C-94/02
ECLI:EU:C:2003:292
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BIRET ET CIE v COUNCIL
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL ALBER delivered on 15 May 2003 1
Table of contents
I — Introduction I -10568
II — Law and facts I -10568
III — The judgment of the Court of First Instance I - 10570
IV — The appeal I - 10572
A — Incorrect interpretation of Article 300(7) EC I - 10572
1. Effectiveness of Article 300(7) EC I -10572
2. Recognition of direct effect of WTO agreements I -10574
B — Incorrect interpretation of Article 48 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of
First Instance I -10575
V — The Council's position I - 10576
VI — Forms of order sought I - 10577
VII— Assessment I - 10578
A — Conditions for a claim for damages I - 10578
B — The illegal conduct of the Council I -10579
1. The direct applicability of WTO law I - 10580
(a) Incorrect interpretation of Article 300(7) EC I -10580
(b) Exceptions I-10582 (c) The direct applicability of WTO law resulting from DSB recommen- dations I - 10586
(i) The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settle- ment of Disputes I - 10587
1 — Original language: German.
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(ii) Reduction in the discretion enjoyed by the EC legislative and executive bodies I -10589 — Power to agree a waiver I -10589 — Implementation of DSB recommendations I -10591 (iii) The principle of reciprocity I -10594 (iv) Comparison with situations within the Community I-10595 — Actions for infringement of the Treaty I-10596 — Liability arising from failure to implement directives I-10596 (v) The fundamental right of freedom to pursue an economic activity . I -10597 (vi) Sufficiently precise rules I-10598 (vii) Interim conclusion I-10598 2. Infringement of a protective measure I -10598 3. Conclusion as to the illegality of the Council's conduct I-10600 C — Damage and the causal link I -10600 D — Incorrect interpretation of Article 48 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance I -10601 VIII — Costs I-10602 IX — Conclusion I -10602
I — Introduction expressly claims that the judgment should be set aside. As to fact, it alleges that it has suffered damage as a result of a Commu- nity prohibition on the importation of beef, which the DSB has found to be inconsistent 1. The appeal — against the judgment dis- with the W T O agreements. missing an action for damages — turns essentially on the question whether the case-law of the Court, pursuant to which individuals cannot rely on W T O rules to challenge the legality of acts of Community II — Law and facts law, also applies where those rules are embodied in a specific ruling handed down by the W T O Dispute Settlement Body (hereinafter 'DSB'). 2 The appellant 2. Reference is made to paragraphs 1 to 18 of the contested judgment 3 for an account 2 — Name given in the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (hereinafter 'the WTO Agreement'), see Article IV(3) of the WTO Agreement (OJ 1994 L 336, 3 —Judgment in Case T-210/00 Etablissements Biret et Cie v p. 3). Council [2002] ECR 11-17.
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or the legal framework and the facts. They the World Trade Organisation (hereinafter are recapitulated here in summary form, to 'the WTO') and all the agreements and avoid repetition. understandings in Annexes I to 4 to the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation (hereinafter 'the WTO agree- ments'). The Council approved the con- clusion of those agreements in Decision 94/800/EC of 22 December 1994. 6The agreements, which include the Agreement 3. As a result of the adoption of Council on the Application of Sanitary and Phyto- Directive 81/602/EEC of 31 July 1981 sanitary Measures 7(hereinafter 'the SPS concerning the prohibition of certain sub- Agreement') and the Understanding on stances having a hormonal action and of Rules and Procedures Governing the Settle- any substances having a thyrostatic action 4 ment of Disputes 8 (the Dispute Settlement and Council Directive 88/146/EEC of Understanding, hereinafter 'the DSU'), 9 7 March 1988 prohibiting the use in live- entered into force on 1 January 1995. stock farming of certain substances having a hormonal action, 5the importation into the Community of meat and meat products treated with certain hormones was pro- hibited. 6. On 29 April 1996, the Council adopted Directive 96/22/EC concerning the prohib- ition on the use in stockfarming of certain substances having a hormonal or thyro- static action and of ß-agonists, and repealing 4. The appellant, Établissements Biret et Directives 81/602/EEC, 88/146/EEC and Cie SA (hereinafter 'Biret et Cie'), hold 88/299/EEC. 10 It confirmed the prohib- 66% of the capital of Biret International ition on imports and added another sub- SA, a company founded on 26 July 1990 stance to the five already prohibited. and entered into the commercial register on 9 August 1990, which is the appellant in parallel proceedings in Case C-93/02 P. The object of Biret International SA, in accord- ance with its constitution, is trade in food- 7. In February 1998, the DSB found these stuffs, particularly meat. Community measures to be inconsistent with the SPS Agreement. The Community had until 13 May 1999 to comply with the DSB's recommendations.
6 — Council Decision 94/800/EC of 22 December 1994 concern- 5. On 15 April 1994, the Community ing the conclusion on behalf of lhe European Community, signed the Final Act concluding the Uru- as regards matters within its competence, of the agreements readied in the Uruguay Round multilateral negotiations guay Round, the Agreement establishing (1986-1994) (OJ 1994 L 3 3 6 , p. 1). 7 — OJ 1994 L 3.16, p. 40. 8 — OJ 1994 L 336, p. 234. 9 — Name given in the WTO Agreement (cited m footnote 2), 4 — O J 1981 L 222, p. 32. see Article III(3) of the Agreement. 5 — OJ 1988 L 70, p. 16. 10 — OJ 1996 L 125, p. 3.
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8. On 10 August 2000, Biret et Cie brought 10. The Court of First Instance dismissed an action under Article 235 EC in con- the action for damages on the grounds set junction with the second paragraph of out in paragraphs 71 to 82 of the judgment: Article 288 EC against the Council for compensation for the damage it had suf- fered as a result of the judicial liquidation of Biret International SA following the prohibition imposed by the Community on the importation of meat and meat products treated with certain hormones. It '71 It is clear from case-law which is now calculates that damage at FRF 70 630 085. firmly established that in view of their nature and structure the W T O Agree- ment and its annexes, in the same way as GATT 1947, do not in principle form part of the rules by which the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance review the legality of acts adopted by Community institutions u n d e r t h e f i r s t p a r a g r a p h of Article 173 of the EC Treaty (now, I I I— The judgment of the Court of First after amendment, the first paragraph of Instance Article 230 EC), that individuals can- not rely on them before the courts and that any infringement of them will not give rise to non-contractual liability on the part of the Community...
9. In respect of the period before 10 August 1995, the Court of First Instance dismissed the action as inadmissible on the ground that it was time-barred. 1 1In respect of the subsequent period, it should be noted that 72 The purpose of the W T O agreements is by judgment of 7 December 1995 the to govern relations between States or T r i b u n a l de c o m m e r c e ( C o m m e r c i a l regional organisations for economic Court), Paris, opened judicial liquidation integration and not to protect individ- proceedings in respect of Biret International uals. As the Court of Justice stated in SA and provisionally set the date for Portugal v Council [Case C-149/96 cessation of payments at 28 February 1995. Portugal v Council [1999] E C R However, according to the Court of First I - 8 3 9 5 ] , the a g r e e m e n t s are still Instance, that did not necessarily imply that founded on the principle of negoti- Biret International SA was no longer able ations with a view to entering into to engage in any commercial activities reciprocal and mutually advantageous during the period from 28 June 1995 to arrangements and thus differ from the 7 December 1995. agreements concluded between the Community and non-member coun- tries whereby the obligations are not 11 — Paragraphs 40 to 46 of the contested judgment. necessarily reciprocal. To have the task
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of ensuring that Community law is in 75 In the circumstances, therefore, the conformity with those rules fall directly applicant cannot rely on an infringe- to the Community judicature would be ment of the SPS Agreement. to deprive the legislative or executive bodies of the Community of the dis- cretion enjoyed by similar bodies of the Community's trading partners.
76 The decision of the DSB of 13 February 1998 referred to above cannot alter that.
73 According to that judgment (Portugal v 77 There is an inescapable and direct link Council, paragraph 49) it is only where between the decision and the pica the Community intended to implement alleging infringement of the SPS Agree- a particular obligation assumed in the ment, and the decision could therefore context of the W T O , or where the only be taken into consideration if the Community measure refers expressly to Court had found that Agreement to the precise provisions of the W T O have direct effect in the context of a agreements, that it is for the Commu- plea alleging the invalidity of the direc- nity judicature to review the legality of tives in question... the Community measure in question in the light of the W T O rules...
78 The plea alleging infringement of the SPS Agreement must therefore be rejected as unfounded.
74 It is clear that the circumstances of this case clearly do not correspond to either of the two hypotheses set out in the 79 As the applicant has thus failed to preceding paragraph. Since Directives establish that the conduct alleged 81/602 and 88/146 were adopted on against the defendant institution is 1 January 1995, several years before unlawful, the action must in any event the entry into force of the SPS Agree- be dismissed as unfounded and it is ment, it is not logically possible for unnecessary to consider the applicant's them either to give rise to a specific locus standi (see paragraph 29 above) obligation entered into under that or other conditions for non-contractual agreement or to refer expressly to some liability on the part of the Commu- of its provisions. nity....
