C-278/01
ECLI:EU:C:2003:342
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OPINION OF MR MISCHO — CASE C-278/01
O P I N I O N OF ADVOCATE GENERAL MISCHO delivered on 12 June 2003 1
1. The thorny problem of the cleanliness of 3. The Directive requires Member States to bathing water, which is highly topical in set the values applicable to bathing water this pre-holiday period, is not, to say the for the physical, chemical and microbi- least, a new one for the Court. This case is ological parameters indicated in the annex however significant in that it is the first to thereto; those values may not be less concern the implementation of a judgment stringent than those given in column I of in the matter. the annex (Articles 2 and 3).
4. Under Article 4(1) of the Directive, the I — Community legislation quality of bathing water must conform to the limit values set in accordance with Article 3 within a period of 10 years following notification of the Directive.
2. The purpose of Council Directive 76/160/EEC of 8 December 1975 concern- ing the quality of bathing water 2(here- inafter 'the Directive') is, as stated in the first recital in the preamble, to protect the environment and public health by reducing 5. Since Article 395 of the Act concerning the pollution of bathing water and pro- the conditions of accession of the Kingdom tecting such water against further deterio- of Spain and the Portuguese Republic and ration. the adjustments to the Treaties 3does not provide for any derogation from the Direc-
1 — Original language: French. 2 —OJ 1976 L 31, p. 1. 3 —OJ 1985 L 302, p. 23.
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tive in favour of the Kingdom of Spain, the conformed to the limit values set in quality of Spanish bathing water should accordance with Article 3 of the Directive, have conformed to the limit values set by the Kingdom of Spain had failed to fulfil its the Directive as from 1 January 1986. obligations under Article 4 thereof.
II — The Court's judgment in Case C-92/96 Commission v Spain III — The written procedure and the forms of order sought by the parties
6. In its judgment of 12 February 1998, 4 the Court held that, by failing to take all necessary measures to ensure that the 7. In its application, the Commission quality of inshore bathing waters in Spain alleges that the quality of inshore bathing waters in Spain does not always attain the standards set in the Directive. It has 4 — Case C-92/96 Commission v Spain [1998] ECR I-505. produced the following table in that regard:
Year Number of areas C(I) (%) NF (%) NC (%) NB (%)
1998 215 73 0.9 25.6 0.5
1999 213 76.5 0.5 13.1 9.9
2000 202 79.2 1 14.9 5
C(I): Percentage of bathing areas from which sufficient samples have been taken and which conform to the prescribed values.
NF: Percentage of bathing areas from which sufficient samples have not been taken.
NC: Percentage of bathing areas from which no samples have been taken (or for which no data are available) or which do not conform to the prescribed values.
NB: Percentage of bathing areas at which bathing was prohibited during the entire season.
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8. It observes, furthermore, that the Span- day of delay from the date on which ish Government has reduced the number of judgment is delivered in the present case inshore bathing areas over the years. until such time as the judgment in Com- mission v Spain is complied with.
9. The Commission adds that the action plan drawn up by the Spanish Government 12. That sum is calculated by multiplying a set out a series of measures both in progress uniform amount of EUR 500 by a coef- and proposed, and specified a timetable for ficient of 4 (on a scale of 1 to 20) for the the execution of works, which were sched- seriousness of the infringement, a coef- uled to be completed in 2003. ficient of 2 (on a scale of 1 to 3) for the duration of the infringement and a coef- ficient of 11.4 (based on the Member State's gross domestic product and the weighting of votes in the Council), which 10. In light of those matters, it considers is deemed to reflect the ability of that that the defendant has not adopted the Member State to pay. measures necessary for complying with the Court's judgment in Case C-92/96 Com- mission v Spain, cited above. 13. The primary submission of the Spanish Government is that the action should be dismissed, on the ground that the Commis- 11. The Commission notes that, according sion has not allowed a sufficient period of to the second sentence of the second sub- time to pass for it to be established that the paragraph of Article 228(2) EC, the Com- judgment in Case C-92/96 Commission v mission is required to specify the amount of Spain has not been complied with. It claims the lump sum or penalty payment which it in the alternative that the imposition of a considers appropriate in the circumstances. daily penalty payment is inappropriate in Relying on the method of calculation set the present case. Lastly, in the further out in its communications 96/C 242/07 of alternative, it challenges the amount of 21 August 1996 on applying Article 171 of that payment. the EC Treaty (now Article 228 EC), 5and 97/C 63/02 of 28 February 1997 on the method of calculating the penalty payments provided for pursuant to Article 171 of the EC Treaty, 6the Commission has proposed 14. The Commission claims that the Court that the Court should, in respect of failure should: to comply with the judgment in Case C-92/96 Commission v Spain, impose a penalty payment of EUR 45 600 for every
— declare that, by not taking the necess- 5 — OJ 1996 C 242, p. 6. ary measures to ensure that the quality 6 — OJ 1997 C 63, p. 2. of inshore bathing water in Spanish
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territory conforms to the limit values — in the alternative, refuse to impose a set in accordance with Article 3 of the daily penalty payment; Directive, notwithstanding its obli- gations under Article 4 of the Directive, the Kingdom of Spain has not complied with the judgment in Case C-92/96 Commission v Spain and has accord- — in the further alternative, impose a ingly failed to fulfil its obligations daily penalty payment not exceeding under Article 228 EC; EUR 11 400;
— in any case, order the Commission to — order the Kingdom of Spain to pay to pay the costs. the Commission, into its 'European Community own resources' account, a penalty payment of EUR 45 600 per day of delay in adopting the measures necessary to comply with the judgment in Case C-92/96 Commission v Spain, from the date on which judgment is IV — Analysis delivered in this case until the date on which the judgment in Commission v Spain is implemented;
A — The failure to comply with the Court's judgment in Case C-92/96 Com- mission v Spain
— order the Kingdom of Spain to pay the costs. 16. The Kingdom of Spain's first ground of defence takes the form of a robust chal- lenge to the Commission's assertion that there has been a failure to comply with the Court's judgment in Case C-92/96 Com- mission v Spain, or, which amounts to the same thing, that the defendant has failed to 15. The Kingdom of Spain claims that the fulfil its obligations under the Directive. Court should:
17. A number of points should be empha- sised in that regard. Firstly, it should be — dismiss the action in its entirety; noted that, according to the settled case-
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law of the Court, the Directive imposes a 20. It is appropriate to define this issue duty on Member States to ensure that clearly at the outset. The Spanish Govern- certain results are achieved. 7It requires ment does not deny that it did not fulfil its them to ensure that bathing areas conform obligations under the Directive within the to the values set out in the annex to the relevant timescale. It accordingly admits Directive and Member States are not that it did not comply with the Court's entitled to rely on practical difficulties judgment within the time-limit imposed on encountered to evade that obligation. it by the Commission.
