly 38. In that connection the Court's review pointed out that, with regard to pro- must be confined to the question whether, motions, the appointing authority is entitled to undertake that comparative consideration 'in the manner which it 10 — As has also been consistently held by the Court of First considers to be the most appropriate'. 9 It Instance: see, for example, Case T-182/99 Caravelis v Parliament [2001] ECR 11-1313, paragraph 32. may therefore take account of a variety of 11 — See, for example, Cubero Vermurie, cited above.
That case factors and make a balanced assessment on concentrated on the question whether the Promotions Committee, in applying the rules on mobility laid down in the basis thereof, as it sees fit. a promotions guide, had taken sufficient account of the specific circumstances of the case. 12 — See Caravelis v Parliament, cited above, paragraph 33. 13 — See, for example, Caravelis v Parliament, cited above, 9 — Case 62/75 De Wind v Commission [1976] ECR 1167, paragraph 34. paragraph 17. 14 — Cubero Vermurie, cited above, paragraph 36.
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having regard to the various considerations at issue, unanimously recommended that he which have influenced the administration should not be promoted in the context of in making its assessment, the latter has the 1997 promotion exercise. remained within reasonable bounds and has not used its power in a manifestly incorrect way. The Court cannot therefore substitute its assessment of the qualifi- cations and merits of the candidates for that of the appointing authority. 15 It there- 4 1 . In the present case, the Promotions fore follows that the Community judicature Committee was bound in its work by the must confine itself to a marginal review of criteria mentioned in Note d'information the consideration of comparative merits no. 7 de ¡995 concernant la procedure de carried out by the appointing authority, in promotion (Information Note No 7 of the course of which it may, in particular, 1995 concerning the assessment of the review the latter's compliance with the merits of officials eligible for promotion). general principles of proper administration. Those are, first, the staff report, which is In addition, the judgment must be reasoned itself based on eight criteria set out in the in such a way that, in the event of an annex to the applicable Directive interne appeal, the arguments of the Court of First aux comités de promotion de 1992 (Inter- Instance are clearly apparent to the parties nal Directive for the Promotions Commit- concerned and to the Court of Justice. tees, 1992), namely knowledge, compre- hension and judgment, initiative, organisa- tional ability, quality of work, consistency and speed of work, professional awareness and working relationships. In addition, in the light of the criteria mentioned in the 39. In order to determine whether, in the 1995 note, importance is also attached to contested judgment, the Court of First the previous staff report, any recommen- Instance overstepped its powers by sub- dation made by the Director-General, stituting, as the Parliament claims, its own mobility of the candidate where appropri- view for the appointing authority's assess- ate, and the principle that, given equality of ment, it must first be examined on which merit, preference is given to women for method of assessment the decision at issue categories where they are underrepre- was based. sented.
40. As is usual, the appointing authority took the decision at issue on the basis of an 42. The working method followed by the opinion of the Promotions Committee. The Promotions Committee in this case is joint Promotions Committee, which gave apparent from the minutes of the extra- its assessment of Mr Samper in the decision ordinary meeting of 19 May 1999. The committee undertook to compare the over- all merits of Mr Samper with those of other 15 — Bouteiller, cited above, paragraph 6 and Case 282/81 officials eligible for promotion to Grade A 4. Ragusa v Commission [1983] ECR 1 2 4 5 , paragraphs 9 It decided not only to take account of the and 13. Repeatedly confirmed i n the case-law of the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance. staff report in that comparison, but also to
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take into consideration Mr Samper's did not take into consideration, or did not responsibilities and duties. The Promotions do so adequately, the relevant merits of Committee also decided to take into Mr Samper. On the contrary, even the account the minutes of the Promotions Court of First Instance seems to acknowl- Committee for the promotion exercise edge that those merits were taken into concerned. That would enable account to account in the appointing authority's be taken of the specific criteria adopted in assessment. the promotion exercise concerned. Finally, the Promotions Committee agreed that account would be taken of the staff reports of the other heads of division. 46. In my opinion, the Court of First Instance attaches too little weight, in 43. It seems to me that, from a procedural paragraphs 48 to 51 of the contested point of view, the Promotions Committee judgment, to the fact that the Promotions acted entirely in accordance with the inter- Committee refers on several occasions, in nal rules. Moreover, at no time during the its reasons, to Mr Samper's merits as head proceedings before the Court of First of division. The minutes of the meeting of Instance was it claimed or did it appear the Promotions Committee of 19 May that any errors were committed in that 1999 16show that the committee took into regard. consideration the level of the duties per- formed by the applicant and adjusted his marks accordingly (his assessment rose — hypothetically — from 56 to 59 points). It is also apparent from the passages of the 44. The only complaint by the applicant minutes of the meeting of 19 May 1999 which the Court of First Instance examined which are cited in the contested judgment concerns the alleged failure of the appoint- that Mr Samper's merits were in fact ing authority to take proper account, in its compared with those of the officials who comparative evaluation, of the merits of his were promoted to Grade A 4 during the work for two years as head of the Parlia- 1997 promotion exercise, as well as with ment's Madrid Information Office. As I the reports of five officials who were also have stated, it is for the appointing auth- eligible for promotion and had received ority to assign a rating to those merits in favourable reports, but who were not the context of a comparative assessment of promoted. The Court of First Instance also the candidates eligible for promotion. In cites the part of the minutes which states that regard, the scope of the judicial review that the majority of those (promoted) is limited to the question whether the officials acted as heads of unit for a certain appointing authority indisputably failed to period, with duties comparable to those of take those merits adequately into account a head of division (paragraph 50 of the in the assessment. contested judgment). 17
16 — As cited, without being contradicted, in paragraphs 36, 37 45. In my view, the Promotions Committee and 49 of the contested judgment. did not commit any appreciable errors and 17 — However, the Court of First Instance finds that observation vague and general since no indication is given as to the there is nothing which would give grounds total period for which those duties were performed and as to the reasons for considering them comparable to those of for assuming that the appointing authority a head of a Parliament information office.