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80 In its reply, however, the applicant EC and incorrect interpretation of requests the Court of First Instance, in Article 48 of the Rules of Procedure of the alternative, to "develop its case- the Court of First Instance. law" in the direction of a system of no-fault liability for the Community in respect of its normative acts. In support of that request, it relies in particular on the "defence of the rule of law", the autonomous nature of an action for damages, the general principles com- mon to the laws of the Member States and considerations of natural justice A — Incorrect interpretation of linked to application of the "pre- Article 300(7) EC cautionary principle".
81 That submission, which changes the 1. Effectiveness of Article 300(7) EC 12 very basis on which the Community could be held liable, must be regarded as constituting a new plea in law which cannot be introduced in the course of proceedings, as Article 48 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First 12. The appellant considers that the con- Instance provides... tested judgment is mistaken about the effect of Article 300(7) EC. In its view, it is inconsistent to maintain that the WTO agreements are an integral part of Com- munity law but not to admit them as a criterion for determining the legality of acts of Community secondary legislation. 82 It is clear from all the foregoing that in so far as the action is not inadmissible it is in any event unfounded.'
13. In the judgment in NV Nederlandse Spoorwegen, the Court held that since, so far as fulfilment of the commitments pro- vided for by GATT is concerned, the IV — The appeal Community has replaced the Member States, the mandatory effect, in law, of
11. The appeal is based on two pleas: 12 — Article 300(7) EC reads: 'Agreements concluded under the conditions set out in this Article shall be binding on the incorrect interpretation of Article 300(7) institutions of the Community and on Member States.'
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these commitments must be determined by 16. Biret et Cie further considers that the reference to the relevant provisions in the Court of First Instance did not pay suffi- Community legal system, 13 which include cient attention to the DSB's decision, which Article 300(7) EC. clearly established the illegality of the Community acts. The Court of First Instance ruled that the direct effect of that decision depended on the direct effect of the SPS Agreement. But this was contrary to the interpretation of Community law, according to which the Court of Justice had never judged the direct applicability of the 14. On this principle, the Court has already provisions of a directive by the direct on several occasions reviewed the legality applicability of the treaties. The appellant of acts of Community law in the light of considers that the judgment in Atlanta, 16 international agreements but has never cited by the Court of First Instance in this found the international measure in question connection, is irrelevant as that case con- to have direct effect. 14 cerned admissibility whereas the present one turns on a question of substance.
17. Biret et Cie claims that Article 300(7) 15. Biret et Cie also cites Advocate General EC should be interpreted as meaning that Saggio's Opinion in Portugal v Council, in the obligation of the Community institu- which he objected that it would reduce the tions to comply with an international rule scope of Article 300(7) EC. The application depends only on whether that rule forms an of rules of an international agreement integral part of the Community legal order. cannot, he said, depend on prior incor- That is undoubtedly so in the case of the poration of the agreement in the Commu- W T O agreements. nity legal order by means of a transposing or enabling act. In any case, internal review of the rules of agreements by the Commu- nity institutions and the Member States cannot fail to offer a stronger guarantee of the fulfilment of the obligations undertaken at international level and is therefore in 18. It also claims that the contested judg- keeping with the objectives of the N T O ment does not address the argument that, in Agreement. 15 acceding to the W T O dispute settlement system, the Community undertook to recognise the DSB's decisions. In so doing, 13 — Judgment in Case 38/75 NV Nederlandse Spoorwegen the Community intended to implement a [1975] ECR 1439, paragraph 16. particular obligation assumed in the con- 14 — In the case of GATT, the appellant refers to the judgments text of the W T O . in Case 38/75 NV Nederlandse Spoorwegen, cited in footnote 13, and Case 112/80 Dürbeck [1981] ECR 1095. 15 — Biret et Cie refers to the statements contained in points 18 and 24 [properly 23] of Advocate General Saggio's Opinion in Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council [1999] 16 — Judgment i n Case C-104/97 P Atlanta and Others v ECR I-8395, I-8397. Commission and Council [1999] ECR I - 6 9 8 3 .
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2. Recognition of direct effect of WTO 21. Also, the WTO agreements are not agreements essentially different from other agreements, which the Court has held to have direct effect. Biret et Cie cites the EEC/Portugal free-trade Agreement and the EEC/Yugo- slavia Cooperation Agreement, and the case-law in that connection. 17
19. Should the Court reject this interpre- tation of Article 300(7) EC, Biret et Cie claims that it should develop the case-law on the effect of the WTO agreements in the Community legal order. First, it claims that the previous case-law is not convincing. Thus, in the contested judgment the Court of First Instance relied on the argument 22. It adds that the fact that the parties are repeatedly adduced in the previous case- contemplating dispute settlement proceed- law that the Community's legislative and ings does not preclude them from holding executive bodies have a certain discretion the domestic measures to be inconsistent under WTO law, which is based on the with WTO law. The Court itself drew reciprocal nature of the obligations attention to this point in its judgment in assumed in that context and is con- Atlanta. 18 sequently inalienable. In the present case, however, Biret et Cie considers that, as a result of the DSB's decision of 13 February 1998, the Community institutions no longer have any discretion in the matter. On that ground alone, the previous case- law does not apply.
23. The fact remains, according to the appellant, that a legal rule that forms an integral part of Community law has been infringed. The Community Courts are therefore required to punish that infringe- ment. Even if damages and other compen- sation might be payable under the WTO 20. Moreover, automatic reliance on the system in the event of an infringement of discretion accorded to the legislative and the agreements, the fact that under Com- executive bodies would suggest that the munity law Article 228 EC provides for WTO dispute settlement mechanism was more tolerant of persistent infringements than other systems. But that is not the case. 17 —Judgments in Case 104/81 Kupferberg [1982] ECR 3641, On the contrary, the WTO agreements are paragraph 20, and Case C-162/96 Racke [1998] ECR much more developed than other com- I-3655, paragraph 6. 18 — Biret et Cie refers to paragraph 21 of the judgment in Case parable international agreements. C-104/97 P Atlanta, cited in footnote 16.
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payment of a lump sum or penalty payment B — Incorrect interpretation of Article 48 does not alter the fact that the infringement of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of may persist. First Instance 19
27. Biret et Cie considers that the contested judgment was wrong to reject its sub- mission regarding a system of no-fault 24. An argument for admitting the direct liability on the ground that it was out of applicability of the WTO agreements is time. In the first place, the reference to the that more and more provisions of the judgment in Atlanta was inappropriate agreements affect the relations between because that case concerned responsibility citizens and the States parties to those for a lawful act. But the present case agreements. Biret et Cie cites, in particular, concerns liability for illegal acts of Com- the provisions on public contracts, protec- munity law on the ground that the Direc- tion of intellectual property and food safety tives at issue infringe WTO law, which is regulations. an integral part of Community law.
28. Moreover, its claim for damages under Article 235 and the second paragraph of 25. Biret et Cie also considers that it is only Article 288 EC makes frequent mention of right, in common justice, that individuals the possibility of no-fault liability for should be able to rely on certain provisions damage. First, in connection with its argu- of the WTO agreements, since they are ment that the Community's international liable to retaliation ('penalties') under obligations are separate from the direct WTO law. applicability of the rules that gave rise to those obligations. 20 Second, in connection with the reference to the general principles of law common to the legal orders of the Member States, including obligations under international agreements, 21 and lastly in
26. Lastly, Biret et Cie raises the question 19 — Article 48 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First of consistency in Community law. It fol- Instance reads as follows: lows from Article 300(7) EC that the WTO §1 In reply or rejoinder a party may offer further evidence. agreements form an integral part of Com- The party must, however, give reasons for the delay in offering it. munity law. The Court has frequently ruled §2 that citizens as well as States are subject to No new plea in law may be introduced in the course of the proceedings unless it is based on matters of law or of fact Community law. Citizens must therefore be which come to light in the course of the procedure.' 20 — The appellant is referring to points 33 to 36 of the able to rely on provisions, such as the WTO application. agreements, that form an integral part of 21 — The appellant is referring to points 37 to 39 of the application. It refers in particular to the relevant French Community law. and Belgian case-law.