18. Secondly, it should be noted that the 21. Plainly, the defendant could hardly relevant date for determining whether a have done otherwise. It follows undeniably Member State has, or has not, failed to from the figures put forward by the Com- fulfil its obligations is that of the expiry of mission that during the 2000 bathing the period specified in the reasoned season a certain proportion, of the order opinion. Thus, the first sentence of the of 20%, of the bathing areas in question second subparagraph of Article 228(2) EC did not conform to the criteria laid down in states expressly that the Commission may the Directive. It was in the month of bring a case before the Court 'if the September of that year that the time-limit Member State concerned fails to take the of two months set in the reasoned opinion necessary measures to comply with the of 27 July 2000 expired. Court's judgment within the time-limit laid down by the Commission'. That point is important in the present case, as the parties have both raised a number of issues of fact relating to the position after that date.
22. Admittedly, the defendant has strongly challenged a specific aspect of the Com- mission's approach, namely the treatment of those areas where bathing has been 19. Those arguments are relevant, as will prohibited or those which have been be seen, in the context of the issue of a removed from the list of bathing areas. It possible penalty payment. On the other considers, unlike the applicant, that those hand, they do not fall to be taken into areas should not be counted among those account at the necessary preliminary stage which do not conform to the requirements of establishing whether or not there was, of the Directive. However, it freely accepts, on the defendant's part, a failure to comply that even if the Commission's figures were with its duty to implement the judgment of to be modified to that effect, the com- the Court. pliance figures achieved in Spain during the relevant period remain clearly below the 100% figure required to implement the Directive and, accordingly, the judgment of 7 — See, for example, Case C-198/97 Commission v Germany [1999] ECR I-3257. the Court.
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23. It is therefore unnecessary, at this point ent to bring infringement proceedings and of my analysis, to deal with the question of when to do so. the consequences of prohibiting bathing or removing areas from the list for the pur- poses of assessing the extent to which bathing areas conform to the criteria laid down in the annex to the Directive. I have, moreover, had occasion to address certain aspects of that question already. 8 26. It none the less remains the case, according to the defendant, that actions for failure to comply with a judgment possess certain special characteristics in this respect. The Treaty, in particular Article 228 EC, on the basis of which such actions are brought, does not specify any period within which a judgment of the 24. Should it none the less be concluded at Court requires to be complied with by a this early stage that the Commission has Member State. established a failure to comply with the judgment of the Court? That would be to misconstrue the defendant's position. The latter argues, in effect, that the Commission has not allowed it a sufficient period of time in which to comply with its obli- gations. It follows that the Court cannot find that there has been a breach of them. 27. It is therefore appropriate to refer to the Court's case-law, which states that a Member State is entitled to a reasonable time in which to comply with a judgment of the Court. That was not, it says, the case in the present matter.
25. Before considering, if necessary, whether this argument can succeed in the circumstances of the present case, it is appropriate to establish whether or not it is permissible in principle. It should be noted 28. I agree with the defendant's analysis. It in that regard that the Court has consist- should be emphasised in this regard that ently held, 9 as the defendant itself men- there is an important distinction between tions, that the Commission has a wide an action for failure to comply with a discretion in deciding whether it is expedi- judgment finding that there has been a breach of a directive and one for failure to implement a directive. Generally speaking, 8 — See my Opinion in Case C-226/01 Commission v Denmark the directive will have specified a time- [2003] ECR I-1219. limit, on the expiry of which the Member 9 — See, for example, Case C-35/96 Commission v Italy [19981 ECR I-3851. State should have complied with it.
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29. Where infringement proceedings are impossible' and in my view confirms the brought, the Court needs only establish defendant's argument that it is necessary to that the time-limit has expired and that assess in every case whether a Member obligations under the directive have not State has been allowed such time as is been complied with. Unless the Member reasonably necessary to take measures to State can plead force majeure, it cannot achieve compliance with the judgment of argue that the time-limit is inadequate. the Court.