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47. However, the Promotions Committee's that the appointing authority committed a conclusion was unfavourable to Mr Samper manifest error of assessment by not taking in respect of the 1997 promotion exercise. account, or by taking insufficient account, That was not because no account had been of the performance of his duties as head of taken of the responsibilities exercised by division (paragraphs 52 and 53 of the him, but because, in the opinion of the contested judgment). Promotions Committee, other candidates were (even) better. The fact that Mr Samper has clear and acknowledged merits as a head of division does not preclude a finding in the context of a comparison that other 49. To the extent that, in accordance with officials have higher merits, whether the applicable rules, the appointing auth- because they have acted as head of division ority made an assessment which is rea- or for other reasons. The appointing auth- soned, amenable to review and unques- ority was therefore reasonably entitled to tionably covered by the authority's per- consider that Mr Samper's merits did not mitted margin of discretion, the Court of justify the award of still more extra points First Instance has substituted its own view for promotion. 18 In other words, the for that assessment. I am therefore of the appointing authority did not act in a mani- opinion that the plea put forward by the festly incorrect manner by, on the one European Parliament is well founded. hand, assessing Mr Samper's merits favour- Moreover, my view is further reinforced ably yet, on the other hand, not concluding by a number of additional circumstances. that he was therefore entitled to promotion.
50. First, I am of the opinion that the Court of First Instance starts from a false premiss by stating that the Promotions Committee based its assessment solely on the marks in the staff report (paragraph 48 of the contested judgment). As is clear from the 48. In my opinion, the Court of First foregoing, account was taken, in determin- Instance has therefore neither established ing the level of those marks, of his perform- nor been able to establish that, in the ance of the duties of head of the Madrid circumstances of the present case, the Information Office. Moreover, there is no committee, and thus the appointing auth- evidence to indicate that the Promotions ority, overstepped the reasonable limits of Committee did not apply the specific its powers. Consequently, there can be no criteria to be taken into account — as question of a certain lack of coherence mentioned in point 41 of this Opinion — (paragraph 47 of the contested judgment) to Mr Samper. in the Promotions Committee's assessment. The view of the Court of First Instance that Mr Samper performed his duties success- fully is not a sufficient basis for concluding 51. Second, it is established that in the 18 — See, to comparable effect. Cubent Vermurte, cited above, 1997 promotion exercise the differences paragraph 21. between the officials concerned, who were
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eligible for promotion, were minimal. 52. In my view, therefore, the judgment of Moreover, the present proceedings concern the Court of First Instance cannot be a special case, since the Promotions Com- allowed to stand. It is vitiated by a defective mittee had to examine how Mr Samper had statement of grounds, since the Court of performed in the post of head of division in First Instance has not established conclus- the Madrid Information Office, without ively that the appointing authority mani- taking into account the circumstances festly made improper use of its powers. which led to the annulment of his appoint- Since, in its judgment, the Court of First ment. For those reasons, the Court of First Instance based its conclusion on only one of Instance is all the more required to act with Mr Samper's complaints, I consider it restraint when reviewing the appointing appropriate to refer the case back to it for authority's assessment. it to adjudicate anew.
V — Conclusion
53. In the light of the foregoing, I propose that the Court should:
(1) set aside the judgment of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities in Case T-99/00 Samper v Parliament;
(2) refer the case back to the Court of First Instance for it to adjudicate anew on the action for annulment brought by M r Samper;
(3) reserve its decision as to costs.
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