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connection with the description of the 30. As regards the interpretation of damage suffered by Biret et Cie as being Article 300(7) EC, the Council cites the specific and unusual. 22 According to the Opinion in Germany v Council, in which case-law, a submission may not be rejected Advocate General Gulmann stated that the on the ground that it is a new plea in law Court has consistently stressed that the and therefore out of time if it merely effects of an international agreement in the develops submissions made in the appli- Community legal order must be determined cation by invoking a number of arguments by reference to the nature and objectives of some of which were adduced for the first the agreement in question. 24 It adds that in time in the reply. 23 Also, it had simply been the judgment in Demirel the Court imposed replying to the objections raised by the the further condition that the provision in Council in its defence. question must contain a clear and precise obligation which is not subject, in its implementation or effects, to the adoption of any subsequent measure. 25
31. It contends that the purpose of the V — The Council's position WTO agreements is not to establish rights for individuals but merely to govern relations between States and regional econ- omic organisations on the basis of negoti- ations based on the principle of reciprocity. Consequently, it claims that the Court of First Instance described the SPS Agreement and applied Article 300(7) correctly in the 29. The Council points out that the Court contested judgment. of First Instance had not ruled on the admissibility of the application with respect to the period between 28 June and 7 December 1995. Should the Court of Justice uphold the appeal, it would there- fore have to refer the case back to the Court of First Instance for further examination. It 32. As regards the effect of the DSB's further argues that the Court must also decision, the Council considers that it was examine to what extent Biret et Cie has reasonable for the Court of First Instance to demonstrated an interest in bringing pro- cite the judgment in Atlanta to show that ceedings. the existence of such a decision could not
22 — The appellant is referring to point 58 et seq. of the 24 — The Council is referring to point 127 of Advocate General application. Gulmann's Opinion in Case C-280/93 Germany v Council 23 — Biret et Cie cites the judgment in Case 2/57 Hauts [1994] ECR I-4973, I-4980. Fourneaux de Chasse v High Authority [1957-1958] 25 — The Council cites the judgment in Case 12/86 Demirel ECR 199. [1987] ECR 3719, paragraph 12 [properly paragraph 14].
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affect the right of Biret et Cie to rely on the Court of First Instance was therefore quite SPS Agreement. The statements in the right to take account of the discretion judgment in Atlanta were general, even if accorded to the legislative and executive they were made in the context of determin- bodies. ing admissibility.
35. As regards the plea concerning the incorrect interpretation of Article 48 of the Rules of Procedure, the Council con- 33. The Council cannot understand how, siders this to be inadmissible. It relates not merely by acceding to the WTO, the to a point of law but to the actual content Community can be deemed to have of the application. In any case, scrutiny of intended to implement certain obligations the application suffices to show that it assumed in that context. The appellant has contains no mention of no-fault liability on yet to explain what is meant by that notion, the part of the Community. which is completely contrary to the philos- ophy of the WTO agreements. Nor does the appellant specify the act by which the Community is supposed to have intended to implement the DSB's decision.
VI — Forms of order sought
34. The Council rejects the suggestion that the case-law on the direct applicability of 36. Biret et Cie claims that the Court the WTO agreements should be developed should: and refers to the previous case-law, con- firmed by the judgment in Omega Air among others. 26 The Council also rejects the objection regarding the discretion enjoyed by the legislative and executive bodies. In its view, the objection is mis- — set aside the judgment delivered by the taken about the ways in which the SPS Court of First Instance on 11 January Agreement can be implemented. The States 2002 in Case T-210/00, parties to that agreement may be guided either by international standards or by some other scientific assessment of the risks or by the precautionary principle. The
26 — Judgment in Joined Cases C-27/00 and C-122/00 Omega — uphold the form of order sought by it- Air 12002] ECR I-2569. at first instance, and
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— order the Council to pay the costs. the measure giving rise to the illegal con- duct on the part of the Community must be intended to protect the injured party. 28
37. The Council claims that the Court should:
— dismiss the appeal, and
39. The present appeal turns primarily on the question whether a rule of law that is intended to confer rights on individuals has been infringed. Is the infringement of the — order the appellant to pay the costs. SPS Agreement committed by the Commu- nity legislature in adopting Directives 81/602, 88/146 and 96/22 prohibiting imports, as found in the DSB's recommen- dations of 13 February 1998, and failing to annul those measures within the period granted to comply with the DSB's recom- mendations such as to justify a claim by V I I— Assessment Biret et Cie against the Community? The Court has not so far been called upon to rule on a claim for damages resulting from failure to comply with a DSB recommen- dation within the prescribed period. The facts in Portugal v Commission 29 did not A — Conditions for a claim for damages involve any DSB recommendation or decision. In Atlanta, 30 the appellant referred for the first time in its reply to a DSB decision delivered in the interim. Its 38. A claim for damages based on non- plea was consequently dismissed by the contractual liability on the part of the Court on the ground that the submission Community presupposes illegal conduct was out of time. 31 In the present case, the on the part of the Community, actual damage, and the existence of a causal link between the illegal conduct and the alleged 28 —Judgments in Joined Cases 5/66, 7/66 and 13/66 to 24/66 Kampffmeyer and Others v Commission [1967] ECR 245, damage. 27 The case-law also requires that 262, Case 5/71 Schöppenstedt v Council [1971] 975, paragraph 11, and Case C-282/90 Vreugdenhil v Com- mission [1992] ECR I-1937, paragraph 19. 29—Judgment in Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council [1999] ECR 1-8395. 27 — See judgments in Case C-104/97 P Atlanta, cited in footnote 16, paragraph 65, and Case C-352/98 P Berga- 30 — Cited in footnote 16. derm and Goupil v Commission [2000] ECR I-5291, 31 — Judgment in Case C-104/97 P Atlanta, cited in footnote paragraph 42. 16, paragraph 22 et seq.
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question of the effects of DSB recommen- the hearing that a claim for damages in dations in the Community legal order is respect of measures adopted during the expressly raised. 1980s is inadmissible because the SPS Agreement did not enter into force until 1995 must therefore be dismissed.
42. International agreements concluded by B — The illegal conduct of the Council the Community take precedence over sec- ondary legislation. 33 The Community con- cluded the WTO agreements and approved them by Council Decision 94/800. The SPS Agreement therefore takes precedence over 40. Liability of the Council under the the relevant provisions of the Directives in second paragraph of Article 288 EC pre- question. The infringement of WTO law supposes illegal conduct. The conduct in was confirmed by the DSB on 13 February this case consists of adopting Directives 1998. 81/602, 88/146 and 96/22 prohibiting the importation of meat treated with hormones and failing to annul them after the DSB made its recommendations on 13 February 1998. The illegality of the conduct arises 43. Liability in respect of failure to act falls from the fact that the directives in question to be considered only where there is a legal are inconsistent with the SPS Agreement. obligation to act. In this case, the legal obligation to act arises from the duty to bring Community law into line with the obligations arising from the SPS Agree- ment, as provided in the DSB recommen- dations of 13 February 1998. The Com- 41. According to the DSB's findings, the munity was granted a period of 15 months SPS Agreement is applicable to Directives for that purpose, which expired on 13 May 81/602 and 88/146. It is true that the 1999. agreement did not enter into force until 1 January 1995 but, according to the DSB, it contains no limitation on its temporal scope. It therefore also applies to measures that were adopted before it entered into 44. Although this evidence suggests that force but were still in force on 1 January the Council's conduct was illegal, the Court 1995. 32 The Council's contention during of First Instance in the contested judgment rejected the claim of Biret et Cie for 32 — Point 128 of the Appellate Body's report of 16 January 1998 (WT/DS26/AB/R, W T / D S 4 8 / A B / R ) , adopted by the DSB on 13 February 1998. A l lW T O documents cited in 33 — Judgments in Joined Cases 21/72 to 24/72 International this Opinion arc to be found on the W T O website Fruit Company [1972] ECR 1219, paragraphs 7 to 9 and (www.wto.org) under the heading 'Trade Topics', 'Dispute 28, and Case C-280/93 Germany v Council [1994] ECU Settlement'. I-5039, paragraph 105.
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damages. This decision was based on 46. Biret et Cie's claim for damages pre- settled case-law to the effect that, having supposes that it can rely on provisions of regard to their nature and structure, the WTO law. In that case, the provisions WTO Agreement and the agreements and would have to be directly applicable and be understandings annexed to it, including the intended to protect individuals. SPS Agreement, are not in principle among the rules in the light of which the Court is to review the legality of measures adopted by the Community institutions. 3 4How- ever, where the Community intended to implement a particular obligation assumed in the context of the WTO, or where the Community measure refers expressly to the 1. The direct applicability of WTO law precise provisions of the agreements and understandings contained in the annexes to the WTO Agreement, it is for the Court to review the legality of the Community measure in question in the light of the WTO rules. 35 (a) I n c o r r e c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Article 300(7) EC
47. The appellant alleges that there is a contradiction between the assertion that the WTO agreements form part of Com- munity law and the contention that indi- viduals cannot rely on them to challenge the legality in Community law of acts of secondary legislation that are contrary to WTO law. 45. The appellant contends that the case- law cited is mistaken about the effect of Article 300(7) EC. It also considers that the DSB's decision establishes the conditions for the first exception recognised by the Court to the principle that WTO rules are 48. It must first be pointed out that the not directly applicable. In the alternative, it Court holds that international agreements suggests that the case-law should be devel- concluded by the Community form 'part of oped. Community law'. 36 Contrary to the view of Biret et Cie, it is unnecessary to decide
34 — Judgment in Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council, cited in footnote 29, paragraph 47, Order of the Court in Case 36—Judgments in Case 181/73 Haegeman [1974] ECR 449, C-307/99 OCT Fruchthandelsgesellschaft [2001] ECR paragraphs 2 to 6, Case 104/81 Kupferberg, cited in I-3159, paragraph 24, and judgments in Case C-307/99 footnote 17, paragraphs 2 to 6, and Order of the Court of Omega Air, cited in footnote 26, paragraph 93, and Case First Instance in Case T-115/94 Opel Austria v Council C-76/00 P Petrotub [2003] ECR I-79, paragraph 53. [1997] ECR II-39, paragraph 101. The Court even held 35 —Judgments in Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council, cited in that this applies to the AETR Agreement, which has been footnote 29, paragraph 49, Case C-307/99 Omega Air, ratified by the Member States but not by the Community cited in footnote 26, paragraph 94, and Case C-76/00 P itself (judgment of 16 January 2003 in Case C-439/01 Petrotub, cited in footnote 34, paragraph 54. Libor Cipra [2003] ECR I-745, paragraph 24).