30. The present situation is quite different. The matter before the Court is the failure of 33. That case-law also means that an a Member State to comply with a judg- action brought by the Commission for ment. The defendant is right to point out failure to comply with a judgment within that the Treaty does not specify any time- a timescale that was so short that the limit in that regard. On the other hand, the Member State could not reasonably have Court has already had occasion to address taken the measures necessary to comply this problem, which is inherent in any with the Court's judgment would require to action for failure to comply with a judg- be dismissed. ment.
31. That case-law 1 0provides that the 34. In that regard, the parties have adopted importance of immediate and uniform diametrically opposed positions in relation application of Community law means that to the two criteria established under case- the process of compliance with the Court's law, namely the immediate character of the judgment must be initiated at once and Member State's initiation of the process of completed as soon as possible. The use of complying with the judgment, on the one the word 'possible' shows that some time hand, and the taking of measures to com- may pass before a failure to comply with plete that process as quickly as possible, on the judgment is clearly established, at least the other. as regards the outcome of measures under- taken.
35. Thus, the Commission is of the view 32. The fact that the case-law refers to the that the action taken by the defendant is process being completed 'as soon as poss- clearly inadequate from both points of ible' simply represents an application of the view. It states in that regard that the first principle that 'no one is required to do the responses provided by the Spanish auth- orities, in the months following the Court's judgment, were far from providing, as the 10 — See Case C-387/97 Commission v Greece [2000] ECR defendant claims, an exhaustive schedule I-5047, paragraph 82, and the cases cited there. and detailed plan of actions to be under-
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taken, including the financial aspects of the begin to take action more quickly than the latter. On the contrary, the data supplied to Spanish authorities did, and that they had the Commission were incomplete or out of in fact waited to receive the reasoned date for a number of regions in the country. opinion before actually initiating com- In particular, one would look in vain for a pliance with the judgment. detailed plan of action.
39. That argument is unconvincing. The 36. Can it therefore be concluded that the fact that the Spanish authorities were able, Spanish authorities did not immediately in July 2000, to send a detailed plan to the initiate the process of compliance with the Commission within a period of two months Court's judgment? does not necessarily mean that they would have been able to do the same thing in 1998, and that they therefore did nothing between the date of delivery of the judg- ment requiring compliance and receipt of the reasoned opinion. The documents in the case show that the detailed plan was drawn up having particular regard to data col- 37. The applicant's first argument does not lected during the period from 1998 to appear decisive. The inadequate nature of 2000. It has therefore not been shown that the initial data supplied to the Commission the Spanish authorities were in a position would not, of itself, prove inactivity on the to draw up such a plan solely on the basis part of the Spanish authorities. Those gaps of information available to them in the could be explained by the fact that while months following the Court's judgment, the authorities had initiated the process of particularly since that judgment was compliance with the Court's judgment, delivered shortly before the beginning of a they had not yet managed to collect the bathing season, that is to say a new period most recent data from all the regional and for the taking of samples. The authorities local authorities concerned. might have wished to wait for the results of these.
38. The Commission also notes that, after the reasoned opinion was sent to the Spanish authorities in July 2000, it took 40. Moreover, the figures provided by the the latter only two months to send the Commission itself show that there was an Commission a comprehensive plan, setting improvement, however slight, in the quality out in detail all the action to be undertaken. of the bathing water in question between According to the Commission, that short 1998 and 1999, as the compliance rate period shows that it was entirely possible to passed from 73 to 76.5%. That was the
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period immediately following the Court's judgment could not be said to be 'as soon judgment. Those figures tend therefore to as possible', as case-law requires. contradict any allegation of inactivity on the part of the Spanish authorities during that time.
44. According to the Commission, there are two reasons which explain the failure to act on the part of the Spanish authorities. The first is that just referred to: they did not begin to comply with the judgment until 41. It follows from the above that the after receipt of the reasoned opinion, that is Commission has failed to prove that the to say two years after the delivery of the Spanish authorities did not immediately judgment. The second arises from the fact initiate the process of compliance with the that the Spanish Government did not, at Court's judgment. It is settled case-law that the outset, take the measures required to the onus of proof lies on the Commission in reduce the period for implementing the such cases. 11 works necessary to put an end to the breach. This is shown by the fact that the relevant calls for tenders followed the standard procedure, instead of being declared to be urgent. That step was taken only in January 2001, that is to say three years after the judgment, and even then only in relation to some of them. 42. However, the obligations of a Member State are not limited to the taking of immediate steps to comply with the judg- ment in question. As was mentioned above, it is also under a duty to achieve com- pliance as quickly as possible. According to 45. As regards the last point, the Spanish the Commission, the defendant failed to do Government claims that the Community so. rules relating to public procurement did not permit the projects in question to be declared urgent. However, it does not explain why those projects which, as the Commission alleges without being chal- lenged on the point, were ultimately none the less declared urgent were not so classi- fied earlier. 43. It notes in that regard that even now the standards set in the Directive have not all been attained. The dates of 2005, or, where applicable, 2003, specified by the Spanish Government in its defence as the due dates for compliance with the Court's 46. It cannot moreover be denied that at the expiry of the time-limit set in the reasoned opinion the standards had still 11 — See, for example, Case C-387/97 Commission v Greece, not been attained at a number of bathing cited above, paragraph 73. areas. The precise number is the subject of I - 14152
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disagreement between the parties, as it different. It might thus be unduly formal- depends on the treatment of bathing pro- istic to dismiss the action on the grounds hibitions. As mentioned above, that ques- that the failure, which becomes evermore tion is not very important at this stage, as undeniable with the passage of time, would the figures attained are in any event inad- not yet have been evident when the time- equate. limit set in the reasoned opinion expired.