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whether the relationship between Commu- nity law. Until the Treaty of Nice entered nity law and international law is to be into force, even an action for annulment understood in a monist sense. On the brought by the European Parliament was contrary, the mere fact that international admissible only if the purpose of the action treaty law is classified as Community law is was to protect its prerogatives and not sufficient to establish the Court's jurisdic- 'merely' to challenge an infringement of a tion to interpret and apply the provisions of Treaty provision; see the third paragraph of international agreements. 3 7 Article 230 EC in the version contained in the Treaty of Amsterdam. The Parliament could not, for example, bring an action for annulment on the ground that an act of the Commission or of the Council was in breach of the prohibition on discrimination contained in Article 12 EC, although that 49. A distinction must however be made provision undoubtedly forms part of Com- between the question whether a provision munity law. forms part of Community law and the question whether individuals may challenge an infringement of that provision. The possibility of bringing an action for infringement depends on two conditions. As to formal scope, the action must be admissible and as to material scope, the provision at issue must be directly appli- cable. 51. In addition to this requirement as to admissibility, there is a further requirement as to material scope: the provision on which an individual relies must be directly applicable. The Court has recognised that some provisions of the EC Treaty are directly a p p l i c a b l e . For e x a m p l e 50. In the case of many Treaty provisions, Articles 25, 38 49, 3 9 90 40 and 141 EC. 41 individuals or institutions may not chal- But many others are not, for example lenge possible infringements by the Com- Article 293 E C . 4 2 All these provisions munity legislature. Under the fourth para- indubitably form part of Community pri- graph of Article 230 EC, a natural or legal mary law. Nevertheless, natural or legal person may institute proceedings only if the persons may bring an action for infringe- contested act is of direct and individual ment of those provisions only in the context concern to it. An individual cannot, for of questions raised in an incidental manner example, bring an action in the abstract for under Article 241 EC. infringement of the limits set in a provision defining powers such as Article 95 EC, even though that provision is part of Commu- 38 — Judgment in Case 26/62 Van Gernd & Loos [1963] LCR 1, 16. 39 — Judgment in Case C-224/97 Ciola [1999] LCR I-2517, paragraph 27. 37 — Judgments in Case 181/73 Haegeman, cited in footnote 36, 40 — Judgment m Case C-159/89 Commission v Greece [1991] paragraphs 2 to 6, Case C-53/96 Hermes International LCR I-691, paragraph 6. [1998] LCR I-3603, paragraph 29, Joined Cases C-300/98 41 — Judgment in Case 43/75 Defrenne II [1976] LCR 455, and C-392/98 Parfums Christian Dior [2000] LCR paragraphs 21 to 24. I-11307, paragraph 40, and Case C-439/01 Libor Cipra, 42 — Judgment in Case C-136/96 Gilly [1998] LCR I-2793, cited in footnote 36, paragraph 26. paragraph 17.
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52. It is clear from these rulings that the nity intended to implement a particular question whether or not WTO law forms obligation assumed in the context of the part of Community law has no bearing on WTO or where the Community measure the question whether individuals may chal- refers expressly to the precise provisions of lenge an infringement of that law. It the WTO agreements. 43 follows that the case-law on WTO law and the fact that individuals may not rely on it to challenge acts of Community secondary legislation is based not on a mistake as to the effects of Article 300(7) EC but on the system of rules on the admissibility and validity of actions against acts of secondary legislation of the Com- 55. As far as I know, the Court has so far munity institutions. The appellant's first allowed an individual to rely on provisions plea must accordingly be rejected. of GATT or WTO law to challenge the legality of Community acts in only three cases.
56. In Fediol, the issue was the legality of a (b) Exceptions decision rejecting Fediol's application under Article 3 of Regulation (EEC) No 2641/84 44for the adoption of appro- priate commercial policy measures to deal with illicit commercial practices on the part of Argentina (charges on exports of soya 53. Biret et Cie also claims, that in acceding products and quantitative restrictions on to the WTO dispute settlement system, the the exportation of soya beans). Fediol Community undertook to recognise the claimed that these practices were contrary DSB's decisions. The present case con- to Articles III, XI, XX and XXIII of GATT. sequently concerns the implementation of a particular obligation assumed in the context of the WTO.
57. The Commission maintained that the application was inadmissible on the ground
54. The Court has admitted two exceptions to the rule that WTO agreements are not 43 — Judgment in Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council, cited in footnote 29, paragraph 49. directly applicable. The Court may review 44 — Council Regulation (EEC) No 2641/84 of 17 September the legality of Community measures in the 1984 on the strengthening of the common commercial policy with regard in particular to protection against illicit light of the WTO rules where the Commu- commercial practices, OJ 1984 L 252, p. 1.
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that the GATT rules are not sufficiently association not having legal personality, precise to give rise to such rights on the part acting on behalf of a Community industry of individuals. The Court did not agree which considers that it has suffered injury with that view. The Court has certainly as a result of illicit commercial practices, held, on several occasions, that various may lodge a written complaint'. Illicit GATT provisions were not capable of commercial practices for the purposes of conferring on citizens of the Community that provision are defined in Article 2(1) of rights which they can invoke before the the regulation as 'any international trade courts. Nevertheless, it cannot be inferred practices... which are incompatible with from those judgments that citizens may not, international law or with the generally in proceedings before the Court, rely on the accepted rules' (my emphasis). That judg- provisions of GATT in order to obtain a ment is consequently an example of the ruling on whether conduct criticised in a second type of exception (express reference complaint lodged under Article 3 of Regu- to the precise provisions of the W T O lation No 2641/84 constitutes an illicit agreements). commercial practice within the meaning of that regulation. The GATT provisions form part of the rules of international law to which Article 2(1) of that regulation refers, as is borne out by the second and fourth recitals in its p r e a m b l e , read together. 45 It follows, according to the Court, that, since Regulation No 2641/84 entitles the economic agents concerned to rely on the GATT provisions in the com- plaint which they lodge with the Commis- sion in order to establish the illicit nature of 59. An example of the first type of excep- the commercial practices which they con- tion (intention to implement a particular sider to have harmed them, those same obligation assumed in the context of the economic agents are entitled to request the WTO) is afforded by the judgment in Court to exercise its powers of review over Nakajwia. 47 In that case, the issue was the legality of the Commission's decision the legality of a regulation imposing an applying those provisions. 46 anti-dumping duty. The proceeding was initiated at the request of the Committee of European Printer Manufacturers (Euro- print) on the basis of Regulation (EEC) No 2176/84. 48Nakajima claimed inter alia that Regulation (EEC) N o 2423/88, 4 9 which replaced the contested regulation, was at variance with a number of the 58. The Court's ruling was based on the authorisation contained in Article 3(1) of Regulation N o 2 6 4 1 / 8 4 , according to 4 7 — Judgment in Case C-69/89 Nakajima v Council [1991] which 'any natural or legal person, or any ECR I-2069. 48 — Council Regulation (EEC) No 2176/84 of 23 July 1984 on protection against dumped or subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Economic Com- munity, OJ 1984 1. 201, p. 1. 45 — Judgment in Case 70/87 Fediol v Commission [1989] ECR 49 — Council Regulation (EEC) No 242.1/88 of 11 July 1988 on 1781. paragraph 19. protection against dumped or subsidised imports from 46 — Judgment in Case 70/87 Fediol, cited in footnote 45, countries not members of the European Economic Com- paragraph 22. munity, OJ 1988 I. 209, p. 1.
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provisions in the GATT Anti-Dumping Community law as far as possible the new Code. The Council considered that claim and detailed rules contained in the WTO to be inadmissible because, as is the case Anti-Dumping Code. It followed that the with the General Agreement, the Anti- Community adopted those regulations and Dumping Code does not confer on individ- in particular Article 2(11) in order to uals rights which may be relied on before satisfy its obligations arising from the Anti- the Court, its provisions being not directly Dumping Code and in particular from applicable. 50 Article 2.4.2 of that code. It was therefore for the Court to review the legality of the contested regulation imposing anti-dump- ing duties in the light of Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Code. 53 This too is an example of the first type of exception (intention to implement a particular obli- 60. The Court rejected that view. It pointed gation assumed in the context of the out, first, that Nakajima was not relying on WTO). the direct effect of the provisions of the GATT Anti-Dumping Code. It was in fact questioning, in an incidental manner under Article 241 EC, the applicability of Regu- lation No 2423/88. Citing the judgment in Kupferberg, 51 the Court added that Regu- lation No 2423/88 had been adopted in order to comply with the international obligations of the Community under the General Agreement and the Anti-Dumping 62. The question is whether in the present Code. It was therefore incumbent on the case there was an intention to implement a Community to ensure compliance with the particular obligation assumed in the con- obligations arising from such agree- text of the WTO or an express reference to ments. 52 the precise provisions of the WTO agree- ments.