49. However, it suffices merely to set out 47. That point on its own might appear this argument to perceive its limitations. sufficient for a finding of infringement as, The subsequent course of events is irrel- in principle, if a Member State has not evant to establishing the point in time at complied with a judgment within the which a breach requires be established. It period set in the reasoned opinion, it has follows indisputably both from settled not done so as quickly as possible. The case-law 12 and from the wording of defendant claims, however, that the par- Article 228 EC itself that the appropriate ticular features of the present case show time for doing so is the expiry of the period that conclusion to be incorrect. The dif- laid down in the reasoned opinion. ficulties of complying with the judgment in Spain were so great that even the quickest possible implementation, within the mean- ing of the case-law, could not be achieved by the expiry of the time-limit set in the reasoned opinion. It follows that the fact 50. Moreover, that is the solution required that the judgment had not been complied by the most basic rules of legal certainty. with by that date does not necessarily prove The facts of the dispute must have cryst- that the judgment was not implemented as allised at a particular time, prior to pro- quickly as possible. ceedings being brought before the Court. Those proceedings cannot concern a situ- ation which is still developing, where the outcome of the case will depend on the length taken by the Court to dispose of the matter.
48. That argument might appear at first sight to be excessively formalistic, particu- larly in the circumstances of the present case. It is not denied that all the standards 51. But that would be the result of the set by the Directive have still not yet been Commission's argument that the defendant attained and the judgment thus remains to had available to it not only the years from be complied with. It therefore appears that, 1998 to 2000, but also the subsequent had the Commission delayed bringing pro- ceedings, as the Spanish Government claims by implication that it should have 12 — See, for example, Case C-362/90 Commission v Italy done, the result would have been no [1992] ECR I-2353, paragraph 10.
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period, until the Court delivered its judg- 54. The Commission claims moreover that ment, to fulfil its obligations. That sub- there should also be taken into account the mission should therefore be rejected and its 12 years between the period for implemen- should be held that since the expiry of the tation initially laid down in the Directive period laid down in the reasoned opinion and the judgment requiring compliance. was at the end of September 2000, the The defendant disputes this. In that regard, period available to the defendant to imple- it is undeniable that that period is even ment the Court's judgment was approxi- longer than the period of 10 years initially mately two years and seven months. allowed to Member States, and, accord- ingly, that Spain had more than ample time available to it before the Commission's first action, even assuming that it did not initiate compliance with the Directive until after its accession.
52. The case-law 13 cited by the Commis- sion at the hearing concerning the account taken by the Court of matters arising after the expiry of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion does not lead to a dif- ferent conclusion. In those cases, the Court 55. It is true, as indeed the Commission held that facts occurring after the period points out, that the obligation to comply were similar to those referred to in the with the Court's judgment and that of reasoned opinion and, accordingly, implementing the Directive are substan- amounted to the same conduct. It was tially the same. It none the less remains the therefore a question of linking proven facts case that they are not entirely comparable. occurring before the time-limit with That applies particularly to the period for matters arising after it had expired. complying with the relevant obligations. The period for implementing the Directive is laid down under it, and has, in the present case, long since expired.
53. By contrast, the approach proposed by the Commission in the present case repre- sents the direct opposite. It amounts in effect to placing reliance on matters occur- ring after the time-limit to prove the 56. By contrast, the period for complying breach, whereas the breach was required with the Court's judgment did not start to to have arisen before the time-limit had run before the judgment was notified, and expired. its expiry assumes the passage of a reason- able period of time, within the meaning of the Court's case-law referred to above. The 13 — Case 42/82 Commission v France [1983] ECR 1013 and reasonableness of the period depends on Case 113/86 Commission v Italy [1988) ECR 607. the measures remaining to be taken by the I - 14154
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Member State when the Court's judgment 60. The defendant next refers to the spe- is delivered and may therefore vary depend- cific features of the situation in Spain, ing on the circumstances of each actual where the implementation of the Directive case. presented particular difficulties. Spanish bathing areas are notable for very weak outflow from the rivers concerned and for a high proportion of areas containing stag- nant water of little depth. Such water has limited diluting ability and does not renew itself adequately, which means that not 57. It may admittedly appear contradictory only is the slightest impurity, which may be to refer to a time-limit within which a caused by something as trivial as the Member State must comply with its obli- presence of a bather, enough for the gations when years have passed since a standards to be exceeded, but also that it judgment finding an infringement, itself is very difficult to remedy constant excesses delivered 12 years after the expiry of the of this kind. That already endemic situation period allowed in the Directive. The fact was further aggravated by the dryness of remains, however, that it follows clearly, recent years. and in my opinion logically, from the case-law referred to above relating to failure to comply with a judgment, that the latter starts a new period running, which must be assessed according to the criteria laid down in that case-law.