61. Again in connection with an action for the annulment of a regulation imposing definitive anti-dumping duties, the Court held in Case C-76/00 P Petrotub and 63. The Court of First Instance considered Republica v Council that the purpose of that the present case did not constitute an Regulation No 384/96 as amended by exception. It held that, since Directives Regulation No 2331/96 is to transpose into 81/602 and 88/146 were adopted several years before the entry into force of the SPS Agreement on 1 January 1995, it is not 50 — Judgment in Case C-69/89 Nakajima, cited in footnote 47, paragraph 27. 51 — Cited in footnote 17. 52 — Judgment in Case C-69/89 Nakajima, cited in footnote 47, 53 — Judgment in Case C-76/00 P Petrotub, cited in footnote paragraphs 28 to 31. 34, paragraph 55 et seq.
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logically possible for them either to give will stand re-examination. The Court of rise to a specific obligation entered into First Instance pointed out in paragraph 14 under that agreement or to refer expressly of the contested judgment that the Com- to some of its provisions. 5 4 munity had informed the WTO that it intended to comply with its WTO obli- gations but that it needed a reasonable time to do so. It was then granted a period of 15 months, expiring on 13 May 1999, to comply with its obligations under the SPS 64. The Court of First Instance also found Agreement. in the contested judgment, with reference to the judgment in Atlanta, 55 that the decision of the DSB of 13 February 1998 did not mean that Biret could rely on an infringement of the SPS Agreement. It held that there is an inescapable and direct link 67. It remains to be seen how far that between the decision and the plea alleging statement by the Community, in this infringement of the SPS Agreement, and the instance the Commission, can be regarded decision could therefore only be taken into as a Community measure intended to consideration if the Court had found that implement a particular obligation assumed agreement to have direct effect in the in the context of the W T O (the first type of context of a plea alleging the invalidity of exception). the directives in question. 5 6
68. The first objection to such an inter- 65. The point about the respective dates on pretation is that the statement in question which Directives 81/602 and 88/146 and was made in the context of international the SPS Agreement were adopted must be law. It was made to the WTO. A statement accepted. The Court of First Instance held to the W T O cannot produce legal effects that Directive 96/22 had no bearing on the within the Community that are comparable case as, in its view, a claim for damages with the regulations at issue in Nakajima could in any case only be considered for the and Petrotub, transposing the Anti-Dump- period prior to 7 December 1995. ing Code into Community law.
66. However, the question arises whether the legal assessment of the DSB decision 69. Moreover, it is not clear that this statement to the W T O by the Community's executive body was intended to have any 54 — Paragraph 74 of the contested judgment, cited in foot- legal consequences within the Community. note 3. The DSB recommendations of 13 February 55 — Cited in footnote 16. 1998 are to be transposed into Community 56 — Paragraph 76 et seq. of the contested judgment cited in footnote 3. law by the adoption of the Commission
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proposal of 24 May 2000 for a directive in the context of a plea alleging the amending Directive 96/22. This is con- invalidity of the directives in question. 58 firmed in the second recital in the preamble to the proposal. 57 It cannot therefore be accepted that the statement by the Com- munity to the WTO was intended to trans- pose a WTO obligation into Community law. Consequently, neither of the excep- tions recognised in the case-law applies in 71. It remains to be seen what legal sig- the present case. nificance DSB decisions have in Commu- nity law and in particular whether they imply that WTO law is directly applicable in the sense that individuals may rely on the findings of the DSB to support a claim for damages.
(c) The direct applicability of WTO law resulting from DSB recommendations 72. For the sake of clarity, it must be observed once again that the Court has not so far ruled on this point of law. In Portugal v Commission there was no DSB recommendation or decision to be taken into account. In Atlanta, the appellant 70. Biret et Cie argues that, in acceding to referred for the first time in its reply to a the WTO dispute settlement system, the DSB decision delivered in the interim. Its Community undertook to recognise the submission was consequently out of time DSB's decisions and recommendations. In and was held by the Court to be inadmiss- this connection, the Court of First Instance ible. found in the contested judgment that the decision of the DSB of 13 February 1998 did not mean that Biret et Cie could rely on an infringement of the SPS Agreement. It held that there is an inescapable and direct link between the decision and the plea alleging infringement of the SPS Agree- 73. The judgment in Atlanta is of interest ment, and the decision could therefore only inasmuch as the Court stated in that judg- be taken into consideration if the Court had ment that the appellant could have main- found that agreement to have direct effect tained its plea alleging the illegality of the Community regulation 'and adduced in particular the dispute settlement mech- 57 — Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and anism set up within the WTO in 1995 in the Council amending Council Directive 96/22/EC con- cerning the prohibition on the use in stockfarming of certain substances having a hormonal or thyrostatic action and of ß-agonists, COM(2000)320 final of 24 May 2000, in particular the second paragraph on p. 2 and the last 58 — Paragraph 76 et seq. of the contested judgment cited in paragraph on p. 3. footnote 3.
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support of its argument that the provisions of recognised authority with demonstrated of GATT were of direct effect'. 5 9 Thus the expertise (Article 17 of the DSU). This Court expressly mentioned in that judg- change gives a considerable legal twist to ment the possibility that an award of the the dispute settlement procedure under new dispute settlement mechanism may GATT 1947, which is more concerned alter the effect of W T O law in the Com- with commercial policy. 61 munity legal order.
(i) The Understanding on Rules and Pro- cedures Governing the Settlement of Dis- 75. It is true that, under the new mech- putes anism, a solution that is mutually accept- able to the parties to a dispute is clearly to be preferred (see the first sentence of Article 3(7) of the DSU), as the Court has already pointed out in Portugal v Coun- cil. 62 However, that applies only while the procedure before the panel or the Appellate 74. As the Court has already noted in the Body is still going on (see Article 5(5) of the judgment in Portugal v Council, the new DSU). An example of such an agreed W T O dispute settlement mechanism differs solution under Article 3(6) of the DSU significantly from the provisions of GATT being reached by the parties to a dispute 1947. 60 In the context of GATT 1947, after the commencement but before the panel decisions could be accepted only by conclusion of the dispute settlement pro- consensus of the parties to the agreement. cedure is the agreement between the EC The DSU agreed in 1994 reversed that rule and New Zealand on the importation of and now provides that decisions of the DSB butter. 63 The panel procedure was sus- must be accepted unless they are rejected by pended, the parties reached agreement, the consensus of the parties to the agreement EC amended its legislation and the dispute (see Article 17(14) of the DSU). The con- settlement procedure was concluded with- sensus required under GATT 1947 was out a DSB recommendation or ruling. replaced by the introduction of an interim However, once a DSB recommendation or review by the panel (Article 15 of the DSU) ruling has been adopted, it must be 'uncon- and the establishment of a standing Appel- late Body comprising independent persons 61 — Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The GATT/WTO Dispute Settle- ment System. International Law, International Orgam- sations and Dtsjntte Settlement, London — The I lagne — 59 — Judgment in Case C-104/76 P Atlanta, cited in footnote Boston 1997, p. 188. 16, paragraph 21. 62 —Judgment in Case C-149/96 Portugal v Counial, cited in 60 — Judgment in Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council, cited m footnote 29, paragraph 36. footnote 29, paragraph 36. 63 — WT/DS72/7 of 18 November 1999.
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ditionally' accepted (Article 17(14) of the set at 15 months in an arbitration pro- DSU). The parties are no longer free to cedure initiated at the Community's reach a settlement and may only agree on request. 65 The period expired on 13 May the period of time within which to comply 1999. The period granted for compliance is with the DSB ruling (Article 21(3)(b) of the in keeping with Article 21(3)(c) of the DSU DSU) or the terms of a mutually satisfac- which provides that the period must not tory solution (Article 22(8) of the DSU). normally exceed 15 months. The new Mutually agreed solutions must be con- dispute settlement mechanism is binding sistent with the W T O agreements on the parties to the agreement and claims (Article 3(5) of the DSU). exclusive jurisdiction (Article 23(1) of the DSU).
76. According to the DSU, 'prompt' com- pliance with recommendations or rulings of the DSB is 'essential' to ensure effective resolution of disputes (Article 21(1) of the DSU). If it is impracticable to comply 'immediately', 64 the Member concerned must have a 'reasonable period of time' in which to do so (Article 21(3) of the DSU). 78. As already mentioned, DSB recommen- The period is to be proposed by the dations and rulings must be 'uncondition- Member in question and approved by the ally' accepted by the parties (Article 17(14) DSB. Or it may where appropriate be of the DSU). Should they fail to do so mutually agreed by the parties to the within the 'reasonable period of time', dispute. If neither course produces a result, compensation and the suspension of con- the period is to be determined through cessions are available. These are described 'binding' arbitration (Article 21(3) of the in the DSU as 'temporary measures' DSU). (Article 22(1) of the DSU). They are to be resorted to only as a temporary measure pending the withdrawal of the measure which is inconsistent with WTO law (Article 3(7) of the DSU). Neither com- pensation nor suspension of concessions, described as a 'last resort' (see the fifth sentence of Article 3(7) of the DSU), is preferred to full implementation of a rec- 77. In the DSB procedure at issue in the ommendation to bring a measure into present case, the period for compliance was conformity with WTO law (Article 22(1) of the DSU). 64 — The German version of OJ 1994 L 336 contains a translation error. The term 'impracticable' in the English version should have been rendered as 'nicht möglich', not 65 — See report of arbitration judge Julio Lacarte-Muró of 'möglich'. 29 May 1998, WT/DS26/15 and WT/DS48/13, point 2.
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7 9. C o m p e n s a t i o n is v o l u n t a r y is ultimately no alternative but to imple- (Article 22(1) of the DSU). Suspension of ment the recommendations or rulings of the concessions is subject to prior authorisation DSB. In particular, they cannot be circum- from the DSB (Articles 2(1) and 22(2) of vented by negotiation between the parties. the DSU). It may not therefore be imposed unilaterally, as it could be under GATT 1947.66 Furthermore, concessions may only be suspended until such time as the DSB recommendations or rulings are imple- mented or the Member provides a solution to the nullification or impairment of bene- fits or a mutually satisfactory solution is reached (Article 22(8) of the DSU). (ii) Reduction in the discretion enjoyed by the EC legislative and executive bodies
80. In any event, the DSB must continue to — Power to agree a waiver keep under surveillance the implementation of adopted recommendations or rulings (Article 22(8) of the DSU). This means that, even where compensation has been paid or concessions have been suspended, there is still a duty to comply with the DSB recommendations or rulings. Payment of 82. One argument against recognising the compensation or acceptance of the suspen- direct applicability of WTO provisions is sion of concessions do not therefore con- that WTO Members are accorded some stitute a waiver, conferring exemption from discretion in complying with DSB recom- the duty to fulfil the obligations assumed mendations and rulings. In particular, it is under the WTO agreements. suggested that they may pay compensation or accept the suspension of concessions ('penalties', as it were, imposed by the other Members) instead of withdrawing a measure adopted for the purpose of health and consumer protection. To recognise the direct applicability of WTO rules would reduce the discretion enjoyed by the Com- munity's legislative and executive bodies. 67 The Council expressly referred during the 81. In the light of the foregoing findings as hearing to the possibility of negotiating a to the structure of the dispute settlement waiver. procedure, it must be concluded that there
67 —Judgment in Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council cited in 66 — Petersmann, cited in footnote 6 1 , p. 182. footnote 29, paragraphs 39 to 4 1 .
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83. However — as explained above — the DSU). A waiver agreed between the the option, available under Article XXIII parties to a dispute would not meet these of GATT 1947, of accepting counter- requirements inasmuch as it would grant measures as the price for maintaining exemption from the obligations incurred measures that are inconsistent with W T O under the W T O agreements. law is precluded under the new dispute settlement mechanism. Once a DSB recom- mendation or ruling has been adopted, the parties to the W T O Agreement no longer have any discretion as to whether to comply with it. They must do so 'uncon- ditionally' and 'immediately'. Ultimately, a Member cannot decline to fulfil its obli- 85. The only waiver recognised under gations under the W T O agreements. W T O law is that granted under Article XXV(5) of GATT 1947 which has very rarely been invoked. Pursuant to point 1(a) of GATT 1994, GATT 1947 forms part of that agreement and consequently also of W T O law. The waiver in question, under the heading of joint action by the con- tracting parties, must be approved by a double majority (more than half the con- tracting parties and a two thirds majority of the votes cast). An agreement between two parties to a dispute does not meet that requirement. N o r has a waiver within the meaning of Article XXV GATT 1947 been approved in the dispute settlement pro- cedure at issue in the present case. How- ever, according to the judgment in Kupfer- berg, 68 the mere fact that a waiver may be granted does not exclude the direct appli- 84. Contrary to the assertions made by the cation of W T O rules. 69 Council representative at the hearing, even a waiver is ruled out. In the DSU dispute settlement procedure, the parties to a dis- pute may no longer agree a waiver, that is to say exemption from the obligations incurred under the W T O agreements. In the first place, the temporary suspension of concessions ('penalty') requires prior auth- 86. Non-compliance with a DSB recom- orisation from the DSB (Article 22(2) of the mendation or ruling may be a commercial DSU) and can no longer be agreed by the policy option. However, it is clear from the parties to a dispute. In the second place, all agreements between the parties to a dis- pute, including 'a mutually satisfactory 68 — Judgment in Case 104/81 Kupferberg, cited in footnote 17, solution', must be consistent with the paragraph 20 et seq. W T O agreements (Article 3(5) to (7) of 69 — See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, 'GATT/WTO-Recht: Duplik', in EuZW 1997, p. 652.
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above account of the DSU that it is not a Treaty entered into force. Only with the lawful option. Consequently, under W T O introduction of Article 228(2) EC did it- law and in particular the Understanding on become possible for the first time to require Rules and Procedures Governing the Settle- Member States to make lump sum or ment of Disputes (DSU), the legislative and penalty payments for failure to comply executive bodies no longer have any dis- with decisions. The fact that DSB recom- cretion that could be reduced by recognis- mendations and rulings are unenforceable ing W T O law to be directly applicable. is consequently no reason for the Court to disregard them.
87. In my view, the answer to the question whether the Court should favour the com- mercial policy option, which — as it found in Portugal v Council — is in any event — Implementation of DSB recommen- only temporary, by counselling judicial dations self-restraint, or whether it should support the principle of legality by recognising that DSB recommendations and rulings are binding and that an individual may rely on them in an action for damages must be that it should support the principle of legality after the expiry of the reasonable 89. There may at most be a reduction in the period of time allowed to comply with the discretion enjoyed by the legislative and DSB recommendation or ruling. executive bodies when it comes to imple- menting DSB recommendations. It is appar- ent from paragraphs 12 and 13 of the contested judgment that the report adopted by the DSB on 13 February 1998 required the European Communities 'to bring the SPS measures found... to be inconsistent with the SPS Agreement into conformity with the obligations of the European Com- 88. Non-compliance with a DSB recom- munities under that Agreement'. The word- mendation or ruling is a commercial policy ing of that injunction means that a further option only because there is no means of legal act is required to implement the enforcing such recommendations or rul- recommendations. This interpretation is ings. They can only be supported by the confirmed by the fourth sentence of traditional retaliation measures (suspension Article 3(7) of the DSU according to which, of concessions). This is bound up with their in the absence of a mutually agreed sol- nature as instruments of international law. ution, the first objective of the dispute There is in principle no way of enforcing settlement mechanism is usually to secure international law. This was also true of the withdrawal of the measures concerned Community law before the Maastricht if these are found to be inconsistent with
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the provisions of any of the agreements ruling establishing the illegality of the covered by the DSU. According to the DSB Community legislation, with the result that ruling, Directive 96/22 should therefore WTO law will be deemed to be directly have been repealed. Directives 81/602 and applicable and the way will be opened for 88/146 had already been repealed by Biret et Cie to bring an action for damages. Directive 96/22. This is in line with Com- mission proposal COM(2000)320 of May 2000 for a directive amending Directive 96/22.
92. The Court has recognised freedom of trade 70 as a fundamental right or, as it is expressed in more recent judgments, free- dom to pursue an economic activity 71 as a general principle of Community law. It 90. Consequently, although it must in seems unfair to deny a citizen a right to principle be admitted that the DSB recom- claim damages where the Community legis- mendations adopted in February 1998 lature, by failing to act, maintains a state of required an act of Community legislation affairs that is contrary to WTO law more to be adopted subsequently, the question than four years after the expiry of the arises whether Biret et Cie may not even so period allowed to comply with the DSB be entitled to rely on the DSB ruling. That recommendations and continues unlaw- view is supported by the fact that the fully to reduce the citizen's fundamental period of time granted for bringing Com- rights. munity law into line with the obligations under the SPS Agreement expired long ago. At the Community's request, it was given 15 months to comply with the ruling. That period expired on 13 May 1999.
93. Recognising the direct applicability of WTO law as a basis for a claim for damages does not reduce the discretion of the legislative and executive bodies in deciding how to implement a DSB recom- mendation. How the Community estab- lishes the conformity of its measures with 91. More than four years have now passed since May 1999 without any change in the law, be it WTO law or Community law. 70—Judgment in Case 240/83 ADBHU [1985] ECR 531, The question therefore arises whether Biret paragraph 9. et Cie must accept this state of affairs 71 —Judgment in Case C-104/97 P Atlanta, cited in footnote 16, paragraph 47, and Order of the President of the Court without compensation or whether in these in Case C-317/00 P (R) 'Invest' Import und Export and Invest Commerce v Commission [2000] ECR I-9541, circumstances it may rely on a binding DSB paragraph 57.