58. In that regard, the defendant raises a number of arguments in support of its submission that the Commission should have allowed it a longer period of time. 61. However, the Commission disputes that version of the facts, claiming that the situation in Spain is comparable to that of other Member States such as Greece or Italy. The defendant responds, without challenge on the Commission's part, that 59. It notes first of all the unusual length of those Member States have designated a the period laid down in the Directive itself considerably lower number of bathing for its implementation by the Member areas 14 than Spain 15 and that only some States. That period may be explained by of them were of a comparable standard to the fact that the Community legislature those in Spain. itself recognised the considerable dif- ficulties that would arise in meeting the criteria laid down in the Directive and that 14 — According to Spain, Greece had designated 5 areas and only 46 Italian areas were comparable to the Spanish only long-term action would succeed in areas. fulfilling them. 15 — In 1998, Spain had designated 215 areas.
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62. In any event, the Commission has not before the Commission brings proceedings responded to other points raised by the can vary between 2 16 and 20 17 years. In a defendant. Thus, the latter observes that a case 18 that was more directly comparable distinction should be made between dif- with the present matter, as it also involved ferent situations. The requirement under the taking of specific measures to combat the directives to ensure that certain results pollution, the Commission waited for over are achieved is not the same in each of five and a half years after the delivery of the them. So, in some cases, the action required Court's judgment before bringing infringe- of a Member State consists in adopting ment proceedings, although the problem at legislative or regulatory standards, which it that time, which involved the management is easy to do quickly. In other cases, such as of waste in part of Crete, might appear the present one, the obligation to ensure more localised than that faced by the that certain results are achieved consists in Spanish authorities. altering and monitoring a physical entity, covering an entire country, whose most strongly flowing water course, according to the defendant, would largely pass unnot- iced in another Member State, except at its river mouth.
63. The defendant is correct to draw atten- tion to those aspects of the present case. It 65. The same applies, moreover, to another should be borne in mind, as the case-law case cited by the Commission at the mentioned above shows, that the question hearing. 19 That involved the position of is one of establishing whether the Member the United Kingdom which was also the State has been allowed a reasonable time in subject of an action for non-compliance which to comply with its obligations. That with a judgment of the Court and included can only be decided in the light of its actual a request for an order imposing a penalty situation at the expiry of the period laid payment. It is interesting in that regard to down in the reasoned opinion. note that in those proceedings the Com- mission allowed a period of six and a half years to pass before issuing a reasoned opinion. Furthermore, the problem arising in the United Kingdom was limited to a discrete area and might therefore appear to be of a scale smaller than that which arises in the present case. 64. In that regard, a comparison between this case and other proceedings for failure to fulfil obligations is instructive, although 16 — Case 131/84 Commission v Italy [198J] ECR 3531. without, of course, any legal significance. 17 — Case C-334/94 Commission v France [1996] ECR I-1307. Thus, in cases which only require legislative 18 — Case C-387/97 Commission v Greece, cited above. 19—Case C-85/01 Commission v United Kingdom (removed amendments to be made, the time elapsing from the Register).
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66. In any event, there are other factors 68. The above clearly shows that in some pointing to the particular difficulty of cases a period considerably greater than the implementing the Directive, a difficulty two and a half years allowed to the which I have already had occasion to refer defendant by the Commission is, even in to in my Opinion in Case C-226/01 Com- the latter's own opinion, objectively necess- mission v Denmark and which is, more- ary in order to comply with the Directive. over, confirmed by the number of infringe- None of the points raised by the Commis- ment proceedings relating to that direc- sion suggests that that is not the case here. tive. 20 It does not suggest that the works under- taken before the judgment in 1998 were sufficiently wide-ranging to prevent prob- lems of this kind recurring and that com- pliance with the remaining obligations would thus be able to progress rapidly. Nor does it claim that the defendant was not faced with diffuse sources of pollution or with water flows from agricultural land in the present matter. On the contrary, it does not challenge the defendant's sub- missions which refer clearly and in detail to 67. A particularly revealing point is dis- such circumstances. closed by the reports of the Commission itself, which have been cited by the defend- ant. It is apparent from Annex 1 to the report on the quality of bathing water for the 2000 season that the Commission explains the fact that, more than 20 years after the adoption of the Directive, some 69. It must be stated that the Commission's bathing areas have not complied for several arguments have failed to demonstrate that years with the prescribed values laid down the Member State in the present case has in it, by noting that it is difficult, especially been allowed a reasonable period in which where less significant and more diffuse to comply with the Court's judgment. It has sources of pollution are involved, to detect thus not shown that on the expiry of the these problems and to remedy them. It even period set in the reasoned opinion it was adds that in the majority of these cases immediately clear that the defendant had several bathing seasons are required to failed to comply with its obligations. detect the true source or the cycle of pollution. In some cases, the situation can only be resolved by the adoption of long- term improvement programmes relating to agricultural practices. 70. It should be noted that this type of 20 — Case C-56/90 Commission v United Kingdom [1993] ECR situation should be treated as exceptional. I-4109; Case C-92/96 Commission v Spain, cited above; Case C-198/97 Commission v Germany, cited above; Case It is linked to the factual background to the C-307/98 Commission v Belgium [2000] ECR I-3933; case, which is characterised, on the one Case C-147/00 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-2387; Case C-368/00 Commission v Sweden [2001] ECR I-4605; hand, by special factors relating to the Case C-427/00 Commission v United Kingdom [2001] implementation of the Directive and, on the ECR I-8535; Case C-226/01 Commission v Denmark, cited above. other, by what must, in the context, be
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termed a certain haste on the Commission's context of which a penalty payment would part, which might have been commendable hardly make sense, as it would not make in other circumstances. possible that which was impossible, namely achieving the required result in a shorter period.
71. In any event, it follows from the above that the Commission's action should be dismissed, because the failure which it 74. Thus, once imposed by the Court, the alleges has not been proved. It is therefore penalty payment would, in the absence of only for the sake of completeness that I any other solution, be due in respect of shall consider the conflicting reasoning of those months until compliance with the the parties regarding the arrangements values set in the Directive could be checked, relating to and the amount of the penalty namely at the end of the first bathing payment. season after its imposition (from 15 April to 23 October in the case of Spain). The same would apply in any other year until the percentages could be checked at the end of the following bathing season.
B — The principles relating to the setting of a penalty payment and its amount 75. For the Commission, the possibility or impossibility of complying with the judg- 72. In this context, the defendant claims, ment immediately is not a relevant matter, firstly, that a daily penalty payment is not having regard in particular to the fact that an appropriate mechanism for ensuring the imposition of the penalty occurred compliance with the judgment having some years after the obligation arose which regard to the actual circumstances of the it is sought to implement, namely that of case. The purpose of a penalty payment is complying with the Court's first judgment. not simply to penalise a Member State, but to encourage it to comply immediately. In the present case, the Member State required to establish what the problems were, which it had already done, to develop action plans, which it had also done, to implement 76. It adds that, ultimately, the question of them and to consider the results at the end whether the penalty payment is appropriate of each annual bathing season. depends only on whether or not the breach continues. If that is the case, the payment of a penalty represents the most appropriate means of ensuring that the breach is terminated. That is all the more so if one takes into account the fact that, in order to 73. It follows that the Member State would put an end to the breach of the Directive, be faced with irreducible timescales, in the the Kingdom of Spain must take certain
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specific measures, such as the control of 79. The defendant also submits that the diffuse pollution and illegal discharges of imposition of a daily penalty payment is waste, and the construction of purification inappropriate in the present case because stations for wastewater, which require to findings of compliance with the standards be undertaken throughout the year. set in the Directive are made annually, at the end of each bathing season. It follows that the penalty payment would of necess- ity be due over a long period.
77. For my part, I would willingly agree that in principle the only relevant question for deciding whether the imposition of a penalty payment is appropriate is that of whether or not the breach is a continuing 80. I understand the defendant to mean by one. If so, the measure is appropriate this that the imposition of the penalty because its aim is to require the Member payment would be inappropriate because State to comply with its obligations as soon it would be due on a daily basis whereas, as possible. By contrast, if the breach has since any finding that the breach has ended ended before the Court gives a ruling, there is made annually, the penalty would be is, by definition, no longer any need to paid during periods when the standards set require the Member State to take any steps in the Directive had in fact been attained, and the penalty payment should therefore but a finding as to that state of affairs could no longer be imposed. only be reached many days later. The Member State would thus be required to pay the penalty for periods when the breach had in fact terminated.
78. In the present case, the latest data provided to the Court by the parties show that the standards set in the Directive have still not been attained in all Spanish inshore bathing waters. The breach is therefore a 81. Indeed, the Directive itself makes it continuing one, and thus so the need clear that findings in relation to the state of persists to require the Member State to bathing areas are to be made annually. 21 remedy it as quickly as possible. That periodicity represents an integral part Admittedly, the penalty payment will not of the obligations arising under the Direc- enable the judgment to be complied with tive and a Member State is not entitled to more quickly, as that depends on a whole assume, before those findings are made, series of works to be undertaken by the that it is already in compliance with the Member State or the regional or local Directive and that a penalty payment will authorities. It nevertheless remains the case no longer be due. that the penalty payment is a means of dissuading the national authorities from 21 — Cf. Article 13 of the Ditective, as amended by Article 3 of slackening their efforts, for example in Council Directive 91/692/EEC of 23 December 1991 favour of other priorities, thereby delaying standardising and rationalising reports on the implemen- tation of certain directives relating to the environment compliance with the Court's judgment. (OJ 1991 L 377, p. 48).
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OPINION OF MR MISCHO — CASE C-278/01
82. Nevertheless, the Spanish Govern- 85. One might even ask whether, in cases ment's argument deserves in my opinion where the measure to be taken by the to be considered in greater detail. One Member State consists in the adoption of a might also ask whether, in circumstances legislative or regulatory act, a finding as to such as those in the present case, where the adequacy of that act and the cor- implementation of the Member State's responding lifting of the penalty payment obligations will of necessity be gradual, a should not be made by way of a decision of penalty payment should not be regarded as the Court, as it was the latter which inappropriate by reason of its being a fixed determined the breach and imposed the amount. The sum is set having regard to the penalty payment. However, I think that situation in the Member State at the time of that would be to take an unduly formalistic the Court's decision and is not capable of approach. being reduced as and when the judgment is complied with by the Member State.
86. In any event, it should be noted that in Case C-387/97 Commission v Greece, cited 83. The Commission argued at the hearing above, the Court held that the amount of that those problems are not insurmount- the penalty payment must be 'appropriate able. A Member State could make an to the circumstances'. As mentioned above, application to the Commission, supported those are characterised by the annual by the necessary evidence, showing that it nature of the finding as to compliance, had made progress in implementing its while the penalty payment proposed by the obligations and that the amount of the Commission is a daily one, and by the fact penalty payment should be reduced. Were that the implementation by a Member State the Commission to refuse the application, of its obligations of necessity will be or to set a new amount which the Member gradual, while the penalty payment is set State considered still to be too high, that at a fixed amount. would be subject to review by the Court by way of an application for declaration of failure to act or for annulment, according to the circumstances.