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its obligations under the SPS Agreement is basis for a possible claim for monetary and remains a matter for the competent damages against the Community or the Community bodies. Thus, on the basis of competent Community bodies which have new scientific information or in the form of failed to implement the DSB recommen- temporary protective measures, the Com- dation or ruling within the period of time munity could well impose an import ban prescribed by the WTO. Recognition of the again, this time in conformity with the SPS direct applicability of WTO law embodied Agreement. The way opened by proposal in DSB recommendations or rulings does COM(2000)320 remains open even if the not therefore mean that meat treated with SPS Agreement is held to be directly hormones can be imported into the Com- applicable on the basis of the DSB recom- munity. mendation of 13 February 1998. Recogni- tion of the direct applicability of WTO law embodied in a DSB ruling does not mean that an individual has a right to require the Community bodies to take a particular course of action. Biret et Cie is merely entitled to seek monetary compensation from the Community provided that the other conditions are met.
95. It must consequently be concluded that the Court will not reduce the discretion enjoyed by the legislative and executive bodies of the Community in implementing DSB recommendations if, in the case at issue, it holds that WTO law should apply after the expiry of the period of time allowed to comply with the DSB recom- mendations of 13 February 1998.
94. According to the case-law, the end of an action for damages is not the abolition of a particular measure but compensation for damage caused by a Community insti- tution. 72 The recognition that WTO law has direct effect does not therefore open the way for Biret et Cie to demand a particular form of conduct on the part of the Com- munity. Thus, Biret et Cie cannot call for the ban on the importation of meat treated 96. In the light of these findings, it must with hormones to be lifted, thereby ending therefore be concluded that recognition of the Community legislature's task of health the direct applicability of WTO law as the and consumer protection. The issue is the basis for a possible claim for damages is not invalidated on the ground that it might- reduce the discretion enjoyed by the legis- 72—Judgment in Case 5/71 Schöppenstedt v Council [1971] lative and executive bodies of the Commu- ECU 975, paragraph 3. nity.
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(iii) The principle of reciprocity 99. Such unilateral restrictions on the legal effects of an international agreement are effective only within the limits of inter- national law. They are governed, in par- ticular, by the rules of international cus- tomary law on reservations laid down in Articles 19 to 23 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (hereinafter the 97. Another argument against recognising 'VCLT'). As the reservation contained in the direct applicability of WTO law is that Decision 94/800 has not been formulated in it would be contrary to the principle of writing by the Community and communi- reciprocity, which is a strong feature of cated to its WTO trading partners, the first WTO relations. It is argued that the WTO condition required by international law for rules would acquire an effect not accorded this restriction to be effective (Article 23(1) to them in the legal orders of the Commu- of the VCLT) has not been met. 75 nity's trading partners. This would con- siderably weaken the Community's negoti- ating position in the WTO. 73
100. The reservation contained in Decision 94/800 is open to objection even under Community law. The Court is required 98. Proponents of this argument are think- under Article 220 EC to ensure that the law ing primarily of the United States of is observed in the interpretation and appli- America. The US legislation on the imple- cation of the Treaty. Moreover, the WTO mentation of the WTO agreements pre- agreements are binding on the Court, as on cludes any claim by a private person all the other institutions of the Community, against the American authorities. 74 Simi- under Article 300(7) EC. The scope of these larly, the Community legislature too sought rules of primary legislation cannot be to limit the legal effects of implementing reduced by an act of secondary legislation WTO law within the Community. The in the form of a Council decision. 11th recital in the preamble to Decision 94/800 states that '... by its nature, the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation, including the Annexes thereto, is not susceptible to being directly invoked in Community or Member State courts.' 101. It is true that the Court, in its case-law 73 — Judgment in Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council, cited in on GATT and WTO law has repeatedly footnote 29, paragraphs 43 and 45. 74 — See paper by Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, 'The Dispute Settlement System of the World Trade Organization and the Evolution of the GATT Dispute Settlement System 75 — See also Advocate General Saggio's remarks in his Opinion since 1948', in CMLR 1994, pp. 1157, 1243. in Case C-149/96, cited in footnote 15, point 20 et seq.
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observed that these agreements are based agree as to the continued existence of rules on the principle of reciprocity. 76 However, that are contrary to W T O law. How- it ruled in its judgment in Kupferberg that ever — as already explained — that is the fact that the courts of one of the parties not the case. consider that certain of the stipulations in the agreement are directly applicable is not of itself such as to constitute a lack of reciprocity between the parties. 77 Advocate General Gulmann expressed the same view in Case C-280/93 Germany v Council. 78
103. The Court applies the principle of legality only in so far as it recognises that the DSB recommendation of 13 February 1998 has legal effect within the Commu- nity after the period of time allowed for implementation expired on 13 May 1999 inasmuch as citizens of the Community may rely on the Community's conduct in breach of W T O law as a basis for a claim for damages.
102. It should also be pointed out that reciprocity is really a commercial policy issue, decked out in the legal trappings of a 'principle of reciprocity'. There appears to be considerable doubt as to whether the Community's trading position might be weakened at all by recognising the direct (iv) Comparison with situations within the applicability of W T O law as a basis for a Community claim for damages. If the Community has infringed W T O rules, it is — as already explained — required to comply with any DSB r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s or rulings. If another Member has infringed W T O rules, the Community may initiate a dispute 104. Recognition that conduct contrary to settlement procedure and demand that it W T O law on the part of Community comply with the DSB ruling. The possibility bodies may establish the basis for a claim of negotiation arises only where it is to damages arising from non-contractual assumed that the parties to the dispute liability is consistent with the Court's case- law on comparable situations within the Community. This applies both to the case- 76 — See, for example, the judgment i n Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council, cited in footnote 29, paragraphs 42 to 46. law on the significance of actions for 77 — Judgment in Kupferberg, cited in footnote 17, paragraph infringement of the Treaty and to Member 18. States' liability for failure to implement 78 — Opinion in Case C-280/93 Germany v Council, cited in footnote 24, point 142. directives within the prescribed period.
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— Actions for infringement of the Treaty Community in the event of failure to implement directives serves to ensure that Member States comply with Community law and implement directives within the prescribed time-limit. Attention is drawn to 105. In the context of penalising conduct the judgments in Francovich 81 and Dillen- contrary to the Treaty on the part of kofer 82 in this connection. A Member State Member States, the Court regards recogni- ought not to profit from the fact that it is in tion of a citizen's claim for damages against default and the citizen ought not to be the defaulting Member State as an appro- obliged to suffer as a result of the unlawful priate means of applying the principle of conduct of the Member State. Here too, legality. Thus the Court found France to be establishing the basis of the Member State's in breach of the Treaty when it continued liability serves to exert pressure on the to prohibit the importation of certain beef defaulting Member State to bring the products from the United Kingdom after situation into line with the Treaty. the expiry of the Community export ban on British beef imposed to protect against BSE and the introduction of a date-based export scheme. 79 It is settled case-law that there is an interest in pursuing actions for infringe- ment of the Treaty in order to establish the basis of liability which a Member State may incur as a result of its default towards other Member States, the Community or private parties. 80 107. In the judgment in Francovich, the Court stated that the full effectiveness of Community rules would be impaired and the protection of the rights which they grant would be weakened if individuals were unable to obtain redress when their rights are infringed by a breach of Com- munity law for which a Member State can — Liability arising from failure to imple- be held responsible. 83 The possibility of ment directives obtaining redress from the Member State is particularly indispensable where the full effectiveness of Community rules is subject to prior action on the part of the State and where, consequently, in the absence of such 106. Similarly, the case-law on Member action, individuals cannot enforce before States' liability towards citizens of the 81 — Judgment in Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Others v Italy [1991] ECR I-5357. 79—Judgment in Case C-1/00 Commission v France [20011 82 — Judgment in Joined Cases C-178/94, C-179/94, C-188/94, ECR I-9989. C-189/94 and C-190/94 Erich Dillenkofer and Others v 80 — See, for example, judgments in Case C-361/88 Commis- Germany [1996] ECR I-4845. sion v Germany [1991] ECR I-2567, paragraph 31, Case 83 —Judgment in Francovich, cited in footnote 81, paragraph C-365/97 Commission v Italy [1999] ECR I-7773, para- 33. See also the judgment in Joined Cases C-46/93 and graph 45, and Case C-207/00 Commission v Italy [2001] C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame [1996] ECR ECR I-4571, paragraph 28 with further references. I-1029, paragraph 20.
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the national courts the rights conferred (v) The fundamental right of freedom to upon them by Community law. 84 pursue an economic activity
110. Lastly, from the point of view of Community law, another argument for recognising the direct effect of DSB recom- 108. This situation appears to be com- mendations and rulings after the expiry of parable with the situation in which Biret the period of time allowed to comply with et Cie finds itself. By binding DSB recom- them is the fundamental right of freedom to mendation of 13 February 1998, an act of pursue an economic activity. As already Community legislation was found to be explained, that fundamental right is inconsistent with WTO law. Its subsidiary unfairly reduced if a citizen is obliged to company, Biret International, is prevented accept without compensation the Commu- by the Community's failure to act from nity bodies' failure to implement the DSB importing meat treated with certain hor- ruling or recommendation for a period of mones into the Community. Its freedom to four years. pursue an economic activity is reduced.