87. Those aspects of the present case have significant practical consequences. Thus, even if, at the end of a given bathing season, it is found that the bathing waters 84. That argument is unconvincing. It is to in Spain are almost in compliance with the say the least doubtful that the parties are requirements of the Directive, the penalty entitled to apply the Court's decision on the payment proposed by the Commission will amount of the penalty payment in that continue to be due in its entirety, for every way. day until the next annual finding is made.
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COMMISSION v SPAIN
88. The defendant would therefore be 91. It should be noted in that regard that liable to continue paying a daily penalty the Court held in Commission v Greece, for another year even though, on the one cited above, that it was not bound by the hand, the number of areas remaining in suggestions of the Commission. 23 It is breach was disproportionate to the sum therefore entitled to set a periodic penalty which continued to be payable, and, on the payment having regard to factors other other, as the number of relevant areas than those suggested by the Commission. would hypothetically be considerably Indeed, that is what was done in Commis- reduced, it would be quite likely that sion v Greece, where the Court imposed a compliance, in fact if not in law, would lower amount than that suggested by the be attained shortly afterwards and, in any Commission. case, well before the next annual finding was made.
89. It is difficult to consider that a mech- anism is 'appropriate to the circumstances' 92. The need to resolve the problems just where the non-compliance of 2 or 3 areas described should in my opinion govern the out of over 200 22 may give rise to an arrangements relating to the imposition of obligation to pay on a daily basis, for an the penalty payment. entire year, or even longer, a considerable sum, which is identical to that which was due at the time when the number of areas failing to comply was almost 10 times higher.
93. I therefore consider that the Court 90. It follows from the above, in my should require the defendant to pay an opinion, that the Court should not impose annual sum calculated by reference to the a periodic penalty payment on the defend- number of areas still not complying with ant of the kind proposed by the Commis- the standards set in the Directive. If the sion. The Court should thus consider approach taken by the Court in Case whether a penalty payment calculated by C-387/97 Commission v Greece is adopted, reference to other parameters should be and the Commission's suggestion is taken imposed, having regard to the fact — as a useful reference point, it will be noted accepted, it should be recalled, only as an that it considered a daily sum of EUR 45 alternative hypothesis — that an infringe- 600 to be appropriate where almost 20% ment is established and that it persists. of bathing areas did not comply with the criteria laid down in the Directive.
22 — As mentioned above, in 1998 Spain had designated a total of 215 bathing areas. 23 — Paragraph 89.
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OPINION OF MR MISCHO — CASE C-278/01
94. That information enables a sum to be would then be EUR 562 500 multiplied by calculated which reasonably reflects the 10. If at the end of the following bathing annual value which 1% of non-compliant season, for 2005, it is found that 95% of bathing areas represents. If 20% of the areas comply, this will mean that 5% do areas correspond to EUR 45 600 per day, not. The amount due will not be more than one can establish what 1% a year actually EUR 562 500 multiplied by five. Ulti- corresponds to. mately, when it appears that all areas comply, the amount will be nil.
95. This produces a figure of EUR 562 500 per year. I therefore suggest, in the alter- 98. The above example clearly shows how native, it should be recalled, that it would the suggested mechanism will enable a be 'appropriate to the circumstances', Member State to see itself rewarded for within the meaning of Article 228 EC, to the fruits of its efforts as soon as their result order the Kingdom of Spain to pay an has been established. That constitutes a amount of EUR 562 500 per year for each positive incentive, in accordance with the per cent of the number of designated areas logical basis underlying the penalty pay- that were found to be non-compliant with ment, to encourage the Member State to the Directive. remedy the situation in the shortest possible timescale.
96. Payment would be due from the time when findings were made as to the quality 99. I shall now consider the question of the of bathing water attained at the end of the amount of the penalty payment calculated first season after delivery of the judgment by the Commission, which the defendant to be delivered by the Court and, if challenges in the further alternative. relevant, at the time when subsequent annual findings were made.
100. As regards the factor related to the duration of the breach, the Commission 97. A practical example will illustrate how points out that more than three years have the suggested mechanism would work. passed since delivery of the Court's judg- Presuming the Court delivers judgment in ment and it accordingly proposes to apply, 2003, the first relevant annual finding will on a scale of 1 to 3, a factor of 2. The be that relating to the 2004 season. Let us defendant points out that in the period assume that it is then found that 90% of between the Court's judgment and the the bathing areas have attained the relevant bringing of the action there were only three standards; it would follow that 10% did bathing seasons, which would not justify not. The amount due by the defendant using a coefficient of 2. The Commission
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COMMISSION v SPAIN
claims, however, that if the minimum 103. The defendant claims, on the other coefficient of 1 were applied in the present hand, that the Commission has failed to matter, there would be no difference have regard to the fact that almost four between a case where calculation of the fifths of the areas were already in com- penalty payment by the Commission was pliance. Furthermore, it should have taken undertaken a year after the judgment and into consideration the time that has elapsed the current case, where three years and since the judgment and not since the time three months have elapsed between the when the Directive should have been Court's judgment and the Commission's implemented. Lastly, it has overlooked the decision to bring proceedings. fact that, because of the date of its acces- sion, the defendant had not benefited from a period of 10 years in which to implement the Directive, unlike other Member States.
101. I agree with the applicant's approach. Once one accepts that the period allowed to the defendant was not inadequate, the fact that it was brief has no bearing on the duration of the infringement. In order to determine that duration, the Court need merely refer to the time which has elapsed between its first judgment and the finding that the breach is continuing. The period in question now amounts to more than five years and the Directive is still not being 104. It is however clear from the terms of complied with in Spain; it follows that the the application itself that the Commission imposition of a coefficient of 2 out of 3 had regard to the increase in the rate of cannot be said to be wrong. compliance, which it notes had risen from 54.5% in 1992 to 79.2% in 2000. As regards the account taken of the time that has elapsed since the date set by the Directive, I also agree with the Commis- sion's approach. It is true that that period 102. As for the factor relating to the should not be taken into account in estab- seriousness of the infringement, the Com- lishing the duration of the infringement mission proposes to apply a factor of 4, on which is the subject of the present proceed- a scale of 1 to 20. It justifies that figure in ings, as that infringement consists in the particular by the importance of the Com- failure to comply with the Court's judg- munity provisions in question, whose aim is ment. That implies by definition that it to protect human health, and by the time should run only from the date of the latter. that has passed since the deadline for It none the less remains the case that that implementation laid down in the Directive. time is relevant in assessing not the dur- On the other hand, it has also taken into ation of the infringement but its serious- account the degree of compliance achieved ness. As the Commission points out, it is and, in particular, the slight degree of objectively more serious to fail to comply progress disclosed by the figures for 1999 with a directive over a long period of time and 2000. than over a shorter period.
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OPINION OF MR MISCHO — CASE C-278/01
105. Lastly, as regards the defendant's designated as such. Some of the areas argument contending that it did not benefit which were wrongly removed did not from an additional period for implementing comply with the requirements laid down the Directive, the Commission's response in the annex to the Directive. that it could have requested such a period, as Portugal did, is hardly satisfactory. Although it is true that the Kingdom of Spain was entitled to make such a request, it cannot be said with certainty that it would have been granted.
108. The defendant vehemently disputes that submission.
106. That said, I am of the view that the other arguments raised by the Commission, in particular the importance of the provi- sions in question for public health, a 109. I have already observed that this criterion that was moreover applied by question was of no relevance in establishing the Court in Commission v Greece, 24 cited whether an infringement has occurred. The above, justify setting a factor of 4 relating same applies in the context of assessing the to the seriousness of the breach. penalty payment because the Commission itself records that it was calculated on the basis of the figures appearing in its annual reports, which disregard areas that have been removed from the list.
107. Before I conclude, reference should briefly be made to the dispute that can only be termed bitter between the Commission and the defendant on the question of the 110. One may nevertheless wonder to what removal of a number of bathing areas from extent the question could be of importance the list. The Commission claims in its for the implementation of its obligations by application that the compliance figures in a Member State. That could be the case its annual reports should be adjusted down- where the degree of compliance with the wards to reflect the unjustified removal of Directive attained by the bathing areas was some bathing areas from the list of areas challenged because the Commission took the view that the result had only been achieved by means of the unjustified 24 — Paragraph 94. removal of areas from the list.
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COMMISSION v SPAIN
111. The following points should be made 115. That solution, which the objectives of in that regard. the Directive require, is also supported by the decision in Commission v Belgium cited above.
112. It is beyond dispute that a Member State is entitled to remove bathing areas from the list of those which it has desig- 116. In the second example, the area with- nated. That is not in any event challenged drawn from the list would be subject to a by the Commission. The Directive cannot prohibition on bathing. It follows plainly be regarded as requiring Member States to from Article 1(2)(a) of the Directive that fix the use of water in their territory for the latter applies only to water in which evermore. bathing is authorised. Accordingly, the standards set in it cannot be applied to water which does not meet that require- ment.
113. The dispute relates to the con- sequences of such a removal and the detailed rules applying to it. 117. Admittedly, it could be said that a solution of this nature, which is compatible with the protection of health, is not, by contrast, necessarily compatible with the objective of the protection of the environ- ment which also underlies the Directive. However, that objective should be seen in 114. As regards the consequences of the context of the scope of the Directive: it removal, two situations should be distin- cannot be relied upon to extend the latter's guished. The first is where a State fails to field of application further than the provi- prohibit bathing in the area in question at sions of the Directive expressly require. It the same time. In that case, the area has should be noted in that regard that under been wrongly removed from the list. The settled case-law a provision whose wording requirements of the Directive must con- is entirely clear cannot be subject to inter- tinue to apply. A Member State cannot pretation. withdraw an area from their purview with- out undermining the public health objective of the Directive. The harmonious develop- ment of the internal market, to which the recitals in the preamble to the Directive also refer, would be compromised as well, since the conditions of competition 118. As to the detailed rules relating to between bathing areas in the different removal, the question arises in particular of States would be distorted. where the relevant onus of proof lies. In
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OPINION OF MR MISCHO — CASE C-278/01
that regard, it is appropriate to note the 119. In the present case, that means that it settled case-law, already referred to above, is for the Commission to establish that one pursuant to which it is for the Commission or more areas were removed from the to prove the alleged breach. official list without bathing being pro- hibited there.
V — Conclusion
120. For the above reasons, I propose that the Court should:
— dismiss the action by the Commission;
— order the Commission to pay the costs of the action.
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