111. This appears to be even less accept- able in that, as the contested judgment confirms, the Community has expressly 109. The Court helps to assert the principle assured the WTO that it is prepared to of legality in those cases by recognising the fulfil its obligations. There is thus not only direct applicability of provisions which a binding ruling or recommendation of the usually have no such effect. It is clear from DSB but also an act of a Community body the third paragraph of Article 249 EC that expressly referring to that ruling or recom- the provisions of directives do not in mendation. principle establish rights on which individ- uals may rely. Directives are only binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon the Member States to which they are addressed and do not as a rule establish rights for individuals. Similarly, in the circumstances described in this case, WTO law should be 112. It is true that the assurance in question recognised exceptionally as being directly was given in the context of international applicable and thereby opening the way to law and, as already explained, produces no a claim for damages. direct effects in the Community legal order. It must nevertheless be borne in mind that the Commission makes such statements to 84—Judgment in Francovich, cited in footnote 81, paragraph the WTO after first informing the compet- 34. ent Council committee of the outcome of
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the dispute settlement procedure. Both (vii) Interim conclusion Community bodies therefore acknowledge that Community law is contrary to W T O law and must accordingly be amended to comply with the DSB recommendations. If it is not amended within the prescribed period, that means that the Commission 114. It must consequently be concluded and the Council are going back on their that W T O law is directly applicable where own position. This is another argument for DSB recommendations or rulings have recognising the possibility of claiming found a Community measure to be incon- damages. sistent with W T O law and the Community has failed to implement the recommen- dations or rulings within the prescribed period.
(vi) Sufficiently precise rules 2. Infringement of a protective measure
113. Under the new W T O dispute settle- 115. As explained at the outset, it is not ment mechanism, DSB recommendations sufficient that the infringed measure be and rulings must be implemented 'uncon- directly applicable. It must also be intended ditionally' and 'immediately'. The parties to protect individuals. It is settled case-law to a dispute cannot escape their obligations that this is not so in the case of W T O law. under the W T O agreements by negotiating The purpose of the W T O agreements is to a waiver. In the light of this feature of the govern relations between W T O Members dispute settlement mechanism, it seems and they are not by their nature such as to reasonable to suppose that after a DSB establish rights of individuals. 8 6 r e c o m m e n d a t i o n or ruling has been adopted and the period of time allowed to comply with it has expired, there is an 'unconditional and sufficiently precise obli- gation' within the meaning of the case-law on directly applicable provisions of inter- national agreements. 8 5 116. The W T O agreements are primarily concerned with customs duties and inter- 85 —Judgments in Case 45/75 REWE v Hauptzollamt Landau [1976] ECR 181, paragraph 24, and Case C-76/91 Caves Neto Costa [1993] ECR I-117, paragraphs 7 and 9. 86 — See paragraph 72 of the contested judgment.
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national trade. However, it is clear from engaged in the trade in such goods. Restric- the judgment in Van Gend en Loos that tions on trade therefore affect the citizen's basic provisions on customs duties may be freedom to pursue an economic activity. directly applicable. In that judgment, the Court recognised that Article 12 of the EEC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 25 EC) was directly applicable. 87 That provi- sion imposes a general prohibition on customs duties on imports and exports 118. Moreover, the fact that a rule is and customs duties of a fiscal nature and intended to protect interests of a general it is addressed only to States, not to nature — in this case the liberalisation of citizens. In that respect it is entirely com- international trade through the WTO parable with the rules of WTO law and in agreements — does not preclude the possi- particular the rules of GATT 1947 and bility that it is also intended to protect GATT 1994. individual interests. In Kampffmeyer, the Court held, with regard to Regulation No 19 of the Council on the progressive establishment of a common organisation of the markets in grain, 88that the regulation was directed to ensuring appropriate sup- port for the agricultural markets of the Member States during the transitional period on the one hand and to allowing the progressive establishment of a single market by making possible the develop- ment of the free movement of goods within 117. Moreover, the WTO agreements also the Community on the other. The fact that guarantee freedom and prohibit discrimi- the interests the regulation was intended to nation. Regulations concerning trade affect protect are of a general nature did not the citizen's freedom to pursue an econ- prevent their including the interests of omic activity. Trade in States organised on individual undertakings which are engaged market economy principles is conducted in intra-Community trade. 89 Similarly, it primarily by private individuals. In par- must also be accepted that the rules on ticular, provisions on sanitary and phyto- liberalisation contained in the WTO agree- sanitary measures such as those contained in ments and the provisions of the SPS Agree- the SPS Agreement are of considerable ment in particular are intended to protect importance to citizens engaged in trade. It individuals. is apparent from the first recital in the preamble to the SPS Agreement and from Article 2(3) that the agreement is intended to prevent a disguised restriction on inter- national trade. Restrictions on trade through the adoption of sanitary and phytosanitary measures are in principle 119. Consequently the second condition likely to result in discrimination between for establishing a claim to damages is also domestic and imported goods and those 88 — OJ 1962 30. p. 933, not available in English. 89 — Judgment in Kampffmeyer, cited i n footnote 28, p. 262 et 87 — Judgment in Van Gend Loos, cited in footnote 38, p. 16. seq.
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met. The SPS Agreement is also intended to referred back to the Court of First Instance protect individual traders. for further examination in accordance with the first paragraph of Article 61 of the Statute of the Court of Justice.
3. Conclusion as to the illegality of the Council's conduct 122. It should merely be added in this connection that the existence of actual damage or a causal link cannot be excluded 120. In the light of the foregoing consider- on the ground that the importation of meat ations, it must be concluded that Articles 3 treated with hormones could have been and 5 of the SPS Agreement embodied in prohibited by measures consistent with the the DSB recommendations of 13 February W T O , particularly if further scientific evi- 1998 are directly applicable since those dence of the harmful effect of the sub- recommendations were not implemented stances had been produced or the import within the prescribed period which expired ban had been adopted as a preventive on 13 May 1999. It follows that Biret et Cie measure. Such an argument is suggested may rely on a rule that is intended to by the approach adopted in the Commis- protect it. Thus, contrary to the findings of sion proposal of 24 May 2000. The pro- the contested judgment, there is a serious hibition on one of the hormones in question infringement of the law. is based on new scientific information. As regards the five other hormones, the pro- visional prohibition applies until more scientific information is made available. 91
C — Damage and the causal link
123. Such an argument does not preclude 121. In the contested judgment, the Court actual damage or the existence of a causal of First Instance did not address the factual link. The new scientific information was aspects of a claim of liability, namely actual not yet available in the crucial period when damage and the existence of a causal link the illegality of the Community measure between the damage and the illegal conduct was established in February 1998. It was and also left open the question whether not even available when the period of time Biret et Cie has an interest in bringing granted to comply with the DSB recom- proceedings. 90 The case must therefore be
91 — See preamble to the Commission proposal, cited in foot- 90 — See paragraph 79 of the contested judgment. note 57, p. 2 in fine.
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mendations — which must in principle be D — Incorrect interpretation of Article 48 considered in a claim for damages — of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of expired in May 1999. Scientific infor- First Instance mation produced later to justify such a prohibition cannot diminish illegal conduct on the part of the Community. Otherwise, a claim for damages would always be precluded in cases where non-compliance 126. In the alternative only, the second with WTO law was attributed to a lack of plea remains to be considered briefly in scientific evidence. Scientific information is case the Court does not follow the course constantly increasing. suggested above. Biret et Cie contends that it raised the question of no-fault liability in its application and its submission should therefore not have been rejected as out of time.
124. As regards the provisional prohibition proposed in the case of the other five 127. The question whether this objection hormones, it should be pointed out that was raised in the application is a matter of this represents a change in the legal basis of fact which cannot be reviewed in the appeal the measure. The illegal measure referred to procedure. In view of the statement in the in the DSB ruling of February 1998 was not contested judgment that in its reply Biret et adopted as a temporary measure until the Cie requested the Court of First Instance to necessary scientific information became develop its case-law in the direction of a available. It seems unfair for the citizen to system of no-fault liability, 92 it is advisable be obliged to accept without compensation to refer to the judgment in Atlanta. In that a restriction of his fundamental right to judgment the Court held that a submission freedom to pursue an economic activity which changes the very basis on which the when the Community legislature proposed Community could be held liable, that is a new legal ground for its own conduct. from liability for an unlawful act to liability for a lawful act, must be regarded as constituting a new plea in law which is inadmissible. 93 Pursuant to Article 42(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court and Article 48(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance no new plea in law may be introduced in the course of the proceedings unless it is based on matters of law or of fact which come to light in the 125. It must consequently be concluded course of the procedure. that the contested judgment should be set aside and the case referred back to the Court of First Instance for further examin- 92 — Paragraph 80 of the contested judgment. 93 —Judgment in Case C-KM/97 P Atlanta, cited in footnote ation. 16, paragraph 27.
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VIII— Costs the Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs. Since the Council has been unsuccessful and Biret et Cie has 128. Under Article 118 in conjunction with applied for them, the Council must be Article 69(2) of the Rules of Procedure of ordered to pay the costs.
IX — Conclusion
129. In the light of the foregoing considerations it is proposed that the Court:
(1) Set aside the judgment delivered by the Court of First Instance on 11 January 2002 in Case T-210/00 Etablissements Biret et Cie v Council and refer the dispute back to the Court of First of Instance.
(2) Order the Council to bear the costs.
(3) Order the Commission to bear its own costs.
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